Investment Pitches

Pitch Summary:
Healthcare spin from 3M trading below peers (~12x FY25 P/E; ~11x TEV/EBIT). Near-term margins/FCF depressed by stand-up/public co costs, TSA/COGS from 3M, ERP/separation spend; organic growth had lagged. New CEO (ex-Zimmer) is driving a 3-phase plan (talent & incentives, commercial structure & R&D focus, portfolio optimization). Early signs: sequential organic growth acceleration (ex-SKU cuts), beat/raise cadence, and sale of Purification & Filtration (~$3.3B after tax) to delever $200mm interest savings. Management guides to MSD organic growth and double-digit EPS/FCF CAGR; upside from vertical integration (undoing 3M COGS headwind), SKU pruning, cost takeout (“Solventum Way”), and small M&A.

BSD Analysis:
Classic “broken out of a conglomerate” setup: under-earning vs. potential due to temporary dis-synergies and spin costs. Evidence of commercial execution (organic growth improving) plus balance sheet reset from asset sale supports multiple catch-up toward med-surg/dental comps once margins/FCF inflect in ’26. Key watch items: tariff mitigation, pace of vertical integration to offset 3M supply headwinds, ERP risks, and HIS (M*Modal) reinvestment. Risk/reward favorable at ~13x ’26e normalized unlevered FCF with credible self-help and conservative guide.

Pitch Summary:
The author argues that LandBridge is a high-quality Delaware Basin surface and pore-space platform with substantial embedded growth in produced-water handling. Today the company handles about 1.4 million barrels per day of produced water at fees of roughly $0.15–0.25 per barrel, with disclosures suggesting pricing near the upper end of that range. Management has indicated it can support more than 5 million barrels per day of produced-water capacity on its existing land footprint, implying significant operating leverage as volumes scale. Using a 10-year projection and a 70% free cash flow margin assumption with no new acreage, the author focuses on value per acre and notes LandBridge already earns about $614 per acre on 277,000 acres, versus a modeled hurdle of $710 per acre. They argue this hurdle is conservative given current performance and the strong demand for water infrastructure and related surface uses in the Delaware. With very high margins, strong returns on existing land, and tailwinds from further infrastructure build-out, LandBridge is presented as an excellent business available at an attractive price. The backing of private-equity sponsor Five Point, which has a long operating history and exit track record in the basin, is seen as additional support for the thesis despite being a governance risk to monitor.

BSD Analysis:
LandBridge operates at the intersection of energy infrastructure and real-asset ownership, monetizing scarce Delaware Basin surface acreage and pore space as a landlord to produced-water operators and other infrastructure users. This model creates a quasi-tolling business with long-duration, volume-linked cash flows that are levered to overall Permian activity but largely insulated from commodity price volatility in the short term. The ability to scale produced-water handling from 1.4 to over 5 million barrels per day on existing land adds significant operating leverage and raises the value of each incremental commercial contract. Structurally, its advantage lies in contiguous, strategically located acreage that would be costly and time-consuming for competitors to replicate, giving it bargaining power over midstream partners and E&Ps. The implied per-acre economics already look attractive relative to acquisition costs, suggesting that even modest volume and pricing growth can generate very high returns on incremental invested capital. Key risks include regulatory changes around water disposal, shifts in Delaware Basin development intensity, and the possibility that sponsors prioritize aggressive growth or monetization over conservative balance-sheet management. There is also execution risk around large projects like the Speedway pipeline and the integration of future surface and pore-space deals. Overall, the setup resembles a niche, high-margin infrastructure landlord trading more like a conventional energy cyclical, which creates room for multiple expansion if investors begin to value the business on its durable, contracted cash flows and per-acre earning power.

