Davos & Geopolitics: The discussion centers on Davos, highlighting a potential shift away from a US-led rules-based order toward a more multipolar world.
Mark Carney Speech: Carney’s remarks framed the rules-based order as a “useful lie,” signaling a strategic European rethinking of automatic alignment with US policy.
Europe’s Weakness: The hosts argue Europe’s decline is self-inflicted via overregulation, fiscal burdens, and underinvestment in defense, increasing reliance on both the US and potentially China.
Greenland Saga: Trump’s Greenland rhetoric culminates in a status-quo outcome—US bases remain permissible without meaningful change—while mining prospects are portrayed as overstated.
Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: More countries may balance against US hegemony rather than bandwagon, with China’s influence rising and BRICS noted despite current limitations.
Monetary Architecture: European moves toward CBDCs could paradoxically boost demand for US stablecoins, reflecting consumer preference for alternatives to state-controlled systems.
Domestic Politics Lens: Foreign policy theatrics may serve US domestic narratives but risk fraying transatlantic ties and alienating parts of Trump’s 2024 coalition focused on domestic issues.
Policy Incoherence Risks: European calls for more Chinese investment alongside stricter Russia sanctions are cited as strategically inconsistent and politically unserious.
Transcript
Welcome back to the Power and Market podcast. I'm Ryan McMan, editor-inchief at the Mises Institute. And if you haven't visited our site lately, be sure and check it out. It's mises.orgg uh for a lot of commentary on issues like Austrian economics, freedom, peace, international relations, and we'll be covering some of those topics lightly today. Certainly a lot of what you'll encounter on the site are are deeper takes more academic uh sort of content. Now we've also got events coming up where some of our fellows uh senior fellows some of our student speakers even in some cases uh will be there but uh th Bishop is joining me today as well as Connor O'Keefe two of our contributing editors and th I bet you can tell us a little bit about some of our upcoming events. Well, our first event for a jam-packed 2026 schedule is in Oklahoma City. I don't think I've ever been there, but we're going to change that in February 21st for an event dedicated to entrepreneurship beyond politics. If you're looking to get a break of all the political headlines, and we've got uh actual real people doing real big things, I'm including Dr. Heath Smith of the Oklahoma Surgery Center and the Free Market Medical Association. and one of my personal favorites, Caitlyn Long of Custodia Bank, who's been doing big things in the crypto space. Um, we'll also have our own Ryan McMon. We'll have Per Band, of course, because he lives in the area. And Timothy Terrell, who's working on a book project that we're excited to be uh be seeing in the future. So, you can find out more about that and all of our events coming up in 2026, or at least those that have been listed yet. There's even more to come. So, uh, keep keep that uh that book page fresh. Um, you'll find all that at mises.org. org/events and also since I know we get a lot of students listening if you are a grad student in particular and you want to to have a one-of-a-kind experience you want to follow the the legacy of people like like Patrick Newman and Jonathan Newman Pand himself uh many many others u the Misesus Institute summer fellowship it's a research fellowship it's a fellowship in residence the deadline for that is coming up next month at the start of February. Um, if you've got a research proposal, submit it. You have access to all of our archives, access to our scholars like Dr. Joe Serno, like Mark Thornton, uh, like Jonathan Newman. Um, a great great option. And best of all, you get to stay at Rothbard Village. You get to enter a a special fraternity of Rothbard Village alums. Um, that and many, many more perks that come with it. Uh, spend your summer in Auburn if you're a grad student. You can learn more about that at mises.org. org/ressearchfellowship. I truly truly recommend anybody who is a grad student uh to apply. It's it's an incredible experience. Um always one of the highlights of my time at the institute. So definitely check that out. >> Well, going on right now is basically what you might call the anti-meises institute. This is the Davos event. Um >> they got Canes Village up there. >> Do they real? I I don't even know if you're kidding or not. Okay. Hopefully they don't have a lot of Keynesian activity but there >> surely. And this is where all the um you know the corporate welfare uh you know recipients they all get together and uh they plot some new evil for the world. These are of course the people who pioneered the idea of how you'll own nothing and you'll be happy. This is their vision for the future. and they just they just love to hatch up new ideas to to push around the the little people who they of course despise. So, let's talk about Davos a little bit. Uh Connor Connor, what's your take? I mean, usually there's some highlights. Uh usually there's something going on there that's seems especially awful. Have you seen anything like that this year? >> Uh well, the big thing for sure has been the Greenland drama that sort of has defined at least the first few days. Um, and I mean that's a whole other rabbit hole. I don't know if you guys want to get into that now or do more of a general um overview. There were some other things too, but that's kind of been the big the big thing at the middle. I I mean, just real quick, I'd say the other two uh things that are kind of related. One, Mark Carney, I think is how you say it, the uh prime minister of Canada, gave a interesting speech that could be worth getting into a bit. And then there's also Trump's Board of Peace, um, which was happening earlier today, which is also kind of an interesting kind of TV reality TV moment. Um, and when we're talking about global politics, those are the big three things uh kind of dynamics happening right here. But I don't know, do you guys want to dive into uh into Greenland first? Well, let's talk about the dynamic which of course is related to the Greenland thing, but it's going to continue far beyond the Greenland thing, which is this issue of uh is the rest of the world just going to continue to accept the United States as the undisputed leader of everything? And uh and Carney's speech certainly went against that. Now, Americans, they get really upset when anyone when other countries act like America isn't the best country, which is kind of weird, right? Americans always talk about how of course you should love your country, America, love it or leave it. And then if people foreigners who are citizens of other countries express any disliking of America, they get really upset for people doing for people loving their own country or maybe not liking when foreign countries intervene in their country. Uh which I just shows a certain short-sightedness. Um but that's that essentially what Carney was doing is saying that maybe this whole rules-based world order is coming to an end which display displays I think a certain level of naive in in the sense that I mean we were saying back in 2022 that the rules-based world order was always nonsense uh in the sense that right it only applied to countries not the United States it or countries the United States didn't like so it obviously it doesn't apply to Saudi Arabia. Arabia doesn't apply to Israel. There's no rules that apply to those countries. No, no rules that apply to the US. The US invades whatever country it wants. But they invoke the idea of a rules-based international order so that we can say, "Oh, Russia violated the rules-based international order." Uh because, well, that's a country we don't like, so therefore they have to follow the rules. But we Americans, we don't have to follow the rules. All that said, Carney is saying is that this order, this postWorld War II order that the US so clearly dominates in is coming to a close uh or at least on the decline. A lot of Americans get really worked up at that. But I think just the first thing I would say and then I'll throw it to you guys is the the people who who think that this sort saying this sort of thing is ridiculous seem to have this bias to believe that whatever is going on right now will continue indefinitely into the future forever. So the fact that the United States currently exercises near hegemonic power right now but is clearly declining in terms of relative power uh because what you have are rising especially Chinese power. Russia continues to delever from the overall global order and establishing itself uh into a a larger Eurasian sort of economic and political block with the Chinese and with with other nearby countries. And then there's bricks which is very weak at the moment. But the assumption always seems to be well America's on top right now so it will be forever. Uh what what what these other countries are trying to do is you could ask John Beers about it. He could explain to you in detail. They're trying to balance against the United States. So there are two things that other countries do when there's a big important country in any international system. You could be a regional hegeimon, you could be a global hedgeimon. The US has always aspired to be a global hegeimon. It missed that boat. it had a brief period where it almost had it after the collapse of the Soviet Union and uh was not able to achieve it and now clearly that's not going to happen uh because of the presence of China especially it's not going to achieve global hegemony that the fact that the US is a regional hegeon obviously obviously the hgeimon of the western hemisphere this is undisputed and that's not going to change for a long time however during most of that period the US reta maintained friendly relations with pretty much all of these western countries, Eastern Europe as well, uh a number of Middle Eastern countries even and certainly in Latin America also. And so what you had was heavy amount of what was called bandwagoning. So that was countries saw a clear benefit to going to the US side to rallying to the US side, being friends and allies with the US side. the US regime, not just Trump, um but the US regime has been so aggressive in terms of uh setting up sanctions against who knows how many countries now, sending drones to bomb various countries, siding with Israel on everything that trying to be friends with the United States has not nearly as clear a payoff anymore because you could spend decades trying to be a close ally with the United States, i.e. Denmark, and then the US turns around and treats you like garbage. So what's the advantage of being a friend of the United States? You could have the rug pulled on you at any time. There's clearly some advantages still to it still, but it's not nearly as clear as it has been historically. So now a lot of countries are looking at balancing against the United States. So instead of joining the bandwagon with the US, they now think if enough countries get together to balance against the United States, we can start to diminish the US's relative power in the international system. And that's what I think the that's the right way of looking at Carney's speech is this is a rallying cry for more balancing against the United States and they're turning away from bandwagoning. And this this takes years to play out. And so the fact that you got all these Trump lovers like you know the US is clearly socendant compared to all these other countries. Yeah, in 2026 I have no doubt. But what happens in 2026 is isn't what's going to be happening in 2035 or 2030. The world changes, things change, gang. Uh, >> history doesn't end, Ryan. Is that what you're saying? >> Right. I mean, it's amazing that things aren't frozen in time forever, but that seems to be what a lot of Americans are counting on. U, but there clearly seems to be some movement there. And I think Davos, what's happening at Davos, I mean, the Greenland issues is part of that, but it's just, I think, a one piece of what's going on. And I think we're probably going to see more of that. I don't know. Um, I mean, if you want to get into specifics of Carney's speech, I think just the big thing was him just basically saying, "Hey, America isn't everything, guys." But, uh, what do you think? >> Well, I think the uh the notable thing from my perspective is that he laid out what you said earlier that the rules-based international order is a fiction. Like there has been some rhetoric. I think especially um since Ukraine started with with this kind of like rebalancing framework, the uh European Union and European countries kind of wanting to sort of uh pivot away from just sort of blindly following the US. But he called it a a lie at the beginning. He said that this he said it was a a useful lie, which you know it was for people that were for countries that were close to the US. They very much benefited from this. But it was like I I mean to me it was like a um calling the emperor out for having no clothes moment, but instead of a kid, it was like a minister of the emperor. Like it was kind of somebody that's supposed to be very