Can We Trust This US-Iran "Peace Deal"? | Michael Every

Summary

• US–Iran Dynamics: Deep dive into the tentative “peace deal,” emphasizing high uncertainty, a 60-day window, and how outcomes could reshape regional power and commodity flows.
• Energy Security: Expect continued investment in alternative routes and pipelines (e.g., Fujairah, Saudi options) and stockpiles; near-term oil curve shifts and potential supply waves if Hormuz partly reopens.
• Defense Spending: Anti-drone/missile systems and a possible multinational naval presence in the Gulf imply rising demand for aerospace and defense capabilities.
• De-globalization/Mercantilism: Structural shift toward blocs and regionalization prioritizes commodities, energy, defense, and resilient supply chains across allied geographies.
• De-dollarization Risk: mBridge and stablecoins were discussed; the dollar remains resilient but could face erosion if the US is perceived to “lose” strategically in the Middle East.
• North American Energy: A potential hemispheric energy bloc (US, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Guyana) could secure supply/refining capacity and buffer global price shocks.
• China’s Oil Posture: China’s import cuts, reserves, and refinery economics help cap prices short term, signaling the US must adapt its energy and geopolitical strategy.
• Market Outlook: Volatility likely extends beyond midterms; watch Lebanon/Hezbollah linkages, proxy financing, and infrastructure build-outs; no specific tickers were pitched, focus stayed on sectors/themes.

Transcript

the words peace and deal are doing a lot of very heavy lifting in that particular sentence. [laughter] Um, you know, the the Middle East is most likely not on the brink of peace. It doesn't mean that it's impossible. Uh, and we can unpack that in a moment. And the word deal is doing a lot of heavy lifting here because there's absolutely no uh guarantee that what is being flagged here which looks to be uh a memorandum of understanding or I would call it a memorandum of misunderstanding is the actual case. Welcome to thoughtful money. I'm its founder and your host Adam Tagert. The trend change away from globalization towards nationalism and mercantalism continues around the world. From the man who predicted this over a decade in advance, what does he see ahead for both geopolitics and the global economy from here? We're very fortunate to sit down again today with Michael Every, global strategist at Rabo Bank. Michael, thanks so much for joining us and all the way from Thailand. >> You're very welcome. It's great to be back. >> Thank you. And uh I I know you mean back on the program, but I also know that you're back in Thailand after having basically uh traveled the world. So I appreciate you making time for us um while you're still recovering from those travels and particularly making time for us. We're recording this Sunday night my time, Monday morning your time, just a few hours, like two hours after uh President Trump announced that a peace deal had indeed been reached between the US and Iran. So, um, of course, everybody right now is asking for the the nitty-gritty details. They've not really been fully provided yet. Um, apparently this is an agreement to then get together in 5 days and sign the agreement over in Europe. Uh, so there's still a lot of unknowns and and I think much of what's in this agreement too is we're agreeing to things, but then we're going to take the next 60 days and actually figure out how to do these things. So, there's still a lot of uncertainty, I guess, is what I'm saying. So, um, lots to dig into with you, but but let's just start with this big news, the peace deal. How big of a deal is this on the world stage in your opinion? >> Well, it's a very big deal just in terms of the headlines that it's going to generate and it's a very, very big deal in terms of what happens next, whatever happens. Because to summarize, I think what you just said simply, the words peace and deal are doing a lot of very heavy lifting in that particular [laughter] sentence. Um, you know, the the Middle East is most likely not on the brink of peace. It doesn't mean that it's impossible. Uh, and we can unpack that in a moment. And the word deal is doing a lot of heavy lifting here because there's absolutely no uh guarantee that what is being flagged here which looks to be uh a memorandum of understanding or I would call it a memorandum of misunderstanding is the actual case. Uh we don't have those details as you said. The only side that is releasing them is the Iranian far fs news service, which is quite uh interesting how that sounds like the word f in English, or at least I'm I'm pronouncing it that way with my British accent. Um, who are basically saying that the deal is exactly the same one that Trump viferously rejected when they flagged it a few weeks ago and ended up bombing them again. So, it seems extremely strange if that is the deal. We don't have the text but I do think that at best it is as you described it some kind of loose performancebased you do this if we do that but the sequencing is very tricky and we'll move gradually over time towards addressing the fundamental core of this which is the nuclear or uranium issue where there is absolutely no guarantee whatsoever that anything will be achieved and in fact we have already seen Trump in an interview with the New York Times in a very fastmoving news environment say, "Well, yes, if they don't after 60 days negotiations agree to anything on the nuclear front, then of course I start bombing them again and I may end up being the overseer of the Middle East's oil for which I want a 20% cut." >> So that's already out there in the public space. And if you think that says peace and deal, you have a very different interpretation of those words than me. But nothing can be ruled out just as nothing can be ruled in. >> Okay. So, you know, I've got lots of questions for you about uh delobalization and mercantalism and all that stuff. And folks, we will get to that in this discussion, but I do want to try to bombard you with some questions here um on what's going on between the US and Iran, Michael, because you are way more informed on this than I am. And if I'm asking you certain things you don't know, just say, "Hey, I don't have any particular knowledge about that." And we'll move on to the next question. Um, question number one, [sighs] uh, as I understand it, Iran is a fairly fractured, um, government right now. So, one of the challenges for the US is sort of whom are we negotiating with and do they actually have decision-making power or not? And it certainly has seemed that at times we have talked say with like um the quote unquote government of Iran and the president there and gotten some agreement and then the IRGC has just turned around and basically you know oh we're going to have a ceasefire and then they just launch a bunch of missiles. Right? So there there's there's one big question about can we really have a successful negotiation with this fractured uh of a party on the other end of the table. But let me ask you this. We tend to think of this as the US on one side of the table and Iran on the other. Is it more like that or is it more like a round table where it's yes US on one side Iran on the other but then all the Gulf countries and you know Pakistan and other providers around the table too. So are we are we really getting to a coalition type deal where everybody's got input and is sort of agreeing to it and trying to make happen or is it really more just birectional between the US and Iran? Well, as far as I understand, it's still primarily birectional with Pakistan actually then being the middleman talking to both sides because they won't talk to each other directly, which is already an interesting dynamic because you're always relying therefore on that mediator, right, >> to be giving you a clear interpretation uh of what the other side is saying rather than massaging it in one way or the other, rounding up and rounding down. And I do think that there are sidebar uh panels being held with different parties, particularly the GCC, uh obviously with Israel, with some other allies too. Uh but that doesn't necessarily mean that everyone knows what everyone else is saying and everyone is sitting there openly putting their cards on the table and getting ready to, you know, prepare their marshmallows to to roast over the fire and and and sing kumbaya together. It's it's a very very complex dynamic. It it doesn't mean, as I said to to reach back to what I was saying a moment ago, that there isn't a potential broader movement for a regional realignment in play in the background. I certainly think there were very powerful, very deep vested interests who would like to see that. And to be clear, if we were to see something like that, it's not something that's going to be >> front and center for the news headlines to capture. What you see and what you get in the Middle East can sometimes be extremely very different things. Absolutely. And