SPECIAL REPORT: Is The US At Risk Of War With Iran? | Ryan Bohl, RANE

Summary

• Market Outlook: The guest expects a volatile but contained near-term environment, with limited U.S./Israeli strikes on Iran possible and larger operations requiring additional military buildup.
• Energy Impact: Oil markets appear to have priced in Iran-related volatility; meaningful price spikes would likely require Gulf energy asset hits or a Strait of Hormuz disruption.
• Missile Defense: Israel’s air defense munitions were heavily used, highlighting replenishment constraints and supporting a sustained demand backdrop for missile defense systems.
• Sanctions & Tariffs: Proposed 25% U.S. tariffs on countries trading with Iran are uncertain in scope; Turkey/UAE may adopt a wait-and-see stance, with disruptions possible if enforcement tightens.
• Regional Dynamics: Gulf states favor de-escalation and are building defense pacts, aiming to avoid being targets and protect investor confidence and diversification plans.
• Regime Trajectory: Base case is regime influence (not regime change) with Khamenei’s succession a key signpost; internal fragmentation limits near-term transition.
• Tail Risks: Worst-case scenarios include Iranian civil war or nuclear breakout; base case is episodic strikes without major market dislocation unless energy infrastructure is directly hit.

Transcript

and we should be live. Welcome to Thoughtful Money. I'm Thulful Money, founder and your host. Welcoming you back here for a special report live stream on the situation in Iran. We are joined by Reigns M East analyst Ryan B who's been with us before. Ryan, thank you so much for joining us. I know this is an incredibly busy time for you that events are are developing in real time as we speak here. Very much appreciate you making the time to talk to a FAF Money audience. >> Yeah, not a problem, Adam. Happy to be here. >> All right. Well, first, happy new year. Um, I think the beard's new since we talked. Uh, I like it. >> It's my This is my winter form. So, yeah, for six months of the year, I go without it, and then the other half that I freeze is where I got to grow it back out. >> It's where your younger brother shows up for six months. All right. Um, well, look, um, let's just dive right in here. I got a bunch of questions, uh, and then we'll try to open it up if we've got time, uh, for the viewing audience here. Mhm. >> Um, as best you understand it right now with the information we have, what exactly is happening on the ground in Iran right now? >> Yeah, we are really in a fluid situation. So these these uh by the hour updates I think are really important for uh everyone to understand and monitor. And what we're getting out of of Iran on the ground itself are reports that the protest movement has ebbed. It is not finished but it is largely suppressed. Uh the Iranians have admitted up to 2,000 casualties and that includes their security forces of an uncertain number. Uh other Iranian opposition outlets uh like Iran International have been saying it's up to 12,000. Uh I think that we're going to be looking at a 2 to 12,000 range if when all is said and done. Now like all authoritarian regimes, information is is a scarce commodity. So we'll never know the full extent. But we do know that there have been high casualties and that the protest movement seems to have subsided at the moment. Caveat with that is that tomorrow is Friday. That's a a Shia uh Muslim holy day. People come out of their mosques and they tend to protest as well. So if we're going to see another phase of this um it would start again tomorrow. So that's what's happening on the ground. The the Islamic Republic is still very firmly in control. We haven't seen any cities fall. We haven't seen any territory change hands. And most importantly, we haven't seen any security forces or elites split with the regime either by criticizing it or in the case of security forces by joining protesters. So the domestic situation seems to be more stable than it was a week ago uh where it was a very serious challenge to their power and legitimacy. But that's where we are in Iran itself. Um then abroad when we're looking at uh what happened last night is the Iranians declared a a no-fly zone over their country. They issued aviation notices not to go over Iran. That seems to be in reaction to some American military movements that were not about striking Iran last night. Now, it's possible the Americans are moving assets around to try to find a way to strike Iran without alienating the Gulf Arab allies. That's that's something that we can discuss later about what the Gulf Arab position is in all of this. Uh but there were no strikes last night. The United States is poised to strike Iran at any time. They have enough assets uh in Turkey, the UAE, uh in Bahrain's fifth fleet to be able to conduct very limited strikes on Iran on whatever targets they might choose. Uh and B2 bombers can be flown out of Missouri and in 24 hours can strike any target uh even without the bunker busters. They can use conventional weapons, tomahawks, etc. Uh that can come off of a B2. So, the assets are there, but we do have a report uh that the uh the USS Abraham Lincoln is being redeployed from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. It'll take about a week for it to get there. Um if they are waiting for more significant assets to come into play so they can carry out larger air strikes. That's a key signpost to watch is when that carrier arrives. After all, that was part of the Venezuela operation. The Gerald Ford had to arrive and it was situated. It was part of that operation to extract Maduro. Um, so if they're looking for something bigger, that carrier will matter. Limited strikes are always on the table, could happen at any time, and they could happen while we're talking right now. Um, but a bigger operation requires more significant buildup, and that will take time. Um, and then the last part is some of the alerts that we have seen reportedly, uh, Aluade Air Base and Katar, their alert has been diminished. Um while there are still notices from like state department and others about being concerned about being in the region if you're a citizen um those are not at a critical level where they're ordering evacuations and we're not seeing the widespread embassy evacuations that we saw last June before the United States uh joined the Israeli campaign against the the Iranians. So we don't have signpost for a major escalation, but we always have this tripwire force within the region that allows for relatively localized escalations uh if that's what the administration chooses to do. >> Okay. Uh great summary. Uh bunch of targeted questions for you. First off, um how many people were involved in this protest? Um was it nationwide? Was it a bigger, you know, was it big relative to what's happened in the past? Um >> yeah, I did. So, a qualitative uh estimate of that is pretty we can do that while saying that it's as big as probably the 2009 so-called green revolution protests that emerged after uh there was a disputed presidential election back then and brought out a lot of people including fair segments of of the Islamic Republic's own base were upset about that election. So, it's it seems to be at least as large as that. And of course, that green revolution didn't succeed. It it did lead to some re reformist trends uh within the government but it certainly didn't topple the Islamic Republic and Alad the Supreme Leader Ali Kmeni is still very much in charge uh in spite of that. So it was a significant number. We could end up with a tally of anywhere between 1 to 5% of the total population being involved. Again the Iranians are going to suppress the the true numbers. It's always going to be hard for us to tell. But it was a major and significant protest movement. And in spite of the bloodshed, uh there's no reason to believe that it can't happen again at a future time, particularly if the Americans and the Israelis decide that they want to weaponize this protest movement and back it overtly. That would encourage uh protests to emerge somewhere else uh later down the line. >> Okay. And and what led to this protest? How do we get here? >> Yeah. I mean, broadly speaking, protests are a routine feature of the Islamic Republic. They usually meet them with a combination of force and symbolic concessions, and we had a couple in 2022 and 2023. And of course, in the US, protests are a routine feature of our political life as well. Uh even nationwide protests are normal in the American context. How the Iranians deal with these protests are are different in that that force element is there and their unwillingness to change is there. So they usually try to outlast these kinds of protests by you know targeting specific leaders, targeting specific geographies, especially Thyran. Tyrron is critical for control of the country. So if they can suppress the protest movement there, other lingering protests in Iranian Arab territory, Iranian Kurdish territory or even in more the some of the poorer areas uh in the hinterland that are Persian, those don't matter nearly as much as as the ones that are happening in the metropolitan center. Um the other part that they always keep an eye out for is how the Sha fell which was through strikes in the oil industry. Um when the oil workers went on strike that crippled the economy overnight that caused the Sha's army to waver and then things fell apart from that point on. So they're always keeping an eye on the oil industry. There weren't any uh strikes this time around. Um they've ideologically uh um you know influenced the oil industry to make sure that the workers and the managers are aligned with the Islamic Republic as much as they can. So the true believers are the ones in charge of that industry on purpose because if if the oil industry goes on strike or goes offline, uh that's a big problem. Um so when it's saying all of that, what drove them is the economy is terrible and has been terrible for a while