bought into this whole thing and keeping this fiction alive. Saying outright on like the world stage that it's just a lie and we're doing it because it's been useful for us, but we may pivot away um if that changes is very interesting and something that you don't just walk back. I think that's kind of the dynamic that's going to be very interesting to watch going forward is like and we talk about this a lot in our circles like the ideas in people's heads are so important for like how power actually resides in society and on an international um scale as well. And so like yes there's I I agree like we're we're on this trajectory of the US kind of losing its postsviet uh post um cold war status but um it what's been interesting over the last few decades is Europe has been behind the US for a lot of what it's doing obviously Iraq and Afghanistan and I think it's it's very interesting to think about what US foreign policy and international relations more broadly would look like if Europe was not behind and Washington as steadfastly as it has been. And yes, that like it's not like this was a sudden pivot to that reality, but this was in my opinion a pretty major step just because he's calling out this whole thing as being this collective lie that they're all kind of working together to to keep intact is, you know, this big source of their power to to kind of admit that to everybody. And also, I mean, just the fact that Carney Carney is not like some like wacky kind of populist leader like he's he's Justin Trudeau's uh like or in Justin Trudeau's party like his uh his next in line. Um, and it's just to me very interesting to hear somebody calling out that specific part of all this that the fact that it's all a lie that um is like you said useful like like it's just like this is what we're chirping about all the time and to see them just admit it um on stage is is pretty remarkable. >> Well, it's a good reminder too because as you obviously people at Carney's level, they know it was always a lie, right? What was interesting is that they helped maintain the lie as you're saying, right? They repeated this pro- US propaganda because it served their purpose. And so their job in part was to convince the Canadian man on the street that they were part of this international order that they benefited from with the US in charge. Carney knew that wasn't true. And everyone at that level knew that wasn't true. Just like everyone in Washington knows that's not true, that it's a lie. Except for some tiny percentage of true believers, uh, like Ted Cruz maybe seems like he's just dumb enough to believe that stuff. But, uh, for the most part, what was remarkable was how the elite, the foreign policy elite from around the world was was pushing the lie to help America and they've abandoned that position. So yeah, that is an important distinction that you make is that we're talking about uh non-Americans who knew the reality but repeated the fake version of reality anyway. And and yeah, it's it's nice to see some recognition of what a joke it always was and things are different now. >> Well, it's it's a fascinating speech. The only speech of this type that I can think of off the top of my head from a western leader calling out um you know America and the you assumed status quo and that has always been sold was a 2019 speech by the um governor of the Bank of England who was raising concerns about at the time dollar uh the the demand of the dollar globally how the dollar as a global reserve currency um we've all accepted it for so long it has the risk of being abused. We need to think about something different than that. And really again like you putting a spotlight on one of the very assumed sort of norms of the global political status quo and the Bank of England governor at the time was of course Mark Carney. And so I think these two those two speeches actually complement each other extremely well. Now to to that to this broader point though when we think about you know this this rising multipolar world or call it what you will um I I do think you know obviously America has lost a element of global dominance relative I think particularly to China right I think it's easy to overstate Russia I mean obviously it's a belligerent you know it's been very aggressive on its own borders but I mean I think it's very easy to overstate Russia's global influence at this time um but obviously China's making very real advances in in tech and other sort of areas um even cultural advances here and there. Um, but the area the global power that has lost the most over this time is of course Europe. And to me like that it I think Carney is responding even though Canada is not Europe but I mean it basically should be. Um, you know my big takeaway of the Davis narrative is just how small Europe looks. And of course this is all self-inflicted right? I mean Europe has you know destroyed its own economy. Europe has given its sovereignty to the EU in many such cases. Um you know Europe has been the biggest loser of the last several decades all from you know minations of their own governments doing and to me and I I you know Zalinsky is usually you know not someone I I uh praise to to a great extent. Um you know but he he had comments along these lines. Obviously, he's got his own self, you know, motivation there and he wants the, you know, Europe to be big and bold like Trump and to, you know, give him more weapons and that sort of stuff, but his big message to Davos was about how weak Europe looks right now. Um, and to me, like that's that's my biggest meta takeaway. And obviously, either the Greenland stuff plays into it, all the, you know, but to me, like it's it's how small Europe looks on the global map right now is to me the narrative from Davos that I think is most important. I think Carney is is himself trying to position himself a bit as a as a leader of that and like trying to you and he p pointed to you know how look how you know look how the culture we're developing in Canada and and how um um you know polyentric it is and how accepting we are and like this is the model for the rest of the world of course I look at Canada that's not exactly what I would want right many many ways um I'm not you know particularly excited about uh you know wanting uh you know I don't know how many European countries are are biting the bit at uh government subsidize Eastern Asia anytime soon. Um, but I I think Carney is trying to position himself and and to a certain extent, you look at other European leaders. I mean, Carney is, you know, I think in many ways a lot more serious um in in ways we don't like, right? You know, but but he he is he seems to me as being one of the more serious leaders out there. You know, McCron tried to you take the stage and do his little bit. I mean, obviously his his domestic issues are are what they are in recent elections, uh, from their their perspective, but I think it's very interesting Carney trying to present himself as the, you know, sort of anti-American leader of the of the West, if you will. And I think his speech went a long way to position himself in that role. >> Yeah. Importantly, Carney is not a populist, as you stated, and he's an international banker. He has direct access to the the world of geopoliticalminded finance. So this is So to treat this guy like, "Oh, he's just a cook from the hinterland of Canada." The exact opposite is true. >> Probably the only leader of of Davos that took a step downwards in terms of political power from his previous position. Like I don't know. Would you rather be a central bank uh a central banker or would you rather be a a political leader? I think uh many would much prefer to be in the position of a central banker, but >> yeah, the Anglosphere is an odd place. I'm the I'm the the governor of the Bank of England one minute and then I'm the prime minister of Canada the next. I mean, I guess that's seamless in the year 1910 or something, but it seems like there would be more problem with that, but I guess Canadians >> don't care that your president is a foreign banker. >> Well, he probably had to learn some foreign languages being Canada now and not just you Chinese and a few others, but that's a that's a whole another demographics issue for Canada. I mean, I've been reading um Vilfredo Parto stuff lately, just motivated someone by Ralph Reiko on this who clearly was something of a fan. And boy, this guy became like a case study in elite theory, right? Mark Cardi and how that works with the circulation of elites in and out of countries, in and out of central banks, really quite amazing. And you act like there's some sort of real turnover in who's running Canada, but of course there's none whatsoever. We start to realize who's really running the place. And then of course we run we realize who's really running things every time we look at Davos and we can see how they get together and they um well of course I assume this year like every year that uh the this the town was flooded with sex workers uh that the price of a prostitute went up 10,000% or whatever. The same thing happens when there's ever like a political convention in town. a lot of Keynesians. >> They're they're people with high time preference to say the least. And yet somehow managed to acquire zillions of dollars, but that's what we're dealing with right now. And so I clearly they're getting together and this is a topic of conversation. The question is though, I mean, does this set the stage for any future presidents, a US president or is well, I guess I want to put it this way. Clearly, like the larger macro geopolitical trends are beyond anything that a US president can just simply change with with a snap of the fingers. However, are these guys just like Biden their time until Trump's out of office and then be like, "Okay, now we can get back to friendly relations with the United States again, or is this do they think this could maybe be something that that will continue?" I I actually have no idea if anyone's giving any thought to what things are going to look like in the year 2028 or 2029 rather. Yeah, I um that's sort of been one of my takes is that for all Trump's bluster and everything he's kind of doing on the world stage. I it doesn't feel like anything that he's done anything that won't easily be reversed by another president coming in whether it's this term or maybe Vance is in for uh a term. And so that's kind of been my take is that they're kind it's sort of what we've been talking about with the Fed that they just sort of want to weather the storm and then um they can kind of treat all this as a diversion from the norm in some kind of weird uh couple of years. But Carney's speech kind of made me rethink that because this was a little bit of a Rubicon crossing like like we were just talking about saying that this is all basically useful fiction um is something that you don't really you're not able to just walk back from. And so I I similar to you, I'm I'm not really sure too much what to uh think about this because I mean that was just I guess kind of a shocking um thing there. And it kind of it it does lend credence to the idea that they view this as a a real trajectory that they're not just going to be able to um correct back from once Trump is off the stage. I mean, I do think it might be shrewd in Carney's part because like there is this underlying question of, you know, let's let's assume right that uh 2028 um again obviously, you know, midterms are not looking pretty good for Republicans, but let's say JD Vance became president. JD Vance seems to be far more anti- Europe than Trump is, right? I mean, Europe Europe can kind of smoo Trump here and there, right? He'll he'll bluster a lot, but you know, I don't think he has any sort of sincere diehard ideological disagreements with Europe. I think Vance has been a lot more pointed on specific criticisms of the way the EU governs itself, the way that it treats other its American companies, right? I I think that Vance is is far more anti-European, far more anti-U than Trump is. And maybe that can, you know, kind of continues a trend there and and whatever. Um on the Democrat side though is that like if you assume that you know Trump's a blip and you have you know someone firmly within the you know Hillary Biden Kamla mold going forward right then maybe that's a that's a return to you know the the you know the international rules-based order being run from DC but there's also I think a very you know kind of sound viewpoint that the Democratic party is also changing that that a you know what a future of the Democratic party is going to be less Hillary and it's going to be more AOC right And obviously AOC is not, you know, is not JD van is not Trump in many foreign policy ways. And I'm not trying to suggest that she is, you know, some sort of serious threat to the status quo by by any means there. But it it is a diff I think there is a some some real differences in terms of you know I think it is is a separation from uh uh you know Obama Hillary style Democratic party. Um, and so that there there might be some, you know, wisdom in recognizing there's a a broader political realignment going on, shifting of of of ways than, you know, what you were used to from the '90s. Um, it's also going to be interesting to see whether any of