so, for example, how something is presented to one's domestic audience, whether it's in the US, where we are completely used to the fact that we're going to get the White House saying this is the best thing ever, regardless of who's president, by the way. That would be true for anyone. Look, this is the best deal. I'm amazing. The same thing runs true in Iran. So, therefore, they're going to be trumpeting saying, "We got XY Z and interpreting it a certain way." But to go back to what you were saying, yes, it's it's a very very complex issue, but I think primarily it is Iran versus the US and we don't know who in Iran. And to draw a parallel with the US, imagine if Iran was negotiating with Gavin Newsome. That that could potentially be what we're talking about here. Great. You know, he's very eloquent. He's promising us lots of things we want to hear. Well, he's not in office. >> But he's not in office. Yeah. Not in power. Yeah. Outside of California at least. Um, okay. [clears throat] Um, got so many questions. I'll try to keep it as tur as I can. Um, layman's understanding of the situation before we went to war. The rest of the Gulf states were mixed in their approach towards Iran, right? Some were more friendly, some were less friendly. They were kind of like, "Yeah, these guys are kind of troublemakers sometimes, but I do business with them, and they've got more weapons than me, and you know, let's let's try not to get Iran too angry, and let's just, you know, learn to live with this. This is the bully of the block, but we're all kind of getting along with them as best we can." post the war where Iran, you know, decided to attack a lot of the its Gulf neighbors, are they more unilaterally united against Iran now? Like in other words, could we ever go back to the way it was before or are they going to do everything they can now to armor up uh and try to provide a much greater deterrent to bad action by Iran going forward no matter how this whatever peace deal is struck? >> Well, basically the dynamics of the Middle East changing anyways no matter what the US and Iran agree to here. >> Well, that is absolutely the case. the dynamics will change, but it depends on the party you're talking about or the counterparty >> and it depends on the field you're talking about it happening within. For example, I don't think for a moment that the region is going to say great, we have a peace deal and believe it in in the way that it's going to be sold. Uh, I don't think that everyone will be saying all those plan B's that I've been expensively dusting off and preparing to get oil and energy and other goods out of the Middle East without going through Hormuz can all be put back in the drawer. The UAE is not going to build a pipeline to Fujira to try and >> get even more energy out without going through Hormuz. Uh, Saudis are not going to be looking at alternative pipelines, etc., etc., etc. No, the complete opposite is true. Everybody will be looking at building whatever infrastructure they can to make sure that regardless of what happens next and how much they're smiling and shaking hands or hugging if they are or they aren't in the background that they are not going to be pressured in the same way going forward which in and of itself on an underlying basis prepares the ground for the next phase of relations whenever that particular casselli or uh you know particular incident were to occur. So in other words, you could see some people move closer to Iran again and some of them have been quite close to Iran. Katar for example, you could see others move further away. You can see others tactically playing the game of you know follow the biggest dog in the in the in the pack which is you know a very very >> deeply rooted dynamic in real politic and in Middle Eastern real politic. But I don't think it's going to change very much on the ground or under the ground in terms of pipelines in terms of people trying to put in play plan B's and plan C's so that we can never have a repeat of this in the same way. >> Okay. Um, one of the things that the president had tossed out there month ago maybe [snorts] was, hey, and in addition to getting everybody to agree to what we're going to do here to bring peace, everybody's going to sign the Abraham Accords. [laughter] >> Yeah. >> What do you think is the likelihood of that actually happening? >> Um, I just saw two pigs going past the window there. Okay. Um, yeah, that's that's that's not going to happen. you you can basically see to allude back to what I was saying a moment ago, there are various different uh political economy architectures being put forward here. One of them which I've been arguing for years and I'm sure I've mentioned to you before is that America wanted to link India through the Middle East to Europe as a way to basically cut China out of more trade loops which is called the IMC the India Middle East economic corridor. Iran was an obstacle to that. It remains an obstacle to that by the way. This doesn't resolve that at the moment. Um, and Trump is talking about in parallel, yes, the Abraham Accords with everyone agreeing all wars stop everywhere. And as an adjunct to that, which we'll have to come to in a moment, we have the Lebanon conflict at the moment sitting on the side and that's now being linked to this. >> But we equally have, and again, if you think Lebanon is controversial or Iran's controversial, we have Israel Gaza in the background too, or Israel Hamas, which is, you know, a very, very hot potato. And I'm going to try and avoid getting my fingers burnt talking about it, but that has been quote unquote resolved with a board of peace. Do we have much peace there? Do we have much of a board there? Do we actually have any reconstruction happening there? And the answer is no. So far everything is completely frozen. So you can see that there is a very ambitious realignment all embracing architecture being put forward by the US. You can see other arguments from people saying, well, there are, you know, there are other deeper realignments happening that aren't being flagged in the press quite so much or the mainstream press >> and they're moving maybe in some similar in some different directions. And you can see other people very openly talking about the fact that, you know, China, Russia, the bricks, etc. are going to try and rebuild the region, you know, with Iranian uh foundational pillars on the other side of this conflict. Um, and for example, China over the weekend has announced that the Mbridge project as an alternative payment system to the US dollar and and Swift is going to go live involving Saudi Arabia. So, you have multiple different signals there, but the key point is none of them are in a position to proceed the way they would like to until this is all resolved. which is why I've been telling everybody how this war ultimately resolves is critical to understanding what the architecture looks like in that region and rotating oh sorry uh rippling out from there not rotating like circum uh concentric circles rippling outwards and we have to see how it happens and and I don't believe it has been resolved yet that's one of the reasons why I'm saying peace and deal because too much is at stake to say it's definitely this or definitely that yeah >> okay so I'm I'm gonna I'm gonna ask you a bunch of questions questions, but I'm kind of building up to the Michael, what do you think is is the most likely outcome here, right? You know, is is a lot of people who think this is just a a slow motion quagmire that's just going to continue to get worse. On the other end of the spectrum, some people think this is going to be transformative to world peace, you know, that type of thing. Maybe the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Maybe it leads closer to one of those ends. I'd love to get your your your informed thoughts on that. But if we can, let me let me stack some building blocks on the way there. Let me ask you this. I'm going to ask you a couple questions. Um, how significant are each of the following? And I'll also add, what probability do you give to them right now given what you know? The first is a non-uclear Iran. Iran that does say, you know what, yep, we're giving up our nuclear ambitions. We're going to give you our nuclear dust. We're not going to enrich going forward. we're going to play by the rules for at least 20 plus years. >> That is the core of everything at the moment after everything else is is you know filtered through. That's what really matters. >> Um how likely is that? This is the critical argument. I would say it's pretty damn unlikely that they have agreed to do what one side are saying they have because the other side in Iran is saying they haven't agreed to it. So that's a fairly a fairly clear dynamic. Now that doesn't mean it can't be true. We have to understand that what we are being told is being spun by both sides, twisted by both sides, etc., etc., and we're in the middle of a propaganda war. >> Yeah. It's >> I think I would