because of in part US sanctions and in part because of Iranian policy choices. One of the big triggers that I think that would kind of been overlooked is Thrron is having a water crisis. Uh there's talk of evacuating the capital. they probably won't do that. But this water crisis is a result of years of of lack of investment in water safety and and water uh saving infrastructure uh to ensure that the capital is habitable. Um and there was a specific bank failure that happened that caused the merchants to come out in the uh in Tran's bizaars and that's why the Islamic Republic responded so forcefully because this is how the sha went down. It was an economically focused bizarre revolt and it spread from there. the if there was a true election in Iran, the current government would probably only get 10 to 20% of the vote um and they would be voted out. Um that 10 to 20% is more than enough for an authoritarian government to stay in power. Uh but that's how they've always been is they're always concerned that that you know kind of sleeping majority will wake up because of economics and that's what happened this time around. >> Okay. And uh how influential was the US strike on Iran's nuclear facility? Um I I was interviewing Peter Turchin a few months ago who's done a lot of studies about basically how uh nations fall into decline and how revolution happens and one of the key elements in all of them is the um the populace basically loses faith in the regime's ability to take care of them or see it sees the regime you know on its back legs and obviously um provided that the people in Iran were aware of what happened to their nuclear facility. I don't know how tight the the news control is there, but obviously that's a sign of like, hey, you know, we're not winning if they're taking out our nuclear facilities. >> You that was a notable blow to especially uh Ali Kmeni's legitimacy. Remember, he's been in charge of Iran since 1989. He's been around for a long time. Uh and in that time he he's always been kind of conservative small C with some of his foreign policy avoiding confrontation with the US avoiding confrontations with the you know the Taliban once massacred a bunch of Iranian diplomats back in the 90s and that would have been across his belly life for war. Kamani deferred from that that's kind of his way of doing things is is trying to use proxies rather than put Iran's own skin on the line and that strategy arguably hasn't worked. Uh obviously you know the proxies have been devastated. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis haven't been devastated, but they're not acting as a very good shield for the Iranians because of their remote geography. Um, and so for Kmeni, I think that there is a legitimacy crisis. And there was an awful lot of speculation that what could come out of this is a potential power evolution where Kamini's authority is either diluted or he's actually sidelined. And there's even more conspiracy based uh uh speculation that Trump is about to Maduro Kamei and extract him from the country. and to do so on behests of a lot of Iranian insiders who have a a fair bit of questions about why this man is still in charge when many of his biggest strategic calls have resulted in deeper isolation have resulted in direct attacks on the country and have resulted in this severe economic crisis that he doesn't seem to have a strategy to get out of. Um so there is a real challenge to his specific leadership but Iran's system is multi-layered. You don't want to think of it as a Saddam Hussein style dictatorship where it's all through one man. There's the Islamic uh Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC. Their career ladder is built through martyrdom. They >> and not not dissimilar to Venezuela, right? Where it's just that the whole system is stacked with Chavez and Maduro cronies. So you remove Maduro, everybody else is still there. Yeah, >> exactly. And you can almost think of it as like the the former Soviet Union, which the Islamic Republic also borrowed from. No single leader in the Soviet Union was was instrumental to it being held together. It failed on multiple levels. That's why it collapsed. The IRGC controls a significant part of the economy. It has a significant support base. And for the people living under that umbrella, living in Iran is pretty nice. They have middle class or upper middle class lifestyles. They can still get the vacations that they want. They can still get the housing and the cars that they want. Um and they are willing to to uh to use force to maintain that lifestyle. That's how a lot of authoritarian regimes still work. And of course, uh, the IRGC is in charge of selling this oil to China, uh, which China still does at scale. And and and that is enough to fuel the survival of this particular government, but the pressure for it to evolve is strong. It can't just stick with the Kmeni style rule where they can pretend to be independent and they don't change any of their ideals from the 70s and they're not looking for new partners and they're not looking to violate their sovereignty uh by allowing the Russians or the Chinese to set up bases in their country. There's enormous pressure that Iran needs to one align with a great power and two evolve its mil it its domestic policies to get out of this economic crisis and Kmeni doesn't seem to be interested in any of that evolution. Okay. Uh, hence the displeasure of the remaining 80 to 90% of the populace there. Um, all right. There there's a a question that's been asked here a couple of times um in the chat. I'm going to tweak it a little bit. Um, the question is is was the currency devaluation the result of manipulation? Uh, oh, this is a version of the question. Uh, manipulation of the real by Western intelligence agencies. more the the spirit of the questions that I've been getting here is did this protest really was it driven by um covert Israeli and US you know operatives and this maybe isn't necessarily an organic protest of the people or uprising of the people it's something that's been fermented by outside powers >> so it was fueled and fanned by outsiders including the former crown prince of of the the sha who's got close >> ties but that makes sense He's going to root for anything that's happening. >> Exactly. He wants he wants his dad's job back. Uh good luck with that. But uh the short answer is yes. There are always uh intelligence agencies specifically and of course MSAD's ground game in Iran is still quite strong. Um this is a product of Iran's dysfunctional economy, its corrupt system that allows spies to penetrate your system. So MSADA is is as we saw in June of 2025 all over Iran. They are probably supplying uh you know activists with ways that they can carry out protests. Some of the small arms I wouldn't be surprised at all if that came from Assad. Uh that being said um it is impossible for an intelligence agency to fment unrest out of nothing. You know if if the Russians could do that they would have done that to America a thousand times at this >> there has to be dry tender. Yeah. >> Exactly. There has to be dry tender. And that is a product of Iran's government's own choices. So they can worsen the situation. They can target the situation, but they don't hold the ability to carry out these large-scale protests if people don't want to show up on their own. They can just amplify the the narratives that are already something that Iranians sort of believe on their own or they can activate, you know, Iranians who weren't thinking about it and, you know, they can make the the the narrative louder. But if people don't already have natural sympathy for the cause, uh it won't work. And and so it only works in the in the in the case of of a legitimacy vacuum which the Islamic Republic has been facing for some time and Kmeni's own role in it has made it worse. Um and the economy of course is making it you know this massive chasm, right? Um so and you know the idea of the west manipulating the currency. I don't think that the CIA or MSD really needs to do much to that because US sanctions have already cratered the real and the Iranians have resorted to printing over and over again to try to get out of their economic crisis. Uh and as we know that really tends to lead to hyperinflation rather than solution to your economic problems. And and um I've got a few more questions before we really dig into the US the future here, but um Trump announced at least uh what a 25% tariff on any country that trades with Iran. >> Um how material is that? >> It's still something we're sorting through because Trump's tariff threats uh sometimes are implemented and sometimes are not. Uh some of those major trading partners are key American partners as well. uh the Turks, the Amiradis, you know, the Amiradis might be rivals with Iran. Uh but Dubai does an enormous amount of trade with the Iranians and always has. Uh 25% tariff on the UAE could jeopardize the American air base that the US wants there. Um if it applied to energy would obviously be a massive energy tax on on American consumers. So I don't think that it'll be implemented in in an expansive way. Uh and it may not be implemented at all uh especially if it's decided to be overlapped with pre-existing tariffs. might be a choice is Turkey is facing this this digital service taxes investigation that could also get them a 25% tariff. The Trump administration may say, well, it's 25% for both and then just move on with that as a bigger way to try to pressure Turkey into changing its economic policy or it its digital services policy. So, the answer is we don't know if that's going to be implemented and it may not be and there's strong reasons for it not to be uh imposed across the board. >> Okay. Uh do you expect it to add additional weight though to the existing sanctions or just hey we'll we'll give it weight when we see it? >> I think that a lot of these countries Turkey and the UAE and and other countries in Brazil that have always been doing uh business