this really matters. Like Europe, you know, it it seems to me that that that, you know, Europe is very hostile and I see no real ideological shift to reversing any of the policies that has made it weak, right? We're not we're not seeing a massive rush to reverse uh you know its nuclear policy, right? You you have German politicians bemoning the fact they shut down the nuclear power plans, but we're not seeing a renearization on the power side of things and a and a complete uh uh elimination of green political parties influence on on policy. Like we're not seeing, you know, okay, we got to get serious about our tax problems here because we're, you know, we we've chugged the life out of our big businesses. It seems that you know to to any certain extent and and and Canada plays a role within this and some of their recent deals is that ultimately if Europe is unable uh because of its own political ingrained political positioning of its leaders um lack of political will whatever that it's simply trans uh taking less reliance from Washington and more reliance from China. Um, and so if that is the case, then okay, that that does have massive geopolitical ramifications. But is that going to make Europe a more robust global power and a more polyentric global order? No, I just kind of training one master for another in that regard. Um, you may split custody, right? But I I think, you know, Europe is unable to really address the underlying issues that has made it so weak. And so, you know, Carney can can go up there and bluster, but ultimately Canada is not, you know, becoming more self-reliant. They're just becoming more reliant upon China. >> Yeah. And it should note that e the EU has been bad for overall global trade in Europe in the sense that uh it has become more restricted because it's not like you as a member country can just go out and trade with whoever you want. And this was one of the complaints that you got from the UK uh in terms of why they wanted out of the EU was that it constrained their trade policy so much. was that if you wanted to trade externally, of course it's good for trade in terms of other members of the EU and that's what it was founded for as basically a customs union. Great. But in terms of trading with the rest of the world, it adds layers of bureaucracy and >> and that well go ahead. I didn't mean to didn't mean to cut you off, but but drawing back to this parallel of the Bank of England Carney versus Canada, you know, Carney and and the the Davos model now is that at the time of Carney's speech in 2019, he was using it as stating the need for central bank digital currencies and basically calling for Europe and England to further control its currency and and to as a way of of creating more independence away from the dollar. What we've actually seen though is that you know the European banking system um yes they're trying to do central bank digital currency but that's actually creating more demand for US stable coins as as something that's independent from that. And so in many ways I there's you know I think there's a lot of a very shrewd analysis that you on the monetary side of things the influence of the Fed and of the dollar um you know regardless of own individual opinion of it is actually more favorable in Europe now is is actually becoming a bigger role now because of consumers have that choice um than it did in 2019. And so again given you if Europeans have the ability you know that that this is why Europe has to almost embrace a more tyrannical model because failure to remove um these underlying interventions in their economy you businesses and in Europe like you they if they have alternatives they will seek other alternatives. I mean, one of the the criticisms of Mcronone, for example, um was saying like, "Oh, we don't need more cheap stuff from Canada, from from China that doesn't fit our standards. We need more direct investment from China." And so, again, like this is consistent uh resistance of you, they they want to continue their control over the market in ways that, you know, has its own consequences. And you can't just, you know, politically will yourself into being a global power if you are fundamentally altering and and damaging your economy and your society with the interventions that has made Europe where it is right now. >> Yeah. There Europe is not a free marketplace. Uh freedom is not their thing. You can just see this in how they treat freedom of speech, uh online speech, that sort of thing. They they have nowhere near the relationship with the idea of natural property rights that American libertarian types have. Right? They it certainly free free markets more or less can be good on a pragmatic level but they can always be constrained by legislation and rightly so in their mind and what what that means then is that there is nothing considered to be free from some sort of regulation some sort of control some sort of subsidy I mean just look at the French markets where boy the agricultural market is so hidebound it is so caught up in such endless subsidies and controls uh trade is this insanely complex thing uh this is not a functioning econ economy. Uh if we're looking at it in terms of providing some level of market freedom, right? We're not even talking pure lazy fair. We're just talking the sort of system where the uh the posture is just generally in favor of markets rather than state control. I don't think that could that phrase could be used to describe most European regimes at this point. Nonetheless, these are very powerful countries. And so what we note though is that their weakness is a choice. And as and you said though it's self-inflicted, right? You take any of the larger countries in Europe, take two of them and you have larger GDP than Russia. So this idea that Europe is at the mercy of Russia without the United States is simply untrue if Russia wished it not or if Europe wished it not to be so. Right? It would not be anywhere near a difficult task for France to up its nuclear arsenal a bit. uh and to join forces with Germany to develop better defense capability for the continent. They absolutely do not need the United States to do that. But they're so obsessed with just augmenting their welfare state for uh bleeding the American taxpayer dry. That's just been their status quo for decades. That's what they're sticking with. Uh but that's a choice they make. There is not something structural in Europe or its institutions that makes it incapable of dealing with Russia, which is one of the poorest countries in Europe in terms of GDP per capita. This is not a rich country. They just look good compared to countries like Ukraine um and maybe Bulgaria and some of those poorer countries in Eastern Europe, but they're not even in the same league as a country like Germany. And even with Germany being much smaller geographically, all Germany just has to team them up with one or two other large European countries and they could easily overwhelm the Russians in terms of because all they have to do is front up defense capability. They don't have to develop some big offensive capability. Defense is easier and cheaper than offense. Europe could easily do that, but they don't want to because they're cheap because they let the Americans do it. And the Americans have been offering to do it because it because it's easy bucks for American defense corporations and all that sort of stuff. And so I can see how that system is finally breaking down, but it's it's not going to happen overnight. And Russia's or and Europe's going to have to face uh some some choices that will require uh it to actually uh quit exploiting Americans on this and and it's it's because Europe is is lying to itself as well. Like it's not just simply about the international global order, but like you know, they like to to proclaim, you know, that that they are standing for a pluristic society and and all sort of stuff. But of course like you you have no like there's a few examples of greater persecution as you mentioned on the free speech issue and and and the way it it monitors social media posts and things like that. But like I mean some of the countries that are most explicitly hostile to political minorities and political opposition are the very European countries bemoning that oh we're losing civility and you know America's being a bully and yada yada yada. you know, they can't even come to frank terms with their own way of, you know, their own lies they are perpetrating um which again are undermining their their own, you know, their own nations. >> Well, I think we can Oh, go ahead. I was just I'm just agreeing with what you're saying, but I do really put a lot of emphasis on the American uh the American side of that because I I sort of look at it almost like um spoiled children like maybe they have like rich parents and they like have the luxury of not having to get out and get a job for themselves because they have that kind of backs stop. And I feel like that like America's given a lot of these countries the luxury to essentially destroy the institutions that you know gave them the wealth and power to sort of help Europe explode to sort of the top of the world. Um, and yeah, so it it's kind of interesting with the whole Carney speech like maybe potentially some people in Europe are talking about pivoting away from relying on the US that much, but it just it it seems like like I it I don't know if they understand really what that means. Like if you take away that backs stop, you can't keep doing what you're doing. And even like if China is coming in investing more like it's kind of absurd to think about what this would look like but if if there was really like a division between the US and Europe and then China was really coming in and getting a lot more involved there like a lot of the influence we've had over Europe is over defense and that's not really something that China can do in the same way that we could. So if we started to view some of these countries as being in bed with China and they were kind of geopolitical rivals in that way like Europe is powerless on that front but and you can kind of take China out of the uh equation there. If the US isn't there, then yeah, they would have to start investing more in their defense and they would not really be able to continue with these, you know, extreme well, they're basically welfare states where we're giving their governments the ability to just hand money out to, you know, interest groups and people uh within their countries. And when that all goes away, like they're going to be forced to recommmit to, you know, actually cultivating the institutions that make society wealthy, which is sort of what, you know, leads to power down the road. And um it it's just it's it's like the the spoiled kid that uh won't get a job. Like they I don't know if they fully understand that they can't just keep going in that the sort of like liberal international uh direction that they're going right now if they don't have the US, but they still kind of seem interested in not being reliant on the US. I don't know. It's interesting. >> Well, just to show the the hypocrisy and and just how unserious these European leaders are. Again, like Mcronone was out there calling for more Chinese investment as part of this sort of repivoting strategy. The same Mcronone has talked about how, you know, we need stronger sanctions on Russia trading partners from third world countries. So, so who who is Russia's most important ally, economic ally, economic partner? It's China. We want more Chinese money, but we need to have tougher sanctions on other countries accepting Russian oil. I mean, this is just it's it's absolutely unserious here. And if if Russia is the great boogeyman of Europe, then then you then then a pivot to China really doesn't make a ton of strategic sense. And so again, like it just shows just how how absolute, you know, you shallow, you know, this entire rhetoric, I think, really is. and and you know outside of you know it's more about complaining about Washington than it is some sort of you know actual blueprint some actual serious policy pivot I I would expect from European leaders >> well so much of what they say is just for consumption of the general public which is barely paying attention so they're not even going to see the contradiction there and they're just going to hear their president saying oh he he wants more direct investment that's good I guess Macron's good and I I've already forgotten about this thing he said about third world sanctions and such, right? They can't remember anything from one week to the next because they got like a regular job and stuff like that. So, they know they can just keep pumping out lies and whatever is a good soundike that that is that week. The public has forgotten what he said the week before. And this brings us to the Greenland issue, which I think is a perfect uh show of I think what is basically Trump's method here based on the last the last news I've seen of a deal. So, uh, here's the current deal I know about. Maybe you guys have got even more recent information. The deal that the US is currently proposing is that the US has tiny pockets of sovereign territory inside Greenland on which to put military bases. In other words, basically the status quo. So, nothing