SPECIAL REPORT: What Will Happen Next With Venezuela? | Mario Braga, RANE

Summary

• Geopolitical Shift: The US removed Maduro and is pressuring interim president Delcy Rodríguez, keeping the regime apparatus intact while prioritizing drug interdiction, expelling hostile operatives, and halting oil flows to adversaries.
• Venezuelan Oil Opportunity: With the world’s largest reserves, Venezuela is a potential long-term prize; a reported 30–50M barrel transfer and a US-managed fund were discussed alongside upcoming meetings with US oil executives.
• Execution Constraints: Super-heavy crude, decayed infrastructure, $110–$200B capex needs, 10–15 year timelines, legal/sanctions hurdles, and political instability pose major barriers to rapid production gains.
• Market Implications: Near-term supply impact is limited, but US refineries suited to heavy crude could benefit if volumes rise; re-routing crude away from China (about 4% of its imports) is part of the US agenda.
• Regional Outlook: A Monroe Doctrine-style focus could drive investment and nearshoring in Latin America (e.g., Argentina’s gas, Paraguay data centers) but risks backlash over sovereignty and coercive policy tools.
• Scenario Range: Paths include cooperation with Washington, renewed US strikes, a hardliner coup, failed-state chaos, or a later democratic transition—the latter seen least likely in the near term.
• Investor Takeaways: Emphasis on Energy, especially E&P and Integrated Oil; outcomes hinge on policy clarity, sanctions, and company participation—favoring patient, well-capitalized players.
• Global Context: Russia and China object publicly yet may benefit from a spheres-of-influence precedent, while Europe warns about international law violations shaping future geopolitical risks.

Transcript

and we should be live. Welcome to Thoughtful Money. I'm Thoughtful Money founder and your host, Adam Tagert. Welcoming you here for a special report on the action that's been going on in Venezuela this week. Uh we're very fortunate to be joined again by um Rain uh Latin America geopolitical analyst Mario Baraga. Mario, thank you so much for taking the time when what I'm sure must be a very busy time for you to talk to the thoughtful money audience. Hi, Adam. Thanks for having me. It's a pleasure to be back in the show. >> All right. Well, look, Mario, um, for those that didn't see it, uh, you were kind enough to come on about a month ago or so, um, and update us on the situation in Venezuela. Uh, this was right as the US was starting to really build up its its naval blockade of the country. Um we talked about um kind of the history of of of how things got to the point in Venezuela where they were being run by Maduro and the infrastructure was you know failing and 8 million people had fled the country and all that stuff. Uh so folks if you want a deep dive kind of in the history of how Venezuela got to where it is today go back and listen to that uh that special report. Um, we talked about the odds of an uh, you know, the US forcibly deposing Maduro and um, correct me if I'm if I'm misremembering here, Mario, but it sounded like at that time that was sort of the the the lower probability option that RA thought was going to happen. They thought it was going to be more, you know, targeted strikes on cartel assets and things like that, but just putting mil more military pressure on Maduro and maybe trying to negotiate, you know, some sort of uh some sort of um you know, uh compliance from him uh but not necessarily, you know, in a military excursion to forcibly remove him from power. That turned out to be what happened. So what we're going to talk about today is okay so so now that we've pulled the leader out of Venezuela um a you know one if you could just give us sort of a a quick snapshot on what exactly the state of affairs is right now uh and then we'd like I'd like to talk with you about sort of all the implications of this what's going to happen in terms of who's going to lead Venezuela um how sticky of an issue uh could this become for the US um uh with the impacts going to be geopolitically, you know, how the rest of the world is reacting to this. Uh economically, does this mean big things for the energy markets or other parts of the global economy? So, we'll get into all those. And then, folks, uh the last time with Mario, we pre-recorded it. Uh this was a live stream, so I want to leave some generous time here for audience questions as well. So Mario, I guess just to sort of start things off, um what is the current state of play right now with Venezuela? >> Sure. Thanks again, Adam. Um, so basically what we had is that on Saturday the 3rd of January, we had the US carry out a military and law enforcement operation as the Trump administration has been framing it to uh not only carry out strikes uh in Venezuela, mostly around the capital Karacas, but also to uh capture and extract then President Nicolas Maduro. was then taken to to the US and is now facing uh charges. Uh what that uh consists what kind of the results of that is that you had a power vacuum in in Venezuela. So who is the president now? Who's going to lead the country? There was a lot of uncertainty over the weekend. But right uh on Sunday, so on the following day, the Supreme Court