'Very Real' War Risk By December: Will U.S. Fight Global Conflict? | Trita Parsi
Summary
Geopolitical Tensions: The podcast discusses escalating tensions in the Middle East, particularly involving Israel, Yemen, and Iran, highlighting the potential for increased conflict and its implications for global economies.
Market Impact: Concerns are raised about the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical oil distribution channel, which could lead to significant disruptions in global oil supply and market volatility.
US Involvement: The role of the United States in potential conflicts is debated, with emphasis on the strategic decisions of the Trump administration and the implications of US military support for Israel.
Iran-Israel Conflict: The discussion includes Israel's strategic objectives in its conflict with Iran, including attempts to weaken Iran's military capabilities and the potential for a broader regional war.
Chinese and Russian Positions: The podcast explores the cautious stance of China and Russia regarding Middle Eastern conflicts, noting their strategic interests and reluctance to engage directly in military actions.
European Sanctions: The reimposition of sanctions on Iran by European powers is highlighted as a significant development, with potential diplomatic and economic consequences.
Future Outlook: The likelihood of further military actions by Israel before December is discussed, driven by geopolitical and political timelines, particularly in relation to US midterm elections.
Transcript
To what extent do you think Donald Trump is going to be involved in the next two years? That is the absolutely most critical question. The Chinese are going to play it very carefully. They have had tremendous discipline not getting themselves dragged in to conflicts in the Middle East. They want to trade with everyone. They want to have good relations with everyone. And they want to stay out of their fights. I wish the United States had much more of a policy that resembled that of the Chinese cuz we tend to do the opposite. we get ourselves unnecessarily involved in too many different things. Israel killed Yemen's Houthi prime minister and defense minister in air strikes uh earlier this week, escalating tensions in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Europeans have placed a snapback sanction against Iran, automatically restoring UN sanctions uh lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal. So we're talking about the escalating tensions in the Middle East. What this means for the entire region and for global economies. Trari joins us once more. He is the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute. He is an expert on Middle East geopolitics. Welcome back to the show, Trida. Good to see you. Thank you so much for having me. Let's start with uh the Israeli air strike on Yemen yesterday. This is from the Times of Israel. The prime minister of the Iranbacked Houthi group in Yemen was reportedly killed during Israel's air strikes on Thursday in the capital city of Sai. Yemen's aljira channel and the Aiden Algad newspaper reported that Houthi Prime Minister Akmed Al Rawi was killed in an Israeli attack on an apartment with the latter reporting that several of his companions were killed as well. What's your immediate reaction to the story and then we'll get into the uh broader ramifications. Well, the Israelis are continuing their strategy of trying to decapitate all kinds of movements or governments in the region that they believe are challenging Israel's domination um and uh uh role in the region. So, uh we see that that's what they did with Hezbollah. Uh we see that they tried to do that with Iran but failed. Uh and they are in the process of doing it with the Houthis. The hooded of course have been attacking Israel on a few occasions successfully with ballistic missiles which they say that they're doing in order to pressure Israel to stop what a majority of Americans now believe is a genocide in Gaza. Uh as well as as we know that they have been shooting at ships uh that have been trading with uh Israel as a way of putting a pressure on the Israelis to stop the attacks in Gaza. At least that's what they state is the purpose of their attack. So, we're seeing an escalation here. Uh, of course, these countries are far away from each other, so we're not talking about land troops or anything like that, but all of this can lead to a much larger confrontation, particularly if it uh leads to the Houthis and the Saudis beginning to shoot at at each other again. As you know, there's been a war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen for several years that was very, very devastating. So, we're speaking today on the 29th of August, Friday, the day after the attacks. What can we expect from the Houthis as an immediate retaliation if anything? I think uh the Houthi playbook is quite clear at this point. They have the ability to strike at Israel using ballistic missiles. They do not have the ability, at least not yet, to be able to shoot a large barrage of missiles. But some of the missiles that they have been shooting have managed to get through all layers of Israel's air defense systems. One of them hit uh right outside of Benuron airport which is quite concerning for the Israelis mindful of the fact that they have the most uh elaborate and extensive air defense system several different layers. Of course the US is paying for the uh most of it um uh but nevertheless it meant that a movement such as the Houthis had the capacity of breaking through. What about the uh closing of the street of Hormuse? It's uh something that analysts are concerned about. It's one of the major choke points uh in the world and one of the major distribution channels of oil in the world. If that street closes, we could be looking at major shocks to the oil supply globally. Absolutely. And this is a threat that constantly has been in the background, particularly in moments in which tensions between the United States and Iran have increased or moments where the US was trying to choke the Iranian economy and prevent its oil sales. The Iranians have made threats. They're their essentially their doctrine is either everyone can trade through the straight of Hormuz and and sell their oil or no one can. So if they're not allowed to do so, they will prevent everyone else from doing so as well. That is nevertheless uh what is considered to be a suicidal move because doing something like that would most likely automatically lead to a major confrontation between the US and Iran that would try to keep the straight open because of its significance to international trade. We saw some signs that during the 12-day war and particularly once the US got involved in that war that the Iranians were making some movements that could have led to uh closing the straits. That may have been a factor as to why uh Trump pushed to end the conflict after 12 days. Uh it's not entirely clear but that risk I think is very real because the risk of war is very real. If war is already happening, then the idea that straight closing the straight would be suicidal is is essentially moot because war is already happening. So um uh in some ways I'm a bit surprised to see that the markets have not uh factored in the significant risk as much as I think they should. Yeah, right now the uh oil price actually is down almost 1% uh the day after the strike. So no one at least in the oil market is expecting that particular outcome. So what is probably the most likely outcome going forward? Do you think the Houthis will collaborate or I not collaborate is the wrong word but uh uh do you think that there's going to be a coalition between the Houthis and uh other nations uh to uh retaliate or do you think the retaliation against Israel will be somewhat localized in nature? No, I I think what you're seeing here is that the strike by the