with Iran are going to do a wait and see approach. Uh it may cause some interruptions in the in the quarter especially as they try to assess whether or not these are these are realistic threats. Uh if they don't become realistic threats I think companies will go back and do business. They've already been bypassing American sanctions for a while. uh and this is a already a high-risisk endeavor. So these are risk friendly entities that are doing business in Iran. This is part of the of the kind of industry that they've chosen to be in. Um so they'll probably assess and then if it doesn't end up being too severe, they'll go back to business as usual. >> Okay. And so Ryan, what do the protesters want? You know, for the people that are uprising, what would they like to see? >> And that's they don't know. Uh in a short answer, there are an awful lot of different factions within Iran that make it very hard for there to be a single unified message as to what they uh want uh out of out of this protest movement because it ranged from we just want the economy to function, you know, the the you know the it's the economy stupid kind of protesters who just want the currency to be stable. They just want hyperinflation to end, etc. >> You usually don't grab a shotgun for that though. >> You usually don't. Well, well, I mean, in some cases, >> depends how bad it gets, but Yeah. >> Yeah. I mean, that's the American Revolution started economically focused, right? >> No, that's true. >> So, it's it's it's something that can evolve into a political demand, but there were plenty of opposition figures who want anything from the return, of course, of the crown prince, which is very much a minority. Some who want uh simply reforms within the current Islamic Republic. They want the reformist wing uh of the government to be given more power to to oversee things. and they have won concessions. It's important to note that in 2022 2023, the hijab protests over that woman who was who was killed by the morality police. In the aftermath of that, the Iranians pulled back their morality police. And now a lot of women, especially in Thran wearing more or less whatever they want and not going without the hijab, not going, you know, in the hijab because the republic said that it's smarter for us to not enforce on this. This is a social trigger point. It's not worth it for our legitimacy. Um, so there's also those folks that just wanted social reforms. Um, and that diversity of opposition and that diversity of voices is one of the reasons this protest movement uh struggled and struggles and will struggle to gain ground against the the Islamic Republic because the the theocrats know what they want. They have a unified vision and a unified, you know, essentially they have their their governing uh Quran that they've got to to keep them all in line. the opposition is busy arguing with each other in the streets as to what they want next and and it's it goes between there are still some radical leftists in the country of course there are the Iranian Kurds who want autonomy and secession um all of these different factions make it hard to have a unified movement which plays into the regime's hands >> so sitting here in the cheap seats in the west knowing very little about Iranian culture and what's going on there um I think we westerners have a sense that and it may an incorrect sense, so please correct me if it is that if given their brothers, the majority of Iranians would want to get out from under theocratic rule and they'd rather go to I don't know, I mean, maybe a democracy, but just something that's not, you know, living under religious Muller control. Is that accurate or >> I would say it is it is something that exists amongst an element of the population. your exiles in the west would feel the strongest in that direction. Um, and that's part of the reason they're exiles in the west and and they'd like to bring those that kind of lifestyle back to Iran >> because Iran Iran was a lot of Western values, we'll say, or at least Western cultural norms up until the the they deposed the sha, right? >> Well, in Thrron and in around the middle class of Thrron is where when we see all those pictures of Iran before the revolution, >> Yeah. the women in bikinis and Yeah. >> Yes. Exactly. You It's It's the equivalent of taking photos of people in Greenwich Village and saying America before whatever. Uh it was a hyper specific location and time. Um and and uh most of Iran at that time was still widely conservative. You know, didn't have electricity, didn't have running water. Uh looked in some cases kind of like how Afghanistan looks today. Uh and you don't see those photos because, you know, they nobody had cameras in those days. >> Cameras didn't make it out there. Exactly. So there's there's a there's an information bias in favor of those middle class people who had the wealth to buy those cameras and of course those are exiles who brought it with them when they left. Um so Iran was by no means a liberal society in the 60s and 70s and it wasn't becoming a liberal societ. That's why the revolution took place was because many of these conservatives in places like K you know the one of the holiest cities for them and Ispahan saw tyranni uh Iranians behaving in ways that they thought were unmus. And that's why the the fundamentalist backlash took place is because the back then the 80% wanted women to cover up and wanted religious rule. Uh be and while the 20% or even less in place >> because it was culturally conservative in an Islamic culture. Got it. >> Yes. And of course that was a fundamentalist wave that was happening globally happened in America too. Um and so there was an independent of of of this global fundamentalism that was uh kind of sweeping the world in the 60s and 70s. Now today it's a little bit more flipped. And again, the diversity of the opposition is a problem where uh there are some who want a secular democracy, western style, live like Europe kind of thing. They tend to be focused in Thran itself. They tend to be younger. You know, you would call them millennials or Gen Z. And of course, 10 years ago when the uh the Iran nuclear deal was signed, there was an awful lot of hope that by offering economic growth to these groups that they'd be able to moderate the uh the Iranian government and slowly take control of the bureaucracy. And then you get a Gorbachoff moment where one of them finally gets to a position where they can change the fundamental nature of the Islamic Republic. That was kind of the hope some 10 years ago. Um there's many of them that still have that attitude, but there is also still a feeling of of you know there's still an affinity towards religion. Uh Shia religion is is critical for Iranian identity. Um so there's plenty that don't want to get rid of the Mullups. They just want them to behave differently. They might not like Kani, but they don't want to get rid of the supreme leader role. They just want somebody who's going to get the water running again. Um, they want to get rid of corruption. They don't necessarily want to get rid of the IRGC. Um, so there's nationalists that are mixed in there. There's religious-minded folks that are mixed in there. There's workingclass folks. And of course, the regime's own supporters. They just want the status quo or a status quo that's less dangerous for them. If the reforms will get the protest to go away, the regime insiders are are fine with allowing those kinds of protests. So um and as we move into this global not necessarily anti-democratic moment but as we go into a move a moment where liberal democracy is not exactly uh advancing in most places many Iranians are seeing that same trend and they don't necessarily want western style democracy because it might involve chaos and they have seen what democracy looks like in Iraq which paralysis bouts of violence Iraq is no better off in terms of material goods than >> Libya or you know other places where Yeah. Yeah. >> Exactly. So there's not there's not that clean invitation and that's again that's another problem for the opposition. What political model can they pitch that would unify people? And there's no political model I would argue globally that has consensus pretty much anywhere. I I think you'd be struggling to find a country you can find some smaller countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada, etc. There's consensus there but they're smaller. Um and those consensus are are you know stressed as well. >> Um okay. So it sounds like Iran is a really tough place for regime change to occur occur organically because the landscape is so fractured. The parties want different things. Um so there's doesn't seem like there's a a common cause that that that's clear for them all to rally around here. That's a big issue. Obviously there's tightfisted uh state control uh that wants to tamp down anybody who's trying to advocate anything different than the status quo. Anyways, so you've got that going on too. Um, one would think that the internet would make it uh would make the desire for reform easier because people can see how other people in other parts of the world are living um and easier for people to kind of share ideas and even if you're not gathering in the real world to discuss your resistance, you can gather online to do it. Uh but um I'm get I mean I know right now the country is under a pretty much an internet blackout um that's being enforced by the state. What's it like normally there? I mean are they are they pretty tightly do they pretty tightly control internet access anyways? >> Yeah, there's blockers but of course VPNs can get around them for sophisticated Iranians. Iran's a relatively well educated country for the region. Um but I would put it behind places like the UAE and Saudi and Ka the Gulf Arab states. It's still you might describe it as as America in the 80s or the 90s in terms of its educational attainment which also means how easy it is for people to access the internet and and come up