Investment Pitches

Pitch Summary:
GameStop’s operational turnaround has been notable. The business has transitioned from a structurally challenged model to one that is meaningfully more stable, with improved cost discipline and emerging operating leverage driving margin improvement. We are constructive on the company’s collectibles initiatives, including the development of new digital collectible products, and view this segment as an underappreciated contributor to future economics. In addition, the company retains a degree of residual optionality tied to its history and investor base, which introduces occasional convex upside. From a risk perspective, while the position is nominally large, it is actively managed and partially hedged through call writing. More than half of the company’s current equity value is represented by net cash per share, which materially limits downside in adverse scenarios. Even at a position size exceeding 10%, we estimate that a poor outcome over the next year would likely translate to an approximate 3% drag on portfolio performance.

BSD Analysis:
GameStop has transformed from a dying retailer into a meme-stock battleground with an unclear operating future. The balance sheet is cleaner, but the core business continues to shrink. Strategic pivots into e-commerce, NFTs, or digital ecosystems have yet to prove durable. Investor sentiment, not fundamentals, still dominates price action. There is optionality if management finds a viable reinvention path. But visibility remains extremely low. This is speculation driven by narrative, not cash flow.

Pitch Summary:
AST SpaceMobile has rerated materially over the past year despite relatively limited changes to the underlying business. Progress has largely taken the form of execution against previously stated milestones, advancing the regulatory framework and continuing to move the technology toward operational readiness, rather than new information that fundamentally alters the long-term opportunity. One outstanding risk that remains on the cusp of resolution is launch execution. While delays were largely anticipated in our internal planning, we have been somewhat surprised by the degree to which the market has extended the benefit of the doubt despite the company not yet having demonstrated full build-and-launch capability. That dynamic is reflective of the current speculative environment, and we have been disciplined in not chasing the stock as sentiment has improved. Looking ahead, the next three to nine months are expected to be particularly active, with launches, satellite unfurling, and commissioning events likely to drive meaningful volatility. We believe this volatility will create opportunities to actively manage the position within the portfolio. AST SpaceMobile currently represents approximately a 3% position.

BSD Analysis:
AST SpaceMobile is attempting to build a space-based cellular broadband network — an audacious idea with massive upside if it works. The technology is complex, capital-intensive, and still largely unproven at scale. Partnerships with mobile operators add credibility, but execution timelines are long. Regulatory approvals and satellite deployment are critical gating factors. Success would redefine connectivity economics globally. Failure would be swift and final. This is moonshot infrastructure investing, not a traditional equity.

Pitch Summary:
Sphere Entertainment was up 138% over the year, reflecting nearly two years of sustained, data-driven conviction rather than a single opportunistic call. For much of that period, the market appeared to value the company almost entirely on trailing, realized cash flows. Our view was that this framework materially understated the business: Sphere possessed substantial embedded optionality and operating leverage, giving it a clear path to meaningful earnings power as utilization and content cadence improved. We built the position aggressively when the stock traded at deeply discounted levels and maintained significant exposure as identifiable earnings catalysts began to play out. More broadly, this investment illustrates the core drivers of our alpha: sourcing differentiated data unavailable to most market participants, applying holistic economic analysis to the full business, and dynamically sizing positions to maximize long-term geometric return. Sphere reached a peak weight of 27% in the portfolio and currently represents approximately 5% at ~$95 per share. We continue to expect the company to operate at a strong cadence and believe that forthcoming positive developments are unlikely to be fully reflected in the stock price, creating the potential for continued mispricing over time.

BSD Analysis:
Sphere Entertainment is a high-concept venue and content company anchored by the Las Vegas Sphere — an engineering marvel with unclear economics. The asset is spectacular, but monetization consistency remains unproven. Event demand is strong, but operating costs are heavy. Replicating the Sphere concept globally could unlock value, but capital intensity is daunting. The business is binary: either the Sphere becomes a cash machine or an expensive trophy. Investors are underwriting concept validation, not cash flow. This is experiential entertainment with venture-style risk.

Pitch Summary:
2025 has been a rollercoaster year for Sea Limited. At one point in September, the stock was up 85% YTD. At the time of writing, it sits in a 33% drawdown, yet still shows gains of 22% for the year, comfortably outperforming the broader market. I believe SE is one of the more compelling opportunities within the existing portfolio. The company delivered strong revenue growth and meaningful margin expansion in 2025, with all three business segments accelerating key performance indicators. The metric that stood out most to me was Sales and Marketing efficiency. Historically, SE was often criticised for subsidising growth, with incremental S&M spend exceeding incremental revenue. Over the past five quarters, that dynamic has flipped decisively. In Q3 alone, SE invested an additional $141 million in S&M and generated $727 million in incremental revenue, a roughly 5x return on investment. When I see a business with a reinvestment runway like this, I want management to reinvest aggressively.

