Investment Pitches

Pitch Summary:
The author believes Sanuwave Health is deeply undervalued given its accelerating growth profile and the strengthening of its sales force. The company expanded from two sales representatives to nine in 2024 and plans to reach full national coverage with 12–13 in 2025, despite already delivering two consecutive years of 50% revenue growth with a small team. UltraMIST, its primary product, has barely penetrated the wound-care market, implying substantial runway ahead. Recent share volatility is attributed to former warrant and note holders selling after converting into common stock, creating temporary pressure in an otherwise tight float. Based on the author’s FY26 estimates, SNWV trades at just 10.5x EV/EBIT, which they view as far too low given ~50% incremental margins and high operating leverage. They argue the company deserves at least a 20x multiple due to its premium growth characteristics and expect continued execution to drive a major re-rating.

BSD Analysis:
Sanuwave sits in a favorable niche within wound-care technology, a category with large addressable markets driven by aging demographics, diabetes prevalence, and chronic-care reimbursement tailwinds. Its UltraMIST device is relatively early in adoption, giving the company multi-year growth visibility if clinical evidence and provider economics remain compelling. The sales-force expansion is a meaningful catalyst, since medical-device distribution often hinges on field coverage and physician engagement. However, the company’s historically small scale introduces risks: concentration of revenue in one flagship product, limited operating history at higher revenue levels, and dependence on successful commercialization rather than recurring consumables. The tight share structure can amplify both upside and downside volatility. Execution will need to remain consistent for valuation multiples to expand toward peers. While early growth metrics are strong and operating leverage is attractive, investors should remain mindful of reimbursement stability, clinical-trial visibility, and competition within advanced wound-care solutions.

Actual Post Content:
Here are a few updates on some recent names: Sanuwave Health (SNWV: NASDAQ) Since publishing the idea, SNWV traded as high as $35.58, yet most recently sold off to as low as $24.90, closing yesterday at $26.24. I believe a lot of the recent stock price volatility is down to the ‘weaker hands’ of former warrant and convertible note holders who only recently converted their investments to common stock in October ‘24. For a lot of them, this conversion was likely viewed as ‘found money,’ so to speak. As such, they are probably outsized contributors to the recent selling. However, with a tight register of only 8.5m shares and a free float that is considerably smaller, I believe the nature of the register is set up nicely to enable a decent long-term run as the company continues to execute into FY25 and ‘26 and all the weak hands move on in the much nearer term. To recap the crux of my thesis: Sanuwave started 2024 with 2 sales personnel and ended the year with 9. They expect to grow this to a team of 12-13 in 2025 which will enable the company to have full nationwide sales coverage for the first time. This team is also now incrementally more senior and experienced than in prior years. Despite the undercooked sales force throughout the bulk of 2024, the company still grew revenues 50% YoY (for the second year in a row), whilst also delivering 73% incremental EBITDA margins. On top of this, UltraMIST is about to achieve just 1% U.S. wound care market penetration. In other words, the bottom-line earnings growth runway is incredibly long and far-reaching, and I don’t believe we are trading anywhere near the right price given this extant runway and the operating leverage that will continue to drive earnings power rapidly from here. At today’s levels, Sanuwave trades at just 10.5x my conservative estimate of FY26 EV/EBIT (which only assumes the same absolute $ revenue growth achieved in 2024, despite the massively bolstered sales team today). Given ~50% incremental EBIT margins moving forward, I believe Sanuwave should and will command a premium market multiple of at least 20x FY26 EBIT, a multiple which adequately reflects its premium growth profile and embedded operating leverage. I suspect this is a “show me story” and believe continued execution into FY25 will wake the market up to the company’s profound organic growth prospects. As such, I added to my position yesterday.