with these clever workarounds. So the bulk of Iranians um they tend to respect the firewall. They tend to respect the information narratives. It's also important to note and Iran is no different than many other countries within the region which is that it's a hierarchal society on a cultural basis. That is that people tend to look for a clear natural leader. Um, here in the US, like you have a manager, you want to have a beer with them, you want to be able to have some jokes with them. You expect equality because that's part of American uh um culture. In Iran, you would never expect your manager to have a beer with you. And you certainly wouldn't want your politician uh to look like they're the average everyman. You want your politician to look like they're strong and they're in charge. Um those are cultural qualities that don't tend to lead towards uh democracy or or um you know, the the idea of kind of again western liberalism, so to speak. Uh instead the challenge is for many Iranians if they were looking at a political model and they wanted to copy it. I would argue most of them are looking at Dubai and they're saying that Dubai is the place that I'd like to live. It's still got a sheh it's it's you know authoritarian. You can't say what you want. Who cares? They all have material goods. They're all taken care of. Um they have a quote nice lifestyle. And I think >> kind of their aspiration that Yeah. Exactly. I think it Dubai is the regional aspiration for many people. I think Iranians are still in that same mold. The problem with that, of course, is that Dubai enjoys Abu Dhabi that has tons of oil and can always backs stop when things go bad. Uh Iran has tons of oil, but a massive population that it has to support with it. It can't do that sort of, you know, the the rabbit out of the hat thing with oil the way that the Amiradis can. So, there's an aspiration that they'd like, but they can't actually follow because of the nature of geography and demography. >> Okay. So, all right, let's get to the US here. So um you know you you've you've shared with us in the past um uh kind of the history of the relationship between Iran and the West. Um US would would love to see the theocracy there go away. Um and it would love to see a more west friendly form of of governance there. Iran's been a huge thorn in the West's side. Um just you know cozing up with America's or the West's adversaries. Russia, China, it's been a huge sponsor of terrorism. It's probably what's kept the Middle East as such a powder keg for so long because it's been funding, you know, all the terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas and all that stuff. So, America would would would love to see this populist uprising succeed. Uh the regime collapse or get replaced by something else. Um again, that's a little more West friendly. So, I I guess in the immediate term here, what's your best sense of what the US is likely to do here, especially given the president's um threats and his recent uh performance of delivering on his threats when it came to Venezuela, >> right? Um and of course, we always have to caveat everything. Trump's got a a volatility to his his policy. Uh but we do know his broad patterns, which is that he likes escalation. That's very >> Trump volatile. What are you talking about, Ryan? just uncertain perhaps we can call it uncertain. >> You got the right you got the right adjective there. >> Um but uh escalation followed by rapid deescalation is his favorite. That's what he did in June of 2025. It's what he did against Solommani. It's what he just did against Maduro. >> He doesn't want to get dragged into even what they did in Yemen last year against the Houthis which was inconclusive. It didn't convince the Houthies didn't stop shooting ships until the Gaza ceasefire uh in October and and then it was weeks and weeks and weeks of heavy bombardment. um cost a lot of money. A fighter jet crashed into the ocean. U that's not his personal preference. It's not his political style and there's no political upside to an extended campaign against the Iranians. What Trump So I think one of the important documents to look at is the national security strategy that came out in November and it talked explicitly about in the Middle East were getting out of the business of not just nation building but telling governments what they want to do politically. And that was kind of a reference to his first term where Jamal Kosoji was assassinated by Saudi agents and there was a huge amount of pressure on the Trump administration to impose sanctions on the Saudis over human rights. That was the Trump administration's insider saying if human rights serve our end, we'll grasp onto it. If it doesn't, we won't. We're not going to be categorically prohuman rights. We're not categorically pro-democracy. We're not categorically pro anything except for our own interpretation of our interests. Um, notably he has not grasped onto Iranian oil the way he has Venezuelan oil. He hasn't interpreted that the US has a has a stake in in getting Iranian oil back on the market. He seems to be focused on the Venezuelans for now. It's always a possibility that he decides that Iranian oil should be American oil and we should go back into business together. That kind of volatility exists. But right now, >> do we have infrastructure over there the way that we did in Venezuela? >> No, we don't. Right. That's part of it. Right. That's part of the story. It's the uh the Americans have been out of Iran since 79. That doesn't mean that he can't resurrect this old story of the 50s and 60s when the US was very much invested in Iran's oil industry. So, um that can be something that he decides to do on a narrow interest of like I want to bring cheap energy to Americans as part of my affordability plan. >> Um but we haven't seen that, right? Uh I think what this administration wants to do under Trump is shape Iran in a proTrump direction. And what that specifically means is a combination of both appeasing Trump personally by meeting his demands, but also meeting his political bases demands, which is in one case meeting Israel's demands. Um, and and the tightness between Netanyahu and Trump has been displayed again and again despite some ruffles here and there. Um, Israel wants Iran to be defanged and it wants it to be fundamentally ideologically a different thing. It doesn't care if it's a democracy, but it does want the IRGC to decide that their main problems are at home or against Pakistan or against the Afghans, just not against Israel, not supporting Hamas or Hezbollah or any of these other anti-Israeli proxies. Um, and that also involves dismantling the nuclear program, destroying the missile program, changing their foreign policy entirely. Um, and Israel's demands therefore become Trump's demands as he's as he has he's got this affinity for Israel's own uh perception of security within the region. But Trump don't I don't think cares if it's a democracy that does this, if it's an IRGC hardliner that just kills all of his opposition and and replaces them with people that will get along with Washington. That's the wide trajectory. The question is how far will Trump go to get that? And of course, how much time does he have in terms of political capital at home before, say, Congress decides to limit his powers to do so? Um, you know, moving into midterms, we saw War Powers Act just fail against Venezuela. Uh, that doesn't mean that after the midterms, a War Powers Act won't pass or that Americans won't become sick of these kind of military adventures and demand that there be constraints on Trump. So, does he interpret this as I only have a year a free hand to act as as hard and as fast as I can to reshape Iran's behavior, or do I have three years, you know, or is Iran just not that important to me personally for my legacy? The Western Hemisphere is all of our efforts should go into Venezuela and Cuba and Mexico and Colombia. Um, that's something that I don't know if we have a clean answer to. We just know that he's chasing all of these imperatives all at once, well aware he's only got three more years left uh in the White House. >> Okay. Um let's see here. Uh I've got a question that my mind wants to go to, but I want to I want to get there through a different path here. Um okay. So um so what do you think he the US is most well I guess I'll get to that question but ju just before that um so uh I've heard it recently described that that Trump America is now um not interested in pursuing regime change uh as it is in pursuing regime influence >> and Maduro is probably a good a good uh example of that right? We're not going into Venezuela and rounding up everybody who was part of the old regime and throwing them in prison and then holding flash elections and letting just a, you know, totally brand new regime take over. >> Um, probably because that would be really intractable and come with a ton of risk and take forever and Trump probably doesn't have the political capital for that, you know, D whatever. So instead, he says, "Well, then I'll do regime influence. I'll take out the top guy. I'll put number two in there and I'll say do what we tell you to do or else you're going to suffer the fate of of guy number one." Right. Um, do you see that as it sort of sounds like you're saying that's probably going to be more Trump style here with Iran? >> Yes, I think regime influence probably is the best. I might steal that. That's >> do it. It's not mine, but steal it. Yeah. >> May bar. But regime influence really is is the uh the strategy with the Iranians is to to reshape what they do, make them less of a threat to America and its allies. Um the trick is though Iran's ideology and political system is wedded to anti-Americanism going back to 79. You know the debt to America is still part of >> the great Satan. Yeah. >> Yes. Exactly. So whereas Venezuela and Maduro they were more ideologically squishy on this front. You know they had worked with the Americans before and there had