has changed in Greenland, but Trump will declare it a great victory. So, let's let's walk through the the Greenland rhetoric, right? He's for years been saying the US needs Greenland. US needs Greenland for security purposes. Also, we're going to mine it. We're going to develop it finally. There's too few people there. It's going to be the 51st state. It's going to be part of America. It's finally going to we're we're just going to do something with it, which then the Danes have done nothing. And and then he says he's going to conquer it. And then he says he's going to buy it. And then when all the dust settles, what is he saying? Oh, we're going to have military bases there. That's the deal. That's the current deal. Well, the US has always been free to put military bases there since uh World War II. It it had it can have thousands of troops there. It has never been constrained in its ability to put Cold War style installations in Greenland designed for missile defense and other purposes. And so, the fact that Trump's doing that now, no change from what has been true for decades. But again, he says a lot of things. His the people who are sort of barely paying attention, they're thinking, "Oh, Trump, he's a tough talker. Those those Greenland people, they just they want to make help Russia and China conquer the world. They if we don't take over Greenland, China and Russia are going to nuke us and win a nuclear war." And if you pay attention to social media everywhere, they were like posting maps of like ICBM paths and stuff over Greenland, which again is all irrelevant because the US already has installations addressing that issue there. And so since they're barely paying attention, the Trump tuck talks tough, says all these things America's going to do if it has control of Greenland. And now he's going to go out and say, "Yes, I want us some sovereign some sovereignty. We now have a sovereign outpost in Greenland and we're going to put military bases there. America is safe now." Nothing changed. It only seemed like he accomplished something if you have no idea what's going on. And it's going to work great for him because all of his core uh supporters are going to take their take away from this is going to be it's America first. Trump's a tough talker. He's making North America safe. And so McCron doing similar stuff. It's it works on certain people. And then but the people who aren't paying attention, who naysay that stuff, you know, we're going to be told we just have a bad attitude, that being too negative, uh that we just have Trump derangement syndrome. Uh but I think Greenland is going to be a very interesting model going forward in terms of how does this method work in terms of engaging with the public and having negotiations quote unquote with other allies in other countries which end up moving the needle almost not at all but provide some interesting sound bites domestically. That seems to be the re it's all about domestic politics. There doesn't seem to be any like real world geopolitics going on here because nothing's changed. Uh but I think what's affecting people at Davos now is just how Europe and other American allies have basically been the whipping boy in this rhetoric is that it's just been a non-stop assault on Europe. Claims that European allies are are useless that that the Danes are somehow bad allies. And so I think all that stuff starts to take its toll. And so while I do think the Greenland thing works well domestically, I do think it's going to feed into this larger narrative we were talking about before in terms of unraveling that uh that narrative of the international order that existed up until now. >> Yeah. Well, I think it's sort of at the it's what caused all the dynamics we were just talking about with the Carney speech is sort of in in the leadup to this this conference over the last I'd say two weeks especially Trump has really escalated the the rhetoric about Greenland and was like hinting that he would send troops and and invade it which everybody was freaking out about. I never bought that. That's never what I was worried about. Um, but what I was kind of pulling my hair out about earlier in the week, I wrote my whole weekly article about it this week was just what you were saying, Ryan, that everything that was on the table. Everything Everything he was trying to do is like we it was the status quo. He was trying to bring about the status quo, but the whole thing was he was trying to buy Greenland. They were talking about spending $700 billion. technically a little more than that because then they were going to give like $100,000 per resident of Greenland. So like $76 billion, but if you look at what we were actually getting, it was nothing. Well, like you said, we've I think since 1951, there's been a treaty where the US can have military assets on Greenland, and we have not even like gotten even close to the limit of what we're allowed to do militarily on Greenland in that time there. We've always been able to ramp those things up. I do think, you know, obviously I'm an opponent of the whole imperial project, but I think there's a lot there's a better argument to be made about having military defensive military assets on Greenland than like Afghanistan or Iraq or whatever. Like yeah, like that isn't like people often think of Russia as being like we think of wall maps, right? So it's like way over here when uh the US is over here, but like Russia and the US are actually pretty close. And in the event of a nuclear war, it would like the missiles would be going over the poles. So if you're going to have an early defense or an early detection radar station, Greenland, the north of Greenland is an excellent place for the US to have that. So like that all makes sense. But we have that already. And on top of that, there's I mean it was basically uh having military assets there. Um keeping the Russians and Chinese out of Greenland and um mining as well. You know, I I looked into the mining stuff, too, and it's just Greenland is not an exceptionally great mining prospect. Most of it is essentially under permanent ice sheets year round, and a lot of the partisans were kind of really trying to make it seem more appealing by looping in like copper and things. Um, so not a not much there. And also at the same time like it's kind of the classic if the government has to tell businesses to go make money at something it's probably not actually a very profitable opport uh profitable opportunity but um yeah and and then once again we already have a pretty big military presence there and it's technically ruled by the Kingdom of Denmark which is a NATO ally. So like the idea that the Russians were just going to come take it under the status quo. Basically it was all like I it was just driving me crazy because people were talking about Greenland like yeah strategically a good place for us to have military assets. We already do. It's like it could be a good place to mine. Yeah. Well like that's not really but there's already kind of not uh negotiations happening about to be fair specifically on that front. I guess there were some people saying that the EU's overly stringent mining regulations were not great and it would be better if those were not uh constraining the mining companies, but there were already I my understanding is negotiations happening where the EO is like yeah maybe we can relax some of that stuff. So like, yeah, not exactly something that would uh require us to conquer Greenland. And then the same thing, like we already have a heavy presence there. And so for all of that, for Trump changing nothing, he wanted to force us to spend $700 billion dollars. That was just like the craziest thing um in my opinion. And so I I was Yeah, like I kind of pulling my hair out arguing with some people about this earlier in the week. And then Trump gets to Davos and just completely flips. And like you said, they're now making this deal. He's bragging about paying nothing, but he's also getting nothing cuz it's just it's the same thing and they're just he's going to rebrand it as a win. >> Well, he got the framework of a future deal, Connor. >> Yeah. But I think that's kind of but I I think that's kind of the ultimately I mean I think that's kind of the motivation is you we've talked about it a lot and I think we're going to continue to talk about it a lot for the next you know uh 3 years is that you Trump's domestic agenda like Congress prevents any anything meaningful happening domestically changes in the margin and so Trump wants big bold things that he can take credit for and so this you know even if the the framework at the end of the day is a very you know is a margin change to the status quo. He can take credit for it and I think and that and I think that's going to be the main story that we're going to continue to see. Um you of course he used tariffs which is his favorite tool, right, as as a as a negotiation tactic and all that sort of stuff. Um but he wants to he wants to stack up accomplishments that he can sell and foreign policy is the easiest way for him to do it. So you're going to I think you're going to see a lot more stuff like this. of his report that you know I would not want to be um in the in the Cuban government u you know during the the rest of 2026 right and I think that you know and and you to Ryan's point I don't even think it plays that well domestically is the larger problem here as well is that you know obviously I think if if you're looking for accomplishments to celebrate with Trump then you know again this this is something that you guys a marginal change to that relationship um but I I I think that what you're seeing is an erosion you know all the polling shows a massive erosion of the coalition that Trump had in 2024 because they wanted more domestic concern like the the major issues were inflation and you the economy, some culture war stuff, right? He was elected off of a domestic agenda. They they didn't want to need to know you. They didn't want to have Venezuela in the headlines. They didn't want to have Cuba in the headlines. They didn't particularly care um about Greenland in in the headlines, right? You know, Greenland was kind of just more of a meme than anything else. Um and and so I think this is the the larger issue that Trump has is that the more that he wants to have these accomplishments, the more he is eroding the very coalition that gave him power in 2024. And I again have a feeling that that's going to play out in a big way come 2026 and and you know, we'll see you know what 28 looks like. Um, and so I to me I think that the domestic policy side of this is perhaps even more interesting um than the international relations standpoint because all the people in Europe that don't like Trump don't like Trump now with one exception. I think one of the interesting components to this um and you even saw this a little bit with Venezuela is that you're starting to see a massive fracture within the global right particularly between Europe and the United States. you know, the the the the first international leader or one of the first international leaders to criticize the Maduro raid was Marine Le Pen who said, "Well, you know, I care about national sovereignty. This was a fringe about sovereignty. I don't like Venezuela's government, but Venezuela has sovereignty." Um, you're seeing right-wing members of the European Parliament saying that this, you know, criticizing Trump on this. And so you I think that's the one extent where you know the the uh you the only people internationally that have changed their minds over this issue is that you're starting to see a breakaway from very Trump inspired you know historically friendly European parties starting to get concerned with some of this action. And it'll be interesting to see is this a blip in the pan, right? Or or how that goes going forward, how much that really influences obviously, you know, American politics is is left to be be seen. But I I do think it's it's very perhaps encouraging, right? If if we want more nations to be independent, you if we want more political nationalism at the expense of the EU, right, the idea that, you know, nationalism is better than globalism. Um if if this further sharpens concerns about national sovereignty even related to a Republican controlled United States, maybe that is going back to our first topic, uh one of these areas where the right is even more skeptical of a Republicancontrolled Washington. Um and so it's not just a you know left-right divide in terms of how you view Washington going forward. >> All right. Well, with that, we'll go ahead and wrap up this episode of Power and Market Podcast. Uh thank you though. Thank you, Connor. Um, and uh, if you haven't been, be sure and subscribe to our weekly or daily emails. If you want to keep up on new content over at the Mises Institute, just go to mises.org and click on the top right where it says subscribe. But >> and Ryan, you can like and subscribe on the podcast as well. Boost our numbers on the the podcast algorithms, too. So, want to get that in there. >> Yes, you should do that. And uh we will of course we'll give you another opportunity to do that again next week. So we will be back next time with another episode here of power market and we'll see you then.