BSD Analysis:
Sea is a high-torque emerging market platform spanning e-commerce and fintech, with a proven ability to pivot from growth-at-all-costs to profitability. The upside comes from re-accelerating commerce growth while expanding fintech monetization through payments and credit. Competition and subsidy wars remain the main threat—margins can evaporate fast if discipline slips. The market will punish any sign of returning to heavy losses, so execution must stay tight. As logistics scale improves, incremental volume can drive meaningful operating leverage. Macro volatility in Southeast Asia is a fact, not a scenario. Sea is a platform story where credibility is earned quarter by quarter.

Pitch Summary:
I went a step further with Uber and added to my position for the third consecutive month. For much of 2025, I regretted the size of my initial position, which I opened in December 2024 shortly before the stock moved sharply higher. While Uber is now in a roughly 20% drawdown over the past two months, the fundamentals remain as strong as ever. The narrative that autonomous vehicles pose an existential threat to Uber has resurfaced, and this is where my view diverges from the market. I believe autonomous vehicles will evolve into a highly fragmented market with multiple winners rather than a single dominant player. In that scenario, Uber is well positioned to leverage its global distribution network and infrastructure. We saw further evidence of this fragmentation recently, as Baidu announced plans to launch driverless taxi trials in the UK next year in partnership with Uber and Lyft. As part of the agreement, Baidu’s Apollo Go RT6 vehicles will join the London networks of both platforms in 2026. This marks the first direct competition between U.S. and Chinese autonomous players in a European capital, following Waymo’s recent supervised testing in the city.

BSD Analysis:
Uber is evolving from a cash-burning growth story into a scaled mobility and delivery platform with real operating leverage. The moat is network density—more drivers and couriers improve ETAs and pricing, attracting more riders and merchants. Profitability hinges on take rate discipline, incentives, and continued growth in higher-margin segments like advertising and enterprise partnerships. Regulatory risk persists, especially around labor classification, but Uber has increasingly navigated policy through hybrid models. The business benefits from urbanization and convenience demand that isn’t reversing. The main risk is competitive subsidy flare-ups and macro softness hitting discretionary rides. Uber is becoming a cash-generative platform, not just an app.