Israelis obviously was an escalation in the sense of managing to take out some of their leadership and going for this type of a decapitation strategy which was not what the Saudis were doing. uh but nevertheless it is happening within the context in which the Houthis and the Israelis have been shooting at each other for some time and just last week there was another major attack by the Israelis uh on Yemen as well. So I think to a certain extent there is a perception that that will be kept under lid. It may flare up but it will not have this kind of spillover effect. The real risk of spillover is if the Israelis restart the war with Iran. And if that war becomes much bigger than it was last time, then then you can definitely see not only uh and further activation of the Saudi of the Israeli Yemeni um uh confrontation, but also between Lebanon and Israel uh between Iraqi militias and Israel and potentially between Iraqi militias and the US as well. uh that's not where I think people think the Yemen conflict in itself will go. But if we have a restart of the war with Iran, then that's a completely different ballgame. This leads to me uh this leads me rather to my next question about your piece that you wrote in foreign policy magazine, the next Israel Iran war is coming. Israel is likely to launch another war with Iran before December, perhaps even as early as late August. Uh you wrote this a few months ago. Uh actually, no, sorry, a few weeks ago. Early August. Uh Iran is expecting and preparing for the attack in the next round. However, Iran is likely to strike decisively from the outset, aiming to dispel any notion that it can be subdued under Israeli military military dominance. As a result, the coming war will likely be far bloodier than the first. Israel's June war was never solely about Iran's nuclear program. Rather, it was about shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. Tell us what's coming up next, Trida. So, I think the Israelis had three objectives with their uh war with Iran in June. The first one was to get the US into the war, which is something the Israelis had pushed for for more than 20 years, and they finally succeeded. They had hoped that, of course, Trump would go into the war for the long haul rather than just a one-off, but nevertheless, they managed to get that direct US Iran confrontation. The two other objectives, however, were not achieved. one uh the second one was to decapitate the regime and although they had significant success in the first 24 hours taking out a large number of uh military leaders, they never managed to disrupt the Iranian command and control for a long period of time and the Iranians starting to shoot back within 24 hours and and replaced all of those different military commanders. The third objective, which is the most important one, is to reduce Iran into another Lebanon or Syria, a country that Israel can bomb at will with impunity, but without any US involvement. That is something I think the Israelis did not believe that they were going to be able to achieve in the first round, and it probably will take several, but I think they believe that they would have been able to go further in the first round than they did. And this is again because of the fact that the Iranian missile strikes in Israel were far more affected than has been reported. Uh and occasionally you saw US officials actually making that clear including Donald Trump himself in the but because they have now started this effort to try to reduce Iran into another Syria. They cannot stop from their standpoint because if they give the Iranians too much time, the Iranians are going to rebuild their air defenses. is they're going to rebuild their stockpile of missiles and their deterrence will be restored and the Israeli would essentially be starting from scratch. So, they have to do something and I think the time frame before December is critical because after that you're entering the American um political season with the midterm elections and it's not a prohibitive thing but it will make things more complicated for the Israelis. This is why I think that this is quite likely to happen relatively soon. Uh, and in that context, if this happens, since the Iranians will do everything they can to dispel the Israelis, that that type of a strategy, which the Israelis call mowing the grass, is possible with Iran, I think this time around they will strike back hard right away instead of playing the long game. And that could mean the activation of other fronts such as Hezbollah, such as Iraqi, Middleas, and of course the Houthis. Let's just talk about objectives one and two uh before moving into a broader context here. Objective one, uh, get the US involved in a conflict. Okay. To what extent do you think Donald Trump is going to be involved in the next two years? That is the absolutely most critical question because if Trump decides not to be involved, the Israeli maneuverability is extremely limited. Um, the US can choose to be involved offensively or do what Trump has done in the past and what Biden did, which was to be involved defensively, which means that they were helping the Israelis shoot down Iranian missiles and drones. If the US chooses not to even do that, then the Israelis have no military option because they cannot take on Iran and they cannot defend themselves against the barrage of missiles that will be incoming without the support of the United States. In fact, the US had to put uh two THAD batteries in Israel in order to shoot down these missiles. And the US consumed 25% of its entire stockpile of THAAD interceptors will take the US 3 to 5 years to rebuild it. So there is despite the fact that Israel is a much more powerful military than Iran, there is a huge vulnerability on that front and the Iranians have a huge asset in their missile program. If the US then chooses to be involved defensively, the Israelis can attack, but they will take a lot of hits, what the Israelis really want is to bring the full force of America's military might into the war, cuz that would be a completely different proposition. But it would also mean that the Iranians would at that point start attacking US targets, bases, troops, perhaps even embassies, etc. And that would be a much much bigger word than what we saw. If I'm talking about the last part of your answer, the final uh part where we have a scenario where the US military is involved in full power, what even would be the justification for the American people for that kind of involvement, for that level of involvement? Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel, has repeatedly over the last many years cited that is Iran's nuclear program is a threat to all global stability. Critics have pointed out that he's been saying this for 20 years. So what would the Trump administration even use as rationale? So there frankly is no legitimate uh um rationale for this and there wasn't for the previous one either. The one that they used is something that really has no basis in reality which is that the Iranians were weeks away from having a nuclear weapon. This is what Trump is saying because he knows that he needs to have some sort of rationale. but it was never um uh verified by these US intelligence services or by the IAEA. So this is something that was done because the Israelis had the opportunity. The Iranians were in a weaker position because of the losses of Hezbollah because of their air defense systems not having been repaired since the October attack. Um and they wanted to do it before um uh the political climate in Washington changed. If Trump goes along with this again, he's going to have to do some uh political acrobatics. Now, of course, he's the master of doing that, but he will have to do so because he's claimed that he's already obliterated the Iranian nuclear program. So, if it's an obliterated, why does he have to step in