Eastern Expert: Dissecting the Rise of Multipolar Trade Alliances

Summary

• Geopolitical Dynamics: The podcast discusses the rise of multipolar trade alliances, highlighting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS as significant players challenging traditional Western alliances like NATO and the G7.
• Neutrality Strategy: Pascal Loa emphasizes the importance of neutrality for small states, allowing them to maintain relationships with major powers like the US and China without fully aligning with either, thus preserving strategic autonomy.
• Economic Implications: The conversation explores how countries like Canada can benefit from economic diversity while maintaining military alignment with the US, suggesting that economic neutrality can provide resilience against geopolitical shifts.
• Corporate Strategy: Companies like Apple are highlighted for their strategic balancing act in maintaining production and trade relationships with both the US and China, underscoring the importance of redundancy and diversification in global operations.
• Resource Control: The discussion points to China's control over critical resources like nickel and rare earths, which poses challenges for Western countries and necessitates strategic investments to ensure supply chain security.
• Middle East Tensions: The podcast addresses the geopolitical complexities in the Middle East, particularly Israel's actions and the international community's responses, including recent recognitions of Palestine by countries like the UK, Australia, and Canada.
• Future Outlook: The dialogue suggests that geopolitical strategies will increasingly focus on real economic capabilities and resource control, with countries needing to adapt to a world where globalization is no longer the primary framework.

Transcript

Are states able to stay neutral today in an increasingly hostile world? And why are some small nations able to act with relative impunity on the global stage while others are punished for minor acts of aggression? And how will the security over raw materials shape the future of public and private relationships specifically in the western world? Today we get into all of this stuff. My guest is Pascal Loa. He is an expert and geopolitical analyst. He's the founder of neutrality studies, the world's first research organization focused on neutrality as a stance for global states, meaning they're not aligned with the west or the east. They're playing the center and doing it sustainably. This is the J Martin show where we dissect the greatest minds in geopolitics and finance. Here is Pascal Lup. Enjoy. >> This is J. Martin. All right, here I am with Pascal Lo. Pascal, it's great to see you. Um, looking forward to seeing you next week in Japan, but great to have you on the program today. Thank you very much for having me again and likewise looking forward to catching up over dinner with you. >> So, lots to talk about. Uh where I'd like to start is um you know we've just come off the heels of the uh Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit and um lots of performative displays on stage I would say uh from the military parade through to the two Koreas shaking hands on stage there's a lot of messaging I felt like from this meeting um did you interpret it that way Pascal I guess reviewing and reflecting on how you um watched that meeting and the outcomes and the takeaways from it. Give me your thoughts. What's material? What's just noise and symbolism? >> Well, as with most of these meetings, also if you think about the G7 and and others, you know, optics is always very important. These leaders a put a lot of uh emphasis on looking good on stage. All of them want that naturally. That's because that's, you know, that's just in their natural. these leaders they always they they seek the the the limelight. That's the one thing. On the other it also um it also conveys messages and as much as these meetings are about um you know brainstorming or diplomacy and and cooperation organization they are also about um signaling to each other and to the outside world what to expect. I mean the aspirations and especially for the SEO I would say this um the point that they made is that there really is now more games in town than just the the traditional western G7 NATO uh EU um uh approach and that actually you know the SEO had very low profile for now a quite a long time. This is the first time that that in my perception we've got a meeting that was this well covered and that had this much impact because the last couple of years the SEO was overshadowed very largely by bricks and these two are um complimentary I would say but they're different um they're different they have a different genesis and different origin and both of and they have slightly different emphasis of what these what these corporation schemes are supposed to do. And um this year it seems to me or my interpretation is that the participating SEO states agreed that they want a grand not a grand entry but a kind of a re-entry into saying like look this is also important and they succeeded at that. um also with the parade which also like of course coincided with the 80th anniversary of uh China's victory uh Chinese Russian US victory in the in the second world war. So they combined all of that in order to create a grand spectacle and kind of give the SEO the gravitas that apparently the uh member states especially Russia and China decided it should it should have um and establish it also as this second pillar to this new multipolar world besides the bricks. I think that was a smart move because sometimes you know if you focus too much on only the bricks forum you you you risk that you lose sight of the other opportunities and the SEO definitely is one. The big difference between the two is that BRICS is mainly a economic forum very akin to the G7 um where where the original idea is that okay let's just the large economies let's let's let's put our heads together and figure out how if we all push in the same direction how we can achieve more together whereas the SEO has same components but then it also has a security component right and a cooperation component in the security realm especially if in uh the realm of anti-terrorism and the SEO is nothing like nothing like NATO, nothing like a military alliance, but it has different arbs and it is more formalized. So I found it a good idea to emphasize um the fact that oh by the way there's this second uh gathering place and meeting space that we can also use and should use and will probably use in the future with also slightly different members so that you create an overlapping net of you know how to build the the multipolarity. >> Okay, thank you for that. Now I I wanted to start with that question and next get into the concept of of neutrality which is your area of focus and here's where I want to come at this. We've seen the two major superpowers make a lot of u declarations lately, right? Some positive, some negative. From the west, it's mainly been trade aggression, negotiations, and demand. And from the east, it's been a bit of a show of here's the alternative, right? Here's what we can do for you. Here's another place where your economy and trade relationships and military reliance can land. Right. >> Right. Um would would you be able to share a list of companies maybe like even Australia that are kind of threading the needle right now and that they're maintaining trade relationships with both China and the US to largely equal degree even if they're you know um verbally aligned with the west right America is a friend China is a customer as they said which is kind of a silly thing to say but love to know your thoughts on that but you know These two superpowers right now I feel like are jockeying for the favor of the neutral states. Would you agree with that? And if so, what would those neutral states be? >> So on the one hand, yes, they're vying for for more support from the neutrals, but they do it in a in a very different way. So the U the US and the and Europe are still in the habit of threatening the others saying like if you don't if you don't join our camp then uh beware of what's going to come your way. Uh we are seeing this very clearly by the way the the EU for instance approaches Georgia and the US approaches Georgia. this and I know Georgia, if you're if you're not following the the news in the caucuses, it's not on on your radar all the time, but you know, Georgia has like um carved out for itself a very clearly neutralist foreign policy to go for to go forward. Um just to recap, right, 2008, they had a small war with Russia after um as by now is clear, a Swiss diplomat actually wrote the entire report about this. Um it was the Georgian side that fired the first shots and then from there things spiraled into um well into into a into a short war. Um the and from there Georgia kind of at that point in 2008 was completely west aligned with that government under Mrs. Takashi and um once he was out of power, you know, the the the Georgia voted in a new a new government, fair and open elections. No, nobody contests that. And that government, the Georgian dream since 2012, has been steering Georgia back into a more neutralist position. Now, the um