I would just have agreed. >> Yeah. And I would just add personal opinion, you know, um one guy's thoughts, but to me that is the table stake that I think the president Trump >> Yeah. >> would have the hardest time walking away from the confrontation without having secured. Right. That's the one where he's basically said, "This is it." You know, if if Iran still does a whole bunch of other bad things, he can always say, "Look, but yeah, I was mainly there to stop the nuclear bomb. That was my my my my job." And if he doesn't do that, can't can't do that conclusively, that's a hard pill for him to swallow. I'm not saying he he might not have to swallow it, but it seems to be that that's the thing America would walk away last conceding. >> 100% 100% because if you look at the stack of everything else, originally it was regime change. So now he's saying it was never about regime change. >> Yeah. And I don't think that was really at the be, but anyways. Go ahead. Yeah. >> Yeah. And then then it was about ballistic missiles. that seems to have disappeared. Then it was about proxies and now we still have the proxies in the background who apparently being linked into this in a supportive fashion rather than a dismantling fashion. >> Um so then you have horm which wasn't a problem before the war started but now is and apart from that you have uranium. So uranium is at the core of it and just to summarize again I do not rule out because at this point you've got to be humble and I tried to be humble from the be beginning on this. I've made a probabilistic call which we can come back to in a moment. But I've always said it can go lots of different ways and I always look at a matrix of different outcomes. That's how you should approach these things. It's not impossible entirely that there is a faction within Iran that is prepared to do something like that and because they're hurting more than it looks, but they won't show it in public and they have to loudly say the opposite to sell it their own people. It's very very unlikely. Very very unlikely, but it's not impossible. And the US obviously is adamant that that's the deal that they have struck so far even though we haven't seen the terms of it that that's what's effectively before it's been done and these are the details on how we do it. That still strikes me as less than a 50% probability. So the greater than 50% is that that hasn't been agreed and therefore we haven't actually resolved this complex crisis yet. >> Got it. Okay. So again, your default here is you don't think it's super likely giving everything you know right now. Um but from a materiality standpoint, let's just assume it did happen. How big of a deal would this be? >> Oh, huge. Because from that st starting point, even though Iran would then still be in terms of what one understands this memorandum of understanding is pointing to in a position to start selling oil again so it gets income to have sanctions removed which means more money comes in um to normalize trade with many people therefore get investment coming in etc etc. it's in a much much stronger position to do many different things including rearming again aggressively or peacefully integrating with its neighbors in the broader world depending on who's really you know driving the ship of state it does change the regional and global dynamic depending on what Iran does on the other side of it because if they say okay yeah we're not going to go for that but we're going to go for a different platform where we still have a massive conventional army uh and very powerfully armed proxies in the region and we're going to integrate you know with other countries around us that still puts them in a very very strong position if that is one particular path we go down. If on the other hand they agree we're not going to have anything to do with nuclear anymore or nuclear weapons uh they are going to agree to hand over the Iranian oneway or dilute it under IEA >> IAEA observation u and everyone understands yeah that particular uh issue has been caged and put over there and won't be an issue again they could go a very different path yeah they could absolutely integrate with everybody and say we're going to be very peaceful and not have any troublemaking issues you know, for any of our neighbors, etc., etc. Again, I find that less than a 50% likelihood if you look at the historical pattern so far. But either way, it's extremely significant. >> Okay. All right. But it sounds like >> And of course And of course it is. If they don't do that, if they if they say, "No, we're keeping uranium," then of course then we're back to square one. >> Exactly. Then everything reflames back up. Yep. Okay. Uh second on this, you know, how how important is it and how likely is it? Um a reopen straight of Hormuz. And let me tack a second question on that which so so one is okay straight reopens Friday which I think is the current guidance when the the deal is signed in Europe. Um how big of a deal is that to the world right now? And then secondly is can do you think Iran ever can close the straight again? >> Okay. So how big a deal is it? Obviously, it's huge in terms of how important was is the entire global uh economic architecture. We've had that proven. >> The ironic thing is because we've had such efficient workarounds up until recently, >> which really have worked very well. >> We have not been uh in a position where we've really felt it quite as much as we thought we were going to. So if you look at oil prices, I think they're down around 4% or something today, which is pretty small considering that peace in our time >> is being laid on the table in front of us, you know, for the 38th or 39th time. Um, but I do think you'll see a shift in oil curves. Now, I don't want to get into the long grass on on energy in particular because our our energy experts, Florence Schmidt and Joe Deau, will be the ones to talk to that when when their time zones allow. Um, but if you've already got the market in in current pricing spot saying, "Well, we don't see much of an issue here and it's only coming down 4%." That tells me you're going to get a reaction in different areas in in different ways. Um, can it close again? This again is the 64 trillion question because to my mind, I don't see any guarantee at all a that we get this quick reopening. Now, could be wrong. It could be on Friday suddenly a flip is switched. All the minds which may or may not be there suddenly disappear. Everyone has complete confidence everything's going to be okay. And certainly I can see a lot of ships if they are allowed out will form a queue to get out which will bring a lot of product with them in a one-way wave. So there will be further downward pressure on energy prices in the near term therefore on bond yields etc etc. So it's a big deal. >> Yeah. >> Yeah. Sorry, just to interject. When I asked if if if they could close this trade again, I I should have been more specific. I didn't mean in the next couple weeks or months or whatever because they they have all the infrastructure they have right there to do it to do it again. I guess I'm thinking more like a couple years down the road. In other words, will the Gulf put it with the Gulf States plus its allies put in a credible deterrent that just says Iran, you can never do this again. And and here's an example which may be totally pie in the sky but I could see it happening which is I could see after the dust settles from all this that the other GCC countries invite basically all the major western nations to create a naval flotilla that's it's just a police force. Its job is basically just to sail in circles in the Gulf. In yeah, in the Gulf and just be there to keep things nice and safe and and and I think the Gulf States would happily pay those countries. So the countries wouldn't be, you know, they could sell it to their their um citizens. It's like we're not paying for, you know, we're getting reimbured for this. It's not coming out of the national coffers. And and the deterrent to Iran would be if you ever try to close the straight again, you get a deal with those guys and you're not just going to war again with America. You're going to war with 15 countries now, right? That's one potential, maybe it's not a realistic idea, but it's one potential thing that could be done. I'm just guessing the rest of the GCC countries once the the straits reopen are going to say, "How can we make sure this never ever happens to us again?" >> Completely. So, first of all, that's a very realistic possibility. Um whether it's uh a coalition or whether it's just the US remains to be seen. I mean the US would obviously want to be paid for that because it's it's all about >> it's all about the bottom dollar to an extent. >> But that would not be in isolation. That would be with massive investment in anti- drone uh and anti-missile technology to make sure they are >> defensively a porcupine. And to refer back to something I already mentioned, it would be alongside alternative pipelines to make sure that