Pitch Summary:
180 Degree Capital (TURN) is a microcap (~$46MM market cap) closed end fund (CEF) pursuing an activist strategy in microcap stocks. Before 2017, some of you might remember the name, it was a venture capital fund known as Harris & Harris Inc (TINY). There are a few similar ones today, these almost never work. CEO Kevin Rendino took over, changed the strategy, but was hampered by their legacy venture portfolio weighting down overall returns. The last few years have been a difficult time for microcap investing, large caps seem to outperform year in and year out, but it's especially difficult to outperform if you're running a subscale internally managed CEF. Expenses create too high of a hurdle to justify a small fund's existence.
I'm going to skip some background but TURN trades at a discount to NAV (not uncommon for CEFs) and has for some time. Naturally activists showed up (Marlton Partners and others) and pushed the company to close the discount by repurchasing shares, liquidating and/or distributing the underlying public equities in TURN's portfolio in-kind to shareholders. To management's credit, TURN did implement a "Discount Management Program", but to limited success.
In January of this year, TURN entered into a reverse merger with private credit manager, Mount Logan Capital Inc (trades as MLC on Cboe Canada) valuing TURN at NAV (later revised to 110%) and Mount Logan at $67.4MM. This transaction potentially fits the "balance sheet to income statement transformation" theme where the market is currently valuing TURN at a multiple of book value and in the future will judge Mount Logan Capital on an earnings basis. Marlton Partners pushed back on the transaction, there was even a counter proposal from another CEF, Source Capital (SOR), at NAV, but TURN rebuffed that deal. Shareholders on both sides of the transaction have now approved the reverse merger with Mount Logan Capital, which should close sometime this month.
Who is Mount Logan Capital? It is an affiliate of BC Partners, where BC Partners credit team's executive management team also doubles as Mount Logan Capital's management team subject to an expense sharing agreement (so not quite an externally managed company). Mount Logan has a random assortment of low-quality asset management contracts plus an owned insurance company where they're managing the float for a total of $2.8B (the graphic is from last November), but that number is puffed up a bit by the insurance AUM and a couple run off management mandates.
It is unclear to me why Mount Logan exists separate from BC Partners which has its own credit platform and the delineation between the two on future asset management contracts. Management owns some shares here but not really enough to prioritize Mount Logan or become exceptionally rich if it is successful. The incentives are hard to tease out, which likely means they're not well aligned with outside minority shareholders. The relationship with BC Partners is strange, the two BDCs (PTMN and LRFC) recently merged, LRFC was being managed by Mount Logan Capital and PTMN by Sierra Crest Investment Management (a JV where BC Partners is the majority owner, Mount Logan Capital held a minority stake), the combined BDC was rebranded as BCP Investment Corp (BCIC) and will be managed by Sierra Crest. What's the point of Mount Logan?
In the merger proxy, Mount Logan management did put forth some pretty ambitious fee-related earnings projections that seems difficult to achieve:
If the 2026 numbers are to be believed, the $67.4MM valuation put on Mount Logan in the merger (actually less now that its been revised) is only 3.5x FRE (heavily adjusted) and doesn't count the spread earnings they receive from the owned insurance subsidiary. So either BC Partners is so desperate to get Mount Logan off of a backwater Canadian exchange and onto the NASDAQ, or something isn't right here. In July, they put out a SPAC-like deck comparing their FRE multiple to much larger more established peers and includes some wild upside targets.
Luckily, as part of the revised merger agreement, new Mount Logan Capital (will trade under the ticker MCLI) has agreed to a $15MM tender offer (presumably funded by liquidating TURN's portfolio) after closing at NAV (~$5/share) for any shareholders that don't want to go along for the ride. It's a bit of a free look to see if MCLI trades better on a U.S. exchange. Additionally, they've committed to a $10MM share repurchase program post-tender offer to support the stock and provide liquidity.
Small-cap BDC/credit managers haven't done particularly well in public markets despite the permanent capital angle, two that come immediately to mind are Fifth Street Asset Management (FSAM) and Medley Management (MDLY). Interested in hearing others thoughts, especially if you have a strong view on the future of Mount Logan. I own a bit, mostly hoping it trades well out of the gate, if not, there's some support from the tender offer (management has committed to not participating).
Disclosure: I own shares in TURN

BSD Analysis:
180 Degree Capital is a public-market and activist-style vehicle where results depend heavily on security selection and realized exits. These structures can trade at persistent discounts to NAV because investors distrust marks and timing. The upside comes from concentrated bets, activism, and unlocking value through corporate actions. The downside is that it can underperform quietly for long stretches, then make it back in one or two volatile quarters. Investors should watch NAV trend, realized gains versus paper gains, and expense discipline. When capital markets are supportive, discounts can close quickly. When they’re not, the discount becomes the story.

Pitch Summary:
We also remain enthused by the opportunity in the entertainment space, with Canada’s IMAX being a key holding. The recent bidding war for Warner Bros Discovery between Paramount and Netflix highlights the immense value placed on scarce content and platforms for developing future high-value Intellectual Property (IP). It has been clear to us for some time that the theatrical window is key to maximising the value of this IP, as content gains a powerful halo effect and associated marketing from a theatre run, while also being highly cash-flow generative in and of itself. Furthermore, IMAX itself has emerged as a keystone asset. Its scarce supply of exceptional technology, both in production and high-quality screens, is now booking into 2029, with some of the best filmmakers struggling to secure a slot.

BSD Analysis:
IMAX is a toll-collector on blockbuster spectacle, monetizing premium screens and premium ticket pricing without owning the entire exhibitor cost base. The moat is format + brand + studio relationships: when a film is “made for IMAX,” the marketing does half the selling. Its economics are structurally better than a normal theater because it gets paid through a mix of system installs and revenue-share arrangements with exhibitors. The risk is simple: if the blockbuster slate weakens or windows shift, IMAX’s “event” advantage fades. Streaming didn’t kill it, but it did change consumer expectations and volatility. IMAX works best when Hollywood produces cultural moments, not content. The bull case is premiumization and international screen growth; the bear case is cyclicality disguised as a platform. It’s a great business tied to an industry that periodically forgets how to make hits.

Pitch Summary:
Similarly, Icon, a top holding that performs drug trials for the pharma and biotech ecosystem, has been tarred with the same brush as the rest of the sector. The shares halved, falling to a low of around 10 times our estimate of normal earnings—a bargain for a good business with secular growth underpinnings. While we do not know the timing of the recovery from the temporary drop in R&D spending that led to short-term negative operating leverage, we are confident that the industry growth trends will resume, driven by the ongoing need for innovative healthcare as the wealthy baby boomer generation enters their twilight years.