been relations and then they deteriorated. There's not that relationship with the Iranians or any of the current insiders. So how does one do that? And it looks like it is in some ways similar to the intractable relationship between Israel and Hamas. You know, also two ideological actors um who want two very different worldviews and then you know are willing to fight over it. Um Iran wants the region to be free of the United States and its influence. The United States can't leave the region because of energy and trade etc. uh terrorism as well. Um, that creates your recipe for conflict right there that Iran as as a significant middle power believes the Middle East belongs to at least its partial sphere of influence. It'll share with the Turks or the Egyptians or the Saudis. It doesn't want to share it with an extra regional power like the United States. So, how does one overcome that? You've got to be looking at a more effective way of what the the the British did to the former Sha of and that was relatively easy because that was a monarchy. That's a personalist system. Replace one Shaw with another, replace a prime minister with another, you get a more amanable regime. But of course, it didn't last, right? It only lasted 25 or so years before that that strategy fell apart. Um, the Americans are probably looking at what the Israelis did last June where they assassinated significant numbers of Iranian hardliners and looking to see if the succession process kind of convinces people to move into a more moderate or at least non-confrontational direction. Now, there's good reason to believe that >> direction where they're not going to get assassinated. >> Yes. Exact. But there's good reason to believe that won't work. Um, Iranian uh, Islamist thought is very heavy on martyrdom. This is a way you get into heaven. This is part of the career ladder. Dying against the the hated enemy is something that people kind of want to do. Um, and until that feeling and ideology is exhausted, potentially through generational turnover, you're looking at an open-ended campaign of assassination where you never kill one person who matters so much that everything changes. Instead, you're looking at a significant yearslong effort of killing people until you've killed enough that a younger generation has come along and said, "Well, I never really believed in this Islamism thing anyway." That's a really uncertain strategy. I don't think I've ever seen it successfully done in the modern world. Um, you know, we're still killing al-Qaeda and and ISIS leaders left and right. I think we killed some more last week. They keep regenerating u as long as that belief system remains intact. Okay. I got a whole bunch of questions here for you. Just kind of on that. Um, to the average Iranian, is the US still the great evil? Do they do they wake up thinking death to America? America's the great Satan. or they kind of like the Mullers say what they got to say and I'll chant because they want me to, but I'm just going to get on with life and I I want to watch my American movies and hopefully get some cigarettes and Levis's. >> And I I would actually extend that feeling to the Israelis as well. I I would argue that for especially uh Iranians under 45 or so, and as I'm getting up there as a millennial, I've got to remember now we got to be under 45. Um but as as millennials and Gen Z tend to see these conflicts as conflicts of their parents' generation, they have not seen any material gains from them. Um it's best not to have an opinion on them, right? Because if you have the the non- mainstream opinion over there, that's how you lose jobs and you get into fights and so on and so forth. Uh I think many Iranians just want to get on get, you know, get on with their day uh with these external conflicts. But there's still an incentive structure to go along with the ideology. If you want to go into government in the bureaucracy or politics, you have to say the slogans and follow through on them whenever you can. Um, if you want to, you know, curry favor with somebody who's corrupt, who can get you a better water supply or get you housing, again, you have to curry favor by uh chanting the slogans and doing things like that. So, there's still a a political currency that comes along with the ideology that people will play along with and that sometimes they feel the need to act with. Um, and again, you know, last year when Israel and the US bombed Iran, that was a moment where a lot of pressure was taken off of the government because everybody rallied to the flag and nobody likes a country being attacked no matter how much they hate their government. It's all in the family, right? I can say that about my dad, but nobody else can. Um, so there is that element as well. So when there's external pressure, people will rally to the Islamic Republic. But when they're left alone, they start to say, well, why aren't the lights turning on? Why isn't the sewer running? So on and so forth. who's responsible for this? >> But but is it I guess what I'm trying to get to is is it is it performative mostly? You know, yeah, you bomb us, I'm going to be mad for a while, or is it existential? Like, yeah, I'm willing to grab a rifle and go fight, you know, in the Iran forces against the great evils of of Israel and the West. >> And, you know, I guess it depends on the scenario. Like if there was a US invasion of Iran, it's a safe assumption that there would be a significant insurgency that would last many years just like Iraq out of people who previously didn't think anything about America, but now that there are troops on the ground in their town, now >> now that you're in my country, I'm Yeah. standing up. >> Yes. Exactly. So, how you take that sentiment if you're looking for a regime change scenario as a strategic planner? How do you take that sentiment of all these people, they just want to go out and get cigarettes, they just want to go on vacation to uh Turkey or to Dubai uh and channel that into anger against the regime that is strong enough to change its nature, it's a really tricky thing because as soon as you apply external pressure to that type of person, they say, "You can't tell me what to do. You know, you're not even from here. What are you talking about?" And then they react to it and then they get closer to your to the adversary you're trying to overthrow. Um, and this is again, this is what intelligence agencies struggle with is finding narratives that don't look like they're sponsored, but do look, you know, but do change people's political behavior. >> Okay. And what is the what is Iran's relationship to the rest of the Middle East right now? In other words, or maybe put this way, what's the rest of the Middle East power players? What are they thinking about this? Are they taking Iran side? Are they affronted? Do they want to see Iran knock down a couple of pegs? They would like most of them except for Israel want it to just go away. What they specifically want is they would love for Iran to be non-confrontational to behave like Turkey or behave like uh you know Saudi Arabia where they assert localized interests that they can manage not this overarching ideological project to dominate the Middle East and spread Islamism all over the place. They don't they want Iran to move away from that. um you know when Iran and Pakistan were firing missiles at each other I think it was the beginning of last year 2025 that didn't inspire a lot of alarm throughout the region because made sense to them this is a localized border dispute they don't want the beluchas independent neither the Pakistanis they got involved and so on and so forth that's what they would like to see out of the Iranians rather than them sponsoring the Houthis to break up Yemen or sponsoring PMUs in Iraq to uh to undermine the cohesion of a of a multi-thnic and sectarian Iraqi They want the Iranians to move away from those big projects and become more nationalists like all of them are becoming. The Saudis are becoming more nationalist, the Turks, the Israelis, the Amiradis. They want Iran to do that because they can cut deals with a nationalist Iran. It's harder to cut deals with an ideologue. An ideologue is my way or the highway. Nationalists on the other hand, and I argue Trump is a nationalist, you can cut deals with them for narrow interests and you can understand their behavior a lot better. escalation becomes more manageable until hyper nationalism comes along and then you end up in things like World War I. But nationalists generally at least in our current phase are are easier because you understand what they're after. Um so if you're the Saudis or the Emiratis or the Qataris and the poor Qataris have tried so hard to be neutral and they've gotten hit uh twice in the past year from an American ally and from the Iranians and they might get hit again if the is if the Americans move on uh Iran again. They all want a pattern of deescalation and a path towards some sort of post-Islamic uh republic nationalism, but they don't want to push on Iran. Iran's got missiles. They have air defenses that are imperfect. They have uh especially the Gulf Arabs have very fragile uh diversification models that are reliant on people believing that these are safe places and you can't sell that image if a ballistic missile is flying overhead every couple months. >> Um so they they don't want to push on Iran to change their behavior. They're trying to stand aside as much as they can and so when these inevitable cycles of escalation take place, they're not on the top of Iran's targeting list. That's what they're aiming for. Um, but there is some interesting undercurrents of that which is, you know, the Saudis and the Pakistanis now have an overt defense pack. Turkey wants to join that defense pack. The Qataris are trying to get the Americans to be more reliable on the defense front and get an extra defense pack there. So, the Saudis have gotten one as well. So, they're all looking at different ways of of of rebuilding their