URL: https://x.com/TenvaCapital/status/1929796102074912992

Pitch Summary:
The author argues that U-Haul appears undervalued given the strength of its core moving business and the embedded value of its self-storage segment. The moving division generates around $5 billion in revenue and has historically shown a long runway for growth, though recent results have normalized after the COVID surge. The storage business produces roughly $900 million in revenue at an estimated 60% EBITDA margin, implying about $540 million of EBITDA, which would be worth around $10 billion if valued in line with storage peers. Given U-Haul's total enterprise value, the author believes the market is effectively pricing the moving business at only 3–4x EBITDA and less than 1x revenue. They highlight that the last time U-Haul traded this cheaply on an EV/sales basis was in 2012, after which the stock tripled. Overall, the pitch presents U-Haul as a misunderstood and undervalued asset-backed operator with significant upside potential if valuation normalizes.

BSD Analysis:
U-Haul occupies a structurally advantaged position in the North American moving market due to its vast network, high brand recognition, and dense physical footprint. Its scale creates both cost advantages and high barriers to entry, particularly in one-way truck rentals where network density is critical. The company’s parallel expansion into self-storage adds a recurring, margin-rich revenue stream that can increase capital efficiency, smooth cyclicality, and justify higher valuation multiples. However, the moving business is tied to housing turnover and migration trends, both of which have shown volatility post-COVID. Capital intensity remains a risk, as fleet refresh cycles and property investments strain free cash flow during downcycles. Storage operations help offset this, but execution and occupancy trends will determine how much of the peer multiple U-Haul can capture. Overall, the setup resembles a classic sum-of-the-parts discount in a dominant but cyclical operator, with clear catalysts through valuation rerating and continued storage expansion.

Actual Post Content:
Anybody look at $UHAL lately? - Monopoly moving biz -Connected self-storage operation -Stock gone nowhere for years $15b market cap Moving business does $5b of revenues, tremendous growth path over the years but down recently from post COVID peak $900m of storage revenue probably at 60% EBITDA margins = $540m storage EBITDA. Peers trade for 20x = $10b of storage So for $5b EV you get the monopoly moving biz for maybe 3-4x EBITDA and <1x sales Last time it traded for 1x EV to sales was like 2012 and it tripled over the next few years.

URL: https://x.com/evantindell/status/1929990448455790671

Pitch Summary:
The author analyzes $CRWV as a textbook setup for an extreme short squeeze driven by structural factors rather than fundamentals. Only ~8% of the company's full diluted share count floats freely, with most shares locked up by insiders and strategic holders. This creates a supply starvation effect compounded by green-shoe restrictions and insider share recalls. The stock also sits at the center of a controversial, high-momentum AI theme, increasing retail speculation and volatility. Options activity, especially zero-day contracts, forces dealers to buy into rising prices, adding mechanical upward pressure. Meanwhile, borrow availability across prime brokers is nearly zero, increasing borrow costs and forcing ongoing short covering. The author notes that these feedback loops can persist until major unlock dates in September. He does not express a valuation opinion but frames CRWV as a high-risk, high-volatility battleground with clear structural squeeze dynamics.

BSD Analysis:
CRWV exhibits the classic post-IPO microstructure fragility often seen when float is minuscule relative to fully diluted capitalization. The combination of insider lockups, ongoing issuance, and green-shoe restrictions effectively removes price-discovery mechanisms, creating a market dominated by derivatives hedging and liquidity vacuums. While this can generate explosive upside in the short term, it is generally disconnected from durable fundamentals and tends to unwind violently once supply constraints ease. The underlying business uncertainty—straddling AI-infrastructure and real-estate-like CAPEX cycles—further complicates fundamental valuation work, leaving participants reliant on sentiment and positioning. Rising borrow rates and share recalls can force repeated involuntary buying from shorts, but this buying is inherently transient. Long-term investors should be cautious: such setups rarely sustain elevated valuations once lockups expire and capital raises resume. The more material risk is that the stock eventually normalizes to a valuation driven by cash generation and project economics, not mechanical flows. Hedge funds shorting the name must recognize that the near-term distribution of outcomes is dominated by path dependency rather than intrinsic value.