Davos Calls For A New World Order
Summary
Transcript
Welcome back to the Power and Market podcast. I'm Ryan McMan, editor-inchief at the Mises Institute. And if you haven't visited our site lately, be sure and check it out. It's mises.orgg uh for a lot of commentary on issues like Austrian economics, freedom, peace, international relations, and we'll be covering some of those topics lightly today. Certainly a lot of what you'll encounter on the site are are deeper takes more academic uh sort of content. Now we've also got events coming up where some of our fellows uh senior fellows some of our student speakers even in some cases uh will be there but uh th Bishop is joining me today as well as Connor O'Keefe two of our contributing editors and th I bet you can tell us a little bit about some of our upcoming events. Well, our first event for a jam-packed 2026 schedule is in Oklahoma City. I don't think I've ever been there, but we're going to change that in February 21st for an event dedicated to entrepreneurship beyond politics. If you're looking to get a break of all the political headlines, and we've got uh actual real people doing real big things, I'm including Dr. Heath Smith of the Oklahoma Surgery Center and the Free Market Medical Association. and one of my personal favorites, Caitlyn Long of Custodia Bank, who's been doing big things in the crypto space. Um, we'll also have our own Ryan McMon. We'll have Per Band, of course, because he lives in the area. And Timothy Terrell, who's working on a book project that we're excited to be uh be seeing in the future. So, you can find out more about that and all of our events coming up in 2026, or at least those that have been listed yet. There's even more to come. So, uh, keep keep that uh that book page fresh. Um, you'll find all that at mises.org. org/events and also since I know we get a lot of students listening if you are a grad student in particular and you want to to have a one-of-a-kind experience you want to follow the the legacy of people like like Patrick Newman and Jonathan Newman Pand himself uh many many others u the Misesus Institute summer fellowship it's a research fellowship it's a fellowship in residence the deadline for that is coming up next month at the start of February. Um, if you've got a research proposal, submit it. You have access to all of our archives, access to our scholars like Dr. Joe Serno, like Mark Thornton, uh, like Jonathan Newman. Um, a great great option. And best of all, you get to stay at Rothbard Village. You get to enter a a special fraternity of Rothbard Village alums. Um, that and many, many more perks that come with it. Uh, spend your summer in Auburn if you're a grad student. You can learn more about that at mises.org. org/ressearchfellowship. I truly truly recommend anybody who is a grad student uh to apply. It's it's an incredible experience. Um always one of the highlights of my time at the institute. So definitely check that out. >> Well, going on right now is basically what you might call the anti-meises institute. This is the Davos event. Um >> they got Canes Village up there. >> Do they real? I I don't even know if you're kidding or not. Okay. Hopefully they don't have a lot of Keynesian activity but there >> surely. And this is where all the um you know the corporate welfare uh you know recipients they all get together and uh they plot some new evil for the world. These are of course the people who pioneered the idea of how you'll own nothing and you'll be happy. This is their vision for the future. and they just they just love to hatch up new ideas to to push around the the little people who they of course despise. So, let's talk about Davos a little bit. Uh Connor Connor, what's your take? I mean, usually there's some highlights. Uh usually there's something going on there that's seems especially awful. Have you seen anything like that this year? >> Uh well, the big thing for sure has been the Greenland drama that sort of has defined at least the first few days. Um, and I mean that's a whole other rabbit hole. I don't know if you guys want to get into that now or do more of a general um overview. There were some other things too, but that's kind of been the big the big thing at the middle. I I mean, just real quick, I'd say the other two uh things that are kind of related. One, Mark Carney, I think is how you say it, the uh prime minister of Canada, gave a interesting speech that could be worth getting into a bit. And then there's also Trump's Board of Peace, um, which was happening earlier today, which is also kind of an interesting kind of TV reality TV moment. Um, and when we're talking about global politics, those are the big three things uh kind of dynamics happening right here. But I don't know, do you guys want to dive into uh into Greenland first? Well, let's talk about the dynamic which of course is related to the Greenland thing, but it's going to continue far beyond the Greenland thing, which is this issue of uh is the rest of the world just going to continue to accept the United States as the undisputed leader of everything? And uh and Carney's speech certainly went against that. Now, Americans, they get really upset when anyone when other countries act like America isn't the best country, which is kind of weird, right? Americans always talk about how of course you should love your country, America, love it or leave it. And then if people foreigners who are citizens of other countries express any disliking of America, they get really upset for people doing for people loving their own country or maybe not liking when foreign countries intervene in their country. Uh which I just shows a certain short-sightedness. Um but that's that essentially what Carney was doing is saying that maybe this whole rules-based world order is coming to an end which display displays I think a certain level of naive in in the sense that I mean we were saying back in 2022 that the rules-based world order was always nonsense uh in the sense that right it only applied to countries not the United States it or countries the United States didn't like so it obviously it doesn't apply to Saudi Arabia. Arabia doesn't apply to Israel. There's no rules that apply to those countries. No, no rules that apply to the US. The US invades whatever country it wants. But they invoke the idea of a rules-based international order so that we can say, "Oh, Russia violated the rules-based international order." Uh because, well, that's a country we don't like, so therefore they have to follow the rules. But we Americans, we don't have to follow the rules. All that said, Carney is saying is that this order, this postWorld War II order that the US so clearly dominates in is coming to a close uh or at least on the decline. A lot of Americans get really worked up at that. But I think just the first thing I would say and then I'll throw it to you guys is the the people who who think that this sort saying this sort of thing is ridiculous seem to have this bias to believe that whatever is going on right now will continue indefinitely into the future forever. So the fact that the United States currently exercises near hegemonic power right now but is clearly declining in terms of relative power uh because what you have are rising especially Chinese power. Russia continues to delever from the overall global order and establishing itself uh into a a larger Eurasian sort of economic and political block with the Chinese and with with other nearby countries. And then there's bricks which is very weak at the moment. But the assumption always seems to be well America's on top right now so it will be forever. Uh what what what these other countries are trying to do is you could ask John Beers about it. He could explain to you in detail. They're trying to balance against the United States. So there are two things that other countries do when there's a big important country in any international system. You could be a regional hegeimon, you could be a global hedgeimon. The US has always aspired to be a global hegeimon. It missed that boat. it had a brief period where it almost had it after the collapse of the Soviet Union and uh was not able to achieve it and now clearly that's not going to happen uh because of the presence of China especially it's not going to achieve global hegemony that the fact that the US is a regional hegeon obviously obviously the hgeimon of the western hemisphere this is undisputed and that's not going to change for a long time however during most of that period the US reta maintained friendly relations with pretty much all of these western countries, Eastern Europe as well, uh a number of Middle Eastern countries even and certainly in Latin America also. And so what you had was heavy amount of what was called bandwagoning. So that was countries saw a clear benefit to going to the US side to rallying to the US side, being friends and allies with the US side. the US regime, not just Trump, um but the US regime has been so aggressive in terms of uh setting up sanctions against who knows how many countries now, sending drones to bomb various countries, siding with Israel on everything that trying to be friends with the United States has not nearly as clear a payoff anymore because you could spend decades trying to be a close ally with the United States, i.e. Denmark, and then the US turns around and treats you like garbage. So what's the advantage of being a friend of the United States? You could have the rug pulled on you at any time. There's clearly some advantages still to it still, but it's not nearly as clear as it has been historically. So now a lot of countries are looking at balancing against the United States. So instead of joining the bandwagon with the US, they now think if enough countries get together to balance against the United States, we can start to diminish the US's relative power in the international system. And that's what I think the that's the right way of looking at Carney's speech is this is a rallying cry for more balancing against the United States and they're turning away from bandwagoning. And this this takes years to play out. And so the fact that you got all these Trump lovers like you know the US is clearly socendant compared to all these other countries. Yeah, in 2026 I have no doubt. But what happens in 2026 is isn't what's going to be happening in 2035 or 2030. The world changes, things change, gang. Uh, >> history doesn't end, Ryan. Is that what you're saying? >> Right. I mean, it's amazing that things aren't frozen in time forever, but that seems to be what a lot of Americans are counting on. U, but there clearly seems to be some movement there. And I think Davos, what's happening at Davos, I mean, the Greenland issues is part of that, but it's just, I think, a one piece of what's going on. And I think we're probably going to see more of that. I don't know. Um, I mean, if you want to get into specifics of Carney's speech, I think just the big thing was him just basically saying, "Hey, America isn't everything, guys." But, uh, what do you think? >> Well, I think the uh the notable thing from my perspective is that he laid out what you said earlier that the rules-based international order is a fiction. Like there has been some rhetoric. I think especially um since Ukraine started with with this kind of like rebalancing framework, the uh European Union and European countries kind of wanting to sort of uh pivot away from just sort of blindly following the US. But he called it a a lie at the beginning. He said that this he said it was a a useful lie, which you know it was for people that were for countries that were close to the US. They very much benefited from this. But it was like I I mean to me it was like a um calling the emperor out for having no clothes moment, but instead of a kid, it was like a minister of the emperor. Like it was kind of somebody that's supposed to be very bought into this whole thing and keeping this fiction alive. Saying outright on like the world stage that it's just a lie and we're doing it because it's been useful for us, but we may pivot away um if that changes is very interesting and something that you don't just walk back. I think that's kind of the dynamic that's going to be very interesting to watch going forward is like and we talk about this a lot in our circles like the ideas in people's heads are so important for like how power actually resides in society and on an international um scale as well. And so like yes there's I I agree like we're we're on this trajectory of the US kind of losing its postsviet uh post um cold war status but um it what's been interesting over the last few decades is Europe has been behind the US for a lot of what it's doing obviously Iraq and Afghanistan and I think it's it's very interesting to think about what US foreign policy and international relations more broadly would look like if Europe was not behind and Washington as steadfastly as it has