again? Uh, moreover, what's the pretext for him? What is the threat to the United States? If the Israelis perceive a threat, that's one thing. But that is not a justification for the United States to enter into a war. Particularly not if your name is Donald Trump and you have made uh opposition to war in the Middle East, opposition to forever wars a very critical element of your platform. So I think it will be challenging for him. But at the same time, we should be under no illusion. He will be under tremendous pressure from the Israelis to join the war. And even if he doesn't do so at the outset, once the Israelis start taking massive hits, then the pressure will be overwhelming, not just from the Israelis, but from supporters of Israel and the United States. TRA, you say that the US was finally involved now, but haven't they already have hasn't the US military already been involved for several years now. You know, just as an example, in 2020, uh Trump in his first term ordered the assassination of uh General Kasam Salmani, an Iranian general near the Baghdad airport. So one could interpret all these events as just a series of escalations after that. One, one certainly can. But in that um um progression, one would have to recognize that as much as that is a major escalation and it almost led to a full-scale war that was an attack on an Iranian general, the most important one they had, but it was on Iraqi sword. What you saw here was actual American airplanes flying over Iranian airspace, bombing Iranian territory. that had not happened before. So that is a massive step up on the escalation ladder. Uh and again um a bit of a mystery and perhaps a miracle that it did not lead to a major war. And I think to a large extent there is because the Iranians don't want to have a major confrontation with the United States. However, if they're pushed into a corner and they have no choice but to have a confrontation with the United States, no choice but to fight back, then that is of course a very different scenario. Is it fair to say that uh both sides have shown restraint this summer post June? The Americans could have done more and certainly the Iranians could have retaliated harder. Yeah. No, I think both the United States and Iran have shown a tremendous amount of restraints. Um Trump less so than previous presidents. Uh but he's also been more willing to explore diplomacy than Biden was. Um but uh the Israelis not at all. And I think we see that constantly, whether it's in Syria, whether it's in Lebanon, whether it's in Yemen, whether it's in Gaza. I mean, it was just a blip in the news, but they also bombed the presidential palace in Damascus. Now, I'm not a fan in any way, shape, or form of the new guy in Damascus. I have huge um hesitations given his deep past in al-Qaeda, but uh he has bent over backwards to try to appease the Israelis, and the Israelis have nevertheless taken Syrian territory and then also attacked Syria. uh Damascus uh and striking his own palace. So I think we have in in Israel particularly after October 7th uh a very unhinged actor but the others are by and large showing restraints uh but that equation can change particularly if it it reaches some sort of a climax. So per your words uh Iran if Iran were to be forced to launch a full-scale war first of all before we talk about what that would look like under what condition would they feel forced to do so Truda I think if there's a competition between the Israelis and the Iranians even if it's a smaller one I suspect that the Iranian will strike back very hard because that's where they have the ability to dispel any notion in Israel that mowing the grass which what Israel is doing is in in Syria in Lebanon in the West bank is not something they can do with Iran. And that is crucial for them because they're not going to be able to um um have a political situation in Iran in which the Israelis are bombing Iran uh even the capital every four or 5 months. Um that is going to create massive problems internally. So that I think is an existential pers uh matter for them. When it comes to the US, I think the Iranians are going to do everything they can to avoid a fullblown confrontation with the US. um uh and go to full extent to try to avoid it. In fact, in many ways, they already have. They could have struck back much harder after they were uh their nuclear facilities were uh attacked, but they didn't. And they telegraphed it. It was all of these different things, very theatrical, aimed at showing that they were fighting back, but doing everything they can to avoid escalation. If, however, the United States enters the war fully on Israel's side, then I think all bets are off. I've heard the viewpoint that the US probably cannot win a war in Iran with Iran very easily if at all. Uh Iran is not Iraq. It's almost double the size of Iraq's population. Uh the region itself is very mountainous. Uh air strikes alone would not be sufficient to crumble. Iran's military and especially a lot of their uh underground bunkered assets. And so a land scale or sorry a land invasion at the scale at which is required would really hurt the US military. That's not something that Donald Trump wants to consider. Is that correct? Not only that, I think we have to recognize that Trump seems to have an infatuation with military strikes but absor and and in his mind there's a differentiation. In others people's minds perhaps there isn't. but something that is quick, timelmited, and enables him to be tough, enables him to show the massive superior military strength of the United States, he seems to be quite inclined, uh more so than previous presidents. But then going into a full-scale war with no clear path out, no clear exit, no clear objectives, uh doesn't know how it will end, will quickly lose control over events. He seems to be extremely cautious about going down that path, having learned the mistakes of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other examples. With Iran, it seems not possible to just do these strikes um and obtain significant political objectives. And on the other hand, as you correctly pointed out, if there's going to be a full-scale war, the US ultimately would probably win it, but it would come at such a high cost that it would absolutely not be worth it, and it would put the US in a very very vulnerable position uh geopolitically given all other types of challenges that it faces elsewhere, particularly in um uh in East Asia. on the second objective of Israel that you talked about earlier, the changing of the regime of Iran. Uh well, Trump has actually verbally, well, publicly said that he doesn't want that. I don't want it. I like to see everything calm down as quickly as possible. Uh Trump said to reporters Air Force One, this was way back in June, uh in regards to a possible regime change. Um, I've I've spoken to several Iranians actually and they they don't like the current regime. So I I don't know to what extent would a regime change actually be stabilizing for the region. What's your comment there? Well, first of all, we have no examples of a regime change uh operation being successful from the air. And with regime change, that means that you're not just taking out the previous regime, you are installing a different regime. This is what happened in Iraq, for instance, full-scale invasion and installing a different regime. I don't think Trump would at all go down the path of regime change. That is not, however, what the Israelis were seeking to do. It was not regime change. It was regime collapse. The difference meaning that you just take out the existing regime, but you're not involving yourself and you're not taking responsibility for what happens afterwards. In fact, you could be totally fine with there being massive chaos in the country that fers and consumes the nation's power. Um, and the Israelis certainly don't have the capability