Actual Post Content:
From the above, it’s clear that there will be a large continual demand for water handling services in the Delaware and $LB’s current 1.4 MMbbl/d handling capacity can certainly increase significantly beyond its current levels. They clearly already have a track record of their average fee for each PW bbl handing is in the $0.15/bbl to $0.25/bbl range. Their latest filings tend to indicate that their are on average at the upper end of that range. Management has made some comments regarding the new Speedway pipeline that will be capable of handing in their latest Q2 2025 earnings call, management mentioned that they have the ability to handle over 5 MMbbl/d of PW with their current land area. Let’s then look at some sensitivities on PW handing as a percent of revenue, surface land use efficiency and what that implies about # $LB Economics on Land Acquisitions Looking at a 10 year projection starting in 2023, the land acquisitions and revenues can be tallied and projected into the future. For future values, I’m assuming a constant FCF margin of 70% and no additions to existing acreage. I’m also the real questions is then: do you have confidence that $LB will at least be able to hit $710/acre on their existing land. Given that they are already at $614/acre on the 277,000 acre position, I think it is fairly easy to assume that this should be a relatively low hurdle for # $LB Current Valuations From the above it’s clear that $LB has great returns on the exiting land with very high margins along with a durable competitive advantage (e.g. land) that has strong tailwinds for future infrastructure development in the area. The final question is then # Risks Five Point, the PE firm backing $LB, has been a long time operator in the area under a variety of different business units and have successfully partnered with and sold businesses to many different public and private operators in the Permian basin at large. Counter to # Conclusion $LB appears to be an excellent business trading at a good price. As shown above, there are many levers that could potentially push revenues and earnings well above the current levels. Even without future land or surface efficiency growth, I would expect the existing

URL: https://x.com/sockfeetrsrch/status/1956396746856071256

Pitch Summary:
The author argues that the market is improperly valuing Teradyne as a cyclical semiconductor test-equipment provider while overlooking its expanding robotics platform. Through acquisitions such as Universal Robots and Mobile Industrial Robots, TER has positioned itself for major secular tailwinds in warehouse automation, EV manufacturing, and AI-enabled robotics. Near-term headwinds in semiconductor test have weighed on the stock, creating an opportunity for investors who believe robotics growth will drive a business mix shift. At ~$110, the stock trades near multi-year lows and reflects cyclical weakness rather than structural robotics optionality. As large customers such as Amazon roll out next-generation automation platforms, Teradyne may re-rate toward higher automation-sector multiples. With minimal debt and a strong competitive position in both test and industrial automation, the setup is presented as asymmetric to the upside.

BSD Analysis:
Teradyne sits at the crossroads of two structurally attractive industries: semiconductor equipment and robotics automation. Its leadership in collaborative robots provides a defensible early-mover advantage, while the test segment supplies stable cash flow. Risks include China exposure, semiconductor cyclicality, and intensifying competition from global robotics incumbents. However, a shift in revenue mix toward automation could improve margins, reduce cyclicality, and justify higher multiples. The key question is timing rather than viability, making the stock compelling for patient investors.

Actual Post Content:
Thoughts on Teradyne, Inc. $TER Teradyne is currently viewed as a cyclical semiconductor test-equipment supplier, but this narrative undervalues its emerging robotics franchise. Management’s long-term vision, emphasized at recent investor days, is to blend AI, industrial automation and electrification (EV/ADAS) into its product. In practice, Teradyne has acquired leading cobot and AMR businesses (Universal Robots, Mobile Industrial Robots, Energid, AutoGuide) and is poised to capitalize on massive trends from Amazon’s warehouse automation to automotive factory robotics. Key catalysts (e.g. Amazon’s Vulcan robot deployment, accelerating EV-related plant automation, Nvidia-accelerated “robotics AI” advances) are not yet priced in. By contrast, the semiconductor test downturn (auto/industrial trough, trade-war delays) has depressed the stock. I believe Teradyne at today’s price offers asymmetric upside. At ~$110, TER trades near multi-year lows, reflecting cyclicality rather than future robotics value. Peers like Fanuc or Yaskawa currently trade at 12–17× EV/EBITDA multiples, whereas Teradyne’s ~24× EV/EBITDA multiples embed only its existing businesses. Once robotics adoption takes off (e.g. Amazon contract recognition, auto plants automating), the stock can re-rate toward “automation tech” multiples (30–35×). The company has pretty much $0 debt and the chart looks interesting.