the US and Europe keep saying, "Oh, this is a pro-Russian government," which it is not. Um my Georgian friends keep telling me, "Nobody needs to teach the Georgians how to dislike Russians because of the very long history." But um a large majority of Georgians has no interest in providing any kind of pretext to Russia to invade again, right? So they don't want to be a second Ukraine. Um so they've they've been trying to have somewhat um a a great relationship with the EU. They would still love to join the EU because that's for economic purposes very important. Um but on the other hand, do not antagonize Russia. The EU keeps saying, "Oh, but you were so friendly to Russia." And the Georgians keep saying like, "But look, we don't even have official diplomatic relations. We are not having any Russian ambassadors here." And no, vice versa, we still are very in a large dispute about our territories. Um, we just don't want to escalate against them more. We just don't want to make things even worse for ourselves. And you know the EU and and Europe have been putting a tremendous um the the the EU and and the US have been putting a lot of pressure including including of course like uh organized street protests through NOS's and uh that has been happening in December 2012. Now this failed but the the strategy still put put pressure not so use the stick not the carrot right or if a carrot then a very small one and a very big stick. Um and unfortunately the west has been very used to this kind of strategy. In other places in East Asia, we've also seen recently um large protests and one where uh Indonesia for example uh Nepal in uh in in South Asia and now most u most recently in the Philippines and some people in our community are discussing could this be uh a form of you know western color revolution taking place. There's I I cannot choose right now what to believe because all three instances don't on the one hand there is some rationale why that could be the case on the other hand they don't look like it I mean if it is instigated or partially instigated by the west then we I would still need to see the proof for what actual mechanisms um other than a few NOS's that got support from um uh from from European from American donors. There are always NOS's involved in this. I must say though, um Brian Balletic uh talked about this but you know just showing that a couple of institutions that are anti-government get US funding is not enough yet in order to say like this is a large scale attack. So I mean we need to be very careful but we need to be careful with this one. Um but it could be that also in East Asia we have this approach of the big stick and the small carrot um going on. Um now the on the other hand we do have um bricks and the SEO that are trying to basically use a big carrot and so far I haven't really seen sticks very much h a little bit a little bit um there are examples where you know Russia decided to announce that it would Vladimir Putin would visit Mongolia last year November December last year and uh you know have a friendly a friendly state visit to Mongolia And the problem is Mongolia is a member of the um international criminal court. So under the ICC under the Rome Statute, Mongolia would have been under the obligation to arrest Vladimir Putin, right? Because Putin has a warrant out. But obviously little 2 million uh people Mongolia will not arrest the leader of its largest neighbor, right, of of of Russia. Obviously that will not happen. And Russia just said, "Look, we're going to visit you. This is what's going to And Mongolia said okay fine so we are going to be the first state to break the Rome statute but there's nothing we can do. So that's also that's an instance of you know a small stick approach to just say like we are going to to set an example and you have to take it and Mongolia understood that and took it and actually made the best out of it for its own diplomacy and it was in fact it's going very well for Mongolia as we saw at the SEO it was revealed that the um this power of Siberia 2 pipeline would not go around Mongolia from Russia into China which would be a possibility will go through Mongolia which which is very good for Mongolia because you can uh you can benefit basically all you need to do is to to give a plot a couple of plots of land in order to get billions of dollars in revenue right in the future. So that's really great for Mongolia as a um as a not not just economically but also um security-wise you know it makes sure that the that the energy future of Russia and China at least for a little part also depends upon Mongolia. So it makes them structurally more important which is great. So these things are you know are are are developing at the same time. But um in my view um the SEO countries, the BRICS countries they try to um first and foremost advertise the the benefits of being a member, the benefits of cooperation, especially the bricks. Bricks is so popular right now that it even had to create different membership categories in order not to overburden itself because each each full member also has de facto veto power. So if you grow that club, you need to make sure that you don't incapacitate yourself accidentally. So they made a membership category being like an um a so a full member and the other one is called a a um associate associated or well the idea is the same just being associated. So you you you contribute to the club, but when it comes to uh voting rights and how to go forward, you're not you're not >> um on exactly the same plane. In return, you don't occur the exact same um you know, obligations to carry carry all of the policies forward. Um so with this said, I think this game is going on at the moment. And when it comes to companies, um I'm sorry I don't follow the um the precise economic situation as as as closely as you do. I really only know of a couple of basically only the tech sector that comes to mind, although there must be others, right? I mean the the oil the the the mineral industry must also be playing um must be looking at this very strongly and try to tread the middle ground in order to keep access. Um it's I mean I guess I guess market not only market access but also you know uh um investment access must be huge on the on the thinking of a lot of companies. Um the only one I can give you an example of is the tech sector with you know basically what Apple is doing. Apple is like now doing this balancing game of still trying they invested for 15 20 years into China to manufacture there. uh designed in Cal designed in California uh uh um produced in China, right? Um they then when the the the trade spat between China and the US started heating up um I mean already under Obama it got clear because Obama uh uh announced the pivot to Asia that there might be problems on the horizon but then under Trump won this got very um explicit and they started to invest into India to have basically another another place to to to shift production to if necessary and also you know just diversify the production portfolio I um which which also makes sense. Um although it seems that in India they hit like a new set of problems which is absolutely expected right these these uh jurisdictions and these countries and these cultures just have different challenges if you want to um produce there and um by now we are seeing that um the pressure on on on Apple is even larger um with the US the President Trump basically demanding to meet Tim Cook and tell him look you have to invest more over here and produce over here. Um at the same time, Cook is also able to meet Xi Jinping actually and um and the China obviously values these foreign tech companies um for their for their very own reasons and and Apple is trying to make the best out of it. But the the more the trade disputes um are increasing and the more one or both sides are trying to put pressure on the other one by pressuring their companies, the harder it's going to get for these companies. And the more you're you are entangled in this network um the the higher the stakes for yourself for so for Apple I think it's it's it's very high and they must be doing like geostrategic uh uh analysis a lot in order to figure out how to mitigate these risks. On the other hand, it also comes with a lot of opportunities, right? If you have production plans, even redundant production plans, which is something you don't want to have um under normal circumstances because it's a waste of money, but in geopolitically uh tense moments, redundancy can save your behind because you're you're able to switch one off and the other one on, right? So this building redundancy must be something that they um that they are thinking about and to serve different markets from different jurisdictions. So the larger companies will have or do have now an advantage if you're able to produce in different jurisdictions and then adjust the delivery to the US market um depending on the tariff situation for instance. Um, so I do I do think that when it comes to the neutrality of these companies, companies will always seek by the way they are designed, they seek profit maximization and they seek revenue, they seek access and they have to somehow be neutral in that sense um in order to create