Actual Post Content:
HOLY TRINITY OF SHORT SQUEEZES: $CRWV What is a short squeeze? No, it's not like the scene in BILLIONS where everyone is running around screaming “IT’S A SHORT SQUEEZE”. If you have ever shorted a stock, you have likely been squeezed … its not fun. Essentially a short squeeze is when you have dynamics at play beyond fundamental buying and selling that adds additional buying pressure to a stock which FORCES 'unnatural' things to happen. Normally you have long buying pressure... with a short you have multiple parties with different interests that can overwhelm the volume and move it higher. For example, it could be a risk model stopping a POD out, it could be a special sit unwind, it could be a highly shorted stock seeing massive inflows due to changing narratives, it could be due to microstructure… there is not a single reason, but they all result in the same out come… pain for shorts. What is the HOLY TRINITY of 'orchestrating' a Short Squeeze: 1. Low Float (architecture of deal) 2. Hot Theme (with controversy) 3. Microstructure PAIN (retail is fast here) For fun, lets look at a name captivating retail and confusing HF’s at the moment. $CRWV. I do not have a current position in it, so this is just me bouncing ideas off the interwebs for educational purposes. ARCHITECTURE OF A SHORT SQUEEZE: The narrative was too perfect for short sellers….a closed IPO window ‘24/25, nasty beta downside market February/March 25, downsizing of the IPO offering, high debt, controversy with short seller reports given relationship with NVDA, controversial roadshow, continual CAPEX needs, confusion around is it a tech company or real estate company… phew. I can just see and hear the analysts pitching their PMs as a 'hedge to AI company XYZ'. 3 key components of the IPO offering: 1. Deal size & dilution: ~50m shares sold to public …. I calculate ~600m shares on a fully diluted basis plus 2025 issuance… that gets me to

Pitch Summary:
Merger reshapes DSM into a higher-quality, synergy-rich nutrition & fragrance leader; divesting low-margin ANH business unlocks €4B cash and refocuses portfolio toward 20%+ EBITDA margins.

BSD Analysis:
The 2023 DSM–Firmenich merger created a €10B-revenue platform spanning nutrition, health, and perfumery. DSM’s commoditized vitamin-heavy mix is rapidly being upgraded as management exits animal nutrition (€4B cash proceeds) and divests €600M of other low-quality lines. Synergies of €350M EBITDA and €500M sales are tracking ahead of plan, with €120M realized and another €100M expected in 2025. By FY27, DSM-Firmenich should generate €10B sales at 20–22% margins, ~€2.0–2.2B EBITDA, implying 10–11x EV/EBITDA vs. peers Symrise (mid/high-teens) and Givaudan (low-20s). Balance sheet de-risked (~€4B cash inflow + €2.7B net debt). Upside as integration completes, synergies materialize, and re-rating narrows quality discount.

Pitch Summary:
Tight aircraft supply + higher re-lease rates + COVID-era roll-offs set up ~200 bps yield lift and EPS to ~double by 2029; shares still ~0.9x BV with likely buyback on excess capital.

BSD Analysis:
$5B of low-rate COVID leases (~20% of assets) roll off in next 2 yrs while new deliveries arrive on 8-yr leases signed into a tight market; management guides 15–20% higher yields than pre-COVID and ~20% asset growth; durable model (security deposits, repossession, long history of negligible credit losses) supports visibility to ~$10 EPS by ~2029 vs ~$5 in 2026.

Pitch Summary:
Cheap, vertically integrated nylon/caprolactam producer with structurally higher mid-cycle earnings from acetone and ammonium sulfate—late in trough, poised for 60–100% re-rate as spreads normalize.

BSD Analysis:
World’s lowest-cost nylon & caprolactam producer; vertical integration and byproduct diversification (acetone, ammonium sulfate) create durable moat and positive FCF even in troughs. Mid-cycle EBITDA has risen from ~$200M pre-COVID to $250–300M post-structural tailwinds: (1) acetone spreads up $0.05–0.10/lb post–anti-dumping tariffs = +$30–60M EBITDA; (2) shift to premium granular ammonium sulfate adds +$10–20M EBITDA; (3) nylon/caprolactam spreads (~$800/ton) are at multi-year trough, with supply tightening (China utilization down). Management is disciplined on capital allocation (debt reduction, share buybacks, prudent capex, dividend). Valuation: 2.8–3.4x mid-cycle EBITDA; 17–22% levered FCF yield. At 5x, fair value $39–48/share. Downside protected by cost curve position and profitability through cycles.