security that is short of just relying always on the Americans and is also short on on confronting the Iranians. It's more about trying to set up new trip wires that changes Iran's perceptions because Iran is paranoid about being diplomatically isolated, militarily isolated. Um, they're trying to set up these trip wires where now if you're in Thran and America's just attacked you, well, maybe the smarter thing to do now is to shoot at an American ship rather than a Qatar because if you fire at Qatar again, they'll join this Turkish Defense Pact and then Turkey will be involved in a war with you uh the next time you attack Qatar and you don't want that. So, um, there's all of these lower layer geopolitical moves that are taking place underneath the surface of these countries that are trying to find their footing in a world where America isn't everywhere and doesn't want to be and isn't capable of being everywhere and where their adversary Iran isn't all powerful and all dangerous, but is disruptive enough to their own economic and and political models that they're trying not to antagonize it. >> Okay. So what I take from that, and correct me if this is the wrong takeaway, is a lot of the players in the rest of the Middle East would actually love to see the Iranian theocracy be replaced with a more nationalistic uh government. >> I mean, they would take an IRGC nationalistic government, too. They would take it if Kami woke up tomorrow and said, "Now I am an Iranian nationalist, and this is the end of the Islamist era." uh I don't think they have picked there's obviously more realistic leaders in that path that they would like to see come to power. Um but yeah that's the overarching goal that they could get is is to get Iran to behave more like say the Russians do in the region or the Turks do in the region where they can understand their behavior and their pursuit of national interests and they can you know they can cut those deals with well this is your sphere of influence this is ours you care about this trade route and we care about that one um and we'll trade things off. Okay. Um, but it's again the impression I'm taking from this is, you know, they're probably not getting too wound up by what Trump is is threatening to do here, right? Because it's it it may it's all right now at least in in the regime influence camp that okay, maybe this will actually kind of keep the Mullers or keep keep the current Iranian uh government uh a little bit more contained after this if Trump's successful. Well, there's that volatility element is I think what they're worried about because each time the Iranians have fired missiles in response to American strikes. Um, and you know, I have to double check on whether or not Qar's domestic investment or foreign domestic investment was affected by the strikes last year. But every time that happens, people pause their business in these re in these places. That's that's time they can't make up as as the world moves away from oil and develops, you know, alternative energies. Um, they're very sensitive to that. So, they certainly don't want they want Trump they don't mind if Trump is necessarily rhetorically escalatory against the Iranians because that doesn't inspire Iranian counterattacks, but they know that they're first in line for retaliation if the US or Israel decides to strike the Iranians. Um, so they don't want the US getting involved militarily if they can help it. Um, because each time it's it's not the Americans that are paying the price for this. It's really Gulf Arab security um that that that is paying the price. >> Okay. Um All right. So, let's let's get to the key question of the whole uh live stream here, which is what in your opinion, in Reign's opinion, is is the more likely thing for the US to do here? Um, you know, Trump has threatened some sticks um maybe some carrots are being offered behind the scenes. I don't know. But what what do you think the US is most likely to do here over the next couple weeks? >> Um, in this quarter, the United States, you know, we have to watch those military assets to see our scale. But the idea that the US has taken uh strikes off the table, I I think that you'd still need to keep it at 5050 over the next few weeks as Trump makes the assessments and the internal adjustments uh to decide whether or not striking now is worth it. Now, in the longer run, both throughout the quarter and the year, we do expect uh new strikes on Iran, whether that's from Israel or the United States. >> And hitting what? Targeting what? probably the either the nuclear program and the missile program again or in reaction to some protest expanding that outwards to political targets to try to destabilize the regime and convince them to come back to the negotiating table which would essentially be a surrender uh for the Iranians. So it the uh at the end of last year Netanyahu and Trump got together. Trump said I agree you the missiles and nukes that the Iranians still have are a problem. Um we have to act on this at some point. It just doesn't look like the Israelis want to do that in this quarter as they deal with Gaza. But over the next 12 months, that risk of another uh regional conflict is going to continue to be there the whole time unless the Iranians come to the table and are willing to essentially offer the Israelis everything they want. The Israelis are at some point poised to restart what they did last year and the US would follow. It's also possible this time around that the US decides to lead um such a campaign believing that a sharp sharp campaign against the Iranians would break their political resolve and result in really uh significant change. Over the next few weeks though it's it's volatile because the protests are ebbing. That's a driver towards deescalation because that's what Trump latched on to for why he wanted to get involved. But US military assets are moving into the region. There is the missiles and the the nuclear program that are still to be dealt with. Um Trump does have the success of Maduro right behind him that is has emboldened him to believe that other military operations could be just as successful uh if they're limited. Um and the US did this with Iraq for uh about a decade of occasional air strikes against the Iraqis to try to change Saddam Hussein's behavior. Sometimes it worked and sometimes it didn't. Um the US could be moving back into that mold where air strikes on Iran are a regular feature of of Middle Eastern policy. >> Yeah. Um, I mean, let's hope that's not the case uh for everybody. Um, I I I don't know Trump well, but I I get the sense that's probably not what he wants to be embroiled in the long term. Um, and Trump, as you said earlier, he's a dealmaker. So, um, let me ask you this. It might not be possible because America has just been sold as the great evil, you know, to these folks. But they're under heavy sanctions largely imposed on them by the US. um uh they have a water crisis as you mentioned. Um America could help, right? I mean it the carrot of hey become less anti-West or you know whatever treat your protesters better or whatever and we can start loosening some of this stuff. We can start bringing you a ton of water or we can set up water treatment facil like there's definitely carrots that could be played here. Um, are they possible or are they just not possible because ideologically the regime has convinced itself as well as the populace can't ever work with the enemy? >> Yeah. And I think um I would say it's impossible with Kmeni still in power. Of course, he's old and he's got to go at some point. uh once there's a new supreme leader, I think the possibility of cutting a deal with the US that's not under severe military pressure, uh not like an open-ended campaign against the Iranians, I think it becomes more likely with a successor to Kmeni. We don't know who that's going to be. They might not know who that's going to be. It seems pretty likely that uh there's going to be a fair bit of power struggles over succeeding. and it could result in a fundamental change of the Islamic Republic where you're seeing things like maybe the supreme leader office is abolished, maybe the president finally is given actual power. Um things like that could happen in the aftermath of Kmeni uh as part of this like internal reformist uh push. So Kmeni's death is probably the biggest signpost towards real change in >> How old is he? >> Uh 86 I believe right around there. Yeah, >> he's definitely up there. No, he's very much uh this this is you know another decade of this is is possible, right? But yeah, we're we're on the back foot and many of the of the uh regime insiders know this and they're preparing for it. Um but that being said, one of the tricks to extending an open hand to the the Americans is that it could require the IRGC to dismantle their corrupt business empire. Um and they don't want to do that because if investors are going to go into Iran, they don't want to do business with the IRGC. They want to build a dam because it's going to make them money. They don't want the IRGC taking a cut of it. There will be some investors, right, that would come into Iran uh that would do business with corrupt entities. That happens globally. But the scale to re rehabilitate Iran's economy really requires internal reform as well. We're seeing this in Venezuela, right? Like Exxon says, Venezuela's uninvestable and it's mostly because of the corruption on the ground in Venezuela itself. Iran could be in the same situation where, you know, maybe there is a fundamental change in the in their outreach to the US, but there's not a follow on of of investment into Iran because who wants to do business in those environments? Maybe the Chinese do in localized areas, but it's still not enough to necessarily change and improve Iran's lifestyle. And then if that's to happen, if that if that's the case where Iran offers these concessions and then nothing gets better, that actually creates a scenario where they might go even