been. And yes, that like it's not like this was a sudden pivot to that reality, but this was in my opinion a pretty major step just because he's calling out this whole thing as being this collective lie that they're all kind of working together to to keep intact is, you know, this big source of their power to to kind of admit that to everybody. And also, I mean, just the fact that Carney Carney is not like some like wacky kind of populist leader like he's he's Justin Trudeau's uh like or in Justin Trudeau's party like his uh his next in line. Um, and it's just to me very interesting to hear somebody calling out that specific part of all this that the fact that it's all a lie that um is like you said useful like like it's just like this is what we're chirping about all the time and to see them just admit it um on stage is is pretty remarkable. >> Well, it's a good reminder too because as you obviously people at Carney's level, they know it was always a lie, right? What was interesting is that they helped maintain the lie as you're saying, right? They repeated this pro- US propaganda because it served their purpose. And so their job in part was to convince the Canadian man on the street that they were part of this international order that they benefited from with the US in charge. Carney knew that wasn't true. And everyone at that level knew that wasn't true. Just like everyone in Washington knows that's not true, that it's a lie. Except for some tiny percentage of true believers, uh, like Ted Cruz maybe seems like he's just dumb enough to believe that stuff. But, uh, for the most part, what was remarkable was how the elite, the foreign policy elite from around the world was was pushing the lie to help America and they've abandoned that position. So yeah, that is an important distinction that you make is that we're talking about uh non-Americans who knew the reality but repeated the fake version of reality anyway. And and yeah, it's it's nice to see some recognition of what a joke it always was and things are different now. >> Well, it's it's a fascinating speech. The only speech of this type that I can think of off the top of my head from a western leader calling out um you know America and the you assumed status quo and that has always been sold was a 2019 speech by the um governor of the Bank of England who was raising concerns about at the time dollar uh the the demand of the dollar globally how the dollar as a global reserve currency um we've all accepted it for so long it has the risk of being abused. We need to think about something different than that. And really again like you putting a spotlight on one of the very assumed sort of norms of the global political status quo and the Bank of England governor at the time was of course Mark Carney. And so I think these two those two speeches actually complement each other extremely well. Now to to that to this broader point though when we think about you know this this rising multipolar world or call it what you will um I I do think you know obviously America has lost a element of global dominance relative I think particularly to China right I think it's easy to overstate Russia I mean obviously it's a belligerent you know it's been very aggressive on its own borders but I mean I think it's very easy to overstate Russia's global influence at this time um but obviously China's making very real advances in in tech and other sort of areas um even cultural advances here and there. Um, but the area the global power that has lost the most over this time is of course Europe. And to me like that it I think Carney is responding even though Canada is not Europe but I mean it basically should be. Um, you know my big takeaway of the Davis narrative is just how small Europe looks. And of course this is all self-inflicted right? I mean Europe has you know destroyed its own economy. Europe has given its sovereignty to the EU in many such cases. Um you know Europe has been the biggest loser of the last several decades all from you know minations of their own governments doing and to me and I I you know Zalinsky is usually you know not someone I I uh praise to to a great extent. Um you know but he he had comments along these lines. Obviously, he's got his own self, you know, motivation there and he wants the, you know, Europe to be big and bold like Trump and to, you know, give him more weapons and that sort of stuff, but his big message to Davos was about how weak Europe looks right now. Um, and to me, like that's that's my biggest meta takeaway. And obviously, either the Greenland stuff plays into it, all the, you know, but to me, like it's it's how small Europe looks on the global map right now is to me the narrative from Davos that I think is most important. I think Carney is is himself trying to position himself a bit as a as a leader of that and like trying to you and he p pointed to you know how look how you know look how the culture we're developing in Canada and and how um um you know polyentric it is and how accepting we are and like this is the model for the rest of the world of course I look at Canada that's not exactly what I would want right many many ways um I'm not you know particularly excited about uh you know wanting uh you know I don't know how many European countries are are biting the bit at uh government subsidize Eastern Asia anytime soon. Um, but I I think Carney is trying to position himself and and to a certain extent, you look at other European leaders. I mean, Carney is, you know, I think in many ways a lot more serious um in in ways we don't like, right? You know, but but he he is he seems to me as being one of the more serious leaders out there. You know, McCron tried to you take the stage and do his little bit. I mean, obviously his his domestic issues are are what they are in recent elections, uh, from their their perspective, but I think it's very interesting Carney trying to present himself as the, you know, sort of anti-American leader of the of the West, if you will. And I think his speech went a long way to position himself in that role. >> Yeah. Importantly, Carney is not a populist, as you stated, and he's an international banker. He has direct access to the the world of geopoliticalminded finance. So this is So to treat this guy like, "Oh, he's just a cook from the hinterland of Canada." The exact opposite is true. >> Probably the only leader of of Davos that took a step downwards in terms of political power from his previous position. Like I don't know. Would you rather be a central bank uh a central banker or would you rather be a a political leader? I think uh many would much prefer to be in the position of a central banker, but >> yeah, the Anglosphere is an odd place. I'm the I'm the the governor of the Bank of England one minute and then I'm the prime minister of Canada the next. I mean, I guess that's seamless in the year 1910 or something, but it seems like there would be more problem with that, but I guess Canadians >> don't care that your president is a foreign banker. >> Well, he probably had to learn some foreign languages being Canada now and not just you Chinese and a few others, but that's a that's a whole another demographics issue for Canada. I mean, I've been reading um Vilfredo Parto stuff lately, just motivated someone by Ralph Reiko on this who clearly was something of a fan. And boy, this guy became like a case study in elite theory, right? Mark Cardi and how that works with the circulation of elites in and out of countries, in and out of central banks, really quite amazing. And you act like there's some sort of real turnover in who's running Canada, but of course there's none whatsoever. We start to realize who's really running the place. And then of course we run we realize who's really running things every time we look at Davos and we can see how they get together and they um well of course I assume this year like every year that uh the this the town was flooded with sex workers uh that the price of a prostitute went up 10,000% or whatever. The same thing happens when there's ever like a political convention in town. a lot of Keynesians. >> They're they're people with high time preference to say the least. And yet somehow managed to acquire zillions of dollars, but that's what we're dealing with right now. And so I clearly they're getting together and this is a topic of conversation. The question is though, I mean, does this set the stage for any future presidents, a US president or is well, I guess I want to put it this way. Clearly, like the larger macro geopolitical trends are beyond anything that a US president can just simply change with with a snap of the fingers. However, are these guys just like Biden their time until Trump's out of office and then be like, "Okay, now we can get back to friendly relations with the United States again, or is this do they think this could maybe be something that that will continue?" I I actually have no idea if anyone's giving any thought to what things are going to look like in the year 2028 or 2029 rather. Yeah, I um that's sort of been one of my takes is that for all Trump's bluster and everything he's kind of doing on the world stage. I it doesn't feel like anything that he's done anything that won't easily be reversed by another president coming in whether it's this term or maybe Vance is in for uh a term. And so that's kind of been my take is that they're kind it's sort of what we've been talking about with the Fed that they just sort of want to weather the storm and then um they can kind of treat all this as a diversion from the norm in some kind of weird uh couple of years. But Carney's speech kind of made me rethink that because this was a little bit of a Rubicon crossing like like we were just talking about saying that this is all basically useful fiction um is something that you don't really you're not able to just walk back from. And so I I similar to you, I'm I'm not really sure too much what to uh think about this because I mean that was just I guess kind of a shocking um thing there. And it kind of it it does lend credence to the idea that they view this as a a real trajectory that they're not just going to be able to um correct back from once Trump is off the stage. I mean, I do think it might be shrewd in Carney's part because like there is this underlying question of, you know, let's let's assume right that uh 2028 um again obviously, you know, midterms are not looking pretty good for Republicans, but let's say JD Vance became president. JD Vance seems to be far more anti- Europe than Trump is, right? I mean, Europe Europe can kind of smoo Trump here and there, right? He'll he'll bluster a lot, but you know, I don't think he has any sort of sincere diehard ideological disagreements with Europe. I think Vance has been a lot more pointed on specific criticisms of the way the EU governs itself, the way that it treats other its American companies, right? I I think that Vance is is far more anti-European, far more anti-U than Trump is. And maybe that can, you know, kind of continues a trend there and and whatever. Um on the Democrat side though is that like if you assume that you know Trump's a blip and you have you know someone firmly within the you know Hillary Biden Kamla mold going forward right then maybe that's a that's a return to you know the the you know the international rules-based order being run from DC but there's also I think a very you know kind of sound viewpoint that the Democratic party is also changing that that a you know what a future of the Democratic party is going to be less Hillary and it's going to be more AOC right And obviously AOC is not, you know, is not JD van is not Trump in many foreign policy ways. And I'm not trying to suggest that she is, you know, some sort of serious threat to the status quo by by any means there. But it it is a diff I think there is a some some real differences in terms of you know I think it is is a separation from uh uh you know Obama Hillary style Democratic party. Um, and so that there there might be some, you know, wisdom in recognizing there's a a broader political realignment going on, shifting of of of ways than, you know, what you were used to from the '90s. Um, it's also going to be interesting to see whether any of this really matters. Like Europe, you know, it it seems to me that that that, you know, Europe is very hostile and I see no real ideological shift to reversing any of the policies that has made it weak, right? We're not we're not seeing a massive rush to reverse uh you know its nuclear policy, right? You you have German politicians bemoning the fact they shut down the nuclear power plans, but we're not seeing a renearization on the power side of things and a and a complete uh uh elimination of green political parties influence on on policy. Like we're not seeing, you know, okay, we got to get serious about our tax problems here because we're, you know, we we've chugged the life out of our big