BSD Analysis:
ICON’s moat is scale and embeddedness in pharma R&D workflows—once a sponsor trusts a CRO, switching is costly and risky. The business benefits from outsourcing trends, but demand is cyclical with biotech funding and big pharma pipeline confidence. Backlogs look reassuring until cancellations and delays show up. Pricing power exists in complex trials, but competition remains intense and contracts get renegotiated. Execution risk is operational: patient recruitment, site management, and timeline discipline. M&A can add capability but also integration risk, especially when systems and cultures clash. The bull case is normalization of trial activity and steady margin recovery. The bear case is prolonged biotech weakness and utilization pressure. ICON is a quality cyclical—defensive only if you ignore the cycle.

Pitch Summary:
Sotherly Hotels (SOHO) (~$108MM fully converted market cap) is a lodging REIT with 10 hotel properties located primarily in the southeastern part of the United States. The REIT is technically internally managed but each of the hotels is under a management agreement (remember, lodging REITs can't actually manage their hotels' operations) with a related party owned by the management team creating a conflict of interest. For that reason and others, SOHO has typically traded at a discount to peers. Their hotels:
On 10/27, Sotherly Hotels announced they are being acquired for $2.25 by a JV between Kemmons Wilsons Hospitality Partners and Ascendant Capital with Apollo Global (APO) and Ascendant providing financing for the deal. Like other REITs with conflicts that trade at a discount, SOHO funded itself with preferred stock classes publicly traded under the tickers SOHOB, SOHOO and SOHON (for purposes of the merger, it doesn't really matter which one you own). These classes of preferred stock all have provisions that allow holders to convert their shares to common in the case of a change of control, however, there's a catch in the form of a share cap:
Upon a change of control (as defined in our charter), holders of our Preferred Stock will have the right (unless, as provided in our charter, we have provided or provide notice of our election to exercise our special optional redemption right before the relevant date) to convert some or all of their shares of preferred stock into shares of our common stock (or equivalent value of alternative consideration). Upon such a conversion, holders will be limited to a maximum number of shares equal to the share cap, subject to adjustments. Each holder of Series B Preferred Stock is entitled to receive a maximum of 8.29187 shares of our common stock per share of Series B Preferred Stock, which may result in the holder receiving value that is less than the liquidation preference of the Series B Preferred Stock. Each holders of Series C Preferred Stock is entitled to receive a maximum of 8.50340 shares of our common stock per share of Series C Preferred Stock, which may result in the holder receiving value that is less than the liquidation preference of the Series C Preferred Stock. Each holder of Series D Preferred Stock is entitled to receive a maximum of 7.39645 shares of our common stock per share of Series D Preferred Stock, which may result in the holder receiving value that is less than the liquidation preference of the Series D Preferred Stock. In addition, those features of our Preferred Stock may have the effect of inhibiting or discouraging a third party from making an acquisition proposal for our Company or of delaying, deferring or preventing a change in control of our Company under circumstances that otherwise could provide the holders of shares of our common stock and shares of our Preferred Stock with the opportunity to realize a premium over the then current market price or that stockholders may otherwise believe is in their best interests.
There is a little more work involved here, you'll have to call your brokerage firm and elect to convert your preferred shares to common after the merger (if you don't, you'll get orphaned).
The take-private transaction appears to be on track: the definitive proxy is out, shareholder vote is set for 1/22/26, insiders own 17.73% of the shares and have signed on to vote yes, Apollo (Marc Rowan has recently said the firm is in a defensive posture) is leading the financing of the transaction. Sotherly Hotels is my largest position heading into 2026.

BSD Analysis:
Sotherly is a small-cap hotel REIT that trades like a leveraged bet on travel demand and refinancing conditions. Hotels are operationally flexible, but that flexibility cuts both ways—cash flow can swing sharply with occupancy and ADR. The upside is that quality assets in good markets can rebound strongly when travel is healthy. The downside is leverage, rising rates, and limited access to capital, which can force dilutive moves. Investors should focus on liquidity and debt maturities before getting excited about RevPAR. If refinancing risk clears, the equity can move fast from distressed levels. If not, the stock is essentially a balance-sheet lottery ticket.