URL: https://x.com/arya__deniz/status/1957481064076824725

Pitch Summary:
The author is bullish on Amrize, Holcim’s spun-off North American building-materials platform, arguing that its end markets are set to inflect from the second half of 2025 through 2029. Commercial, infrastructure, and residential together drive the bulk of revenues, with housing shortages and aging roofs providing a long runway for residential renovation and replacement spend. Amrize already posts above-peer EBITDA margins and free cash flow conversion, indicating a high-quality, cash-generative business relative to its construction-materials peers. At roughly 11.8x LTM pro forma EBITDA, the stock trades at a discount to comparable names like CRH and Heidelberg, and also to precedent transaction multiples. If the market eventually values Amrize in line with those peers (12–13x EBITDA), the author believes investors can earn attractive IRRs. The position is framed as a long-term compounding story rather than a quick trade, and the author discloses they own shares while reminding readers to do their own work.

BSD Analysis:
Amrize sits in a structurally advantaged niche: North American infrastructure renewal, non-residential construction, and residential repair/remodel all have multi-year policy and demographic tailwinds. As a focused spin-off from Holcim with dual listings in Switzerland and the US, it can benefit from both a cleaner capital allocation story and a broader investor base once it seasons as a standalone. The combination of high-20s EBITDA margins and >50% FCF conversion suggests a high-return, asset-intensive business with pricing power and disciplined capex, which is relatively scarce in heavy building materials. On valuation, a low-teens EBITDA multiple for a business with mid-single-digit top-line and high-single-digit EBITDA growth plus strong FCF looks reasonable; if anything, index inclusion and de-levering could support incremental re-rating. Key risks are classic late-cycle construction risks: a deeper-than-expected recession, a housing correction, or a fiscal pull-back in infrastructure spend would all pressure volumes and pricing. Integration and execution risk also matter—Amrize needs to prove it can maintain Holcim-like discipline without the mothership’s balance sheet and portfolio diversification. Over time, capital allocation (bolt-ons vs. buybacks vs. dividends) will determine whether the spin-off’s superior operating metrics translate into superior per-share value creation.

Actual Post Content:
7) Commercial, infrastructure and residential contribute ~49%, ~28% and ~23% to net revenues. Based on peer commentary, put in place projections and other industry/government statistics, end markets inflect starting in 2H 2025 (continuing through 2029). 8) Residential: Needs average annual housing starts of 1.7M through 2.0M to combat shortage. Buyer sentiment will inflect once borrowing costs decline. BE will capture growing R&R spend as roofs approach the end of their useful lives. 9) AMRZ adj. EBITDA margins of 25.6% and 23.8% for FY 2024 and the 3-year average (2022-2024), respectively, outperformed the peer median of 21.8% and 21.4%. AMRZ 3-year avg. FCF conversion of 52.2% ranks second only behind Carlisle, outperforming the peer median of 42.3%. 10) AMRZ trades for 11.8x LTM pro forma adjusted EBITDA. AMRZ is most comparable to CRH, Heidelberg, CSL and RPM, implying (conservatively) an EBITDA multiple of 12.0x to 13.0x, supporting the selected base case IRR multiple of 12.5x. Precedent txn multiples at 11-15x as well. 11) This is not investment advice. I own shares of AMRZ. An investment in AMRZ bears risk for which I am not liable. Please do your own due diligence and consult a financial advisor before considering or making an investment in Amrize.

URL: https://x.com/Stated_intent/status/1956452682291384327

Pitch Summary:
Remitly is my most recent purchase, only a few weeks ago. Let me preface this by saying I pride myself on inactivity. I don't want to be too frequent a market participant, because it can degrade the advantage of a long time horizon. I try to use that edge intentionally and only invest in situations where I have a differentiated view on what a company will look like, and what its future prospects will be, five or ten years out. ... Back to Remitly. I've been following the company for around a year now and became interested when Mario Cibelli pitched it on the Yet Another Value Podcast. I work in payments, so remittance is a business model and market I am quite familiar with but hadn't really looked at for investment before. This year, however, the market soured on the company's narrative. This seemed to be at odds with a business that was firing on all cylinders, so I bought a small stake. Remitly was an instinctual purchase. The time seemed right; I had become more comfortable with the story, more positive on leadership, and had reason to argue with the prevailing view. The industry is in a secular transition, and Remitly is on the right side of the disruption. The source of the market's pessimism doesn't particularly concern me; the fact is expectations were lowered, and the investment equation had changed. I'm happy to have some skin in the game and look forward to learning more as an owner.