we can get everything out going via Jordan, via Syria, uh you know, via via Turkey. Uh one potential pipeline alternative people mentioned sometimes much politically contentious via Israel, via via Cypress and Greece, etc., etc. There are different alternative pipelines going west. You got Fujira going east via the UAE. lots and lots of alternatives are possible and I expect a stacked program of plan B's to roll out altogether but what I did just want to add to that because this is a longerterm argument which we must keep hold of and Iran is cognizant of it too which means that it would actually be in a much weaker position going forward to try and be a troublemaker um in that there's less trouble it can make and that's an important dynamic people are maybe not necessarily grasping but that feeds back to what I was just about to say which is if we have this 60-day window, which is apparently what will be triggered on Friday >> during which we negotiate. You can expect if it's real, if you don't get hardliners from either the US side or the regional side or the Iranian side literally blowing it up early doors, >> which can happen. >> Sure. >> You are going to get a flood of ships getting out temporarily with a long queue, you know, like an LA freeway. You are going to get those ships coming out and there will be a further boost to global energy and key commodity supplies. >> But then people are going to look at that 60-day timeline given that there's a long journey time for a lot of these vessels to get to where they were going. Let's say 30 days, 45 days depending. Are they then going to say, "Let's turn around and head back to Hours as that 60-day window looms." now potentially because 60 days only takes us to late summer >> and you and I both know the midterm elections are in November and I hope this wasn't a question that was going to be coming up shortly but if so I'm preempting it. >> Okay. It was preempt away. >> Okay. Okay. So, do you do you really think we're going to kick off again to in 60 days from Friday, so mid August, given how much closer that would be to the midterm? And I would argue, look, probabilistically, no. >> But logically, you would then say, >> well, you know what, we can extend for another 60 days. >> It's not difficult the way things are at the moment to extend another 60 or another 90 days until you get to the other side of the midterms, at which point then everything can begin again. if issues haven't been really seriously addressed. So this could just be a effectively a prisoner exchange if you will. You know, some cash might go to Iran from >> Qatar, for example. I wouldn't rule that out, but not from the US, I would imagine. >> And we get lower gas prices. >> You get lower gas prices in the midterms and then afterwards we'll see who's actually really agreed to what. >> Yeah. >> But that doesn't mean that Hormos actually reopens properly in the interim. you just get a one-off hostage exchange and then we see where we go from there. And I think that's that's something we can't rule out at all. >> Okay, that's really interesting. Okay, next question. Again, how important and how likely? Iran agreeing to defund its terror proxies. >> Not going to happen, but very very important. Very important because they see them as a defensive shield, but also an offensive weapon uh against others in the region. This is primarily focused on Lebanon now and Hezbollah. Um you can imagine it could at a push be extended to the Houthis in Yemen if we start to see you know further military action in that country or that a region of of Yemen I should put it. Um but Iran has very very explicitly now tied the outcome of what's going on between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon to what's happening between the US and Iran. And there's a certain irony there because originally they had them as a defensive shield. The thought being if anyone ever attacked Iran, Israel in particular, that Hezbollah would then attack Israel. So Israel doesn't attack Iran because they know Hezbollah will attack them. That's actually been flipped now that Iran is having to step in to protect Hezbollah [clears throat] >> against Israel rather than it operating the other way around. So that changed the dynamic. But I don't think there's any chance that Iran is going to say, "Right, okay, we can give up Hezbollah and just say there you go." Which means that there's another layer of vulnerability on top of all this because you still have a live conflict there where we've at time of speaking just hours before this announcement of the of the peace deal which is going to be signed on Friday, of course, we had Hezbollah firing drones into Israel. Israel bombing Beirut uh to take out a Hezbollah commander and Trump telling Israel stop doing that in very very strong terms which I won't repeat here. >> But that dynamic is not going to hold unless Hezbollah actually entirely stops firing against Israel but also for those who understand the dynamic in the region and I'm not taking a side I'm just describing also stops not firing but building up potential firing positions. So for say for example, if you metaphorically or literally see people creeping towards you and taking up sniper position but not firing next to you, do you just stand there and say, "Well, I can see what they're about to do, but they haven't done it yet, so I'm not going to react." Or do you preempt and say, "Right, I'm going to strike against you." Now, the way things work now, if Iran is managing to impose those conditions regionally, the US would tell Israel, "Your hands are tied. You can't strike against Hezbollah when you see them basically starting to rearm." >> Yeah. and and point weapons against you. Israel's entire strategic doctrine post October the 7th is they will no longer have a wait and see approach. Anything they see that looks like a potential problem, they hit first. I'm not making a judgment on that. I'm just stating what their national security doctrine. >> But no, that that seems very clear that it's a non-starter for Israel to just be told to just keep your hands tied behind your back. Yeah, >> exactly. And by the way, and as another aside, and there are so many hot potatoes here, but it's hard to avoid touching some of them. Um, Trump has said he's not interested in regime change in Iran anymore. Now, whether he means that or not is irrelevant. You know, that's what he's stated. Um, ironically, if things don't change and what the Iranians are saying is the deal is true and the US has openly told Israel, you can't act against Hezbollah, you can't act against Iran, etc., He may ironically end up with regime change in Israel because you have an election day coming up, >> right? >> Uh sometime between September or October and there's very little way in which Netanyahu can wear that >> uh and write into an election and say I achieved some kind of victory rather than being basically put in shackles here. >> Right. And Netanyahu is already quite he's already quite vulnerable in in that election. Correct. >> Well, he's not doing well in the polls. If you look at >> every poll that's come out for the past couple of weeks, uh, if not months, he doesn't have a coalition that he can assemble that will keep him in office. The opposition will win one way or another. And e, I don't think you'll necessarily see a shift between the anti- Netanyahu and and the Netanyahu supportive, should we say, camps. But within the Netanyahu camp, he will probably lose a vote share to even more right-wing parties. Mhm. [clears throat] >> So therefore, even if that camp were to somehow win, it wouldn't necessarily be with him in the same position he's in now. >> Same position. >> But but yeah, so many dynamics can change here, but some of them are quite ironic and not what you would have imagined. >> Yeah. Okay. I got one last of these questions, then we'll move on. But one last one just on this current topic. So I understand you're saying crazy low probability of Iran um cutting its proxies loose and and no longer funding them. just assume it happens. How big of a deal would that be to the dynamics in the Middle East? >> Huge. And again, I really want to underline this. I make probabilistic calls based on, you know, an assessment of a very, very complex dynamic. And you know me, having, you know, had the privilege of appearing with you many times over the years. >> I I know you are. I I'm not afraid to make very very big straight calls like saying we're going to have the end of the rules-based order. Mechantalism is coming back. Economic policy's finished. These are rather ballsy calls if I say so myself and I've made them publicly and early. >> With this dynamic, I am absolutely aware of the fact that you know literally one bullet in different places can tip it to the left or the right and it's very very complex and it can evolve in lots of different ways. I do not rule out even if I think it's a low probability event that you have a cascading stack of positive positive developments