of going in with ground troops and installing a different regime. So, and I think Trump understands this and that's why he at one point said it would be too destabilizing because he knows that it wasn't really regime change. It was just regime collapse which for the region is tremendously destabilized. Okay. So there's no possibility of, let's say, a covert strike on Iranian leadership, leaving the country in chaos, and then immediately having the country itself just figure out who will be the next leader. Oh, that could certainly happen. Um, and that would be a regime collapse strategy, but the US or Israel wouldn't be directly uh involved or leading efforts to see what would come afterwards. And even if it may look easy, the bottom line is every time the US has done so, something has gone wrong and it's ends up backfiring. But the most likely scenario if that were to take place is that the elements that would take over the country are not some tree huggers and human rights defenders, but it is the most hardline elements in the Iranian IRGC, the revolutionary guards. They're the ones with the guns. They're the ones with the training. They're the ones that have shown the the the ability and the willingness to use it. So, in that type of a chaotic situation, it's not the Democrats and liberal-minded people that tend to win over uh win out. it is the people who have the guns. And that's exactly also what happened in the Iranian revolution 1979. That was a revolution that was led by the people with several different um coalitions and groups and many of them very secular. But once the chaos spread and it came down to who had the guns, it was not the liberals. It was not the Democrats that won out. To what extent would China and Russia be involved in the long protracted war if it were to happen? So I think the Chinese are going to play it very carefully. They have had tremendous discipline not getting themselves dragged in to conflicts in the Middle East. They want to trade with everyone. They want to have good relations with everyone. And they want to stay out of their fights. I wish the United States had much more of a policy that resembled that of the Chinese because we tend to do the opposite. We get ourselves unnecessarily involved in too many different things. But at some point, this can end up becoming quite costly for the Chinese as well. They're getting a lot of their oil uh from Iran at a massive discount because of the sanctions that the US has imposed on Iran. Um and of course they do not want to see a situation in which the tide in the region entirely turns against China in favor of the United States even though they don't want to actively fight anything like that on from the Russians. I think the bar is a little bit lower in the sense that not that they would directly get themselves involved but they will probably provide more military assistance. um and and trade with Iran. They already have agreements around those uh type of things. But what's most important for Russia ultimately is to rebuild this relationship with the United States, resolve the problem with Ukraine, and essentially go over the head of the Europeans. It's not going to sacrifice that for Iran. So basically, Iran is not a priority for neither China nor Iran. Sorry, I think Iran is Russia. Yeah, Iran is very strategically lonely. It does have uh some relations and some elements of support, but none of these countries are looking to join into a war with the United States on behalf of Iran. Well, let's take a look at uh this. This leads me to the next piece of news and the final uh piece of news we'll be covering today. Uh France, Germany, and the UK sent a letter Thursday morning to members of the UN Security Council announcing they are triggering the snapback mechanism to reimpose US sanctions on Iran, which have been suspended under the 2015 nuclear deal. Why it matters? In the letter, the three European powers emphasized that during the next 30 days before the sanctions take effect, they are open to negotiations with Iran on a nuclear agreement that could hold the process. I mean, isn't this basically just inviting Russia to protect Iran? It is escalatory. Um, I do not believe the Europeans believe themselves that this is going to help diplomacy. To push for diplomacy with this tight deadline when the two sides are so far away from each other, um, is not conducive to success. And I think they fully understand that. In fact, I think their calculation behind this is that Iran is no longer important for Europe. Years of sanctions have killed whatever trade existed. Europeans are not relying on Iranian oil any longer. They're not going to go back to Iranian oil. So Iran is not a relevant player for them. But Iran has emerged as an actual threat to Europe from the European standpoint because of its support for Russia and Ukraine. So there's a desire to punish Iran because of its support for Russia. And there's also a desire to see if they can align themselves with the more hawkish elements in the Trump administration and use by essentially aligning themselves on Iran and then use that in order to lessen tensions elsewhere in the transatlantic relationship which is of such importance to the Europeans. Um and for that sacrificing Iran or even getting an escalation with Iran is not any longer apparently a problem. And and again don't take it from me. Take it from what the German chancellor himself said when the Israelis started this war when he said Israel is doing Europe's dirty work for it. That was a direct endorsement of the Israelis using military force which is a 180 degree different position for the Germans than what they have had up until 2022 at least when they have stood very firmly and done quite a lot and and and I would commend them for a lot of the efforts they did to try to avoid a larger Middle East war. Okay. My final question before we go, Truda, you wrote uh in the uh foreign policy piece that Israel is likely to launch another war with Iran before December. We've already talked about that. Is that still your view before December? Is that still your timeline? And if so, what are some of the key de developments or potential events leading up to that that we should be watching for? I think the time frame up until December is the most likely one. And again, it's primarily driven uh by the political clock in Washington. Once you enter the midterm elections, I think it will just get a little bit too messy and more difficult for them to be able to get Trump on board. But between then and now, I think it will primarily be driven by Israel's own readiness uh in terms of having rebuilt its stockpile of interceptors, learned as much as possible from the previous war. whatever they are trying to do on the intelligence front because they did an intelligence coup in the beginning of the previous war. Can they um uh strike again in that uh sense or not? I think factors of that kind will make the determination when within this time frame it will happen. And and things such as snapback can potentially provide a political lubricant, but I don't think the Israelis need it. Uh and they they didn't need it last time either. They were actually pushing to have an attack back in February uh of this year and Trump said no to them at that time but then apparently said yes sometime towards the end of May. Excellent. Thank you very much for your analysis. Uh very timely update. Where can we follow you and learn more about you? You can go to Twitter on X. I'm at Tarsy. Uh and you can go to the Quincy Institute's website which is quincyst.org. Okay. We'll put the links down below. So, make sure to follow Trida and the Quincy Institute in the description links down there. Thank you very much, Trida. Thank you so much for having us summer. Thank you for watching. Thank you. Thank you. And thank you for watching. Don't forget to like and subscribe.