BSD Analysis:
Remitly is a high-growth, pure-play on digital cross-border remittances whose stock is a conviction bet on the structural, multi-year shift from legacy cash-based money transfer to mobile-first platforms. The core thesis is driven by its technological superiority, providing a faster, cheaper, and more transparent service than traditional money transfer operators. The company's massive global payment network reaches over 170 countries and 5,100+ corridors, enabling funds to be sent to billions of bank accounts and mobile wallets. This scale allows Remitly to reduce its global transaction cost (maintaining an average of ∼2.28%) and disburse over 92% of transfers in less than an hour. The stock is a leveraged bet on the rapid digitization of the global remittances market.

Pitch Summary:
Xometry recently blew earnings out of the water, and the stock jumped over 40% on the day. Volatility has been par for the course over the last three years, though not always to the upside. While I have no evidence to support this, I suspect the extreme price action reflects a constantly evolving view of the bigger picture; the market hasn't decided if it believes in it or not, but it recognizes something is there. The bigger picture, as I see it, is that Xometry is digitizing a massive industry. Buying custom parts is a tedious, analog process today. Not many companies are trying to solve the problem in the same way as Xometry, and of those players, it is by far the largest. Xometry's approach is particularly powerful because scale accrues to its advantage. From my view, it's a classic digital marketplace disruption story. Xometry's business is enabled by an AI instant quoting engine. This technology alone is not a competitive advantage; it's a foundational technology layer that allows them to pursue a new business model category and offer a "wow" customer experience. Xometry's primary competitive advantage is the scale and scope of its network, and as it continues to grow, I expect this advantage to deepen. It's classic network effects. I believe scale wins on the internet, and if you can remove the friction from a manual / analog sourcing process, people will choose digital every time. That's the crux of the thesis: millions of custom parts are transacted each year, and Xometry is going to steadily take share of that volume. I think this provides a long runway to grow whether or not they really excel in production (though I think they likely will). Production is no doubt an accelerant - an offensive move to drive further scale - but I think if Xometry were to simply dominate the prototyping market, it would still be a successful outcome for shareholders.

BSD Analysis:
Xometry is a high-growth, AI-powered industrial marketplace whose value is locked in its ability to digitize the fragmented, multi-trillion-dollar manufacturing supply chain. The core thesis is driven by the company's AI-driven Instant Quoting Engine and its massive 10,000+ supplier network. This technological edge allows Xometry to instantly match complex manufacturing jobs (CNC machining, 3D printing, fabrication) with the optimal supplier globally. The company's Manufacturing Partner Network is the largest of its kind, offering over 30 million available machine hours and seamless integration with thousands of facilities worldwide. Xometry is a high-conviction play on the structural digital transformation of the global manufacturing sector.

Pitch Summary:
Let's now talk about a different name: Thryv. Very basic business model, nothing too differentiated about it. I'm invested in the company, and recently increased the size of my investment, for one main reason: the leadership. It's a jockey bet. Joe Walsh successfully executed the same print to SaaS business model transition Thryv is currently undergoing at a prior company. At that company, shareholders earned a ~20x return. History doesn't repeat, but it rhymes, and great operators tend to remain great operators. Thryv participates in a massive market with countless permutations of competitors, but I think the greenfield aspect of the opportunity is often overlooked. There is ample growth to be had by simply growing into evolving demand, not necessarily stealing share from competitors. I believe that distinction is important and commonly not given enough weight. Thryv's core advantage is its ability to leverage longstanding relationships with small business owners across the country to sell locally at scale. This model allows them to more effectively capitalize on the natural evolution of SMB demand towards SaaS while maintaining a profitable business model (that is, not overspending on customer acquisition). I think it will just take solid execution for shareholders to reach a good outcome, and Joe Walsh is the guy to do it.

BSD Analysis:
Thryv is a deep-value, small-to-medium business (SMB) SaaS pure-play whose stock is an asymmetric recovery bet on its successful, brutal corporate transformation. The core thesis is driven by the successful pivot from its legacy, declining Yellow Pages business to the high-margin Thryv SaaS platform. The company achieved a major financial milestone in 2025, projecting full-year SaaS revenue guidance of $460 million to $463 million and reaching 103,000 SaaS subscribers. The legacy business still generates a robust $250 million to $300 million in unlevered free cash flow (FCF), which is being surgically funneled into the high-growth SaaS engine. Thryv is a conviction bet on the inevitable, multi-year digital transformation of the small business market.