ordered that Venezuela's vice president Dulce Rodriguez should take uh up the role of interim president for 90 days. >> Right. And I'm sorry, the Supreme Court of the US or of Venezuela, who wrote this? >> The Supreme Court of Venezuela ordered that following uh the country's uh constitutional process. Uh but that's not uh only enough in a country where the military has a strong power. Uh the the last time uh I joined the show we were discussing uh the different uh factions that sustained uh Maduru in power and one of them is uh the armed forces who which are led by defense minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez. But Venezuela also has a lot of paramilitary forces. has the Bolivarian militia. It has the armed so-called collectivos which are civilians um that uh follow orders by interior minister Dios dao cababo. So you had different factions and groups that could fight for power and this could lead to internal disputes, internal struggles, even an armed conflict. So there was a lot of uncertainty in this initial hours. But after the Venezuelan Supreme Court ordered the OC to become the interiming president, uh, Vladimir Padna Lopez, the defense minister, issued a statement saying that the armed forces recognized her as the leader of the country. And then from there, you had uh a slightly less tense and less uncertain but still highly uncertain scenario. So the state of play is Deli Rodriguez is now the acting president. She was the vice president under Maduru and all the apparatus of the regime. So all the ministers all all the kind of the this uh paramilitary forces they are still in place. So we cannot necessarily talk about regime change just by the removal of Maduru from Karakas and from Venezuela because all the rest of the government and military structures are still in place. And then we can discuss in detail why that is the case, what seems to be the Trump administration's rationale. Uh but uh the situation now is that Delir Rodriguez is uh the president and it seems that there have been conversations between her and the Trump administration on how things should uh proceed uh from now on. >> Okay. So I think a question uh that a lot of people have is all right. So, as as we understand it, um, Venezuela held elections, I can't remember when, a year or two ago, >> July, >> pardon me, >> July 2024. >> Okay. July 2024. And, uh, Maduro did not win. Uh, but he held on to power anyways. And, uh, the the the party or the person who won was this woman, I'm forgetting her first name, but but Machado was her last name. Um, folks might might recognize the name because she was the person who uh won the Nobel Peace Prize a few months back. Um, and so she was sort of a leader in exile, right? And uh she has a a a guy, I can't remember his name, I'm sure you'll share it with us, who's kind of her proxy inside the country. and she is, you know, has been working with the rest of the the global community, as you shared with us last time, uh, on she's got a very detailed plan about how Venezuela should be run and it could re-engage much more with the global economy and be a lot more friendly to a lot of other countries. And they've got a a game plan for that that she's been selling. Um, I think a lot of people thought, okay, well gosh, you know, the Trump administration is just going to put her in power and hand the torch to her. But Trump uh said, "No, I she doesn't have the support inside the country." Uh and that that surprised a lot of people. I'd love to hear your explanation as to why you think the administration is not choosing her. Just to to to tack on to that question, last time you were here, you explained again the history of of of how um Maduro rose to power uh within Venezuela. And as part of that process, you know, he was Chavez's successor. And during both the Chavez Chavez regime and the Maduro regime, they basically stacked the entire deck in the power structure of the country with their cronies. So everybody in the political system, everybody in the military, everybody in the judiciary, everybody in the local police forces. and you had said it's tough to effect to force regime change on the country because if you remove the head of the snake, you still have the whole rest of the snake that's that's aligned with kind of the Maduro way of doing things. [snorts] Um, and so was part of Trump's decision was, hey, I can't just remove the head, one head, and put a different head on it because it's got a a snake body that's going to reject it. >> Yeah, you're right, Adam. That's the the rationale behind what uh seems to be the decision-m process of the Trump administration. So to get the the kind of the story line uh together basically we had uh in July 2024 the presidential elections uh in uh Venezuela which were part of a broader agreement that the Biden administration was trying to uh get Maduro on the table with other stakeholders uh in like Brazil as well, Colombia. There was the Barbados agreement. Maduru uh back in I think 2023 late 2023 said okay I will hold free and fair elections the opposition will be able to run uh then we'll see who wins and in exchange for that the US would reduce economic sanctions and that seems to be a way for uh a transition to democracy right because if