Pitch Summary:
Genmab, our largest position, is a prime example. Investors often flee when a patent cliff for a flagship product like Genmab’s Darzalex (late 2020s/early 2030s) looms, fixating on the certain loss of legacy revenue while completely discounting what might replace it. Meanwhile, a slate of late-stage assets and growing partnered drugs are only beginning to contribute revenue well into the 2030s. The company’s R&D machine, still run by scientist-founder Dr. Jan van de Winkel, fosters disciplined capital allocation and scientific excellence, and its recent acquisition of ProfoundBio slots antibody-drug-conjugate technology neatly into its core expertise. Yet, the market treats Genmab as a single-product story, which allowed us to acquire the stock at a price lower than the cash flows from its commercialised drugs alone, essentially getting a world-class discovery platform (which has yielded eight approved medicines thus far) for free.

BSD Analysis:
Genmab’s moat is antibody engineering capability and a partnership model that monetizes innovation without fully owning commercialization risk. The best version of the story is royalty-like economics on successful drugs plus a pipeline that keeps producing shots on goal. The risk is dependence on partners’ execution and portfolio decisions—Genmab doesn’t control everything that matters. Biotech multiples swing violently with pipeline sentiment, regardless of underlying science quality. Competitive biology moves fast, and “best-in-class” can become “me-too” quicker than expected. Cash flow quality is high when partnered assets perform, but visibility varies across programs. The bull case is sustained platform credibility with multiple clinical wins. The bear case is pipeline disappointment and partner deprioritization. Genmab is high-quality biotech—still hostage to binary outcomes.

Pitch Summary:
Sharp-eyed followers will have noticed the reintroduction of Alphabet to the portfolio. Approximately a year ago, we sold out of Google’s owner, Alphabet, on the concern that its core business was being undermined by the rapid development of AI-powered Large Language Models (LLMs). ChatGPT’s introduction seemed to catch Alphabet flat-footed, prompting a response that was first slow, then rushed and chaotic. How the facts have changed. With the recent launch of Gemini 3, Alphabet’s LLM is widely perceived to have overtaken ChatGPT in capability, and is catching up in user numbers too. We now believe Alphabet has formidable competitive advantages which will be exceedingly difficult for competitors to overcome. A key one is the ability of Google Search and Gemini to riff off each other, with Gemini grounding responses in real-time information via Search, improving accuracy and reducing hallucinations. With YouTube and Android, Alphabet has data to draw on that AI competitors can’t so easily access, alongside its own ready-made AI use cases. Alphabet also has a cost advantage from operating its own cloud and designing its own purpose-built chips. Despite fears, Alphabet’s search revenues have accelerated, not declined. At 28 times next year’s estimated earnings, headline metrics understate long-term earnings power; valuing the core implies assets like Waymo, quantum computing and Gemini effectively come for free. If AI takes over the world, Alphabet is best placed to win; if it doesn’t, we return to a world where Google’s core search business was never under threat. Welcome back to the portfolio, Alphabet, you’ll fit in just fine.

BSD Analysis:
Alphabet remains a cash-printing machine, but AI has forced the market to finally price in self-cannibalization risk. The shift from links to answers threatens ad density even if users love the new experience. Its true moat is distribution—Chrome, Android, YouTube—and default placement, not just model performance. Google Cloud diversifies earnings, but it’s capex-heavy and structurally lower-margin than search. YouTube is a quietly powerful monetization engine that benefits from creator economics and shifting TV budgets. Regulation is a slow valuation tax that rarely kills the business but caps the multiple. Buybacks defend per-share compounding when growth optics wobble. Alphabet’s job is to evolve monetization without breaking the machine that funds everything.

Pitch Summary:
Light & Wonder (LNW) ($6.5B market cap, $11.3B EV) is a Las Vegas based maker of video gaming terminals, shuffle machines, other table products, etc., plus they now own 100% of SciPlay (SCPL) after the 2023 buyout and have a growing iGaming unit. This is the old Scientific Games (SGMS), they sold their lottery business to Brookfield (BN) in 2022 for $5.8B and the name went with the lottery business.
Light & Wonder is undertaking a strange move, the company is currently traded in both Australia on the ASX (which they only added as a secondary listing in 2023) and the U.S. on the NASDAQ, but after 11/12/25 (this coming Wednesday) the shares will be delisted from the NASDAQ, any remaining shares trading on the NASDAQ will move to OTC. A popular strategy in recent years to increase your multiple has been to move listings to the U.S., but here Light & Wonder is doing the reverse which piqued my interest.
Multiples for gaming companies tend to be higher in Australia, for example, The Lottery Corporation (ASX: TLC) trades for 20x EBITDA, Brightstar (BRSL) trades for 7x EBITDA in the U.S. Light & Wonder's closest peer, industry leader Aristocrat (ASX: ALL) trades for 14x NTM EBITDA, while LNW trades for 8x.