Pitch Summary:
When I started buying Pagaya in early 2024, I had no idea it would turn into my largest position today. I simply saw a disconnect between what I viewed as a founder-led company with a uniquely powerful business model and a consistent track record of growth - even through a major credit cycle - and what the market viewed as a questionable second-look loan originator. I spent a lot of effort trying to understand what I was missing or where I might be wrong but came away each time thinking if it looked and smelled like a good business, it just might be. I invested a lot of time and money into Pagaya, and it's paid off much faster than I would have guessed, though the process was accelerated by multiple expansion. In other words, more people have come around to the view it is a viable business with lots of potential, but there is still a lot of work to be done. I expect future returns to be much more closely tied to the fundamental progression of the business, but I'm in it for the long run. The overarching theme of AI in consumer credit brings another portfolio name, Upstart, into the discussion. Each company approaches the problem slightly differently, but with a similarly thoughtful business model backed by focused execution. In general, I think the problem of consumer credit is a massive opportunity, Al is a perfectly matched solution, and as a result, the industry is likely to evolve significantly over time. I expect Pagaya and Upstart to be major winners from this reshuffling.

BSD Analysis:
Pagaya is a high-growth, AI-powered fintech disruptor whose value is locked in its proprietary technology for originating and managing complex credit assets. The core thesis is driven by its AI network, which connects generative AI to lending operations, allowing prominent banks and cutting-edge fintechs to expand credit access while accurately assessing risk. This technological edge allows Pagaya to provide institutional investors with diverse, high-yielding asset-backed securities (ABS). The company is demonstrating strong financial velocity, recently announcing new $500 million Personal Loan ABS transactions and closing a $400 million Auto ABS transaction, underscoring strong demand from investors for its AI-vetted assets. Pagaya is a high-risk, high-reward play on the successful deployment and adoption of its AI-driven credit ecosystem.

Pitch Summary:
Planet Labs was probably the first stock I bought in significant size. I started buying in early 2023 at almost $5 per share, and for the next 18 months, the stock marched steadily lower. I bought the whole way down. Today, my average cost basis is $3.12, but the way I think about the future of the business, it shouldn't matter too much if my cost basis is $2, $5, or anything in between. If that view turns out to be reasonably accurate, I should do alright. What drew me to Planet is it being a true "one-of-one" business. Differentiation is a function of doing something differently, and Planet is very different from competitors. It designs, builds, and operates the largest fleet of earth observation satellites and has been the only company to image the entire Earth every day for eight years now. This dataset is a core, daily compounding advantage. I own the company because I believe the data it produces is immensely valuable, extremely difficult to replicate, yet still poorly monetized. Over the next decade, I expect the economic value of this data to increase non-linearly, and the gap between the value Planet creates and captures to narrow. Scaling up new constellations, increasing fusion of multiple sensors and data types, and moving further up the value chain into delivering solutions to customers, not raw data, will support this value unlock. It is much easier to sell answers than data, and Al is an accelerant to this endgame.

BSD Analysis:
Planet Labs is a high-growth, space-enabled data pure-play whose value is locked in its unmatched ability to provide near-daily, global satellite imagery. The core thesis is driven by the company's unrivaled multi-sensor constellation (SuperDove, SkySat, Pelican, and the hyperspectral Tanager), which generates a non-replicable, continuous, massive data set. This data is becoming an indispensable input for applications across agriculture, defense, disaster relief, and climate monitoring. Crucially, the newest satellites include the NVIDIA Jetson AI platform for on-orbit edge computing, accelerating the delivery of actionable insights by processing data before sending it back to Earth. The stock is a leveraged bet on the long-term, structural growth of Earth Observation data and its transition to a high-margin data-as-a-service (DaaS) model.