'Very Real' War Risk By December: Will U.S. Fight Global Conflict? | Trita Parsi
Summary
Transcript
To what extent do you think Donald Trump is going to be involved in the next two years? That is the absolutely most critical question. The Chinese are going to play it very carefully. They have had tremendous discipline not getting themselves dragged in to conflicts in the Middle East. They want to trade with everyone. They want to have good relations with everyone. And they want to stay out of their fights. I wish the United States had much more of a policy that resembled that of the Chinese cuz we tend to do the opposite. we get ourselves unnecessarily involved in too many different things. Israel killed Yemen's Houthi prime minister and defense minister in air strikes uh earlier this week, escalating tensions in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Europeans have placed a snapback sanction against Iran, automatically restoring UN sanctions uh lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal. So we're talking about the escalating tensions in the Middle East. What this means for the entire region and for global economies. Trari joins us once more. He is the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute. He is an expert on Middle East geopolitics. Welcome back to the show, Trida. Good to see you. Thank you so much for having me. Let's start with uh the Israeli air strike on Yemen yesterday. This is from the Times of Israel. The prime minister of the Iranbacked Houthi group in Yemen was reportedly killed during Israel's air strikes on Thursday in the capital city of Sai. Yemen's aljira channel and the Aiden Algad newspaper reported that Houthi Prime Minister Akmed Al Rawi was killed in an Israeli attack on an apartment with the latter reporting that several of his companions were killed as well. What's your immediate reaction to the story and then we'll get into the uh broader ramifications. Well, the Israelis are continuing their strategy of trying to decapitate all kinds of movements or governments in the region that they believe are challenging Israel's domination um and uh uh role in the region. So, uh we see that that's what they did with Hezbollah. Uh we see that they tried to do that with Iran but failed. Uh and they are in the process of doing it with the Houthis. The hooded of course have been attacking Israel on a few occasions successfully with ballistic missiles which they say that they're doing in order to pressure Israel to stop what a majority of Americans now believe is a genocide in Gaza. Uh as well as as we know that they have been shooting at ships uh that have been trading with uh Israel as a way of putting a pressure on the Israelis to stop the attacks in Gaza. At least that's what they state is the purpose of their attack. So, we're seeing an escalation here. Uh, of course, these countries are far away from each other, so we're not talking about land troops or anything like that, but all of this can lead to a much larger confrontation, particularly if it uh leads to the Houthis and the Saudis beginning to shoot at at each other again. As you know, there's been a war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen for several years that was very, very devastating. So, we're speaking today on the 29th of August, Friday, the day after the attacks. What can we expect from the Houthis as an immediate retaliation if anything? I think uh the Houthi playbook is quite clear at this point. They have the ability to strike at Israel using ballistic missiles. They do not have the ability, at least not yet, to be able to shoot a large barrage of missiles. But some of the missiles that they have been shooting have managed to get through all layers of Israel's air defense systems. One of them hit uh right outside of Benuron airport which is quite concerning for the Israelis mindful of the fact that they have the most uh elaborate and extensive air defense system several different layers. Of course the US is paying for the uh most of it um uh but nevertheless it meant that a movement such as the Houthis had the capacity of breaking through. What about the uh closing of the street of Hormuse? It's uh something that analysts are concerned about. It's one of the major choke points uh in the world and one of the major distribution channels of oil in the world. If that street closes, we could be looking at major shocks to the oil supply globally. Absolutely. And this is a threat that constantly has been in the background, particularly in moments in which tensions between the United States and Iran have increased or moments where the US was trying to choke the Iranian economy and prevent its oil sales. The Iranians have made threats. They're their essentially their doctrine is either everyone can trade through the straight of Hormuz and and sell their oil or no one can. So if they're not allowed to do so, they will prevent everyone else from doing so as well. That is nevertheless uh what is considered to be a suicidal move because doing something like that would most likely automatically lead to a major confrontation between the US and Iran that would try to keep the straight open because of its significance to international trade. We saw some signs that during the 12-day war and particularly once the US got involved in that war that the Iranians were making some movements that could have led to uh closing the straits. That may have been a factor as to why uh Trump pushed to end the conflict after 12 days. Uh it's not entirely clear but that risk I think is very real because the risk of war is very real. If war is already happening, then the idea that straight closing the straight would be suicidal is is essentially moot because war is already happening. So um uh in some ways I'm a bit surprised to see that the markets have not uh factored in the significant risk as much as I think they should. Yeah, right now the uh oil price actually is down almost 1% uh the day after the strike. So no one at least in the oil market is expecting that particular outcome. So what is probably the most likely outcome going forward? Do you think the Houthis will collaborate or I not collaborate is the wrong word but uh uh do you think that there's going to be a coalition between the Houthis and uh other nations uh to uh retaliate or do you think the retaliation against Israel will be somewhat localized in nature? No, I I think what you're seeing here is that the strike by the Israelis obviously was an escalation in the sense of managing to take out some of their leadership and going for this type of a decapitation strategy which was not what the Saudis were doing. uh but nevertheless it is happening within the context in which the Houthis and the Israelis have been shooting at each other for some time and just last week there was another major attack by the Israelis uh on Yemen as well. So I think to a certain extent there is a perception that that will be kept under lid. It may flare up but it will not have this kind of spillover effect. The real risk of spillover is if the Israelis restart the war with Iran. And if that war becomes much bigger than it was last time, then then you can definitely see not only uh and further activation of the Saudi of the Israeli Yemeni um uh confrontation, but also between Lebanon and Israel uh between Iraqi militias and Israel and potentially between Iraqi militias and the US as well. uh that's not where I think people think the Yemen conflict in itself will go. But if we have a restart of the war with