businesses. It seems that you know to to any certain extent and and and Canada plays a role within this and some of their recent deals is that ultimately if Europe is unable uh because of its own political ingrained political positioning of its leaders um lack of political will whatever that it's simply trans uh taking less reliance from Washington and more reliance from China. Um, and so if that is the case, then okay, that that does have massive geopolitical ramifications. But is that going to make Europe a more robust global power and a more polyentric global order? No, I just kind of training one master for another in that regard. Um, you may split custody, right? But I I think, you know, Europe is unable to really address the underlying issues that has made it so weak. And so, you know, Carney can can go up there and bluster, but ultimately Canada is not, you know, becoming more self-reliant. They're just becoming more reliant upon China. >> Yeah. And it should note that e the EU has been bad for overall global trade in Europe in the sense that uh it has become more restricted because it's not like you as a member country can just go out and trade with whoever you want. And this was one of the complaints that you got from the UK uh in terms of why they wanted out of the EU was that it constrained their trade policy so much. was that if you wanted to trade externally, of course it's good for trade in terms of other members of the EU and that's what it was founded for as basically a customs union. Great. But in terms of trading with the rest of the world, it adds layers of bureaucracy and >> and that well go ahead. I didn't mean to didn't mean to cut you off, but but drawing back to this parallel of the Bank of England Carney versus Canada, you know, Carney and and the the Davos model now is that at the time of Carney's speech in 2019, he was using it as stating the need for central bank digital currencies and basically calling for Europe and England to further control its currency and and to as a way of of creating more independence away from the dollar. What we've actually seen though is that you know the European banking system um yes they're trying to do central bank digital currency but that's actually creating more demand for US stable coins as as something that's independent from that. And so in many ways I there's you know I think there's a lot of a very shrewd analysis that you on the monetary side of things the influence of the Fed and of the dollar um you know regardless of own individual opinion of it is actually more favorable in Europe now is is actually becoming a bigger role now because of consumers have that choice um than it did in 2019. And so again given you if Europeans have the ability you know that that this is why Europe has to almost embrace a more tyrannical model because failure to remove um these underlying interventions in their economy you businesses and in Europe like you they if they have alternatives they will seek other alternatives. I mean, one of the the criticisms of Mcronone, for example, um was saying like, "Oh, we don't need more cheap stuff from Canada, from from China that doesn't fit our standards. We need more direct investment from China." And so, again, like this is consistent uh resistance of you, they they want to continue their control over the market in ways that, you know, has its own consequences. And you can't just, you know, politically will yourself into being a global power if you are fundamentally altering and and damaging your economy and your society with the interventions that has made Europe where it is right now. >> Yeah. There Europe is not a free marketplace. Uh freedom is not their thing. You can just see this in how they treat freedom of speech, uh online speech, that sort of thing. They they have nowhere near the relationship with the idea of natural property rights that American libertarian types have. Right? They it certainly free free markets more or less can be good on a pragmatic level but they can always be constrained by legislation and rightly so in their mind and what what that means then is that there is nothing considered to be free from some sort of regulation some sort of control some sort of subsidy I mean just look at the French markets where boy the agricultural market is so hidebound it is so caught up in such endless subsidies and controls uh trade is this insanely complex thing uh this is not a functioning econ economy. Uh if we're looking at it in terms of providing some level of market freedom, right? We're not even talking pure lazy fair. We're just talking the sort of system where the uh the posture is just generally in favor of markets rather than state control. I don't think that could that phrase could be used to describe most European regimes at this point. Nonetheless, these are very powerful countries. And so what we note though is that their weakness is a choice. And as and you said though it's self-inflicted, right? You take any of the larger countries in Europe, take two of them and you have larger GDP than Russia. So this idea that Europe is at the mercy of Russia without the United States is simply untrue if Russia wished it not or if Europe wished it not to be so. Right? It would not be anywhere near a difficult task for France to up its nuclear arsenal a bit. uh and to join forces with Germany to develop better defense capability for the continent. They absolutely do not need the United States to do that. But they're so obsessed with just augmenting their welfare state for uh bleeding the American taxpayer dry. That's just been their status quo for decades. That's what they're sticking with. Uh but that's a choice they make. There is not something structural in Europe or its institutions that makes it incapable of dealing with Russia, which is one of the poorest countries in Europe in terms of GDP per capita. This is not a rich country. They just look good compared to countries like Ukraine um and maybe Bulgaria and some of those poorer countries in Eastern Europe, but they're not even in the same league as a country like Germany. And even with Germany being much smaller geographically, all Germany just has to team them up with one or two other large European countries and they could easily overwhelm the Russians in terms of because all they have to do is front up defense capability. They don't have to develop some big offensive capability. Defense is easier and cheaper than offense. Europe could easily do that, but they don't want to because they're cheap because they let the Americans do it. And the Americans have been offering to do it because it because it's easy bucks for American defense corporations and all that sort of stuff. And so I can see how that system is finally breaking down, but it's it's not going to happen overnight. And Russia's or and Europe's going to have to face uh some some choices that will require uh it to actually uh quit exploiting Americans on this and and it's it's because Europe is is lying to itself as well. Like it's not just simply about the international global order, but like you know, they like to to proclaim, you know, that that they are standing for a pluristic society and and all sort of stuff. But of course like you you have no like there's a few examples of greater persecution as you mentioned on the free speech issue and and and the way it it monitors social media posts and things like that. But like I mean some of the countries that are most explicitly hostile to political minorities and political opposition are the very European countries bemoning that oh we're losing civility and you know America's being a bully and yada yada yada. you know, they can't even come to frank terms with their own way of, you know, their own lies they are perpetrating um which again are undermining their their own, you know, their own nations. >> Well, I think we can Oh, go ahead. I was just I'm just agreeing with what you're saying, but I do really put a lot of emphasis on the American uh the American side of that because I I sort of look at it almost like um spoiled children like maybe they have like rich parents and they like have the luxury of not having to get out and get a job for themselves because they have that kind of backs stop. And I feel like that like America's given a lot of these countries the luxury to essentially destroy the institutions that you know gave them the wealth and power to sort of help Europe explode to sort of the top of the world. Um, and yeah, so it it's kind of interesting with the whole Carney speech like maybe potentially some people in Europe are talking about pivoting away from relying on the US that much, but it just it it seems like like I it I don't know if they understand really what that means. Like if you take away that backs stop, you can't keep doing what you're doing. And even like if China is coming in investing more like it's kind of absurd to think about what this would look like but if if there was really like a division between the US and Europe and then China was really coming in and getting a lot more involved there like a lot of the influence we've had over Europe is over defense and that's not really something that China can do in the same way that we could. So if we started to view some of these countries as being in bed with China and they were kind of geopolitical rivals in that way like Europe is powerless on that front but and you can kind of take China out of the uh equation there. If the US isn't there, then yeah, they would have to start investing more in their defense and they would not really be able to continue with these, you know, extreme well, they're basically welfare states where we're giving their governments the ability to just hand money out to, you know, interest groups and people uh within their countries. And when that all goes away, like they're going to be forced to recommmit to, you know, actually cultivating the institutions that make society wealthy, which is sort of what, you know, leads to power down the road. And um it it's just it's it's like the the spoiled kid that uh won't get a job. Like they I don't know if they fully understand that they can't just keep going in that the sort of like liberal international uh direction that they're going right now if they don't have the US, but they still kind of seem interested in not being reliant on the US. I don't know. It's interesting. >> Well, just to show the the hypocrisy and and just how unserious these European leaders are. Again, like Mcronone was out there calling for more Chinese investment as part of this sort of repivoting strategy. The same Mcronone has talked about how, you know, we need stronger sanctions on Russia trading partners from third world countries. So, so who who is Russia's most important ally, economic ally, economic partner? It's China. We want more Chinese money, but we need to have tougher sanctions on other countries accepting Russian oil. I mean, this is just it's it's absolutely unserious here. And if if Russia is the great boogeyman of Europe, then then you then then a pivot to China really doesn't make a ton of strategic sense. And so again, like it just shows just how how absolute, you know, you shallow, you know, this entire rhetoric, I think, really is. and and you know outside of you know it's more about complaining about Washington than it is some sort of you know actual blueprint some actual serious policy pivot I I would expect from European leaders >> well so much of what they say is just for consumption of the general public which is barely paying attention so they're not even going to see the contradiction there and they're just going to hear their president saying oh he he wants more direct investment that's good I guess Macron's good and I I've already forgotten about this thing he said about third world sanctions and such, right? They can't remember anything from one week to the next because they got like a regular job and stuff like that. So, they know they can just keep pumping out lies and whatever is a good soundike that that is that week. The public has forgotten what he said the week before. And this brings us to the Greenland issue, which I think is a perfect uh show of I think what is basically Trump's method here based on the last the last news I've seen of a deal. So, uh, here's the current deal I know about. Maybe you guys have got even more recent information. The deal that the US is currently proposing is that the US has tiny pockets of sovereign territory inside Greenland on which to put military bases. In other words, basically the status quo. So, nothing has changed in Greenland, but Trump will declare it a great victory. So, let's let's walk through the the Greenland rhetoric, right? He's for years been saying the US needs Greenland. US needs Greenland for security purposes. Also, we're going to mine it. We're going to develop it finally. There's too few people there. It's going to be the 51st