Pitch Summary:
Canadian E&P with low leverage, deep tax shields, and major upside from asset sales; trades at ~$22K/flowing boe or $30K precedent deals.

BSD Analysis:
Obsidian has transformed since 2019 under CEO (and FrontFour PM) Stephen Loukas—reducing debt, selling non-core assets, and focusing on Peace River heavy oil and Willesden Green light oil. The April 2025 Pembina sale netted C$220M cash + C$85M in InPlay shares + $15M WI, transferring $400M ARO. Remaining 29.2K boe/d implies EV/flowing <$23K, or <$16K adjusting for $2.2B NOL (PV ~$200–300M). Sum-of-parts suggests equity value ~$985M (C$13.9/shr). Shares trade at 3–4x 2026E EBIT or ~5x FCF ($60–70 WTI), with $1.55/shr FCF at $70 oil and active buybacks (share count -25% since 2022). Peace River’s Clearwater wells show 100%+ IRRs, and NOLs make OBE a tax-efficient acquisition target. Loukas signals willingness to “harvest value”—likely via asset or corporate sale. Downside cushioned by low-cost structure and FCF breakeven near $47 WTI.

Pitch Summary:
PIPE deal caused dilution and price drop; remains pre-revenue with quarterly loss; overvaluation in microreactor market.

BSD Analysis:
Short thesis centers on dilution and a long, capital-intensive path to commercialization. Recent financing/registration activity increases float and creates a supply overhang; operations remain pre-revenue with multi-year regulatory and HALEU fuel hurdles before any cash generation. Valuation is driven by optionality and policy headlines more than fundamentals; watch for registration effectiveness, lock-up expiries, and cash burn cadence.

Pitch Summary:
Revenue possibly overstated by ~$283M; claimed downloads nearly double actual numbers; major gaps in gaming and social/chat revenue reports; declining paying user base; concerns about auditor reliability.

BSD Analysis:
Pelican Way Research critiques Yalla’s user growth authenticity and revenue sustainability, suggesting heavy reliance on incentivized traffic and opaque related-party dealings. The Middle East gaming/voice-chat niche faces saturation risk. Limited disclosure, questionable governance, and competitive encroachment from global platforms raise downside catalysts.

Pitch Summary:
Biorem is positioned as a promising investment due to its substantial backlog and growth initiatives. Despite a challenging Q1, the company's backlog of CAD 68 million and a strong focus on organic growth initiatives suggest potential for significant earnings per share. The stock is trading at a low price relative to its cash reserves, presenting an attractive risk-reward opportunity.

BSD Analysis:
Biorem's Q1 performance was impacted by seasonal and logistical challenges, which are expected to resolve in subsequent quarters. The company's backlog, which supports a potential CAD 0.20 EPS, indicates robust future revenue streams. With a share price under CAD 2 and CAD 0.30+ per share in net cash, Biorem offers a compelling valuation. The management's focus on expanding international client support and securing logistics for its biological media solutions is crucial for sustaining growth. Given the CEO's track record in capital stewardship, Biorem is well-positioned to capitalize on its market opportunities, particularly as environmental regulations drive demand for air quality solutions.

Pitch Summary:
The author is long SOC at $23 based purely on a short-term legal catalyst rather than long-term fundamentals. They argue that if current legal disputes are resolved favorably, SOC could trade above $30, implying meaningful upside, but they disagree with bulls who claim the stock is worth $50–$100. The author highlights that they previously exited in the low $20s after observing significant legal uncertainty and concerns about operational risk. They note that SOC’s pipelines were originally built in the early 1980s, surpassing their intended lifespan, and last produced oil in 2015, which presents operational and regulatory challenges. They also warn that SOC faces persistent ideological opposition that will continue to scrutinize and challenge operations even if the company wins the current legal case. Despite these risks, they believe a total collapse is unlikely and estimate downside in the $15–$20 range if legal outcomes turn unfavorable.