you have free and fair elections the opposition wins Madur is out of power >> but then what happened following this agreement is that uh Maduro did not deliver uh So he tried to repress the opposition. He prevented the most popular opposition leader, Maria Korina Machado, as you mentioned, who now just won the Nobel Prize. She was barred from running. So what the opposition did was they uh united behind one of the few single candidates that was still allowed to run because Maduro thought he was so unpopular that he would never win. That's Edundo Gonzalez Oruchia. He was a diplomat. uh and he was uh kind of unknown to most Venezuelans. But despite not being on the ticket, Maria Kora Machado reigned the campaign. She was going across the country. She gathered large crowds and most importantly the opposition managed to have uh kind of a a structure of allies in all the kind of the ballots and the center so they could get the the receipts of the votes. and they proved uh that the results that Maduro claimed that he had won the election were false because with the with the receipts they were able to show that in fact Gonzalez Oruchia got 67% of the vote but as you mentioned Maduro controls the entire apparatus the government the electoral bodies the judiciary the military so the official version that he had won prevailed he remained ing power uh taking office in uh January 2025 and in this mindset of an authoritarian regime with repression, Gonzalez fled to Spain. He was recognized as president-elect, but he left the country. And Maria Korina Machado remained in hiding in Venezuela up until late 2025 when she left the country to the Nobel ceremony in in Norway in Oslo. Now, the two of them are outside the country. So, you don't have uh an opposition leader in Venezuela. And when we focus on what was the the Trump decision making process, there are reports uh media reports showing that the CIA assessed the scenario. And if you have the option of having Maria Kina Machado uh who is friendly to the US, she was proposing uh the privatization of stateowned companies. She was proposing opening up the oil and gas sector. She was talking about 1.7 trillion uh investment opportunity over uh 10 to 30 years. So she was friendly. But the question was would she be able to deliver? We're talking about h a country as I said before in which the armed forces play a strong role in which you have paramilitary forces and Maria Korina Machado although she's popular among the population she does not control or have influence over these other parts of the state. So the assessment seems to be that well if we remove Maduro and we make right away a transition to democracy in which we recognize the 2024 election results in which Gonzalez takes office and Maria Korina is a strong kind of stakeholder within this government. They would highly likely be challenged by the security apparatus. This could lead as I said before a lot of instability a lot of uncertainty. There could be a coup to house them. There could be an internal armed conflict. There could be so a highly uncertain environment that is not favorable to businesses. And it seems that the Trump administration for now has prioritized as we saw in President Trump's statements uh the opportunities uh that the Venezuelan oil sector can provide. So instead the calculation was well we can remove Maduro and now he's in the US he'll face charges we leave the entire uh apparatus in place because this is an apparatus that although has not been friendly to the US it gets the state running right so uh things are under control there was a severe economic decline that led to uh the immigration of millions of Venezuelans like nearly eight 8 million since 2016. But the the rationale is if they are there and because the US has the naval buildup in the Caribbean, a lot of uh kind of military personnel deployed because they have carried out the operation that stracted Maduru, they have the leverage to pressure the the new government to play ball to uh appease and meet Washington's demands. So it seems that now their preferred uh path was we keep things in place and we get them the new government to play by our uh rules or our interests or our demands and this is what we have seen in recent days and because just to wrap this this this part on the Venezuelan side you have like this Rodriguez she's a loyal to the socialist revolution she has been uh in position positions in the government since since 2003 under former president Ugu Chaveis. Uh she has made a lot of strong uh criticisms to the US. She has said that Venezuela will not be a colony is now like after the extraction of Maduro. She demanded Madura's release. But all of them, not only her, the high ranking officials in the government and in the military, they are afraid that what happened to Maduro could happen to them, >> right? We are afraid that if the regime collapses, they would face charges both in Venezuela and or in the US for illegal activities, illegal drug trafficking, for human rights violations, even for terrorism. So for them now, the calculation is well maybe it's better for us to cooperate with Washington and prevent the regime from falling then uh the other option that would be a democratic transition. they get voted out and then