BSD Analysis:
Light & Wonder is a gaming content and systems company that benefits from recurring revenue and strong IP in casino floors and digital channels. The best part of the model is that once games and systems are installed, replacement and participation revenue becomes sticky. Growth comes from new game performance, expansion of installed base, and digital cross-sell, which can be powerful when execution is strong. The risk is that gaming is hit-driven, and regulators can change the rules quickly in key markets. Capital allocation matters because acquisitions and content investment can either compound or dilute returns. If the game pipeline stays strong, operating leverage is meaningful. This is a higher-quality gaming supplier when content is winning.

Pitch Summary:
Jefferies Financial Group (JEF) was recently ensnarled in the First Brands bankruptcy. Jefferies was First Brands' banker on the failed refinancing and a fund managed by Jefferies was exposed to the factoring debt. The situation seems pretty contained, Jefferies has limited actual exposure and the market will likely forget about it in a quarter or two. Unlike other troubled financials, JEF continues to benefit from strong M&A and open credit markets.

BSD Analysis:
Jefferies is a cycle-exposed investment bank with a scrappier culture and a history of opportunistic capital allocation. Its earnings are tied to capital markets activity, underwriting, advisory, and trading conditions that can turn on a dime. The upside is that operating leverage is significant in recovery periods, and Jefferies can take share when larger banks retrench. The downside is the inevitable dry spells when deal flow freezes and risk appetite evaporates. Balance sheet discipline and risk management matter more than growth ambitions. Management has generally been shareholder-friendly, which helps the long-term compounding story. Jefferies is a “buy when hated” capital markets lever, not a steady financial utility.

Pitch Summary:
Fiserv (FI) ($35.4B market cap, $65.7B enterprise value) is a large legacy merchant acceptance business (the old First Data) paired with a decent but no-growth core account software provider to small and medium sized community banks. These types of legacy fintech businesses usually have poor reputations with their clients, the view is they've levered up and no longer invest in their product or innovate, rather they rest on their laurels knowing their products are sticky and generally not worth the risk of transitioning away to a new provider. Fiserv apparently pushed that narrative to the extreme and clients are fighting back on extra fees attached to their Clover product (point of sale device, plus a software platform for small businesses) bringing their previously issued guidance into question. New CEO, Mike Lyons (joined from PNC, former CEO Fran Bisignano left to join the Trump Administration running SSA and the IRS) pressed the reset button on the company's strategy, management team (hiring new co-presidents for each business segment and a new CFO) and guidance. Shares dropped roughly in half last week, quite shocking for an real business and S&P 500 component.
Investor trust has been broken for now, but the reset seems to be the right strategy for the long term (?), this is still a non-discretionary product that should trade for more than ~7.5x adjusted earnings (much of the adjustment is non-cash amortization expense from the First Data merger). Fiserv has historically been a levered equity buyback story, hopefully they continue to buyback shares down here (they bought back $6.7B in the last twelves months at significantly higher prices) and avoid the trap of management teams hoarding cash just when the stock becomes cheap.

BSD Analysis:
Fiserv is payments plumbing that wins by being embedded, not exciting. Its merchant acquiring and core banking platforms create high switching costs because customers can’t afford downtime or integration chaos. Clover has added a software layer that improves growth and margin quality, turning a “processor” into a more platform-like business. Recurring revenue and scale make Fiserv far more resilient than pure-play fintechs when transaction growth slows. The main risk is competitive pricing pressure and merchant churn, but incumbency and integration complexity are strong defenses. Margin expansion comes from software mix and operating leverage rather than heroic assumptions. Fiserv is a quiet compounder that the market often ignores until it misses.