further, you know, to the far right back into religious nationalist conservatism because they tried and they got burned and, you know, jilted lovers sort of of effect that has happened where where movements shift away from their outreach because they get spurned or or the effects of it uh aren't what they expected. >> Okay. Um, so you were kind of going into my some of my concluding questions here, which was what's the best that could h like what's the best outcome we could hope for from this? And then secondarily, what's the worst outcome that could happen from this? >> Let's start. The worst outcome, I think, is an Iranian civil war. Uh, one that it doesn't involve just the Kurds and the Arabs and the Baluch, but a significant civil war between Persian factions and the IRGC against, say, elements of Artes, the Iranian army. Um that is a possibility way down the line if the succession of Kmeni fails. Um and there is something like a Persian spring that results in significant defections from the the security forces especially from the army. Um and then you start seeing a big civil war that would result in millions of refugees flowing into Pakistan and Turkey and Europe and the Americas. And the US would be under intense pressure to take some of these refugees in because of our pro-Iran democracy stance. And it would be like Cuba with Castro taking over. uh they would have a similar political dynamic where a lot of lobbying would take place here even in our nivist moment to bring those folks in. Um so I think that's the worst case and of course there's always that chance that they could have developed a nuclear weapon by then and then you got a loose nuke in a civil war scenario. Um second worst scenario I think is that the Iranians develop a nuclear weapon because of these recurrent attacks. Um and they could do so with North Korean help. They could do so maybe with Russian help. The Russians don't want them having nukes, but it's it's a possibility under enough attacks that they get some technical help. So if you have a belleaguered Iranian regime with nuclear weapons, now you have a North Korea in the Middle East with all of its volatility. And I think that would be probably your second worst scenario is that the IRGC >> and with a religious fanatic finger on the trigger. >> Exactly. And then that volatility could result in well if somebody's falling, you know, if the regime is collapsing, what happens to the nukes? Do they give it to extremists? Do they fire it off in a direction to get their final revenge? Things like that become more probable under those circumstances. Um the best case that I think is realistic over the next five or 10 years is the shift towards a more moderate nationalist government. And I think here this model is Syria with Akhmed Tra who was al-Qaeda and then he became a Syrian rebel faction and now he's the president of Syria shaking hands with American generals that were once hunting him. Um that's probably and Syria is by no means it's not a walk in the park. There's still significant security risks there. But that is the best that Syria could have gotten out of its civil war. Iran could get something that's similar from a series of elites that say we need to focus on our near abroad. We need to give up on our ideological struggle, at least downplay them and become more like China. Like we we'll still say that we want to, you know, spread communism and whatnot, but the Chinese don't do that anymore. Uh the Iranians could choose that path as well. And I think that becomes more likely after Kmeni's death where you have this evolution to your Islamic Republic run by the revolutionary guards. It's still corrupt. It's hard place to do business. Um but is more open to the world. It it is it is an easier place to access and it doesn't think about attacking Israel every few minutes. >> Okay. Um well, we will cross our fingers and hope for the best coming out of this. >> I've got a few concluding questions for you, Ryan, but again, first I just want to say thanks so much again for, you know, taking the time out of your very busy schedule and all these real time breaking developments to talk to us about this. And um you know, I'll just say I'd love love love to have you back on if and when there's material more stuff to to discuss. And um I I I I'll hope it won't be anytime soon. At least not for for bad reasons. >> Yeah. No, me too. I mean, there's always that possibility. We're talking about Persian democracy. I mean, it's like 5%, but it's there. >> Yeah. Yeah. And I would love nothing more to have you back on in a week or two saying, "Oh my god, there's been a regime change and now everybody wants to partner with the West and let's talk about what that's going to look like." >> Yeah. Um, okay. Uh, I I guess right now, um, as as best you can tell, do you see any material economic or or or financial market impacts from what's going on right now or is it are the markets just sort of in a wait and see stage? >> I I say short uh version of this, no, I think that Iranian volatility is starting to get priced into it's already been with the oil markets for a long time. Uh, and I think I've said before, the oil traders are great people because they they don't they know how to assess risk appropriately. If if there's not a supply interruption, there's no reason to spike the uh the the oil prices. Um, I think that right now if the expectation is that if there is a US intervention, it's limited and then the Iranians do a limited intervention and then we move on with our day until the next round. Uh, that's something that won't uh destabilize financial markets. It won't cause a recession. it doesn't involve the Hormuz scenario or attacks on Gulf Energy. That will keep it contained. In the longer run, the problem is that the US is going to get pulled into this dynamic that the Israelis are now pulled into, which is that they occasionally have to attack Iran to maintain deterrence, to gain advantage, to try to shape its behavior. And they have to keep doing that until Iran fundamentally changes the kind of geopolitical entity that it is. And that could be years down the line. Again, Saddam is the is the angle that I look at. They they tried to get rid of his WMDs via air strikes and that eventually led to the ground invasion. I don't think we're looking at a ground invasion, but I do think that there's going to be greater and greater temptation that the US is getting involved with Iran more from the air and each time the Iranians are going to have to consider a more escalatory response. I don't think they're there in this scenario, but one of these days, an Iranian ballistic missile hitting major energy facilities, trying to close the rate of hormuz, destroying a tanker, something like that that could really rattle markets. I think that does grow with with each one of these rounds. >> Okay. You mentioned at the beginning that uh as best we know right now, there's somewhere between two and 12,000 casualties from these recent protests. Mhm. >> Trump specifically said, "Don't kill the protesters or else I'm going to get involved and you're going to pay the price." Does he does he have to respond with some sort of show of force to those numbers? >> I don't think he has to do anything in a war of choice. That was a red line that he set, you know, like Obama's red line with with Syria. Uh that's an internal one. There's no legal mechanism that forces him to do anything. Will his credibility be damaged if he doesn't follow through? I'm not sure he had very much credibility in terms of Iranian internal affairs to begin with. The Iranian government's going to do what it's going to do. They changed their PR a bit. There was one that one shopkeeper that they're no longer going to execute under this pressure. That's the most minor that's little that's probably the least that they could do uh to try to get that that pressure off of them. Um it's a question of whether or not Trump cares about his credibility on threats towards Iran. Uh, and we've seen these threats go back and forth in other places like Russia and Ukraine where he says he's going to do something and then doesn't follow through or tariffs and things like that. Um, so I don't think it links him and forces him to do anything. I think that the maneuver of an aircraft carrier to the region is the more significant change. Uh that suggests that the they want to have the option for significant escalation. Um, and I think they're also going to be asking the Israelis, what is the effectiveness of a strike right now or should we wait for later for later in this year when we can do a joint strike together and and have a much bigger impact. Um, that I think will also matter in in whether or not we see escalation over the next few days or the next few weeks. >> Okay. Um, the impression I'm getting from what you've told me, Ryan, correct me if if this is the wrong impression, is my guess is you'd give 90 plus% probability to the fact that these protests are probably going to diminish, you know, the American way. They could flash up again in the future. But you're not expecting the existing regime to to to really change anytime in the near future from what we're seeing going on right now? >> Yeah, not in a substantial way. Unfortunately, there will be some people that will lose their jobs and central bank head already has um and that's probably about it unless you know again suddenly falls over. Uh then we see a significant change but that's not because of the protests. >> Okay. Um a question here. Um how has this affected oil shipments to China so far? Has has anything that's been going on impacted the flows of oil from Iran? >> Not that I have seen because the oil industry didn't go on strike. Again, that's an ideologically controlled uh industry because it's strategic. It shuts down. The Islamic Republic shuts down. Um so the uh so so far those still seem to be taking place and going and going out. Uh if the US does enter a Venezuela style oil blockade, that could