they would face the consequences. So that's kind of how things uh seem to be placed to play out in the coming weeks and months. >> Okay. So to continue to murder my analogy, rather than chop the head off the snake, you know, graft a brand new head on it and then risk the body of the snake rejecting the new head and and Venezuela descending into kind of Lord of the Flies, you know, failed state territory. Um, instead we said, "Okay, look, we're going to keep the whole snake in place, you know, minus Maduro. Um, but we're going to put our hand firmly around its neck and squeeze and say, "Snake, you're going to do what I tell you to do." Um, and it seems like the the main levers there are, um, uh, okay, we now we're now taking over your oil infrastructure. So, if you want to continue to get, you know, revenue from your own oil industry, it's going to come through us. We can turn it on, we can turn it off. And then secondly, you know, missiles and special forces, you know, uh you saw what happened to Maduro. You know, you do something we don't like, you might be the next one pulled out in a midnight raid or you might just find a missile in your bedroom, right? So, you're nodding here, but that's that's that's pretty much the the control uh mechanism we now have in or the US now has in place over Venezuela. >> Yeah, it's basically an option for some sort of coercion, right? Because on Saturday on the same day of the operation uh President Trump gave a press conference and then he said the US will run Venezuela and then a lot of people were asking okay how will that play out? will appoint for example Marco Rubio to be in charge or and later what we had even statements from Rubio himself is that is not that will not be kind of an official position uh that the US will become kind of a governing Venezuela but that the US the US officials the Trump administration will uh and then air quotes like work closely with Karakas with the new government Rodriguez the new president so the new government um adopts policies that are aligned with what the White House thinks should be the priorities for Karakas. And then there there have been media reports uh since uh the weekend that give a hint on what we can expect um to to be these priorities. So uh I'm just going to refer to some of the notes that I have here. >> Okay. >> And while you're plugging them up, let me just ask this. So it it kind of sounds like the US or the administration's codory, you know, whoever is going to be tasked with this, Rubio and others, they're going to be like a board of directors and they're essentially going to give the president there the marching orders. Okay, this is the strategic direction. These are the policies we want. And they want her to say, "Okay, got it, boss. I'm going to go execute." >> Yeah. Informally, that's the the design and that's what they expect uh Rodriguez to to do. And that's still to be seen if that will actually work. But uh from media reports, what we have is that so far in these background conversations uh government officials from the United States have uh outlined three main priorities for the new president of Venezuela. The first is fight drug trafficking. We know this has been a major priority across Latin America. Uh the second is removing from Venezuela operatives from countries uh that are hostile to the US. So Iran uh and Cuba namely but from other countries as well. We know uh as we discussed the first time I was on the show that uh Cuba runs the uh counter intelligence uh services in uh Venezuela that 32 Cubans uh and kind of officials died because they were basically the bodyguards of Maduru. So there are operatives from Iran from Cuba there. The Washington wants them out. And then the third priority is to stop the shipment of oil uh to countries that are adversaries to to the US. Uh and that can include also Cuba because the Venezuelan oil provides the lifeline to the Cuban regime. But a lot of Venezuelan oil also goes uh to China for example. Uh it accounts for 4% of China's oil imports. So of course China can still get this oil from elsewhere but that's still a disruption. Um so these are the three top priorities and then later what we had is that yesterday uh President Trump announced on Truth Social uh a deal and this has not been confirmed from the Venezuelan side but basically Trump said that Venezuela will turn over between 30 million and 50 million uh barrels uh of oil. This would be worth between two billion and 2.8 8 billion. Basically, uh the US would get this oil, would sell at market price and would put this the proceeds in a in a fund that would be run by the US government. And then when Trump posted it, he said that the proceeds would be used to the benefit of the people of both countries. And then later we had just a couple of hours ago energy secretary Chris Wright saying kind of confirming this that there would be a structure a fund uh to which the revenue would go and it would be used uh in favor of Venezuela. So, it's still uncertain um how this will actually play out, but and if Karakas will confirm this deal, but there are steps that are indicating how um the situation is likely to evolve. >> Okay. Um and that sounds kind of like classic Trump of like, you know, hey, whatever whatever costs