because certain powerful forces are shifting backstage which are not how they're represented in the mainstream media and you do get some kind of slow gradual integration of Iran into a broader architecture. Um and it wouldn't be the Abraham chords. It's not that political economy the way that that you would like a Hollywood ending where everyone clearly sees what's happening. But you get some kind of de facto integration which you know takes friction in that region down significantly and opens new possibilities for business and markets going forward. >> I don't rule it out. >> All right. And sorry to interject but this is sort of the spirit of my last question which which tactically was what if there's internal regime change within Iran, right? which, you know, we're not no one's counting on at this point, but it it could happen, right? And and Iran, the regime is certainly, I think, weaker than it was pre pre-war. Uh, and that doesn't necessarily have to be the mechanism here, but but let's assume within a couple years we have this cascade of of really positive developments that you said could happen, not necessarily probable, but it's in the the realm of the possible. H how big a deal would that be? and and and I asked that not knowing the Middle East as well as you do, but Iran has been such a um destabilizing factor to to just peace and stability in that region and to the larger world. If that were to moderate materially, I mean, it could be just tremendously positive for world trade and world peace and all that stuff, I think. But I'm not I'm not the expert. >> No, you're completely right. If you imagine the fantastic potential of the Iranian people unleashed and you imagine Iran operating like the UAE, like it's like, you know, super Dubai. >> Wow, what fantastic good news that would be for everybody. And we can hope for that. And to tie it back to what I said just a second ago, one of the terms of the purported deal being put forward by by far the Iranian IRGC news service is that the US has agreed to a $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran. Mhm. >> Now, [clears throat] I think you and I both know if that's true as they're selling it, that's political poison for Trump that I've promised to give Iran $300 billion. >> And I'm sure that's not the case. What if actually that is part of this underlying dynamic that I was talking to that that 300 billion is from Gulf money from other sources including some US private sector capital which is part of a secret unofficial paristrika if you will >> as with the Soviet Union at the end where effectively the communist party stays in power or here the Iranian regime stays in power but actually it's been hollowed out you know you what you had also in China where of course the western capital went in, the communist party still runs China but everything transformed >> behind you know the political shell remaining exactly the same. The economy changed. Is that possible? It's possible. I'm not ruling it out. I still think it's a low probability event but I'm not here to say this is the only way the future can go and no other way. But it it's not my base case yet given that the fundamental dynamics still look like they're not easily resolved and I think this 60-day window could become extended and extended but not much further than the midterms and then we go back potentially to round two for legacy sake. >> Okay. So, um thank you for entertaining all that with me. Um and super useful and helpful. Now, let's just look at the world as it is right now. Right. Best we know it right now. Um, who is more wounded at this time? Um, the US or Iran? Um, and how has the path to today affected, if at all, US, the US's position versus China and Russia? >> Okay, that's a great question. This is again incredibly contentious. You know, analysis, you can look at the data and you can draw different conclusions. And it can get quite quite viferous you know the disagreement you know we need we should do X we should do Y within a normal political sphere here it becomes vitriolic and very much ad hominemm and I want to try and state that you know people can have different views and hopefully you can disagree respectfully rather than you know unpleasantly but I would say >> most people can't on this subject and I've learned that the hard way but go ahead. [clears throat] >> Yeah absolutely and I'm I'm just saying this before all the brick bats get thrown in my direction. Yeah, >> but I would say that Iran has been a significant victor in some contexts and an enormous loser in others and you have to look at the win loss column. So first of all, we can't finalize that until we understand what this deal actually is in reality rather than how it's been presented. >> And that isn't something that you get on Friday. It's the evolving process over the next couple of months. So we're not even there yet, but you can look at it in two different kind categories. if Iran gets what it says it's getting, if the US gets what it says it's getting. But even before we get there, Iran has been physically pulverized by this. Um, it didn't have much of an army or a navy or an air force. So Trump talks about having destroyed them. They were never that significant, but its air defenses have been hit. It looks like, on the other hand, that its missile systems and its underground bases, etc., that it's spent a lot of GDP putting in place have been much more successful than people would have thought that they are hard to remove because they're limpit like stuck there like North Korea. So that's a win. It's proved that it's got some very significant defense technologies despite the sanctions that have been put in place and with a you know a little strategic help from a few others. Nudge nudge wink wink at the margin. >> But its economy is a shambles. It was a shambles before this before but >> it's an absolute shambles now. I mean >> if you read anecdotes from on the ground the ordinary Iranian person is seeing just a family is seeing terrible hardship and even prior to the war starting you already had tan close to running out of drinking water due to economic mismanagement which has nothing to do with the US. >> Right. >> So you know potentially if you have a really bad El Nino this year uh or Yeah. Yeah. El if you have >> which is the forecast like a super Elino. Yeah. So imagine you get a massive drought on top. It's a terrible dilemma for any country to have to face. So that's a reality. On the other hand, if you have managed to survive the US attack, they said the world's, you know, greatest military power tries to take you out and says we want regime change and a few months later effectively says we don't want regime change. Your missiles and drones are very hard for us to deal with, etc., etc. And here's 300 billion, depending on how you interpret what's going on, etc., etc. Your moral standing amongst all those who you know are like anti-west, anti-US, anti- capitalism, however you want to frame it, obviously your stock rises. But I do think we have to differentiate between one's moral standing or or uh social media standing in some particular context and whether you can put food on the table, >> whether you have a stable economy and whether you can actually project power on a sustainable basis when you don't even have drinking water. These are >> the point that I've been using, sorry to interrupt, but the point I've been using when people are like, "Oh, Iran is so much stronger and you know, it's winning this war and it's coming out so much stronger." And I'm like, "All right, social media to maybe a certain audience, you know, maybe you can make somewhat of an argument what you're saying, but I'm just like, look, what country in the world, let's go through the whole list of world countries, which would willingly trade places with Iran right now?" Yeah. Now, maybe they maybe today is a little bit more optimistic because of this peace deal, but but let's go back to yesterday, right? Where you're basically losing half a billion dollars a day. Your oil wells are basically shut in at this point or getting shut in. You might not be able to reopen them. You've got massive inflation. You've got dra you you know I I I don't know a lot of countries that would be saying, "Ooh, please put me in that position." >> Completely. I mean and Iran's strength here is their underlying uh ideology you know which is this is a religious regime it's a theocracy with with some you know rubber stamp democratic elements on the side but it's fundamentally a theocracy which we we all have to understand that and you know the theocracy is based around this you know stubborn resistance such that it doesn't matter to them so much what condition the economy is in it's basically did we hang on and survive >> right now but that that's that's the regime's mentality that is not necessarily shared by the remaining 90 million Iranians. Correct. >> Completely. And the majority of them don't feel like that. Right. >> But I'm saying you can you can frame