Iran, then that's a completely different ballgame. This leads to me uh this leads me rather to my next question about your piece that you wrote in foreign policy magazine, the next Israel Iran war is coming. Israel is likely to launch another war with Iran before December, perhaps even as early as late August. Uh you wrote this a few months ago. Uh actually, no, sorry, a few weeks ago. Early August. Uh Iran is expecting and preparing for the attack in the next round. However, Iran is likely to strike decisively from the outset, aiming to dispel any notion that it can be subdued under Israeli military military dominance. As a result, the coming war will likely be far bloodier than the first. Israel's June war was never solely about Iran's nuclear program. Rather, it was about shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. Tell us what's coming up next, Trida. So, I think the Israelis had three objectives with their uh war with Iran in June. The first one was to get the US into the war, which is something the Israelis had pushed for for more than 20 years, and they finally succeeded. They had hoped that, of course, Trump would go into the war for the long haul rather than just a one-off, but nevertheless, they managed to get that direct US Iran confrontation. The two other objectives, however, were not achieved. one uh the second one was to decapitate the regime and although they had significant success in the first 24 hours taking out a large number of uh military leaders, they never managed to disrupt the Iranian command and control for a long period of time and the Iranians starting to shoot back within 24 hours and and replaced all of those different military commanders. The third objective, which is the most important one, is to reduce Iran into another Lebanon or Syria, a country that Israel can bomb at will with impunity, but without any US involvement. That is something I think the Israelis did not believe that they were going to be able to achieve in the first round, and it probably will take several, but I think they believe that they would have been able to go further in the first round than they did. And this is again because of the fact that the Iranian missile strikes in Israel were far more affected than has been reported. Uh and occasionally you saw US officials actually making that clear including Donald Trump himself in the but because they have now started this effort to try to reduce Iran into another Syria. They cannot stop from their standpoint because if they give the Iranians too much time, the Iranians are going to rebuild their air defenses. is they're going to rebuild their stockpile of missiles and their deterrence will be restored and the Israeli would essentially be starting from scratch. So, they have to do something and I think the time frame before December is critical because after that you're entering the American um political season with the midterm elections and it's not a prohibitive thing but it will make things more complicated for the Israelis. This is why I think that this is quite likely to happen relatively soon. Uh, and in that context, if this happens, since the Iranians will do everything they can to dispel the Israelis, that that type of a strategy, which the Israelis call mowing the grass, is possible with Iran, I think this time around they will strike back hard right away instead of playing the long game. And that could mean the activation of other fronts such as Hezbollah, such as Iraqi, Middleas, and of course the Houthis. Let's just talk about objectives one and two uh before moving into a broader context here. Objective one, uh, get the US involved in a conflict. Okay. To what extent do you think Donald Trump is going to be involved in the next two years? That is the absolutely most critical question because if Trump decides not to be involved, the Israeli maneuverability is extremely limited. Um, the US can choose to be involved offensively or do what Trump has done in the past and what Biden did, which was to be involved defensively, which means that they were helping the Israelis shoot down Iranian missiles and drones. If the US chooses not to even do that, then the Israelis have no military option because they cannot take on Iran and they cannot defend themselves against the barrage of missiles that will be incoming without the support of the United States. In fact, the US had to put uh two THAD batteries in Israel in order to shoot down these missiles. And the US consumed 25% of its entire stockpile of THAAD interceptors will take the US 3 to 5 years to rebuild it. So there is despite the fact that Israel is a much more powerful military than Iran, there is a huge vulnerability on that front and the Iranians have a huge asset in their missile program. If the US then chooses to be involved defensively, the Israelis can attack, but they will take a lot of hits, what the Israelis really want is to bring the full force of America's military might into the war, cuz that would be a completely different proposition. But it would also mean that the Iranians would at that point start attacking US targets, bases, troops, perhaps even embassies, etc. And that would be a much much bigger word than what we saw. If I'm talking about the last part of your answer, the final uh part where we have a scenario where the US military is involved in full power, what even would be the justification for the American people for that kind of involvement, for that level of involvement? Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel, has repeatedly over the last many years cited that is Iran's nuclear program is a threat to all global stability. Critics have pointed out that he's been saying this for 20 years. So what would the Trump administration even use as rationale? So there frankly is no legitimate uh um rationale for this and there wasn't for the previous one either. The one that they used is something that really has no basis in reality which is that the Iranians were weeks away from having a nuclear weapon. This is what Trump is saying because he knows that he needs to have some sort of rationale. but it was never um uh verified by these US intelligence services or by the IAEA. So this is something that was done because the Israelis had the opportunity. The Iranians were in a weaker position because of the losses of Hezbollah because of their air defense systems not having been repaired since the October attack. Um and they wanted to do it before um uh the political climate in Washington changed. If Trump goes along with this again, he's going to have to do some uh political acrobatics. Now, of course, he's the master of doing that, but he will have to do so because he's claimed that he's already obliterated the Iranian nuclear program. So, if it's an obliterated, why does he have to step in again? Uh, moreover, what's the pretext for him? What is the threat to the United States? If the Israelis perceive a threat, that's one thing. But that is not a justification for the United States to enter into a war. Particularly not if your name is Donald Trump and you have made uh opposition to war in the Middle East, opposition to forever wars a very critical element of your platform. So I think it will be challenging for him. But at the same time, we should be under no illusion. He will be under tremendous pressure from the Israelis to join the war. And even if he doesn't do so at the outset, once the Israelis start taking massive hits, then the pressure will be overwhelming, not just from the Israelis, but