BSD Analysis:
SOC is fundamentally a high-volatility, binary-outcome situation centered on legal rulings, regulatory approvals, and aging offshore infrastructure. The company’s asset base requires substantial reinvestment or redesign to resume operations, and the age of the pipelines raises material concerns around safety, maintenance costs, and environmental reliability. Activist and regulatory scrutiny represent structural headwinds that could slow or prevent project restart even if initial legal decisions go SOC’s way. Operational timelines are uncertain, and delays could pressure liquidity and force additional capital raises. While a favorable legal outcome could unlock a valuation re-rate, the risk profile remains asymmetric, with dependence on external decision-makers outside the company’s control. Investors must weigh the potential short-term legal catalyst against long-term operational complexity, political opposition, and uncertain capital requirements. Overall, this resembles more of a speculative event-driven trade than a stable energy investment.

Actual Post Content:
At $23, I'm long $SOC again. Unlike most bulls, this is a short-term legal play, not a long-term fundamental play. I don't think $SOC is worth $50, $70 or $100 as many bulls take the mgt ppt narrative to drive a sky-high valuation. But if the current legal noise settles (which i think is likely/shortly), the stock is worth $30+, that's 30%+ upside. Now KC is the "poking $SOC bulls" specialist... 😀 I have no pos (exit in low 20s), and I wish it works out for $SOC shareholders as I watched 10H+ hours of various hearings, and was disgusted by how ironically arbitrary the entire process is (all under the name of legal procedures). But i have 2 primary concerns (hence exit my pos). I think collectively, $SOC bulls are over-optimistic: put legal aside, I think it underestimates the challenges of running pipelines (1st prod in Y81) that are beyond their designed lifespans (35-40Y) and last production was 2015. The other thing is that SOC faces the worst type of opposition, as CBD is ideology-driven, insensitive to economics, and will never walk away even if it loses the current battle. It will surely watch the operation like a hawk, and report issues every other day. It's challenging to predict the downside risk given the legal uncertainty, but I don't see judicial outcomes leading to anywhere near 0.... (prob $15-20 range?)

URL: https://x.com/siyul/status/1930286155041263874

Pitch Summary:
HAMR leader set to ride AI data boom: 30TB shipping now, 40TB in ’26 drives step-function GM/FCF; duopoly structure, tight supply, LT agreements; stock at ~12x ’26 EPS despite multi-year margin expansion + cash returns.

BSD Analysis:
Seagate derives 80%+ rev from high-cap nearline HDDs for hyperscalers/enterprise. HAMR re-accelerates areal density, lowers $/TB and power/TB; 30TB qualified at 3 hyperscalers with volume ramp 2H25; 40TB in mid-’26 should lift unit economics materially (higher capacity, flat/lower BoM). WD lags (first HAMR not till ~’27), Toshiba behind—supporting pricing discipline. HDDs remain ~6x cheaper/TB than SSDs and ~9x more capex-efficient to manufacture; IDC sees HDD share ~80% of cloud storage through ’28. Mgmt targets sustained GM expansion; FCF could top ~$8B over next 3 FYs enabling dividend raise and buybacks. Market still models a 2026–27 downcycle; if AI super-cycle extends, numbers and multiple re-rate. Catalysts: June Q print (HAMR qual/ramp detail, video/imaging recovery), FY26 guide, progressive GM/FCF beats each quarter, Oct dividend hike, late-’25 unveil of 40TB HAMR + customer quals, buyback resumption in 1H26.