shareholder value. uh and I do believe that a lot of them will have to start investing into this um into redundancies in order to um to mitigate the risks and risks that 10 years ago we weren't thinking about because 10 years ago the the the name of the game was still globalization right and more access and pressure for ever more access and ever more plain le um level playing field and we are now living in the opposite world and it's like okay fine got to get used to this. Yeah, 100%. And you know, such an interesting point on just the general economic implications of this when we see this, you know, trade war, global competition continue to heat up. And there's two very different strategies at play, right? China's uh implemented uh, you know, a state corporate partnership model for a very long time. And this is one of the reasons that many of their companies have become so competitive. When you have access to the pockets of the central bank when you need it, right, more frequently than than they do in the west. Um, but we're seeing this occur now in the US much more frequently. And you know, the US steel deal, uh, President Trump negotiated a board seat in the American organization. He can veto decisions at the American plants. The Nvidia deal. Now, if Nvidia sells chips to China, the US government gets a cut. And these are just deals of influence, but the government's also invested directly in certain mining companies like MP Materials >> to uh boost the competitive nature of America's rare earth supply, which they they need to do if they want to stay competitive. Or we're going to end up in some kind of a two-tier commodity system where you can buy the cheap stuff from an adversary or the expensive stuff from an ally. you'll need a really good reason to buy the expensive stuff from an ally, especially as the commodity market continues to heat up. And I think the nickel industry is such a great example of this because, you know, if you look at the nickel price, it's like Pascal, it's like the one hard commodity where the price has fallen off a cliff right now. Most hard commodities are hitting all-time highs, whether you're looking at gold, silver, copper, uranium. For some reason, the nickel chart is the opposite of that. And the reason is is because China invested about $65 billion in Indonesia's nickel market and they've been able to flood the world with very cheap nickel because nickel comes from Indonesia, Canada, and Australia. And obviously Canada and Australia can't compete with not just Indonesia's uh labor prices, but also just the the environmental regulation, right? And the Salwasi Islands where the nickel comes from are an absolute disaster from an environmental standpoint. uh but you know as a consequence they're able to get much cheaper nickel to the market and Indonesia today controls like 65% of the refined nickel industry globally and just for context like OPEC at its peak in 1973 only had 55% of the oil market. So 65 is a lot, but the consequence is that they're they're choking out the Canadian and the Australian providers taking more market share as Aussie and Canadian miners go on care and maintenance and shut down their mining operations. And so my expectation is that we see government intervention into these projects and maybe subsidization to get Aussie and Canadian miners competitive again or some kind of a carrot or incentive to get Western allied countries buying Western nickel. This is probably something we're going to see in the future and it will set precedent for more corporate state partnership in the west. That's my expectation. Any thoughts on that, Pascal? >> I think you're you're right on the money as they say. It's um the current situation the last the last few years and especially the last one year I would say has driven home at least to the United States that you do need to shift focus again on the real economy. Um the reason the NATO is not able one of the reasons NATO is not able to win its war in Ukraine is because they ran out of production cap capacity for that for all of these military goods which is something I would never have thought possible. I thought the military-industrial complex in the United States has basically um infinite capacity of producing how muchever you want. Turns out that was wrong. there is real economic constraints um because of 30 years of de-industrialization in certain sectors the dependency on um modern supply chains I mean supply chains today are much more complex than they used to be in the in the ' 50s60s and 70s and and these modern production um um um uh well entire chains that you create um led to this effect that now certain things cannot be produced without um input from the other side of the world. And even if that part of the world is really uh on your adversaries on your adversary soil, the most um the most the best example of that we got is how China suddenly made the US realize that you guys you need our rare earth. If you want to create these weapons, you need a rare earths. So if you put the absolute maximum pressure that you can think about then um we control I think they control 96% right of that of that sector which is even more insane and they just say like okay fine no more exports to you guys export controls now from and the US backtracked within within a week within a week even Donald Trump because somebody in the Pentagon must have actually uh gone to the office and said like look let me show you let me show you how important this is and what China is doing right now and they got the point across and this is now a a very strategic security vulnerability of the US which I am absolutely certain they are reacting to and they do exactly what you're saying with uh with nickel they they are now strategically investing and doing this um public private partnerships in order to mitigate those risks because anything else would just be absolutely completely dumb and um you can I cannot imagine that the Pentagon um and and and other institutions including CIA would let that So you do need to do these kind of investment. You need to refocus on the real economy. Um access to these to these goods, access to the supply chains or control and and management of like where is all of these where is all of this stuff sourced from in order to produce an F35. You just need you need millions of parts and you need millions of components and they all need to be produced >> pounds of rare earth metals >> and thousands of pounds of rare earth medals and and you know it's just the rare earth is just the one that comes to mind but there might be other strategic choke points right that are other from rare earths that we are just not aware aware of and even for the US to figure that out which one that which ones that are you need to to uh to do um almost a forensic uh analysis right of the entire process so Um the that's just to say that the the production environment in a in this multi-olar world where um globalization still happens still happens but it doesn't happen under the same um under the same rules anymore that we were used to. This is this is this changes a lot and this means you need to to to invest into understanding actually how things are being produced. The Europeans I don't believe understood this yet. The Europeans for some reason they still live in this fantasy world where they think anything can be solved by just throwing money at it. Um the the Americans I do believe understood that the real constraints are there. The Chinese understood that from the from the beginning and still do. The Russians also the Russians have access to like most things um absolutely most things you need in order to run an Otaric uh uh uh economy although that's not their goal but their their land mass is just so so vast and their their resources including human resources is so is so vast plus then the access to to China and and and Central Asia in general. So um long story short um I do think that we are now going to see more um more emphasis on the real economy and maybe maybe just maybe also the dangers um of financialization. One of the reasons why the US lost so much in its competitive edge in the real economy is because the last 30 years was the the big financialization uh uh uh uh drive that then really hollowed out um the real capacity of of the country. And I would expect also if you look at how the rhetoric of Donald Trump and MAGA and not just Trump MAGA, right, how they will shift again focus on um what are we actually able to make versus uh what can we uh what can we buy, package and sell on the markets. >> 100%. And you just make such a good point. If you view all of these headlines through the lens of real economy, you can see things a lot more clear. Like what what can we make, right? When a month and a half ago, President Trump was in Pittsburgh pounding the podium saying we're going to make Pittsburgh the steel capital of the world again. Um and and maybe maybe that's great. Um, but if you understand how steel is made and that the most important alloy for stainless steel is nickel, back to that, you can't actually make Pittsburgh the steel capital of the world without uh the express um approval of China. And that's just how global trade has shaken out and that's how