from supporters of Israel and the United States. TRA, you say that the US was finally involved now, but haven't they already have hasn't the US military already been involved for several years now. You know, just as an example, in 2020, uh Trump in his first term ordered the assassination of uh General Kasam Salmani, an Iranian general near the Baghdad airport. So one could interpret all these events as just a series of escalations after that. One, one certainly can. But in that um um progression, one would have to recognize that as much as that is a major escalation and it almost led to a full-scale war that was an attack on an Iranian general, the most important one they had, but it was on Iraqi sword. What you saw here was actual American airplanes flying over Iranian airspace, bombing Iranian territory. that had not happened before. So that is a massive step up on the escalation ladder. Uh and again um a bit of a mystery and perhaps a miracle that it did not lead to a major war. And I think to a large extent there is because the Iranians don't want to have a major confrontation with the United States. However, if they're pushed into a corner and they have no choice but to have a confrontation with the United States, no choice but to fight back, then that is of course a very different scenario. Is it fair to say that uh both sides have shown restraint this summer post June? The Americans could have done more and certainly the Iranians could have retaliated harder. Yeah. No, I think both the United States and Iran have shown a tremendous amount of restraints. Um Trump less so than previous presidents. Uh but he's also been more willing to explore diplomacy than Biden was. Um but uh the Israelis not at all. And I think we see that constantly, whether it's in Syria, whether it's in Lebanon, whether it's in Yemen, whether it's in Gaza. I mean, it was just a blip in the news, but they also bombed the presidential palace in Damascus. Now, I'm not a fan in any way, shape, or form of the new guy in Damascus. I have huge um hesitations given his deep past in al-Qaeda, but uh he has bent over backwards to try to appease the Israelis, and the Israelis have nevertheless taken Syrian territory and then also attacked Syria. uh Damascus uh and striking his own palace. So I think we have in in Israel particularly after October 7th uh a very unhinged actor but the others are by and large showing restraints uh but that equation can change particularly if it it reaches some sort of a climax. So per your words uh Iran if Iran were to be forced to launch a full-scale war first of all before we talk about what that would look like under what condition would they feel forced to do so Truda I think if there's a competition between the Israelis and the Iranians even if it's a smaller one I suspect that the Iranian will strike back very hard because that's where they have the ability to dispel any notion in Israel that mowing the grass which what Israel is doing is in in Syria in Lebanon in the West bank is not something they can do with Iran. And that is crucial for them because they're not going to be able to um um have a political situation in Iran in which the Israelis are bombing Iran uh even the capital every four or 5 months. Um that is going to create massive problems internally. So that I think is an existential pers uh matter for them. When it comes to the US, I think the Iranians are going to do everything they can to avoid a fullblown confrontation with the US. um uh and go to full extent to try to avoid it. In fact, in many ways, they already have. They could have struck back much harder after they were uh their nuclear facilities were uh attacked, but they didn't. And they telegraphed it. It was all of these different things, very theatrical, aimed at showing that they were fighting back, but doing everything they can to avoid escalation. If, however, the United States enters the war fully on Israel's side, then I think all bets are off. I've heard the viewpoint that the US probably cannot win a war in Iran with Iran very easily if at all. Uh Iran is not Iraq. It's almost double the size of Iraq's population. Uh the region itself is very mountainous. Uh air strikes alone would not be sufficient to crumble. Iran's military and especially a lot of their uh underground bunkered assets. And so a land scale or sorry a land invasion at the scale at which is required would really hurt the US military. That's not something that Donald Trump wants to consider. Is that correct? Not only that, I think we have to recognize that Trump seems to have an infatuation with military strikes but absor and and in his mind there's a differentiation. In others people's minds perhaps there isn't. but something that is quick, timelmited, and enables him to be tough, enables him to show the massive superior military strength of the United States, he seems to be quite inclined, uh more so than previous presidents. But then going into a full-scale war with no clear path out, no clear exit, no clear objectives, uh doesn't know how it will end, will quickly lose control over events. He seems to be extremely cautious about going down that path, having learned the mistakes of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other examples. With Iran, it seems not possible to just do these strikes um and obtain significant political objectives. And on the other hand, as you correctly pointed out, if there's going to be a full-scale war, the US ultimately would probably win it, but it would come at such a high cost that it would absolutely not be worth it, and it would put the US in a very very vulnerable position uh geopolitically given all other types of challenges that it faces elsewhere, particularly in um uh in East Asia. on the second objective of Israel that you talked about earlier, the changing of the regime of Iran. Uh well, Trump has actually verbally, well, publicly said that he doesn't want that. I don't want it. I like to see everything calm down as quickly as possible. Uh Trump said to reporters Air Force One, this was way back in June, uh in regards to a possible regime change. Um, I've I've spoken to several Iranians actually and they they don't like the current regime. So I I don't know to what extent would a regime change actually be stabilizing for the region. What's your comment there? Well, first of all, we have no examples of a regime change uh operation being successful from the air. And with regime change, that means that you're not just taking out the previous regime, you are installing a different regime. This is what happened in Iraq, for instance, full-scale invasion and installing a different regime. I don't think Trump would at all go down the path of regime change. That is not, however, what the Israelis were seeking to do. It was not regime change. It was regime collapse. The difference meaning that you just take out the existing regime, but you're not involving yourself and you're not taking responsibility for what happens afterwards. In fact, you could be totally fine with there being massive chaos in the country that fers and consumes the nation's power. Um, and the Israelis certainly don't have the capability of going in with ground troops and installing a different regime. So, and I think Trump understands this and that's why he at one point said it would be too destabilizing because he knows that it wasn't really regime change. It was just regime collapse which for the region is tremendously destabilized. Okay. So there's no possibility of, let's say, a covert