Pitch Summary:
Salesforce's recent Q1 FY26 results, despite a mixed market reaction, demonstrate the company's resilience and potential for long-term growth. The stock has dropped to $265, below the target buying range of $270, presenting an attractive entry point. Salesforce's strategic acquisition of Informatica for $8 billion is expected to enhance its AI and data management capabilities, crucial for future growth. The company's strong position in the CRM market, coupled with its innovative AI products like Agentforce, positions it well for sustained growth into the next decade.

BSD Analysis:
Salesforce's acquisition of Informatica is a strategic move to bolster its data management and AI capabilities, crucial in an era where data quality is paramount for AI success. The deal, valued at $8 billion, is financed through cash reserves and debt, avoiding shareholder dilution, and is expected to be accretive to margins, EPS, and FCF by year two post-closing. Salesforce's financial health remains robust, with a strong balance sheet and significant free cash flow generation. The company's focus on AI, particularly through its Agentforce product, is anticipated to drive the next growth phase, although adoption is currently slower than expected due to macroeconomic conditions. Salesforce's valuation, at 24x earnings and an EV/EBITDA of 16x, appears attractive compared to historical averages and industry peers, suggesting potential for significant upside. The company's strategic initiatives and financial discipline provide a solid foundation for future growth, making it a compelling investment opportunity.

Pitch Summary:
Sun Hung Kai & Co. presents a mixed investment case. The company offers a high dividend yield of approximately 9% and is trading at a significant discount to its book value. However, its historical return on equity (ROE) performance has been lackluster, and there is uncertainty about its ability to shift towards higher ROE activities. The company's recent shift from unsecured to secured lending could reduce impairment losses, potentially improving profitability.

BSD Analysis:
Sun Hung Kai & Co. is trading at a price-to-book ratio of less than 0.30x, with a market capitalization of HKD 6 billion against a book value of HKD 21 billion. This substantial discount suggests potential upside if the company can improve its ROE. The firm's dividend policy has remained stable despite past investment-related losses, indicating a commitment to shareholder returns. The company's shift towards secured lending and investment fund distribution platforms could enhance margins and reduce capital intensity. However, the company's ability to achieve a sustainable ROE of around 5% remains uncertain, and its performance lags behind peers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which consistently achieve ROEs above 20%. Investors should weigh the potential for re-rating against the availability of other attractive opportunities in the Hong Kong market.

Pitch Summary:
The author argues that Remedy Entertainment is at an inflection point similar to CD Projekt Red before its breakout success, with the market failing to recognize the company’s transformation. Remedy has transitioned from a work-for-hire studio into a fully self-publishing, IP-owning developer with multiple AAA franchises. Over the past decade, it has scaled from producing one game every four years to being structurally capable of launching one major title annually by running four parallel development cycles. The author contends that Remedy’s upcoming slate—Firebreak, Max Payne 1&2 Remake, and Control 2—represents a recurring pipeline where any single hit could equal or exceed the company’s entire market cap. They highlight the acquisition of key IP rights, improved publishing deals with top-tier partners, strong insider ownership, and back-catalog royalties that alone justify much of the valuation. With EBIT potentially reaching 35–40 million EUR in 2026 and over 70 million EUR in 2027, the stock trades at extremely low implied multiples. The market’s skepticism, recent sector-wide pessimism, and misunderstanding of Remedy’s structural shift have created what the author believes is a highly asymmetric risk/reward setup.

BSD Analysis:
Remedy sits at the intersection of high-end content creation and scalable IP leverage, a space where hit dynamics can transform long-term earnings power. Its move toward annual releases reduces revenue cyclicality, spreads development risk, and increases the probability of establishing durable franchises—critical in the modern gaming landscape. Owning key IP rights gives Remedy far more economic participation and strategic flexibility than under its earlier publishing structures. Its partnerships with Epic, Annapurna, and Rockstar signal industry validation, while Tencent’s ownership stake underscores strategic optionality, including potential M&A scenarios. Back-catalog performance provides a growing base of recurring, high-margin revenue that can smooth cash flow between major releases. Still, the model remains exposed to execution risk, hit-dependency, and the inherent volatility of AAA development costs. Competitive intensity in action RPG and shooter genres is high, and production delays could challenge the one-game-per-year cadence. However, given its IP depth, improved economics, and structural scale-up, the valuation disconnect appears unusually wide for a studio with Remedy’s pedigree and optionality.