change. And I I would think that Trump would be considering such an oil blockade as an option against the Iranians. I mean, there's been new sanctions issued as well. So, that could be something that they decide to do, but so far the flows are still going to China. >> Okay. Um, I'm just going to ask this question because this guy has been asking it every like 2 minutes. Um, uh, how much damage did Israel suffer from Iranian missiles during the 12-day war? >> I think the most impactful thing that happened to Israel was not the exhaustion of its air defenses, but a lot of utilization of hard to replace air defenses like THAAD, uh, A2 and A3. Those are slow to replace. Uh I have seen reports, estimates, the IDF will never tell you, right? But the the the Israelis used up up to 25% of these advanced systems. Now that's still 75% of their or their it's been replenished since last June. U but it was the air defense impact that really is is an issue for the Israelis. The Iranians, the raw estimated math, big caveats on this, but the Iranians had at least 3,000 or so, 2500 long range ballistic missiles during the war, they fired up to 500 of them. Um, they leave them with 2500 to 2,000 left. Um, that might be enough uh to overwhelm the Israelis air defenses, but then they're out of missiles and they're out of missiles for years as they replenish it. So, they don't want to fire them all. Mhm. But >> the Israelis, it's the air defense game because you can't win a war with missiles or air power alone. The Iran, the Ukrainians and the Russians have demonstrated this. They're firing drones and missiles left and right. Nobody's winning. Um but you can break the political will of an adversary like Israel through civilian casualties. The Israelis are very civilian casualty averse. uh if they are having to endure uh ballistic missile strikes that are killing large numbers of Israelis on the ground that will change the politics of Israel, the hawkishness of Israel in a really significant way. So it's the air defenses component that matters. They didn't lose any aircraft. Uh they lost very few I don't think there were any soldiers. There were some civilian casualties. There was some economic damage of course but then the the economy rebounded in Q3 2025 just shot up because everybody delayed their business. They didn't cancel it. Uh but the air defenses is the is the thing to watch. And that's one of the reasons I think Trump was complaining about the uh defense contractors here in the US is that companies like Rathon that are part of the Israeli air defense network, they just can't produce these these replenishment uh anti-missiles uh munitions at the scale that I think Trump wants so he can reescalate and not ensure that a major horm ballistic missile lands in the middle of Tel Aviv and kills 100 civilians. >> Okay. All right. Um, got one more question for you. Two more, but but one more topic. Um, but first I just want to preface it by saying Ryan, um, I appreciate so much again you coming on, but also just got a wealth of knowledge about the region. Um, I think in our first, uh, interview we did, I gave you like a couple minutes to give everybody your your whole CV and and how you have come to know so much about the region. So folks, if you want to get that on Ryan, go back and watch that. Um but uh you just seem to be extremely knowledgeable, extremely open-minded. Um I don't detect any bias one way or the other from you except maybe just for hopes of peace and prosperity. Uh you just kind of tell it like it is. That's that's why I that's what I see and that's why I keep having you back on. The question I'm gonna ask is a question that I I see in the comments when you and and some of your colleagues from Rain are on here, which is uh you know, hey, Rain is uh got CIA ties and you know, these guys are deep sters and they're, you know, there there's whatever biases come with those assumptions. I just want to give you a chance to talk to that potential criticism that it's unfounded from from coming from these people as best I can tell, but I just don't want it hanging out there unressed. So, what would you say? >> Uh, I mean, Rain is an independent company. Uh, I if we were getting deep state backing, uh, I think I'd be living in a nicer house. Uh, I'd probably be living someplace other than the Philadelphia metro area as well. Um, so there's there is that. Uh these the the a lot of these stories go back to you know the Wikileaks hack with with Stratfor way back in the day which exaggerated the company's capabilities and exaggerated our influence and I wasn't part of the company at that time. I joined in 2017 but it exaggerated um the status of the company with more or less everybody. Um and that was that was an affair that I think has lingered on social media for a long time. Um you know our our income comes from the vast majority our corporate clients. uh and they are coming to us because outlets like CNBC and Bloomberg etc keep saying geopolitical risk geopolitical risk geopolitical risk and then they don't define it um and as and as one of the earliest purveyors of talking about geopolitics as a field that gives us an advantage over some of our many competitors and we have many competitors and some of them are much bigger than us in terms of both personnel and budget uh because they do more you know they might not just be involved with risk analysis they might also be involved in media they uh they might be involved in partnerships with foreign governments. We don't have any partnerships with foreign governments. We don't have any partnerships with the US government. Anybody can subscribe to us and that does include some folks that just want access to our website. Um and that can be government entities, but it's also universities. Um some of these folks might be surprised at how many NOS's uh come to us for uh geopolitical analysis as they're trying to decide if they want a humanitarian mission in in a place like X Y and Z. Um, but there's a big appetite for people to have geopolitics interpreted these days because the multipolar world is so confusing. So that's really what we do for a living. Um, the market is there. Uh, it is it is I wouldn't describe it as overly lucrative. If you could ever get a Wall Street titan to back us, they would be super lucrative. Uh, but Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, they all have geopolitical in-houses uh, as well. And yeah, that's kind of what we do. Um, and I do really want to emphasize when we were bought out by rain in 2020. Uh, that involved us a a almost total leadership change. I don't work for the same people that I did back then, although some of them are still around. Um, that was a significant change for the direction of our company where we we kind of stopped being a magazine and started being more of a of a geopolitical consultancy uh for major companies, entities, NGOs, etc. >> All right. Well, well, thank you for that great answer. Um uh I expect to have you and your colleagues from RAIN on the channel more frequently going forward. Um just simply because the world seems to becoming much more multipolar uh and therefore understanding the geo strategic tectonic plates and how they're shifting becomes more and more important to understanding where things are going economically and of course at the end of the day this is an investing channel. So that that's that's why it matters so much. Um, but it is uh it's it's such a privilege and a gift to to be able to access you um when we can and when you have time to come on this channel. So Ryan, again I want to say thank you. For folks who would like to follow you and your work in between now and the next time you come on Thoughtful Money, where should they go? >> Uh you can find me on LinkedIn, which is where I tend to post some of the long the longer like sort of hot takes. Uh I'm occasionally using uh TwitterX again, so you're welcome to follow that too. Uh because of the Saudi Aradi crisis, there wasn't any. What's your handle there? >> Um, I'd have to check. It's like Ryan Bowl. I think it's Ryan.Boll, something like that. >> Okay. Probably not too many Ryan Bowls on Twitter, but >> yeah, there's not too many of them. There's just Yeah. Yeah. There's a coach somewhere that always gets in the SEO. >> I got a famous soccer player in Australia with my name. So, yeah. >> Um, so those are the two primary areas that I think you can you can uh look for connections and you know, on LinkedIn, I'm pretty open to having back and forths with folks if if they're they're interested. Um, obviously there's only so much I I'm willing to always discuss because again, you got to keep some some of the stuff for the clients. >> Sure. Yeah. And you know, it all might change tomorrow. I mean, it's the nature of your business, right? >> Absolutely. >> All right. Well, look, thank you so much for giving this real time update to this audience. Folks in the live chat, please tell Ryan how much you appreciate him making the time to come and do this. Uh, do the same thing, folks. If you're watching the replay, just put it in the comments section below. Uh, but thanks so much, Ryan. Again, we'll cross our fingers here for for peace. Um, you know, I I I will be I've been pretty vocal on X. You know, I will I will be rooting for the people of Iran uh to get the type of future that they want and deserve. Um, however that unfolds and whatever that is, you know, time will tell. But um, you know, beyond that, let's hope the bloodshed gets kept to a minimum. And, um, again, next time there's a big important development in the story. Love to have you come back on here, Ryan. >> Yeah, I appreciate it, Adam. And I appreciate your audience as well. Um, I was just checking the comments now and it seems like there's a lot of positive folks and constructive folks always willing to have a constructive conversation um on a variety of platforms. >> All right. Well, thanks so much Ryan. See you again soon. Everybody else, thanks so much for watching.