Pitch Summary:
Golden Entertainment (GDEN) (~$780MM market cap) is a regional casino operator primarily focused on the drive-to regional market, their flagship asset is the STRAT Hotel (fka the Stratosphere) focused on value oriented customers that opened in 1979 on the very north end of the strip. The rest of their assets cater to the locals markets in Las Vegas, Laughlin and Pahrump (town 60 miles west of Las Vegas where prostitution is legal), plus 72 taverns in the Las Vegas area functioning as mini-casinos with slot machine gaming being the primary draw. GDEN is one of the few remaining regional casino operators that still owns the majority of its real estate, most of the others have sold theirs to the gaming REITs.
On 11/6/25, after a long strategic alternatives process, Golden Entertainment announced a deal to sell their real estate in a sale-leaseback transaction to gaming REIT giant VICI Properties (VICI) (VICI was originally a 2017 spin of CZR, but has since diversified into other entertainment asset classes) while their OpCo is going private via an MBO transaction with CEO Blake Sartini (who founded GDEN ~30 years ago). VICI is buying the real estate of 7 of the 8 casinos (the 8th is already leased to a third party) at a 7.5% cap rate, with the initial annualized rent set at $87MM. GDEN shareholders are to receive 0.902 VICI shares for each share of GDEN (at today's VICI share price, that's $26.39/share) plus $2.75 in cash for the OpCo ($29.15 total versus $29.65 GDEN's share price today). On a trailing basis, GDEN has done $145.7MM in EBITDA over the last twelve months (this is now EBITDAR in Casino OpCo talk), subtracting out the new annualized rent equals ~$59MM in EBITDA, the $2.75/share represents $75MM, GDEN has some net cash after VICI assumes the debt, so Sartini is paying around ~1x EBITDA for the OpCo.
This low-ball offer has attracted the ire of two activists, friend of the blog Andrew Walker at Rangeley Capital wrote up a public letter and EverBay Capital has also express dismay at the offer for the OpCo being too low (additionally, Dalius @ Special Situation Investments has a great write-up, paywalled, but worth the sub).

BSD Analysis:
Golden Entertainment is a levered bet on the Las Vegas locals and regional gaming customer, not the high-roller Strip fantasy investors often default to. Its tavern and locals casino portfolio generates steady cash flow, but lacks the glamour and pricing power of destination resorts. Management has talked up digital and diversification, yet the core earnings engine remains physical gaming and distributed slots. Leverage constrains optionality, especially if consumer spending softens or financing costs stay elevated. Unlike larger peers, Golden has limited scale to absorb shocks or aggressively reinvest through downturns. The valuation screens cheap, but that largely reflects balance-sheet risk and modest growth prospects. The bull case is steady deleveraging and normalization; the bear case is that this remains a structurally low-multiple regional operator.

Pitch Summary:
Forward Air (FWRD) is primarily an asset-lite (relies on independent contract drivers) less-than-truckload transportation services provider that historically had a nice niche in airport-to-airport routes. They diversified through acquisitions over the years to include truckload, intermodal drayage (between ports/railyards and other points in the supply chain) services and most recently with their ill-fated acquisition of Omni Logistics, a 3PL service provider. The Omni Logistics acquisition, announced in 2023 but closed in early 2024, was done at peak post-covid earnings and a peak multiple of 18x EBITDA (which was higher than FWRD's multiple at the time). The market hated the acquisition from the start, crashing the stock, Forward Air management tried to backout of the transaction but eventually closed it with a small price cut.
In January, Forward Air announced it was conducting a strategic review, there have been reports of multiple (5-6 financial buyers) bidders being interested including Clearlake Capital Group which owns a 12.6% stake in the business. The strategic process is long in the tooth at this point, Axios recently reported the process is at an impasse due to a wide bid-ask spread. Shares have traded down as the market seems skeptical of a deal happening, but a turnaround effort is probably best conducted in private hands and activist shareholders will continue to pressure management to sell. I'm hoping a deal can still be reached as the company has yet to call off the sale process, despite the Axios report being a couple weeks old now.
There's quite a bit of debt on FWRD, it's on the riskier side, but at $18.25/share, its trading at 7.7x consensus NTM EBITDA of $315MM. Tariffs and supply chain disruptions, plus a general shipping recession is a concern, but on more normalized earnings, this business is even cheaper and could be a home run for a PE buyer.

BSD Analysis:
Forward Air was historically a best-in-class asset-light logistics operator, prized for high margins, disciplined execution, and consistent free cash flow. That reputation cracked with the Omni Logistics acquisition, which introduced leverage, complexity, and strategic drift into what was once a clean model. Investors now question whether management abandoned its circle of competence chasing scale for its own sake. Integration risk, elevated debt, and cultural mismatch have compressed the multiple and eroded trust. While the core expedited freight business remains solid, it is now overshadowed by balance sheet and execution concerns. The bull case hinges on successful deleveraging and refocus; the bear case is permanent value destruction from empire-building. Forward Air has shifted from compounder to “prove-it” story—and markets are unforgiving in that phase.