a conception of how you want to look at this in which Iran wins. And I I think elements of that are valid and the theocratic one is valid if your effectively religious belief is we will win this. we can inflict more pain on the GCC and on the Western economy than they're prepared to take, which means we eventually get to hang on and then get to set terms to others. Strategically, you could give that a tick depending on how this deal pans out if it pans out. And theocratically, yes, you know that we have God on our side. We're okay. You could give that a tick. But economically and you know from a bigger picture perspective, is this really a foundation from which you can build much on? Not so much. I would say not so much depending on how the the GCC and the West collectively choose to react. If they all say, "Well, fantastic. What can we do to build to help you Iran without Iran having made any change?" If Iran says, "We're not handing over the uranium." And the US and Europe and everyone says, "Fantastic. How can we invest? What can we possibly do to help you >> if you don't meet any of these terms and conditions?" Then you can turn around and say Iran's the winner. >> We're not there. We're not there yet. So, I agree with you. There are nuances here. It's not blank. It's not white. And I don't buy propaganda waving from either side. >> Yeah, I I agree with that. And I'm not trying to push um aside either because there's certainly a lot of challenges the US has here as well. But I as we've talked about, you know, Iran has a lot of elements that I said, you know, nobody's envious of them for. And and and one thing I I think that again, there's so much we don't know, right? like Iran could be teetering on the brick of collapse and that's why they're deciding to make peace with us now, right? Or they might feel like they've got 20 more years of this. We just don't really know. We won't know for a while. The one thing though that I think we kind of know is that the US could largely end the war could could force Iran to capitulate overnight if it wanted to. And and you might you don't have to agree with this, but this is sort of my conclusion having been following this is we could blow up Car Island in an hour, right? We could go and just decimate their the Trump's bridge and tower tunnel, sorry, bridge and power plant day. We're just going to take them all out, right? And we have chosen not to because of the humanian humanitarian hardship that that would impose on the people of Iran and we don't want to do that. But there is sort of an element of like are you really winning if the if your opponent really could just kill you, you know, with with one knockout punch if he wanted to. He's just choosing not to. I >> I think that's an incredibly powerful point. I'm glad you brought it up because again, you're going to get brick bats for saying it and I'm sure we both will for discussing. >> We both will. Yeah. >> Yeah. But this is how the world actually works. Of course there would be consequences in terms of politics, markets, moral standing, etc. But in terms of pure physical reality, if the US wanted to take out those bridges, the infrastructure, the drinking water, etc., etc., if it also wanted to drop a nuclear weapon on some of the reinforced uranium mountain underground bases where the uranium dust is being kept. There's one called pickaxe mountain that they're currently still developing for etc etc. If it wanted to basically say that can never be used again. It could do all these things. It has the ability to do it. It doesn't because and this is a good thing in my book. We have moral frameworks within which we operate. And frankly, let's be blunt, the moral frameworks are often pretty immoral from some standards because this is this is the reality. And I'm not saying for a second anyone is a night in shining armor. No m no matter how everyone everyone likes to think they're a saint or a night in shining armor. Every country's propaganda says they are. >> The reality is that the US has that power. Iran doesn't. Always flip it round. If Iran had the ability to do that to the US, would it be holding back? >> I think a lot of people would think no. >> Yeah. Well, I I'll leave that question with whoever is watching and then start thinking what the world looks like when you're deciding what people will or won't do. And I don't just mean the US, what other countries regionally and globally will do when they start to see that dynamic. Okay. So, that's the first part of it, I think. And I didn't even get to the uh to the China. >> I know. I I sorry I took you on a little bit of a >> No, no, not at all. But it's it's it's it's all relevant again because it it factors into this because people look and China in this particular instance looks at what the US is doing and they look at their potential for action across different spectrums from the political to the economic to the military and they say what can they do? What are they likely to do? So the actions that you set and your reasonable parameters already define to your opponent where you will and won't act. So again, this crisis I think is not over because if we take this geostrategic view and I stick with it because I made that call early and I'm not backing off and people a lot of people have followed me and saying it afterwards that this wasn't just about Iran, it wasn't just about the nuclear weapon. It was about energy in the Middle East and it was about the fact that there's a supply chain of raw materials from the Middle East to China. And if America controls them upstream effectively despite the fact China controls most global production downstream because they have all the industry, America still has a kind of a counterbalance. >> Right? >> I still believe that's true. We have we can take away different lessons here. The first one we can say is that if the pain of that downstream disruption gets too much, the likelihood is America will blink. Certainly the rest of the West will blink. That's not good. That certainly shows that any steps taken so far need to be more aggressive. And I don't mean necessarily more aggressive militarily though that is one of the logical options on the table. But I mean say for example the US putting together alternative energy plans which I've already floated in public. In fact I was floating that when I was there in Houston and Chicago the week before last saying that for example the US can get together with a group of countries. Um, I was making the joke that instead of a NAFTA, you would have NAPFA, which is the North American Petroleum and Hydro Harbons Trading Hub Association, where you get the CA Canada, the US, Mexico, uh, Venezuela, increasingly, Guyana, other Latin American producers if you can get them on board. If you have that, you have all the energy you need pretty much. You have the energy and the refining capacity to make sure that as a block you have pretty much everything you want and the rest of the world faces $200 oil. >> That that's a very broad simplification. So in other words, a much more radical step to say, "Okay, we can really ride this out." You got >> Sure. Sure. And and in that spirit, do you think moving on Venezuela and then on Iran before the Trump Shei meeting a few weeks ago was part of a more muscular strategy of, you know, I'm sitting down letting you know that I could connect those dots because I can connect even more in the future. Right. >> 100%. And of course, I think that was with the expectation on the US side that um this would be a Venezuela style outcome that three, four, five days, maybe a week or two, >> we're done and we're in an incredibly strong position. Now, it hasn't played out like that, but that feeds back to my point that they've lost that particular gamble if you're looking at this who has the cards casino game of poker. >> But and China has displayed a very strong card which is at least temporarily they can suddenly stop importing oil. That's one of the reasons why we don't have tripledigit oil right now. China has massively reduced its imports. Now, some people say that's because massive reserves, right? Yeah, >> they got mass they have massive reserves. Okay. They won't last forever, but they have massive reserves. They've electrified their economy to a large degree. I don't believe though that everyone suddenly said, "I'm leaving my diesel truck at home and I'm driving my my my EV truck in a few months." I don't believe that happened. I think it's much more likely that what we're seeing is that refineries in China, particularly tin the tin private quasi private sector ones. They're basically looking at oil prices compared to the subsidized rate. They have to sell energy at home and the crack spread and saying this doesn't work out for me. So, I'm going to run down stock first of all >> before I have to take the loss bringing more stuff in. So, they haven't solved the problem. They've kicked the can down the road. Right. So, I think that's more the reality. But, China has shown, look, we can