it functions today. >> Um, just just one thing like one of the problems that I see in the in the vision of um the the Trump cabinet is that they are longing for the past, right? It's like we want to go back to the 1950s where this was the case. So Pittsburgh used to be steel capital. Let's go to steel back to steel cap capital. And what you need to do obviously is to to analyze what the future is going to going to look like and then and then reverse engineer, right? And that's something that the Chinese are extremely good at. Um, so this there's a problem in vision, but that's not to say that the that the that the gut feeling of that of that of of of that group of people isn't isn't uh right. So, I do think the gut feeling is right. The question is how do you get it? >> Yeah. And, you know, there's two things that play there, right? When you're focused on two-year election cycles, you have to tap into people's emotion. And so >> promising to bring back uh the golden American days of the ' 50s is something that resonates with people and they want back. They want that culture back and I completely understand why. >> Um even if that's not sort of the real politic approach, right? And actually this brings me to like another uh point I wanted to ask you about. So at the end of 2025, China will announce their 15th 5-year plan, right? uh they've been executing these 5-year plans um since the foundation since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Uh uh what was that? 19 around >> 1949. >> 1949. Thank you. Thank you. And if you look at the um commitments on a 5-year plan basis back to that point, I think the 14th 5-year plan that we're currently in had like 20 commitments that 20 goals, right? And if you go back to the early years, the goals were very industrial, very heavy industrial, uh, annual coal production, annual grain production, things like this, very heavy industry. Whereas right now, it's more focused on like pension plan participation, uh, GDP per capita, much more like sophisticated economic goals. and the next 5-year plan very focused on high-tech, high innovation, AIcentric goals, which when I read that it just it made me wonder, right? Is is one economy hyperfocused on the next generation of um of economic inputs, whereas the current global superpower or at least regional hedgeimon being the US is trying to get back to 1950s um advantages, right? And how's that going to shake out? Because though that doesn't seem like a good strategy. What's your take? >> Well, I mean, you you you put it correctly. I think part of the rhetoric is has to do with like um winning voters over. This is something that the top leadership of China just doesn't need to worry about uh very much. They I just had an interesting discussion with a with a China scholar uh who explained look the Chinese model is actually quite uh quite intricate and between the top and the lower levels and so on. But it is pretty clear that on the top level the the system that reigns is meritocracy. So people people rise through the ranks and they have to do so. There is there are ways around there is nepotism. There is still forms of corruption that also undermine the system. Well, at least in theory, the large part the largest part of these of these vast of the vast bureaucracy um and political bureaucracy um as well is is is to rise through these through the ranks. Um that then allows you to plan differently whereas in in the US the planning is sometimes at least when we when we listen to the political speeches seems haphazard. But we must not forget that the US too has a vast bureaucratic apparatus. And sometimes we refer to this as the deep state but you know any country any any modern state needs a bureaucratic apparatus. It needs the the permanence right in order to govern itself. Um and these people also work on uh on plans and on strategies and the US also has a lot of think tanks. the the US had has um one of the advantages it has it it's got a very very plur pluralistic society in which a lot of ideas can be bounced around very very freely um and the so I I wouldn't say that what the the US will be planning over the over the next decades um cannot be viable um and necessarily you know what what uh you what you then end up implementing will be different from the from the political rhetoric. So it's very difficult for us who are not um who do not have access to the to the you know also to the bureaucratic arm of policym to judge what will be actually the the the um the economic real strategy or at least at least the the many economic um um um approaches that the United States will be taking. It's very hard to judge that but I think overall your depiction is is quite accurate. The Chinese try to try to analyze where the biggest um biggest chances for growth are and then strategically invest in those and they try to understand where the largest vulnerabilities and mitigate those as well. And um if in the process of that every once in a while you even need to flatten uh parts of your economy they do that. I just recall that two or three years ago they completely they they they cracked down hard on the Chinese gaming market and on a couple of um IT industries uh IT companies which is something that would never happen in the US right you wouldn't just just flatten a profitable part of the of the economy but the Chinese decided that this is undesirable because it screws up our plans in other in other parts and they did that so the um China is able to use more of a heavy hand on the econ economy because they have the the grip is the political grip is around the economy. Not that like in the US where where all the economy also has the very strong feedback loop to the point where lobbyists and lobbying groups are are an essential part of how the entire system works and then how resources are allocated. So rent rent seeking in the US is is extremely strong and I I'm not entirely sure how that will shape out. I'm not I'm not saying the US is doomed. Not at all. It actually just for the for the for its sheer size and and the ability over the last 250 years to shape itself, I wouldn't discount them. But the um when it comes to strategic um decision making, I think the Chinese system just lends itself better to that. So, so I um we probably need to need to um observe in the United States what kind of uh which which processes will drive the um the overall economic output of the US in the future and not necessarily the speech acts right but what can the what will what cannot go wrong I mean if you look at um the development of fracking in the US fracking was a was a huge gamecher of the way the US also um created energy security for itself and became a net energy exporter in including LG and there is no chance in the world that the United States will go back on on on fracking and would would um fall fall back to the place where they were in the 1990s. So these kinds of these kinds of industries I guess um are um detrimental also just because of how the United States works. >> Let me ask you Pascal I want I want to ask you about the concept and utility utility of neutral states and maybe specifically about Canada if I could. Canada is a country that, you know, shares the largest land border in the world on the other side of which is the world's wealthiest and hungriest customer. And Canada is an export nation when managed properly. Right? We've got a lot of what the world needs. You know, 25% of the world's softwood lumber, 30% of the world's pot ash. If you want to grow anything in the world, you need potsh. Top five producer of of copper, nickel, gold, uranium, oil, gas. We're a we're a supplier of of commodities. That's what Canada is. when managed properly and when managed properly, you know, we come through the 2008 financial crisis with a healthier balance sheet than any G7 nation. Um, we share that land border with the US. That relationship is obvious and natural, right? >> We also have the largest coastline in the world that spans three oceans and provides access to every global market, right? And so diversity of customers very important for Canada and probably something we could do better, right? open ourselves up to new markets in the east and elsewhere. Um h how what are the challenges of being a neutral state? What are the advantages? And if I could ask you, how would you counsel uh a country like Canada to play it neutral to its own best interest? >> Um so the the the kind of neutrality you talk about is the one that I call um um analytical neutrality. you know when when when you look at countries and you say like okay they cannot um put their lot 100% behind somebody right they need to have some degree of um strategic autonomy um and hence you're you will always be caught in the in the middle somehow and this this is this is a position that a lot of countries experience over time a lot of actors experience um NATO uh sorry um Canada of course is a is a member of NATO so security wise there's no there's no way of talking about uh Canada as a as a as a proper neutral, but economically, as you're absolutely correctly pointing out, um it makes a ton of sense for Canada to to diversify and to do what I think is the core of that of an of a neutralist strategy, which is