strike on Iranian leadership, leaving the country in chaos, and then immediately having the country itself just figure out who will be the next leader. Oh, that could certainly happen. Um, and that would be a regime collapse strategy, but the US or Israel wouldn't be directly uh involved or leading efforts to see what would come afterwards. And even if it may look easy, the bottom line is every time the US has done so, something has gone wrong and it's ends up backfiring. But the most likely scenario if that were to take place is that the elements that would take over the country are not some tree huggers and human rights defenders, but it is the most hardline elements in the Iranian IRGC, the revolutionary guards. They're the ones with the guns. They're the ones with the training. They're the ones that have shown the the the ability and the willingness to use it. So, in that type of a chaotic situation, it's not the Democrats and liberal-minded people that tend to win over uh win out. it is the people who have the guns. And that's exactly also what happened in the Iranian revolution 1979. That was a revolution that was led by the people with several different um coalitions and groups and many of them very secular. But once the chaos spread and it came down to who had the guns, it was not the liberals. It was not the Democrats that won out. To what extent would China and Russia be involved in the long protracted war if it were to happen? So I think the Chinese are going to play it very carefully. They have had tremendous discipline not getting themselves dragged in to conflicts in the Middle East. They want to trade with everyone. They want to have good relations with everyone. And they want to stay out of their fights. I wish the United States had much more of a policy that resembled that of the Chinese because we tend to do the opposite. We get ourselves unnecessarily involved in too many different things. But at some point, this can end up becoming quite costly for the Chinese as well. They're getting a lot of their oil uh from Iran at a massive discount because of the sanctions that the US has imposed on Iran. Um and of course they do not want to see a situation in which the tide in the region entirely turns against China in favor of the United States even though they don't want to actively fight anything like that on from the Russians. I think the bar is a little bit lower in the sense that not that they would directly get themselves involved but they will probably provide more military assistance. um and and trade with Iran. They already have agreements around those uh type of things. But what's most important for Russia ultimately is to rebuild this relationship with the United States, resolve the problem with Ukraine, and essentially go over the head of the Europeans. It's not going to sacrifice that for Iran. So basically, Iran is not a priority for neither China nor Iran. Sorry, I think Iran is Russia. Yeah, Iran is very strategically lonely. It does have uh some relations and some elements of support, but none of these countries are looking to join into a war with the United States on behalf of Iran. Well, let's take a look at uh this. This leads me to the next piece of news and the final uh piece of news we'll be covering today. Uh France, Germany, and the UK sent a letter Thursday morning to members of the UN Security Council announcing they are triggering the snapback mechanism to reimpose US sanctions on Iran, which have been suspended under the 2015 nuclear deal. Why it matters? In the letter, the three European powers emphasized that during the next 30 days before the sanctions take effect, they are open to negotiations with Iran on a nuclear agreement that could hold the process. I mean, isn't this basically just inviting Russia to protect Iran? It is escalatory. Um, I do not believe the Europeans believe themselves that this is going to help diplomacy. To push for diplomacy with this tight deadline when the two sides are so far away from each other, um, is not conducive to success. And I think they fully understand that. In fact, I think their calculation behind this is that Iran is no longer important for Europe. Years of sanctions have killed whatever trade existed. Europeans are not relying on Iranian oil any longer. They're not going to go back to Iranian oil. So Iran is not a relevant player for them. But Iran has emerged as an actual threat to Europe from the European standpoint because of its support for Russia and Ukraine. So there's a desire to punish Iran because of its support for Russia. And there's also a desire to see if they can align themselves with the more hawkish elements in the Trump administration and use by essentially aligning themselves on Iran and then use that in order to lessen tensions elsewhere in the transatlantic relationship which is of such importance to the Europeans. Um and for that sacrificing Iran or even getting an escalation with Iran is not any longer apparently a problem. And and again don't take it from me. Take it from what the German chancellor himself said when the Israelis started this war when he said Israel is doing Europe's dirty work for it. That was a direct endorsement of the Israelis using military force which is a 180 degree different position for the Germans than what they have had up until 2022 at least when they have stood very firmly and done quite a lot and and and I would commend them for a lot of the efforts they did to try to avoid a larger Middle East war. Okay. My final question before we go, Truda, you wrote uh in the uh foreign policy piece that Israel is likely to launch another war with Iran before December. We've already talked about that. Is that still your view before December? Is that still your timeline? And if so, what are some of the key de developments or potential events leading up to that that we should be watching for? I think the time frame up until December is the most likely one. And again, it's primarily driven uh by the political clock in Washington. Once you enter the midterm elections, I think it will just get a little bit too messy and more difficult for them to be able to get Trump on board. But between then and now, I think it will primarily be driven by Israel's own readiness uh in terms of having rebuilt its stockpile of interceptors, learned as much as possible from the previous war. whatever they are trying to do on the intelligence front because they did an intelligence coup in the beginning of the previous war. Can they um uh strike again in that uh sense or not? I think factors of that kind will make the determination when within this time frame it will happen. And and things such as snapback can potentially provide a political lubricant, but I don't think the Israelis need it. Uh and they they didn't need it last time either. They were actually pushing to have an attack back in February uh of this year and Trump said no to them at that time but then apparently said yes sometime towards the end of May. Excellent. Thank you very much for your analysis. Uh very timely update. Where can we follow you and learn more about you? You can go to Twitter on X. I'm at Tarsy. Uh and you can go to the Quincy Institute's website which is quincyst.org. Okay. We'll put the links down below. So, make sure to follow Trida and the Quincy Institute in the description links down there. Thank you very much, Trida. Thank you so much for having us summer. Thank you for watching. Thank you. Thank you. And thank you for watching. Don't forget to like and subscribe.