ride this out for up to six months. So, if you're ever going to try this with us, you better be able to write this for six months, not six weeks. >> Yeah. >> Which then tells me again that the US has to look at that card in this poker game and say, "Right, I need to rethink that. I need to replan, back off, which is where you might have the extension for 60 days, >> then 90 days, then the midterms, >> then then okay, then the plan, you know, and oil stocks have built up in the background. Then you say, right, let's go again with better drone techn better anti- drone technology from Ukraine in the Gulf region. Let's go again with a 2027 UAE pipeline, you know, in very close to coming out of the pipeline. Let's see where we end up again. >> This is the dynamic where I think that US versus China has shown the game. China has shown, you know what, I've planned for that and the US is now saying, right, okay, I'm not out of the game. I'm preparing my card to counter for that. That's where I think we stand. >> Okay. And in terms of um some of the cards that might be playing to counter that, let's head over to the Western Hemisphere, right? So Monroe Doctrine 2.0, Donroe Doctrine, right? So uh with Iran maybe uh calming down, right? Um and we either get a sustainable peace deal or we're in this we just keep extending and extending, you know, the situation. At least we're not kinetically involved over there and we can perhaps focus a little bit more in our own backyard, right? Um, so, uh, I was going to go through a similar exercise with you. We don't have the time to do it, so let me just list the things I was going to ask you to respond to. Um, with Iran simmering down, does it give the US the chance to then start fully focusing on its Western Hemisphere plans, including targeting the cartels, building the Golden Dome defensive shield, figuring out what to do with Greenland, kissing and making up with Canada and Mexico. Um and um you I'm noting that that more South American countries are are voting to tip more USfriendly making some sort of you know really harmonious uh full America's trade you know negotiation maybe a little bit more likely. So um I guess those are all the key points. react any as you like, but but with Iran maybe quieting down, does it give us the ability to really start putting pedal to the metal with those initiatives? >> I'd phrase it differently. >> It makes it an urgent imperative because you get need to get a win on the table. >> Okay. >> A win on you need to get a win on the board pretty quickly. So, if I was Cuba, I'd be sleeping very uneasily. >> Oh, I forgot Cuba on the list. I'm glad you added it. Yeah. >> Yeah. I I I would be sleeping very uneasily if I'm in power. >> Sorry, probability. What probability do you give that there's some sort of material regime change or or relations change between the US and Cuba? >> High high. Because you go for Venezuela, easy win. You go for Iran. So far, let's call it I'm going to call it a messy draw at the moment. Okay, that's that's where I as by the time this airs that could really have changed. >> I'm calling it a messy draw, but it's not over. Um, and Cuba, that looks like it should again be a fairly easy win, I would think. But again, could be wrong. You know, Cuba will be looking at Iran and thinking, how quickly can we order tens of thousands of drones? >> And the US will probably be looking at, you know, cargo shipments heading towards Cuba pretty quickly, >> etc., etc. >> Um, but if that's the case, it just incentivizes the US to say, right, we need to get the Dunro doctrine in action. But unfortunately within Latin America, I think you I say unfortunately from the US perspective, right? I don't mean that in objective terms. >> Uh it's going to make it more difficult because everyone's going to look around and say, "Well, Iran managed to push back. How long can we hold out?" You know, does the US really have the stomach for this. But I think in its own strategic uh sphere of influence, the US is going to have less and less time for people standing up and saying, you know, we're not going to work with you. And I do think that elections are so far on balance albeit by very fine margins in places like Peru [clears throat] >> tipping the US way. If we get Colombia in another couple of uh is it days or weeks it's pretty soon Colombia has their election too. We are really starting to see a more and more proTrumpian shift. And then the really big ones as you said Canada where obviously there isn't an election coming up but we've had Carney pivot from new world order with China in January to how do I do a trade deal with the US to make America great again. Mhm. >> That's a pretty big pivot, right? So, what can be put in place? And in Greenland, we have this suggestion that Japan might invest in critical minerals there, which of course will be with the US standing behind them. Um, and that the US might get military bases, which are actually sovereign territory. So, if they get a military base, which is sovereign territory in Greenland, that might tick that box and they can say we're we're pretty much done with that, >> right? >> Watch this space. I think maybe it's the best summary, but I think things will happen fast. >> Okay. All right. Um, it's been a great discussion. Thank you. Um, I'm going to keep you on for a few more minutes, but um, I'm going to ask you some questions that we could talk for another hour on, so we'll just have to do the crib notes and then have you back on again. um our mutual friend Brent Johnson, dollar milkshake theory gentleman um you know kind of the if I can boil down his argument it's it's don't count the US and and and by extension the US dollar out um there's all sorts of exorbitant advantage it currently has and don't think for a second it won't act to protect it right um do you have any particular opinion on the outlook of the dollar going forward from here um especially in the context of you know ddollarization and you know initiatives like Embridge which you referred to earlier. Um you know Brent is is sort of the mindset of like those things have been talked about forever. I think they'll continue to be talked about forever. I I I I I think they're kind of science projects that'll probably never really fully leave the lab and make a big dent and the US can do a lot of things if they start to look threatening. Do you agree with Brent on that or do you have uh do do you give the DD dollarists uh greater credibility? >> Well, I'm broadly of the same mind on that. But I have been very clear in my view that if this particular war versus Iran >> is one in which the US is comprehensively seem to have lost if for example despite what it has done to Iran which is very significant as we've already discussed >> on the other side of it the US says we're leaving the region >> we are tying everyone's hands including Israel against Hezbollah so Iran free reign, we're giving them $300 billion, etc., etc., etc., you know, we're not going to do anything with uranium. I'm not saying any of this is true. I'm not. Yeah, >> if those are the terms of the deal as the Iranian side are putting it forward, this is exactly the kind of pivot point around which you start to see that while the architecture may not be there, while the infrastructure may not be there, while the internal trade dynamics between supply and demand and exporters and importers aren't there yet, it's hugely damaging to the US and the dollar story to the point where it starts to open a fissure within which more damage can be done or other entities or options can be inserted into it. For example, if the US is going to roll out stable coins, which we've discussed in the past and I'm sure I'm sure I know you have with Brent too and again we're a likemind on that. I've been saying that they're a key part of >> effectively the slicing and dicing of the dollar into a new format under a reverse paristrika. But if they if they can't get people to accept them because the Middle East is saying, "Who's the US to us?" >> The world starts saying, "Look, the US paper tiger, and if you don't like him, you don't have to worry about him anymore." Yeah. >> Exactly. At which point then you do start practically thinking, is there really a US global military footprint backing the dollar? Are there aircraft carriers behind every dollar bill? the way that the popular meme often runs. If they turn up, >> don't bomb everything they can or could because they don't want energy prices to get out of control or for whatever reason, etc., etc., you start having second thoughts. So, that's the best way I can put it. It doesn't change the dynamic short term. It does start to seriously look like a potential pivot point. If that's true, >> I'm not saying that's true. And my logic tells me because it's so damaging, if I can see that, the US can see that, and this is unlikely to be the deal. that the headlines this morning as I'm speaking to you Asia Time >> Yeah. >> suggest and over time something different will more likely