Actual Post Content:
World’s Cheapest AAA Gaming Play $REMEDY Remedy Entertainment? Remedy Entertainment At The CD Projekt Red Moment For those who followed CD Projekt Red $CDR knows that after Witcher 3 it changed everything for the company - the company multiplied in short order year after year. A studio like CD Projekt Red which is very rare in a global setting has the infrastructure to produce world-class titles. One other that is pivoting and by far not understood by the market is Remedy Entertainment producing some of the most beloved titles ever created in gaming including Max Payne, Alan Wake and Control. The company is now for the first time in its history set to produce more world class titles with mass-market appeal and recurring yearly release. Let’s first have a closer look on key parts of the history of $Remedy: Remedy’s business is very differently structured operationally from 10 years ago and likewise even from five years ago which is not all, at least currently, understood by the market. To get a grip on this, the company started as work for hire for around 30 years ago and then around 10 years ago pivoted to partial self-publishing, contract with a publisher, where Control was its first title and a sales success and got rid of its work-for-hire business to concentrate on self-publishing where the major value centers around. The capacity 10 years ago was one game per 4 years and improved in 2020 to one game per 3 years. Fast forward to 2025 doubling the staff roughly in the last 8 year period and the company is now ready with teams - optimized to be able to deliver on average one game per year. That will most likely propel the business in the future. Finally Remedy is for the first time in its history ready to release one new game per year with four simultaneous spinning 4 year cycles of development. Notably, while many large and smaller players had to shut down or limit their games productions in recent years, Remedy went directly in the opposite direction, scaling up to catch the opportunity - all made possible because of its robust business and the balance sheet strength. Not surprisingly either, the company is owner operated with c. 50% insider ownership. This is clearly not understood by the market at all, as if each of the game’s potential in terms of sales can exceed or half of the market capitalization of the company, the latter being tilted clearly on the low sales outcome but more on that later. The argument that has for long circulated with Remedy is that they do niche games while they consistently also underestimated the sales trajectory of these “niches” (also one of the reasons why arguably the major price to value situation exists) but reality now is entirely different - this is not their strategy any more the company is focused on making mass-market appeal games within large genre’s with large commercial successes going forward - FBC Firebreak with multiplayer co-op aspect is a clear testament to this evolution. Control 2 pivots to the very large action RPG segment and Max Payne 1&2 Remake together with one of the most premiere studios in the world focusing on mass market games - Rockstar Games / Take Two $TTWO. Furthermore, the company has clearly bought its own future in its hands with buying all the rights to Control franchise in 2024 from 505 Games / Digital Bros $DIB and to Alan Wake in 2019 from Microsoft XboX $MSFT. Business decisions along with recent favorable deals with world class gaming companies most likely means that the company has learnt their lesson to only do deals with the few global tier-1 gaming companies and not selling its upside potential to another entity. Indeed, it is evident the company has pivoted to better strategic decision for the business and shareholders by having favorable publishing deals set with large recognized players Epic Games for Alan Wake and the Oracle linked Annapurna Pictures for Control 2 and also possible franchise films through Megan Ellison (daughter of Larry Ellison) who is the CEO and founder. This seems to be a great decision not only to increase royalty income from movies or series based on unique stories from the Remedy universe, but also as a significant step to help the IP reach new players and become more mass market through future games like Control 2. Remedy is again one of the few developers also working with Rockstar Games one of the planet’s most successful IP games companies. It is clear that Remedy is structurally very interesting - Tencent has bought shares in the company already three times in the last five years owning 15% (last time in 2024). But let's dive more into this topic a bit later. Favorable Extreme R/R Profile With Zero Level Expectations On Delivery FBC Firebreak is its first 100% profit accretive game. The game alone easily has the potential to deliver millions of copies the talk/previews are clearly positive overall for the game but lets only count with around a half of million - the result? EUR 20 million EBIT for 2025 vs EV of C. 200M - c. 10X EV/EBIT. The case is not FBC Firebreak albeit looking favorable, the case is the pivot to high quality recurring yearly releases where it is only a matter of time they release a hit that far exceeds the market cap. All of the upcoming years it is highly likely that the company has a reasonable shot at producing close to or above its market capitalization. But there is more dynamics that is playing that is directly bottomline accretive. Namely that Control franchise sales came in effect only starting in the beginning at the new year shift in to 2025 and secondly Alan Wake 2 generated its full quarter of its royalties since launch in late 2023. In conservative terms with release of Max Payne 2 most likely in H2-26 the company is set to produce 35-40 million EUR in EBIT in 2026 (4x EV/EBIT) and then in 2027 with Control 2 with larger audience target it's clear that the company has the shot in a conservative scenario to produce >EUR 70M EBIT (