um be friends to all and foe to neither as toides uh defined it 2,400 years ago. It's like I think it's the most beautiful definition of that you just try to make friends on all sides. The problem that you run into automatically is that sometimes your your friends find with a fight with each other. So you end up being friends with enemies and that con that that conflict constellation as I call it then creates pressure points on the neutral because naturally both of the enemies of the com of the of the quarreling states and the the quarrel can be a hot war which is the worst form of conflict. Um it can be a cold war, it can be a trade spat, it can be like just anything anything where two states directly uh uh have a dispute with each other and you as a third state you you you want to be friendly to both of them and remain neutral toward their dispute. So the my the the advice I would have is that for Canada try to analyze um where the tensions between your friends are, right? Um understand make sure that you correctly understand what the the tension between China and the United States is actually about because that has to inform your approach toward both of them because what you don't want to do is to add fuel to the fire and you don't want to anger anger one by making the other one happy, right? Because naturally, if you're if you're nice to one, the other one's going to say like, "Hey, that's my enemy. Why the hell are you being nice to my enemy?" And in the worst cases during wars, I mean, states even make laws, right? The the United States had a trading with the enemy act and a tra which said like, "Oh, any third states trading with our enemy is naturally going to have decent sanctions applied to them." Um and that is a very unfriendly act toward the neutrals and it's not it's not fair but it's just a matter of matter of fact that that's what happens um because it's how the conflict dynamic evolves. So main thing is understand the bilateral tensions because most um we we sometimes forget that because we talk about NATO and you know alliances and this group and that group but um a lot of that is is um makes you forget that international relations at its core is a bilateral game. It's the game of Canada with all the 192 other states or 190 odd other states and some of these bilateral relations are more important than other ones. Obviously the most crucial one to Canada is that with the United States but um also the the the bilateral relationship with Mexico is not unimportant. The bilateral relationship with China is not unimportant and with Europe neither. So you need to keep those in mind but then try to understand so what at which points for instance does the United States have uh pressure points or or or issues with the with the Europeans? Where do they have issues with the Mexicans? and how do I position myself in those disputes um in order to make sure that the uh on the one hand the United States um remains calm and fine and good with me on the other hand Mexico and the Europeans also stay calm and fine and good with me because if I achieve that well they are they are most likely to give me uh to give me access the way that I want and the you know states are much more willing to cooperate with their friends than with and people they trust than those that they that they don't. So strategically, uh, you need to make sure that you don't accidentally piss off one because you're nice to the other. Um, and that's just even outside the security realm, right? Yeah. And you know, there's there's an argument to be made and it comes up in Canada a lot right now that it's actually in Canada's best interest to do the opposite, to go allin on our relationship with the United States. And I can see that argument and I understand it and I understand a lot of the advantages. Um, but I think just on its face, even if Canada were to go allin on its relationship with the US, that would never be reciprocated. And the United States is never going to go allin on its relationship with Canada. And so at a point in time where a tough decision had to be made about trade, um sovereignty will always be the better option for a country like Canada. But you know is is if I think about this and could I ask you through the lens of like John Mshimer's work >> where uh countries like Canada are often used as leverage points by countries like the United States and um neutral states are seen as risks to powerful states depending on where they are from a proximity standpoint. Canada shares that large land border with the United States. So how much of a vulnerability and does this question make sense? How much of a vulnerability is Canada to the United States if it's not US aligned? Pascal. >> Well, look, if if Canada ever had like let's say um uh a military alliance with China and was stationing Chinese weapons on Canadian soil, um that would be a mortal threat to the United States and the US would have to invade you like period. There's just no way that a great power could let that happen. And we are seeing that with Russia right now in Ukraine. And we know it from uh 1962 uh what the US was willing to do to Cuba or where it was willing to go when Cuba unwisely decided that it is a good idea to allow or to ask the Soviet Union for stationing nukes on their soil. I mean these kind of uh um these kind of threats direct and real existential threats to great powers is something that they won't let happen or they will do anything and everything uh to prevent them. So um in this sense Canada is condemned to um being part of the security environment the security structure of the United States but let me just you know that that has been the case for the last for the last 200 years and Canada actually fared really well by providing that and it's not even that Canada doesn't want to do that. I mean can the Cana in my perception Canada and the United States are largely on the same page when it comes to interpretation of international affairs when it comes to um uh what is a uh what is desirable what's not right um there are of course differences naturally and and and we all know that also from TVs and so on and the closer the neighbor usually the larger we emphasize our differences and um and also in cultural output we we we make fun of each other and so on but overall All I would say it is absolutely clear that Canada and the United States have the best of all chances to get along very well with each other and it makes sense for Canada to be part of the larger um of the larger um geostrategic environment of the United States. Canada can benefit from that a lot. Again, you can benefit from the huge US market. You can benefit from trade deals that also the United States uh negotiates. And thanks to having access to US markets and so on, you're basically you you you profit and benefit as well. Um the the question for states is always like is the is it is it the right kind of balance or are we being taken advantage of or not? We see how Donald Trump brings up that rhetoric a lot time and time again to the point where everybody else says like look you're just being a bully. I mean you're just portraying yourself as a victim while you're bullying everybody else. But let's put this one aside. Um [Music] the idea we need to um maybe not forget about but but seriously curtail is that sovereignity means that country X can do anything it wants. If Canada decides tomorrow it can uh put a man on the moon it can uh station Chinese weapons or it can uh it can do whatever it wants. Right? Unconstrained unfathered freedom. the only country on earth that kind of has that at the moment. The closest thing is basically Israel because it can do whatever it wants with impunity and you know it just it breaks every single norm that we have seen but uh but even Israel is under constraints because action and reaction right even Israel wasn't able to to break Iran at least not in the last round of of its war and so there are constraints every country acts under under certain constraints and it to me it makes more sense if we think of uh international relations not only as a game of bilateral al relationships but also as spheres and within these spheres um you have different possibilities um spheres of sovereignity um there are certain things Canada can do and Canada can't so again um I mean legally and hypothetically possible to station Chinese nukes on Canadian so soil um practically absolutely utterly completely out of the question and if you try to do then Canada will be a Ukraine period and um we just That's just the constraints we're in. So if we think about that, then the the question is what's what's the realm of the possible and how can we negotiate that realm of the possible? Um and the a neutralist strategy would then say that you are not going to put uh you're not going to put all of your chips into the US boat, right? you maintain a some some degree of um strategic autonomy but not not just in the security realm like also in the uh you know in the economic realm and you make sure that if for whatever reason the US ship sinks that you still stay afloat because if you put everything in if you're all in then they go down you go down and this is this is a this is a a clear risk that does exist and