emerge. >> Okay. And again, thank you so much for taking an hour plus away from the headlines when this is all breaking news. I I very much realize this is not an easy time to be away from your your work desk. Um all right, last question for you or last main question and then we'll wrap up. Um, folks, I I normally try to kind of push Michael as best I can, uh, given his constraints, uh, because he is not a financial analyst. He's not an investment adviser. Um, but I usually try to see if he, you know, if there are any investment themes that come out of the way that he sees the world and he always has to remind me, look, I'm I'm not an investment adviser. Um, so I am not going to do that today uh to thank him for taking all the time to do this [laughter] right now. So the question I'm going to ask you to wrap up is um just simply are there any other key geopolitical trends that are going on right now that we have not talked about yet but you feel is just important to to you know your the grand tapestry of what you're looking at uh right now from a mercantalism standpoint. >> Well first of all the the you know nationalism and mercantalism is now dyed into the wool. Everyone can see that this is the path forward whether we like it or not. >> And that toothpaste out of the tooth to tooth tube, right? The toothpaste out of the it's you don't think we're going back to >> rembbracing globalism in our lifetimes. I imagine >> well you'll get regionalism or you'll get different kinds of globalism that effectively the one world system is collapsing and it's now going to be reordered and countries are looking at others to kind of tag onto themselves. So, for example, you and me and them together, we're we're great. Little blocks. Yeah. And it may be two blocks or it may be smaller blocks, but that's that's the game. And this will determine a lot of what's going to happen in economics and markets and politics going forward. There you go. 20 second summary, right? Of my underlying view, which is again quite a strong view or very strong view and I've had for a very long time that doesn't change obviously key sectors that run through that. I'm not giving any names because I don't do that and I'm not saying what you should or shouldn't invest in but I'm saying there are certain things which are obviously going to be key to that supply chains commodities energy defense now by the way energy that doesn't what's happening in horm or isn't happening has huge impact on energy prices that doesn't change the fact that if you're building a block you need to look at energy you need to be looking at commodity supply you need to be looking at physical supply chains all of these things need to be there and you need to be looking at defense as in how are we going to defend ourselves So you are going to see headline after headline looking at scrambling to work out who's going to build what with whom where using which inputs delivered how paid for in which currency. So that's a very overarching view but that will tell you where markets are going to go and of course AI is part of that too. So all of that >> thrown into the mix but what are we not seeing that is again dependent on this particular crisis resolution. If the US, if this is a messy draw for now, we're as we were, it chaos continues, you know, but lower key for a while. That's one thing. If the US actually has got Iran over a barrel here and Iran won't admit it, you can expect to see further US efforts to try and build the block it wants to build more aggressively and it will be in a better position to do it. >> If Iran is in a better position, then the US is over the barrel. And I leave it to the viewer to decide. I've only given you my call on what the probabilities look like. Doesn't mean I'm right. You decide. I'm just describing the framework. But if the US is over the barrel, lots of other global players will be looking and seeing where are the opportunities now for me to push to get better terms from the US or to squeeze people around the periphery given that the US is not going to be ready to pivot somewhere else in the next two months. Even if Iran is done and dusted, even if the US says right, we're going home, they're not ready to send aircraft carriers somewhere else tomorrow. We know that they need a couple of years to rearm, right? So where else is vulnerable if that's the case? >> Right. And Trump just needs I mean my opinion, but he just needs a pause of his stuff before the midterms. I think the the American public has the appetite for another wait a minute, we didn't vote for this kind of confrontation. >> 100%. But you know as well as I do as an American, post midterms, every president is in the final legacy phase where effectively, okay, yeah, they're looking ahead to the next election, but it's all about what do I achieve for prosperity and I'm out the door afterwards. So if you think that, you know, Trump is going to dial it down post November, whether he loses the midterms or wins them, and that's a whole separate argument. He's going to dial it up. If he wins the midterms, he dials it up because he can. if he loses them, the only way out is through. You dial it up. So, a lot more volatility to come. >> I a thousand% agree with that. Um, just in general, but specific to the man, I think that's his personality as best I can tell from the cheap seats. Okay. Um, thank you again, Michael. Um, last question for you. For people who have really enjoyed this and maybe this is their first exposure to you and they'd like to follow you and your work between now and the next time you come back on the channel, where should they go? >> Sure. Well, you can follow me on LinkedIn. Um, and also and more frequently uh on X. My handle is the Michael Every. It would be nice if you would uh say something neutral or friendly rather [laughter] than rather rather rather than a brick bat. But, you know, I understand the way the world works. That's my job. So, there you go. >> All right. Well, Michael, um I will put your ex handle on the screen when I edit this. I'll put the links to your LinkedIn and your Twitter account X account in the um in the description below this video. So, folks, you can get there with one click. And yes, folks, let me please ask you as a favor to me to Michael. Um if you want to engage with them, please do. If you disagree with them, that's fine. Just be respectful. I' I've mentioned a number of times late on this channel, Michael, about how on this subject in particular, you know, social media, which is a toxic swamp at best. Um there's just a huge cohort of people that do the fire ready aim approach. You know, they just take out the flamethrower first. Um and folks, that doesn't help you in the long run. It might might, you know, give you a second of uh of righteous fury and then you'll feel bad and the person who gets flamed by it is going to say, "Wait a minute, you just could have engaged with me respectfully. I would have happily talked with you, but now I'm not going to." So, please just use civility, folks. Um, all right. Uh, thanks so much, folks. Um, you know, Michael did give us a couple of areas to look at in terms of what he thinks the whole move from globalization to mercantalism is going to do. And there are definitely ways to play that as an investor. Um, if you'd like to get some help in sort of um, you know, talking through ways to take advantage of those ideas, I recommend you do that with a good financial adviser. If you've got one who's already serving that role for you, great. Work with them. If you don't though, feel free to talk to one of the ones that Thoughtful Money endorses. These are the firms you see with me in this channel week in and week out. To do that, just fill out the very short form at thoughtfulmoney.com. Only takes you a second to fill out the form. These consultations are totally free. There's no commitments involved. It's just a service these firms offer to be as helpful to as many investors as possible. The last thing, please share uh my appreciation along with me uh your appreciation along with mine uh to Michael for giving us so much of his time at a very crazy time of the news cycle. Uh do that by hitting the like button and then clicking on the subscribe button below as well as that little bell icon right next to it to it. Michael, um you're you know I know you personally. We've spent time together in the real world. you are such a gentleman. Uh I so appreciate you coming on this channel as often as you do and I so appreciate our professional relationship and our friendship. Thank you so much and uh I I wish you all the best in continuing to surf this very you know chaotic set of waves here and as you said we don't really know where it's going to end up yet. Um and I'm sure your work is going to get harder on this before it gets easier and and just know that you know I'm rooting for you and again I'm grateful you making the time today to speak with us. Thank you very much. >> All right, and everybody else, thanks so much for watching.