Pitch Summary:
The author argues that EAF is positioned at the bottom of a pricing cycle in a deeply out-of-favor industry with limited spare capacity. They highlight insider buying and activity from foreign competitors as indications of improving conditions. The company is expected to benefit from the reshoring of U.S. steel production, which requires substantial investment in electric arc furnaces and thus more graphite electrodes. EAF is described as the lowest-cost producer with vertical integration through needle coke, providing structural advantages over peers. As steel gains share within the broader metals mix in the U.S., demand for electrodes should rise. With the stock trading at a low valuation and the company carrying leverage, the author views it as having high torque if earnings begin to re-rate alongside tightening supply-demand dynamics.

BSD Analysis:
GrafTech represents a cyclical, capacity-driven industrial materials business that is highly sensitive to steel industry capex, particularly the build-out of electric arc furnace capacity. Vertical integration into needle coke gives the company cost and margin stability that competitors often lack, but dependence on a concentrated end market adds inherent volatility. The long-term shift toward EAF steelmaking in the U.S. creates a structural demand tailwind, though the timing and magnitude can vary with macro cycles. Supply discipline from global producers would be key to maintaining pricing power in electrodes, which historically have experienced sharp boom-bust periods. Leverage amplifies both upside and downside, making earnings momentum critical. If the supply-demand balance tightens as expected, the company could see a meaningful re-rating, but execution risk, commodity exposure, and global steel-cycle uncertainty remain central considerations.

Actual Post Content:
$EAF Thesis Pricing cycle appears to have bottomed, hated sector with limited spare capacity Directors are buying, as well as foreign competition Beneficiary of US insourcing of steel production, requiring capex on arc furnaces and therefore electrodes … that only $EAF can produce Lowest cost producer of graphite electrodes and vertically integrated operations of needle coke Beneficiary of rising steel wallet share in US Levered asset trading at a low valuation offering significant torque if and when earnings rerate

URL: https://x.com/jupiters_string/status/1928531749874634779

Pitch Summary:
Mining equipment OEM with dominant slurry pump installed base, 80% aftermarket revenue, and structural growth tailwinds from ore-grade decline and production intensity.

BSD Analysis:
Weir is a “pure play” mining OEM (grinding, crushing, pumps, cyclones, GETs via ESCO) with ~£2.5B FY24 revenue and ~19% adj. op margin. Its global Warman slurry pump franchise underpins an unrivaled aftermarket business—50% of sales and majority of profit—with 80% of total revenue recurring. Pumps in abrasive slurry environments require frequent part replacements (often >100% of OEM price/year) at 50%+ GM. This entrenched base, global service centers, and IP-protected foundries create high switching costs and barriers to entry. Trading at ~12x 2026E EV/EBITA, WEIR’s valuation doesn’t capture its durable, high-ROIC model or optional upside from a future mining capex upcycle. Structural tailwinds include declining ore grades (more rock processed per ton of output) and potential copper/gold demand from energy transition. Cost-out and restructuring programs support near-term margins. Micromine acquisition adds digital optionality, though capital allocation bears watching.