Pitch Summary:
IG Design Group is a UK-based producer and distributor of gift packaging, craft and party supplies, homewares, and other items. After a number of years of growing earnings and dividends, IG Design acquired two large US competitors, first Impact Innovations in 2018 for $75M, then CSS Industries in 2020 for $95M. Integrating these US acquisitions did not go well and they've been struggling to bring their "DG Americas" division to profitability ever since. After hitting a high of over 7 GBP/sh in late 2019, supply chain struggles and the underperforming US acquisitions forced them to cut their once growing dividend entirely. The stock price proceeded to get cut by over 80% in 2022. They were able to stabilize the business and delivered a much better bottom line result in 2024, but only right before disaster struck again. One of their larger customers, Joann Fabrics, after initially restructuring in 2024, went bankrupt again in early 2025, which likely was the beginning of the end for DG Americas. Given the seasonal working capital demands of their business and uncertainty presented by tariffs, management decided to exit the US business completely. DG Americas was sold to a liquidator for a nominal sum of $1 and a 75/25% split of net proceeds between the IG Design and the liquidator, respectively. Even if they receive a material sum from the liquidations, it will be a far cry from what they purchased the US businesses for 5-7 years ago. Clearly this was a terrible experience and outcome for the company and any unfortunate shareholders along for the ride. You're probably wondering why anyone would want to touch this company and certainly wondering why I'm bothering talking about it. IG Design's core business, "DG International", has hummed along just fine throughout this entire debacle. During FY25, the DG International segment generated $28.1m in adjusted operating profit before corporate costs. In fact, DG International has consistently churned out $20-$30m in adjusted operating profit for most of the last decade. They still anticipate some headwinds for FY26 and will incur some costs related to DG Americas for a couple months prior to selling to Hilco Capital (the liquidator). Importantly, management sees adjusted operating profit returning to $13-15m in FY27. That target seems very achievable, especially since they can finally put all of their attention to their more profitable, stable segment. The market cap today is around $80m USD and they have $85m in net cash, so there's not much good news baked in. While I don't expect much in terms of proceeds from the DG Americas liquidation, they have received $8.4m so far. I've estimated DG Americas owns over $30m of real estate and some smaller structurally profitable segments but it's unclear how well the good parts are structured separately from the bad parts and also how material wind-up costs could be. For those reasons I'm keeping expectations low for any proceeds from the DG Americas liquidation. While I truly think the bulk of bad news is behind them, owning even a small position has been a headache to say the least. When it comes to small LSE traded companies, and especially AIM-listed companies, I'm disappointed by the lack of respect given to minority shareholders, dark-room style trading on the AIM, and trading updates with as little information as possible. In my experience, it's always better to communicate to shareholders in a straightforward manner, delivering bad news clearly and up-front, owning up to mistakes, and discussing the path forward. Continually trying to paint everything in the most rosy way (especially significant mistakes) often leads to distrust of management. My favorite companies are ones that continually underpromise and overdeliver, and my least favorite do the opposite.

BSD Analysis:
IG Design Group is a deep-value, post-restructuring consumer packaging and gift wrap specialist whose stock is an asymmetric recovery play. The core thesis is driven by the company's aggressive portfolio simplification, which includes the disposal of its DG Americas segment. This strategic cleanup is designed to eliminate low-margin businesses and allow management to focus on its higher-value core segments. The company's value is locked in its low capital requirements and high capacity for cash generation once the restructuring is complete. The stock is a high-risk, high-reward bet on the successful completion of this turnaround, leveraging its specialized manufacturing and distribution capacity to deliver improved operating margins and profitability.

Pitch Summary:
VYKAT XR is a dangerous, ineffective repurposed drug causing severe adverse events in Prader-Willi children, supported by flawed trials, conflicted investigators, and deceptive marketing. Follow-up 10/1/25 - Update on reported fatalities;

BSD Analysis:
Slide Insurance is facing growing regulatory, operational, and ethical scrutiny that undermines its credibility as a Florida-based insurtech turnaround story. According to Manatee Research, state insurance regulators sent a formal letter urging the removal of three top executives, some of whom are barred from leadership roles at other firms due to prior compliance violations. The company allegedly manipulates reported margins by delaying and denying legitimate claims, artificially inflating earnings and capital ratios to appear financially robust. These tactics may create temporary profitability optics but risk eventual reserve shortfalls and reputational damage with policyholders and regulators. The combination of executive misconduct, regulatory pressure, and aggressive accounting practices suggests earnings quality is poor and core operations are fundamentally unstable. Slide’s valuation hinges on a narrative of disciplined underwriting and profitable growth — both of which appear exaggerated.