Pitch Summary:
Braemar Hotels (BHR) is an externally managed (Ashford Inc) lodging REIT focused on luxury hotels and resorts, back in August, BHR announced the initiation of a sales process. In keeping with the "K-shaped economy" theme, BHR's high end luxury resorts have performed well on an individual basis, but the REIT's abusive external management agreement and conflicts of interest have kept the stock from performing. Ashford is incentivized to sell BHR because they're due a 12x termination fee, but not necessarily incentivized to sell at an advantageous price for the equity (other than getting a reasonable enough deal to secure the vote). @somehotelguy posted on Twitter back at the end of October, "Braemar call for offers tomorrow. Any guesses?" and the CEO Richard Stockton wrote in his annual letter that "further announcements should be coming in 2026." I'm hoping for a good outcome in Q1. Interestingly, Ashford's other lodging REIT, Ashford Hospitality Trust (AHT), initiated a similar sales process in December, adding legitimacy to both, seems like Monty Bennett is serious about one last grift and leaving public markets.
Braemar Hotels & Resorts (BHR) (~$200MM market cap, ~$2.1B enterprise value) is a luxury hotel REIT that was formerly known as
Ashford Prime, a spin of Ashford Hospitality Trust (AHT) in 2013. BHR is externally managed by Ashford Inc (formerly AINC, went
private via a reverse/forward split last year), the creation of the infamous Monty Bennett. Hotel REITs are a challenging business
because they need to outsource the hotel management function to a third party to maintain REIT status, then also pay for the
franchise flag, throw on top of that an egregious external asset management contract and BHR never had a chance. The only reason
these external Ashford hotel REITs exist is because they were all originally under one roof before AINC was spun from AHT. I don't
think this structure would have gotten public otherwise.
Again, skipping a lot of history here, there has been numerous activists at BHR trying various ways to remove Ashford from an
otherwise healthy portfolio of luxury hotels. Finally, on August 26th, the REIT officially waived the white flag and announced the
initiation of a sale process.

BSD Analysis:
Braemar Hotels & Resorts owns a portfolio of high-end, luxury hotels, but the equity behaves more like a levered macro trade than a real estate compounder. Its assets benefit disproportionately when travel demand is strong, yet suffer quickly when financing costs rise or RevPAR softens. Heavy leverage magnifies both outcomes, leaving little margin for error in a higher-for-longer rate environment. Management has leaned on asset sales and refinancings to manage the balance sheet, which stabilizes liquidity but caps long-term upside. Unlike diversified lodging REITs, Braemar lacks scale advantages and defensive cash flow streams. The bull case depends on sustained luxury travel and easing capital markets; the bear case is dilution or forced asset dispositions. Braemar is less about asset quality and more about balance-sheet timing.

Pitch Summary:
The fund’s largest position in Vietnam is FPT Corp, which is Vietnam’s largest software outsourcing company. FPT’s stock price has corrected in 2025 after a very strong rally due to concerns over its customers’ IT spending decisions. However, the company is now seeing a pick-up in momentum in its order book from the second half of 2025, which portends well for FPT’s 2026 earnings outlook. We would not be surprised to see FPT’s stock price move significantly higher in 2026 as its earnings growth recovers.

BSD Analysis:
FPT Corporation is Vietnam’s most credible IT services export, quietly compounding by selling cost-efficient digital transformation to Japan, the U.S., and Europe. It benefits from the global push to diversify tech labor away from China and India, positioning Vietnam as a credible “next-tier” outsourcing hub. Unlike hype-driven AI stories, FPT monetizes AI pragmatically through embedded services rather than moonshot platforms. Margins are steady rather than spectacular, reflecting a labor-scaled model rather than true software economics. The key risk is wage inflation and talent retention as Vietnam’s tech ecosystem matures. Growth is real, but multiple expansion depends on convincing investors this is more than a labor arbitrage story. FPT works best as a steady compounder, not a narrative-driven breakout.

Pitch Summary:
Sri Lanka’s gains were broad-based, led by Commercial Bank of Ceylon. The bank, a long-time holding since 2019, has achieved 52% profit growth YoY, with a return on equity restored to pre-pandemic levels at 21%. Despite this re-rating, the stock remains attractively valued at 1.0x book value, leaving ample scope to re-rate even further.

BSD Analysis:
Commercial Bank of Ceylon is the dominant private-sector bank in Sri Lanka, operating with scale, brand trust, and a deposit franchise that smaller peers struggle to match. Its recent history has been shaped less by underwriting mistakes and more by sovereign and macro shocks beyond management’s control. Asset quality has held up better than feared, but capital preservation remains the primary objective rather than aggressive growth. Earnings power is real, yet highly sensitive to policy, currency stability, and rate normalization. Investors treat the stock as a proxy for Sri Lanka’s recovery rather than a standalone banking franchise. Valuation reflects both survival risk and upside optionality if macro stabilizes. This is a franchise waiting on the country—not the other way around.