you would want to try to mitigate that uh uh somehow I believe but then again the people who say like no all in and whatever the US does we do and even if it means the US wants to make us the 51st state so we we you know no more prime minister but a governor fine enough okay we're good with that that's a possible future it is the question is is it a wise strategy to to care for the prosperity of the people living in Canada >> right yeah okay thank thank you for that so you know gross summary militarily aligned economically diverse right the strategy for Canada I mean Why not? Why not? I mean, Canada has also slightly different interests from the United States when it comes to the economy, right? Um, naturally, and you're also competing with US with different US states and um and giving up on that competition and giving I mean up a large part of your industry just in order to please the hedgeon around the corner that might not be necessary in order to um in order to prosper. So I, you know, again, don't try to break the system, but try to to pu push and and figure out where the boundaries are. >> So let me ask you, uh, let's let's pivot to the Middle East. Let's pivot to Israel. Uh, nice segue there, as you mentioned, Israel and your your previous response. Um, last week the UK, Australia, and Canada uh, decided to recognize the state of Palestine. Um, this obviously set both President Trump and um, Netanyahu uh, off on a bit of uh, tangents online. My initial response was, you know, watching the announcement from Kier Starmer, the prime minister of the UK declare the his support for the the state of Palestine. I I just immediately thought of the Belffor declaration and thought maybe you guys should just sit this one out. Wasn't it uh a UK initiative that created the modern state of Israel? And um maybe maybe your opinion is fine on the sidelines here. So what's your what's your take on on that announcement, Pascal? How material is it? And what's the what's the point? What's the point of countries like Canada, the the Australia, and the UK recognizing the state of Palestine? >> Yeah. And you can add to that uh just 12 hours ago, France actually also announced it. It now recognizes Palestine. So, um, let me put it this way. It's an important decision and one that carries potential weight in the future, but it is currently for the situation immaterial because it won't change the uh neither the way the the Israelis approach their um their goal of emptying the Palestinian lands of Palestinians. Um nor will it change the the approach to basically genocide Gaza, which now several also UN reports confirmed. And I um I mean I don't think that we will ever remember this anything differently than than as a genocide. But let's put that one aside because the the approach won't be changed. It will only actually the counter reaction from Israel has been um ever since the UK and and and others announced that they would in the future like September. They announced this like three months ago, right? Uh France too that they would recognize in September. And already that was weird because if you want to recognize just recognize now you don't need to wait for a UN general assembly. It's really not necessary. That's like just performative. But you could see how they tried to basically assue their own populations because the anger is rising and the anger is real. Even if uh even if it's being downplayed and so on, but the the European and also um in Canada, a large part of the population is not on the same page with the with the with the official line of the government, right? And this tension keeps boiling. So one of the ways to diffuse it is by taking a very performative step um in order to tell everybody look we're we're we're doing things and so on um that has little real world impact. Now it is important though because it is it is part of a general push. So if the street protests and if the if the outrage about what's happening doesn't stop if it actually keeps continuing then these governments are under pressure to continue um going in that direction. So in a sense it's like it's a virtuous salami tactic in order to then um get to real political pressure that could actually have real world impact on on on Israel. And Israel actually said, "Look, we need to prepare for an for a future where we need to rely on ourselves, right? They understand that they're losing large parts of um the West, which they um used to think that, you know, they're just extensions of that." And this is changing. So, in that sense, it's important, but in immediate immediacy, the immediately stopping the bombing in Gaza, it won't it won't do that. And it is also meant not to do that, right? the recognizing the state of Palestine is a very strong political um um statement in order not to do something that could actually hurt Israel, right? Which would be uh real economic sanctions uh which would be um not not just on on certain leaders, right? But actually, let's say uh uh forbidding uh European ships to use Hifa as a port. That would have an immediate uh impact, right? And that would be a relatively easy sanction to take if you look at how easily the European Union was able to put like 18 sanctions packages on Russia. I mean they could do that in one sitting basic not one sitting but within two within two weeks you could have a sanction package on Israel that would actually hurt Israel and that would hurt them a lot. Um but that's not being taken in in in order not to do that you actually do the other one and we've seen the these acts also by people like um Mr. Mer in Germany who said like okay we are now going to have a arms embargo on Israel but an arms embargo with asterisk. So only um Germany decided not to export any more weapons that could be used in Gaza to Israel which is a ridiculous uh statement because what kind of weapons can you can you use in one theater and not in another. Um but it was meant to to basically you know be a political statement to one side of the population say look we're doing something we now have some form of arms embargo. Um and on Twitter actually people were very outraged about that how come we're standing with the terrorists and so on like the other side of the debate right but in reality in reality this has no this has no severe impact on the way that uh Israel will be able to procure pro procure weapon systems from the west not at all so there's this duplicity in that in in that act um on the other hand again um if there ever will be a Palestinian state and if there ever will be a two-state solution if we ever have uh a a moment when the Palestinians get um get some form of of justice for the last 100 years of European oppression than it is by such acts, right? And building little by little. And you can see that the that the Palestinians are are of course um happy about that because it gives them more um political leverage. uh although in order to become a UN member you also would need the agreement of the big five in the security council and we can be a million% sure that the United States current US won't let that happen. Um so they are not closer to have a UN seat but they now have a a few um few ways diplomatic ways more and it is first and foremost uh a pressure campaign uh a moral pressure campaign I would say. Why do you think it is that countries like Canada, Australia, UK and France may make statements like this, which I understand public support narrative, we kind of talked about that earlier, that's a different game, >> but they would not take the step of sanctions. And as you mentioned earlier, Israel is one of, if not the only nation in the world that's able to act with relative impunity more so than any other country. Why do you think that's the case, Pascal? I mean overall the Euroamericans um the so the Europeans and North Americans they just still support the Zionist project and there's different reasons for that. I would say one is culturally grown because to some level some people in Europe and the US recognize themselves in the Zionist project. White people settling a new land right that is proclaimed to be empty. Turns out it's not empty and if the people who are there resist then well they for fate their right to live there hence they're being genocided. I mean the North American continent Canada and the United and the US they were emptied out of their native populations. I can't I don't think the US has a single political leader in Congress uh who's actually Native American, right? I mean the Native Americans are completely utterly out of the question when it comes to to the US. like they they are politically a non- entity even though a few of them still exist. Um but that that was a completely different question 300 years ago and in a sense the what we're seeing the Zionist project is of course the resettlement of large parts of the European population and and Russian and and actually from other parts as well in a uh in a new land. Right? So partially this is the last or one of the last outgrowths of um settler colonialism. On the other hand, um we do have we do have political uh movements that are in in large support of this. I mean in the US uh it is the evangelical Christians that for religious reasons support Zionism. So