Pitch Summary:
U.S./LatAm exhibitor (~300 U.S., ~200 LatAm) with ~15% U.S. share and ~40% of revenue from high-margin concessions. Box office has recovered off COVID lows but remains below 2019; 2024–early 2025 was hit by strike-driven content gaps, with 2Q25 strong and 3Q25 softer on slate. Balance sheet repaired; dividend reinstated; gross leverage expected <3x in 2026. Near-term overhang is the 2018 convertible and associated call spread (dilution trigger ~$21.95); company paid off the convert and is expected to neutralize the call, removing dilution and technical pressure. Thesis: multi-quarter “beat and raise” as slate improves in 4Q25–2026; pricing and concession mix lift revenue/EBITDA even at sub-2019 attendance. Consensus implies ~40% upside to trade on 2026 metrics; the author argues Street is too low for 2026 given slate-driven comp dynamics, market share gains, and mix. Potential industry M&A (Regal parent process; National Amusements sale) could rationalize capacity and/or create accretive tuck-ins for CNK. Risks: slate volatility, streaming substitution, FX/LatAm macro, and execution on call unwind.

BSD Analysis:
Cinemark is a classic slate-levered recovery with structurally better unit economics than 2019: higher ticket yields, outsized concession mix, and improved cost discipline. Even modest attendance lift on a stronger 4Q25–2026 slate should translate to outsized flow-through given fixed costs and pricing power. The convert/call spread cleanup is a real catalyst: removing dilution above ~$21.95 can expand the buyer base and reduce technical selling, especially as fundamentals inflect. Deleveraging (<3x in 2026) plus reinstated capital returns de-risk the equity and create optionality for selective M&A if Regal/NAI assets come to market at rational prices. At ~11–12x 2026E EBIT/FCF ~9x (per pitch figures), valuation is undemanding versus prior-cycle medians for high-quality exhibitors. Key debate is sustainability of theatrical windows vs. streaming; recent performance shows tentpoles and “eventized” mid-budget films still drive traffic and concessions. LatAm (~20% rev) adds growth but introduces FX and macro noise; treat as a portfolio diversifier. I would anchor on 2026 EBITDA/FCF and give credit for technical overhang removal; risk-control via slate monitoring and leverage trajectory. Upside skew looks favorable if slate beats and dilution is neutralized; downside cushioned by improved mix and lower leverage than peers.

Pitch Summary:
At $17/sh, TGONF trades at >50% discount to reported NAV and ~⅓ of the author’s adjusted NAV calc, largely due to entrenched dual-class structure and a history of management extracting value. Key hidden asset: Ripple Labs, where TFG’s stake (XRP holdings + RippleNet) is marked at ~$3/sh but could be worth ~$20/sh+ if IPO occurs. Ripple’s $700m June 2025 tender at $175/sh implies far higher private-market value. SEC lawsuit resolved, Circle’s IPO success, and Ripple tender activity point toward IPO in next 1–2 yrs. Mgmt (Griffith/Dear, ~27% ownership, full voting control) have been buying stock; author expects a tender offer at premium to capture Ripple upside for themselves while minorities still benefit. Even with heavy fees, NAV/share has compounded ~11% since IPO. Thesis: tender or re-rating inevitable once Ripple monetization occurs; worst case, shareholders share in Ripple windfall.

BSD Analysis:
TGONF is a governance hairball but potentially a levered play on Ripple. Discount to NAV is chronic, driven by mgmt control and fee extraction, but their incentives now align with minorities: tendering in shares ahead of Ripple IPO is the rational way to maximize value capture. Ripple IPO probability has risen post-SEC settlement and with Circle as a public comp; the $175/sh private tender is a strong validation signal. Key is sizing: Ripple stake could exceed TGONF’s entire market cap. Risks: IPO delay, crypto cycle reversal, continued mgmt self-dealing. Even so, downside is cushioned by other assets (Equitix, credit funds) and mgmt’s historic NAV compounding. I’d treat this as an event-driven stub equity: optionality on Ripple IPO crystallizing NAV at multiples of current, with mgmt likely engineering a tender to harvest value. For sophisticated investors, the asymmetry is compelling, but governance overhang means position sizing should be small.