state. It's going to be part of America. It's finally going to we're we're just going to do something with it, which then the Danes have done nothing. And and then he says he's going to conquer it. And then he says he's going to buy it. And then when all the dust settles, what is he saying? Oh, we're going to have military bases there. That's the deal. That's the current deal. Well, the US has always been free to put military bases there since uh World War II. It it had it can have thousands of troops there. It has never been constrained in its ability to put Cold War style installations in Greenland designed for missile defense and other purposes. And so, the fact that Trump's doing that now, no change from what has been true for decades. But again, he says a lot of things. His the people who are sort of barely paying attention, they're thinking, "Oh, Trump, he's a tough talker. Those those Greenland people, they just they want to make help Russia and China conquer the world. They if we don't take over Greenland, China and Russia are going to nuke us and win a nuclear war." And if you pay attention to social media everywhere, they were like posting maps of like ICBM paths and stuff over Greenland, which again is all irrelevant because the US already has installations addressing that issue there. And so since they're barely paying attention, the Trump tuck talks tough, says all these things America's going to do if it has control of Greenland. And now he's going to go out and say, "Yes, I want us some sovereign some sovereignty. We now have a sovereign outpost in Greenland and we're going to put military bases there. America is safe now." Nothing changed. It only seemed like he accomplished something if you have no idea what's going on. And it's going to work great for him because all of his core uh supporters are going to take their take away from this is going to be it's America first. Trump's a tough talker. He's making North America safe. And so McCron doing similar stuff. It's it works on certain people. And then but the people who aren't paying attention, who naysay that stuff, you know, we're going to be told we just have a bad attitude, that being too negative, uh that we just have Trump derangement syndrome. Uh but I think Greenland is going to be a very interesting model going forward in terms of how does this method work in terms of engaging with the public and having negotiations quote unquote with other allies in other countries which end up moving the needle almost not at all but provide some interesting sound bites domestically. That seems to be the re it's all about domestic politics. There doesn't seem to be any like real world geopolitics going on here because nothing's changed. Uh but I think what's affecting people at Davos now is just how Europe and other American allies have basically been the whipping boy in this rhetoric is that it's just been a non-stop assault on Europe. Claims that European allies are are useless that that the Danes are somehow bad allies. And so I think all that stuff starts to take its toll. And so while I do think the Greenland thing works well domestically, I do think it's going to feed into this larger narrative we were talking about before in terms of unraveling that uh that narrative of the international order that existed up until now. >> Yeah. Well, I think it's sort of at the it's what caused all the dynamics we were just talking about with the Carney speech is sort of in in the leadup to this this conference over the last I'd say two weeks especially Trump has really escalated the the rhetoric about Greenland and was like hinting that he would send troops and and invade it which everybody was freaking out about. I never bought that. That's never what I was worried about. Um, but what I was kind of pulling my hair out about earlier in the week, I wrote my whole weekly article about it this week was just what you were saying, Ryan, that everything that was on the table. Everything Everything he was trying to do is like we it was the status quo. He was trying to bring about the status quo, but the whole thing was he was trying to buy Greenland. They were talking about spending $700 billion. technically a little more than that because then they were going to give like $100,000 per resident of Greenland. So like $76 billion, but if you look at what we were actually getting, it was nothing. Well, like you said, we've I think since 1951, there's been a treaty where the US can have military assets on Greenland, and we have not even like gotten even close to the limit of what we're allowed to do militarily on Greenland in that time there. We've always been able to ramp those things up. I do think, you know, obviously I'm an opponent of the whole imperial project, but I think there's a lot there's a better argument to be made about having military defensive military assets on Greenland than like Afghanistan or Iraq or whatever. Like yeah, like that isn't like people often think of Russia as being like we think of wall maps, right? So it's like way over here when uh the US is over here, but like Russia and the US are actually pretty close. And in the event of a nuclear war, it would like the missiles would be going over the poles. So if you're going to have an early defense or an early detection radar station, Greenland, the north of Greenland is an excellent place for the US to have that. So like that all makes sense. But we have that already. And on top of that, there's I mean it was basically uh having military assets there. Um keeping the Russians and Chinese out of Greenland and um mining as well. You know, I I looked into the mining stuff, too, and it's just Greenland is not an exceptionally great mining prospect. Most of it is essentially under permanent ice sheets year round, and a lot of the partisans were kind of really trying to make it seem more appealing by looping in like copper and things. Um, so not a not much there. And also at the same time like it's kind of the classic if the government has to tell businesses to go make money at something it's probably not actually a very profitable opport uh profitable opportunity but um yeah and and then once again we already have a pretty big military presence there and it's technically ruled by the Kingdom of Denmark which is a NATO ally. So like the idea that the Russians were just going to come take it under the status quo. Basically it was all like I it was just driving me crazy because people were talking about Greenland like yeah strategically a good place for us to have military assets. We already do. It's like it could be a good place to mine. Yeah. Well like that's not really but there's already kind of not uh negotiations happening about to be fair specifically on that front. I guess there were some people saying that the EU's overly stringent mining regulations were not great and it would be better if those were not uh constraining the mining companies, but there were already I my understanding is negotiations happening where the EO is like yeah maybe we can relax some of that stuff. So like, yeah, not exactly something that would uh require us to conquer Greenland. And then the same thing, like we already have a heavy presence there. And so for all of that, for Trump changing nothing, he wanted to force us to spend $700 billion dollars. That was just like the craziest thing um in my opinion. And so I I was Yeah, like I kind of pulling my hair out arguing with some people about this earlier in the week. And then Trump gets to Davos and just completely flips. And like you said, they're now making this deal. He's bragging about paying nothing, but he's also getting nothing cuz it's just it's the same thing and they're just he's going to rebrand it as a win. >> Well, he got the framework of a future deal, Connor. >> Yeah. But I think that's kind of but I I think that's kind of the ultimately I mean I think that's kind of the motivation is you we've talked about it a lot and I think we're going to continue to talk about it a lot for the next you know uh 3 years is that you Trump's domestic agenda like Congress prevents any anything meaningful happening domestically changes in the margin and so Trump wants big bold things that he can take credit for and so this you know even if the the framework at the end of the day is a very you know is a margin change to the status quo. He can take credit for it and I think and that and I think that's going to be the main story that we're going to continue to see. Um you of course he used tariffs which is his favorite tool, right, as as a as a negotiation tactic and all that sort of stuff. Um but he wants to he wants to stack up accomplishments that he can sell and foreign policy is the easiest way for him to do it. So you're going to I think you're going to see a lot more stuff like this. of his report that you know I would not want to be um in the in the Cuban government u you know during the the rest of 2026 right and I think that you know and and you to Ryan's point I don't even think it plays that well domestically is the larger problem here as well is that you know obviously I think if if you're looking for accomplishments to celebrate with Trump then you know again this this is something that you guys a marginal change to that relationship um but I I I think that what you're seeing is an erosion you know all the polling shows a massive erosion of the coalition that Trump had in 2024 because they wanted more domestic concern like the the major issues were inflation and you the economy, some culture war stuff, right? He was elected off of a domestic agenda. They they didn't want to need to know you. They didn't want to have Venezuela in the headlines. They didn't want to have Cuba in the headlines. They didn't particularly care um about Greenland in in the headlines, right? You know, Greenland was kind of just more of a meme than anything else. Um and and so I think this is the the larger issue that Trump has is that the more that he wants to have these accomplishments, the more he is eroding the very coalition that gave him power in 2024. And I again have a feeling that that's going to play out in a big way come 2026 and and you know, we'll see you know what 28 looks like. Um, and so I to me I think that the domestic policy side of this is perhaps even more interesting um than the international relations standpoint because all the people in Europe that don't like Trump don't like Trump now with one exception. I think one of the interesting components to this um and you even saw this a little bit with Venezuela is that you're starting to see a massive fracture within the global right particularly between Europe and the United States. you know, the the the the first international leader or one of the first international leaders to criticize the Maduro raid was Marine Le Pen who said, "Well, you know, I care about national sovereignty. This was a fringe about sovereignty. I don't like Venezuela's government, but Venezuela has sovereignty." Um, you're seeing right-wing members of the European Parliament saying that this, you know, criticizing Trump on this. And so you I think that's the one extent where you know the the uh you the only people internationally that have changed their minds over this issue is that you're starting to see a breakaway from very Trump inspired you know historically friendly European parties starting to get concerned with some of this action. And it'll be interesting to see is this a blip in the pan, right? Or or how that goes going forward, how much that really influences obviously, you know, American politics is is left to be be seen. But I I do think it's it's very perhaps encouraging, right? If if we want more nations to be independent, you if we want more political nationalism at the expense of the EU, right, the idea that, you know, nationalism is better than globalism. Um if if this further sharpens concerns about national sovereignty even related to a Republican controlled United States, maybe that is going back to our first topic, uh one of these areas where the right is even more skeptical of a Republicancontrolled Washington. Um and so it's not just a you know left-right divide in terms of how you view Washington going forward. >> All right. Well, with that, we'll go ahead and wrap up this episode of Power and Market Podcast. Uh thank you though. Thank you, Connor. Um, and uh, if you haven't been, be sure and subscribe to our weekly or daily emails. If you want to keep up on new content over at the Mises Institute, just go to mises.org and click on the top right where it says subscribe. But >> and Ryan, you can like and subscribe on the podcast as well. Boost our numbers on the the podcast algorithms, too. So, want to get that in there. >> Yes, you should do that. And uh we will of course we'll give you another opportunity to do that again next week. So we will be back next time with another episode here of power market and we'll see you then.