that's then where all of the Christian Zionists come from. But funnily enough, in their in their worldview, in order to go to judgment day, you need um Israel to um build the third the the to rebuild the temple on the temple mount. And then, you know, once that happened, then uh judgment day will come. And that's actually something they want. So, it's a really weird reason. It's a but anyhow, so you have these diff this group in Europe. You have um on the one hand you have the Germans, right, which keep saying that um we we committed a holocaust on the Jews and now we owe them one. I mean we owe them um unconditional support the the merits and before him Mr. um Schultz they Schultz even said you know Israel is the is the part of this of the state rationale for Germany to exist. I mean we we uh that's our that's our debt. Of course, this is a complete misreading of what the what the guilt of the Holocaust is all about. But fine, there's people who who think that never again means never again to the Jews. And if the Jews do it to somebody else, and I must say it's not the Jews, it's a Zionist. It's we need to differentiate Israelis from Jews from Zionists. These it's very important to do that otherwise we we mischaracterize the situation and of course we open up ourselves to the charge of anti-semitism. The problem is Zionists and there's a lot of Jews who are not Zionists and a lot of non-Jews who are Zionists and that that group that wants to implement this uh this uh religiously clean version of a um of a uh basically European state in the Middle East. um they they are the ones who are in in support of then emptying out these lands and they are willing to use um enormous enormous uh amounts of violence um and not just against the primary target. I mean again the impunity that we have seen is just mind-boggling to the point where Israel is able to attack a US ally in the Middle East. I mean Qatar I I this again blew my mind. I just didn't think that this could happen. I mean that that they blow up buildings in Qatar. Not only that Qatar is a independent sovereign nation and a UN member state. Um but it's also a one of the US main allies in the Middle East, right? A huge air base on down there which is very important to the US and the implicit agreement is of course that the US provides security. It provides security to Qatar and now suddenly Qatar finds itself in a situation where its patron allows the other state to bump them. It's like okay, what kind of security is that? That's another norm broken, right? It's this this uh not not just a diplomatic norm um not just an a norm between states not just a UN norm but also a norm of um of how people believe the world is running how Qatar thought it was secure as long as it makes sure that the United States uh is is um happy and healthy on its soil. Uh that norm is now broken and um all of this will have necessarily a huge backlash. Um uh but the reasons for that is just because there's a lot of um of people I mean in in in in conclusion it's just a lot of people in Europe and the and the US who for different reasons have think it is good to support uh the Zionist project >> when Yes. And when that bombing in Qatar happened I thought the president of the United States remarks were odd. I think he said in quotes, "We have to >> Oh, we had no time." Yeah, we had no time. They informed us too late. There was nothing we could do, you know. Ah, it's too bad. Ah, come on. Come on. Come on. Come on. Seriously. You tell me that you have all of these raiders and all of these points and this is such an important important uh uh uh military base right next to Iran and you don't monitor what's coming in and because they informed you too late. I It's a joke. That's a joke. It's obviously >> the the only question is did the Americans tell the Israelis to do that or did the Israelis just do it >> and told the US that's what's going to happen and this is how we how we cover it up. Uh or I mean it's it's a joke. It's an and I think most most certainly in the region people understand it's a joke. So this happened with full consent of the US. It wouldn't happen if it didn't. When you say eventually there will be a tremendous response to this, do you mean eventually there will be a tremendous response to this impunity being allowed to run rampant for so long? Is is that what you mean, Pascal? >> No, the the counter reactions, you know, I mean, Qatar now obviously needs to think about how to re rekindle its security uh it security in the region, right? Now, it now needs to be clear that even if you gift a $400 million US chat to the US president, even if you if you host all of their troops and everything, you're still not secure. If Israel decides tomorrow that you're part of the problem, then uh downtown Qatar might look in 2 months uh very similar to what uh uh Gaza looks like now. I mean, this is a rational thing now for the Qataris to think about and um they cannot change the strategy immediately, but they will now rekindle this, right? And we are seeing how Saudi Arabia over the last couple of of the last decade rekindled its uh its security relationship. Just last week they they concluded a uh now a defense alliance agreement with Pakistan. Um and the Alexander Mercures from the Duran analyzed this very very well that is not a alliance against the United States but it is a diversification of a security uh of a security structure. Right? Saudi Arabia understands that um the US is not that that that reliable protector anymore. It cannot be not just because it's losing uh economic and industrial power and has constraints but also because it is so beholden to Israel that this that the Israel relationship will always override any other relationship. Hence you're not very you're you have a problem, right? You don't have the big protector that you used to have is not as big anymore and the threats in the region are much larger. And again, Israel is such a wild card. They are currently fighting seven wars with seven of their neighbors, right? Um I mean, if we include Qatar now as a country that they bumped, they have a war with Lebanon. They have a war in and with Syria. They keep bombing these places. They bombed um they bumped Iran, they bomb uh Yemen. I mean there are in so many theaters involved now that the the most logical um uh conclusion for you living in that region is like look it's getting really harder and harder. Um and that that's what I mean. So um I don't this impunity at some point will will hunt will will come and bite them again. It's biting them at the United Nations already. It's biting them in the public relations realm where, you know, you can cover up the impunity only for so and so long, especially if you use the victim card like every single time if that's your strongest card. And they've overplayed that hand. So, a lot a lot of like people in the general public see through them. A lot of politicians see through them. A lot of u a lot of systems now see see through that. And it has become very plain and clear what Israel is about and after. And this this will hurt them over the over the long run. I'm absolutely certain. Unless unless they can win all of the wars very quickly um uh uh assert their absolute dominance and basically you know um we then continue to the next war and forget about it. If they manage to do that, clean everything up and then just, you know, the genocide was the genocide and we will revisit in 50 years once everybody is dead anyhow. If they manage to do that, then maybe it's not going to be as dramatic as I'm saying. But if they don't and if they keep being embroiled in all of this and if it keeps boiling uh it's completely shifting the discourse you know the discourse 5 years ago is was still like how do we implement the Oslo agreements how to get to the two-state solutions by now we're in a completely different discourse >> yeah and what is you know what is winning seven wars even look like how would you even begin to define what some kind of a conclusion would be right I just don't even know have you been to Israel Pascal No, no. And I'm not planning on going. I mean, no. I um I couldn't I mean, although I would be interested in seeing what it is like, but at the moment, I'm just like on a personal level to um to um >> It consumes me too much. >> No, that makes sense. >> Have you Have you been >> Yeah, I went in 2018. I invested in this company. It was actually like super uh >> out there. It was a a plant-based baby food company that I invested in in 2017. And I met the founder at a technology investment conference I was running in Toronto in Canada. >> And I I have a little private investment club. And I invited like eight entrepreneurs out that were running cool uh private tech companies and we all watched these pitches together. And it was 2018. So if you remember this is like the first mainstream crypto rush where so we looked at eight companies. I think six of them were like blockchain or cryptoreated and then we saw this uh sort of food technology company >> and I had just had my first son and he had this aversion to dairy and in the investment club there was like six other brand new dads and the aversion to dairy was common. So when we heard this pitch it