Pitch Summary:
VYKAT XR is a dangerous, ineffective repurposed drug causing severe adverse events in Prader-Willi children, supported by flawed trials, conflicted investigators, and deceptive marketing

BSD Analysis:
Scorpion Capital argues Soleno is a “one-trick pony,” reliant entirely on its lead candidate for Prader-Willi Syndrome. The company has no diversified pipeline, and the regulatory path remains uncertain. Even if approved, commercial uptake could be limited by pricing and reimbursement hurdles. The report highlights management’s promotional tone, repeated financings, and insider selling. With valuation elevated on binary clinical outcomes, downside is significant if trial results disappoint, FDA approval is delayed, or competitive therapies emerge.

Pitch Summary:
Production Problems (Hand Made & High Failure Rate); Engineers Fleeing; Army is Buying a Competitors Drones; Paid Stock Promos & Death Spiral Financing

BSD Analysis:
uzzy Panda flags recurring production problems, limited scale, and high failure rates in Red Cat’s drone manufacturing. Despite management’s claims of rapid adoption, evidence suggests constrained demand and execution challenges. Heavy competition from both domestic defense primes and Chinese manufacturers erodes pricing power. Financials reveal limited gross margin leverage, raising doubts about scalability. The short thesis centers on RCAT being structurally unprofitable and surviving primarily on equity raises, with speculative enthusiasm around drone adoption far outpacing fundamentals.

Pitch Summary:
@ToffCap presents 2CRSi as a small-cap turnaround evolving into a potential AI infrastructure beneficiary. The pitch centers on a dramatic acceleration in order intake for AI-optimized servers, which the author believes is not yet fully reflected in valuation despite a sharp share-price rerating. 2CRSi is framed as moving from a marginal, forgotten server vendor into a credible supplier of high-density, energy-efficient hardware aligned with AI data center demand. The investment appeal lies in a combination of hypergrowth, operational turnaround, and a valuation that appears low relative to forward EBITDA and growth rates. However, the author explicitly flags discomfort with position sizing due to limited industry familiarity and rapid structural change in AI infrastructure. The request for community input underscores uncertainty around durability and competitive positioning. The stance is Bull, driven by momentum, transformation, and valuation asymmetry, but tempered by acknowledged execution and industry risks.

BSD Analysis:
2CRSi sits in a highly competitive but capacity-constrained segment of the AI supply chain, where demand for GPU-dense, power-efficient servers has surged faster than incumbent vendors can respond. The company’s recent contract wins suggest it has crossed an important credibility threshold, moving from niche supplier to production-scale partner for AI workloads. Margin expansion potential hinges on mix shift toward AI servers and the successful layering of services, which could structurally re-rate the business away from pure hardware cyclicality. Key risks include dependence on NVIDIA GPUs, exposure to export controls, and execution strain as a relatively small organization scales globally. The valuation argument is compelling if backlog converts cleanly and services margins materialize, but downside scenarios involve order lumpiness and competitive responses from larger OEMs. This is best underwritten as a high-beta AI infrastructure optionality play rather than a steady compounder.

Actual Post Content:
Just published on a new company, and this is one I’m going to need your help with. No paywall on this one. Despite having done little work on the industry, I took as small position in 2CRSi a few months back with the intention to scale it up as we did the works. I figured that the current order momentum was still not nearly being reflected in the price, and we could at least play this one for a short rerating. Well, the market clearly woke up on this one. Our smallish position is up plus 160 percent and we’re hitting ourselves for having postponed the hard work to today. Despite the recent move, the valuation does not seem right given the ongoing transformation, growth and hype potential. We’re doing work on it but we are still uncomfortable sizing this one up properly; it’s an industry that is changing rapidly, with a lot of moving pieces. With our still sub-par understanding of the industry and the story moving fast, I felt it would be good to put this one out there, asking knowledgeable people for their input. So, in short: Is 2CRSi a hidden gem or not. Any help is appreciated. In short, 2CRSi seems to be successfully transforming itself from a forgotten player in the server world into a pretty interesting player in the global AI infrastructure race. Today, 2CRSi is notable for three things. The company has an ugly name and an annoying ticker. Its order book is on fire. A nice string of massive order wins is transforming the company’s outlook over the next years. Not expensive at all given what’s already in the pipeline, less than seven times EV EBITDA looking out a few years, for more than 100 percent growth per annum.

URL: https://x.com/ToffCap/status/1955984045340242310