like resonated. Anyways she was an absolute pitull. the kind of entrepreneur where you're like, I don't care what you're building. I'm all in on what you're doing. Anyways, they're based in Tel Aviv and um they flew us out a year and a half later to to see the operation. But it, you know, it was cool. I like while I was there, I went to Jerusalem, went to the Temple Mounts, walked the Via Dear Roa, went to the Black Sea, the Dead Sea. Um really glad that I did exactly when I did, right? Glad that I got that opportunity in 2018 to get out there and >> um because Yeah. And you know we we must we must not demonize Israel. Um obviously the the solution needs to be one where the people on this land uh are able to live and prosper together, right? Um the the the bad thing is that we have political ideologies and actors um on that land that that really have very very in my view unhealthy ideas of how that what a prosperous um land between the river and the sea looks like. Uh, and that's that's a huge tragedy. I mean, obviously it's beautiful. Obvious it's a great land, right? I mean, I don't think the Palestinians would all want to stay on their land if it wasn't that beautiful, right? And the Israelis probably wouldn't want to be there either if it wasn't beautiful, right? It's it's a great place and it's obviously has great people as people are great everywhere. So the the political tragedy we need to we need to overcome is these toxic ideological views of what a good society looks like. >> Yeah, 100%. Wow. Um Pascal, it's always great chatting with you. Uh thanks so much for making the time today. I'm excited to see you in Osaka in a few short days. So, I'll be out there hitting Kyoto with a couple buddies and uh then meeting up with you in Osaka. I'm looking forward to that. Thanks so much for coming on today. I appreciate it. >> I'm looking forward to meeting you in uh in Osaka and thank you very much for your interest and the questions and uh yeah, we'll we'll talk more over dinner. >> Let me ask you a question before we wrap up here. For anybody who's super curious about going deeper into any of these sort of geopolitical topics, I mean, first of all, I'd point them to Neutrality Studies, your YouTube channel. Uh, it's like the the first sort of neutrality focused research organization. >> Um, that you founded. Um, where else would you, and your content is excellent, by the way. Uh, so congratulations on the success of the channel. What are your main sources, Pascal? Where do you go to stay upto-date on important geopolitical trends? >> Well, it's diff it's um you know it's at the same time difficult and easy. Um it's difficult is like okay what kind of depth of analysis do you want? Uh so one thing I can recommend is you know um um read a couple of the important books I mean Mshimer uh or if you want something about let's say the Chinese political system I mean Google it and figure out a a good book published by a nice university publisher or or any kind of good publisher right uh uh and then and then read that. So go and use a book in order to get a little bit of of of of of context of stuff and then the easy thing is I mean all we need to do is is to Google things. So you go and you read the different newspapers or look you don't even need to read them you look at the headlines and try to understand how is stuff being framed in the Guardian in the New York Times in Russia today in uh in the Japan times in uh I mean take your pick but the important thing is we need to we need to uh compare uh unfortunately the times are over where we could just like rely on one newspaper and then uh blissfully believe that we are well informed we're not but you don't you you read just what is the general um chatter about and then you get you get the large overview and then you know seriously YouTube is just an amazing platform. It has it has a lot of it has some crap but it also has a lot of very good content. I mean the fact that we can hear meshimer in the original almost on a daily basis and Jeffrey Sachs but also uh uh French analysts and and and European analysts and and Chinese analysts who also speak to us. It's not always easy to find them. Um I mean some of them might just show up in your feed. So do explore also in your own feed and see if you find people who who say intelligent things you follow them. Um I would say it's it's one of the largest it's probably the largest platform now for this kind of um IR discourse. There's other platforms. I don't recommend Twitter. Twitter just makes you angry and it's too short form. Substack. Substack by the way. Substack is a good platform for long form essays. they have good analysts as well and people just publish there now. So for current discourse that's not at all bad to stay up to date with the with the analysis and I get a lot of my I mean I one channel that I just find amazing with the depth of the of analysis is Alexander Mercuris the Duran they just he does an amazing job at every day 90 minutes of of of news. Um, and of course, as with everybody, you can't completely trust them because people also make mistakes and people only choose what they want to talk about, right? So, we still need to compare, but there's very, very good analysts out there. >> The Duran's an excellent podcast. So is Brian Burletic, who you put me on to last time we spoke. >> Yeah. >> Um, I agree. >> And again, I don't I I don't trust everything he says, but but it's very good to know what because he is a he's a very good brain just as a lot of others are good brains. And then the job we have to do is to use our brains to compare and and figure out what we what we choose to believe about how the world runs. >> Yeah. No doubt. No doubt. I'm I'm presently reading my way through John Mshimer's work. Really enjoying it. You wrote a book called uh Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War, published in 2022. >> Could you walk my audience through that thesis, Pascal? I'm I'm really curious about the inspiration for the book and um what the reader take away. >> The the the book is an outcome of my dissertation. I wrote my dissertation about Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Second World War. And by the time I finished the dissertation, each one of them was a chapter. I realized they had so much u you know, I realized Spain had already been worked on a lot by others, so I left that aside. But the Spain uh Sweden and Switzerland, I had so much material that I said I could have a book on each one of them. And I started with Sweden with the idea that if I screw it up, I don't screw up my Switzerland, I screw up Sweden. But turned out I worked with a Swedish uh researcher and it became a good book. It became a good narrative about, you know, 15 years of Japan's experience of war. Of course, self self-inflicted, I mean self-done, right? The Japanese chose to go to war in 31 and start with like with uh clipping off a part of China um from China and create this state manu. It lasted all the way until 45 uh 80 years ago, right? And in that in those 15 years, the interesting thing to me was to look at um the interactions with states that were not allies of Japan but not enemies either. So those are the neutrals, right? uh and Sweden and Switzerland both had a relationship with Japan and the Swedish diplomats were able to do things in Japan and Japan was able to do things through Sweden in Stockholm in their embassies and that was so the book is all about that how did that bilateral relationship work out as I said earlier right even during war the relationship is still a bilateral one right and with some with some states the Japan was at war like the US and Britain and France And with others it was in an alliance like Germany and Italy. Uh with some it was neutral like Sweden, Switzerland and the Soviet Union. Uh right. So even though the Soviet Union was an ally of the others, it was not uh an enemy of Japan. And this this um configuration is highly interesting. And so the book itself is focusing on a small neutral and what the small neutral then did and why they did that. I mean why did Sweden not just say like okay in 41 or 42 we're going to pack up. We're leaving. Um and the book is about that and the short answer is uh states are very very careful with breaking relationships if they don't have to. So until the very end it just seemed more profitable for Sweden to maintain a good relationship with Japan and it made no sense for them because they thought from their perspective it's like yeah sure you're on the losing end of the Second World War but until until very late it wasn't clear what that would actually mean. So the uh the incentive was to maintain and stay and then you engage in activities including uh humanitarian activities but also business activities until the very end. Uh on the last uh on the last submarines that still reach Japan from Europe, you still had people transporting uh uh Swedish piano wire because that was the hardest uh wire steel you could get and it's important in the wings of airplanes. So trade until the very end. I mean it it it went to almost nothing but the highest value trade u was maintained until 45. >> Right. Fascinating. Fascinating. >> That's it. That's what it's about.