the US might uh in, you know, endure from from getting involved in Venezuela, the Venezuelans are going to pay for it, right? It'll be funded by Venezuela's own own oil. >> Um, okay. So, um, >> uh, let's see here. So, with Machado, the thought was, hey, we don't want to put her in too soon and have the whole system reject her. Um, so presumably the country is going to have elections, right? that presumably that's a big priority of of the US is is hey let's get democratic elections held some point soon and then eventually a democratically elected leader will get in and then they'll be able to continue to drive these reforms. Um why do they think putting in a democratic leader in the future versus now will work any differently? Is is that because they want time to kind of force, you know, by by choking the snake the snake to kind of, you know, foam the runway for the new leader? Um, are they trying to give everybody who's kind of in power right now and afraid of what would happen if if if government changes because all of a sudden there's a target on their back? Is it just to give them time to kind of decide, hey, what country do I want to escape to? Um, why should we expect a Democratic leader if they're put in in three months or six months or whatever to be any more successful than if they put Machado in today? >> Yeah, it's it's hard to tell exactly what uh went on uh in this decision and kind of the different drivers that influenced uh it. So, uh I can't really say that there is like one single reason or why they prefer this over that. Like the broader rationale as I said before is that they they opted for what uh the CIA assessed to be a more stable scenario. And this of course according to to media reports that there was a CIA assessment showing that under JC she would be more able to uh keep the state under control and that would be a more stable scenario. Uh and then there is still an open question of when there will be elections uh and even uh if these elections that are still to be scheduled will be for example free and fair or if the US will be comfortable with the current government again trying to rig the election to stay in power. We still don't know. According to the Venezuelan constitution, when the president is absent and you have a new president, the new president should call elections in 30 days. >> We have not heard anything so far that that would be the case. So, it's hard to to to say uh that they could call elections in 30 days, but as you said, these could be elections scheduled for the second half of the year. So uh it's still early days and we haven't seen the uh indications that a concrete transition to democracy is actually going to occur because there is also the the potential scenario in which uh as I said before the current members of the regime they get too afraid of regime collapse of US intervention of another extraction or US military air strikes and then they just go along with Trump's demands. Uh we we anticipate that Deli Rodriguez will continue to make this harsh uh speeches to continue to criticize the Trump administration, but she's not going to cross the line and break uh these background conversation channels because she that would be too high of a risk. Trump has said that she would pay even a higher price than Maduro did. So, so there is this constant pressure uh and in a scenario in which the new government in Karakas, let's say they meet all of these demands that uh seem to be on the table, maybe the Trump administration will be comfortable with that. So it's like it's hard to to tell um how especially when you think about a longer we have put out a piece and analysis for the next three to six months because then we have more visibility and one of the scenarios is over the next three to six months she can make this very tricky balancing act of appeasing Washington but at the same time she cannot displease the hardliners within the regime for example because she would risk a coup, a military coup that could try to oust her for being overly friendly to the United States. So, it's a very tricky balancing act and that's why there is also a persistent uncertainty on how things can evolve >> evolve. Okay. You know, there's there's an argument to be made where, you know, Trump may have done this because he sort of says, "What's my downside?" Right? I've got this regime that's thumbming its nose at me and doing all sorts of things I don't want it to do and it's got, you know, my my adversaries. It's it's opening itself to my adversaries and all that stuff. Um, so let me grab that guy, right? Let me hopefully, you know, scare the country into the leadership of the country into into whatever line I want and I get, you know, I take over their oil and all that stuff, right? Um, and if they if they fall into line, great. That's way better than what I had before. If they eventually have democratic elections, whether it's 3 months or three years from now, and the country becomes much more democratic and USfriendly, even better. Um, but you know what? If if they take out if the hardliners take out this president and this new president and they put their own harder person in there, it's really no different than what it had before, right? So you know you can kind of make the argument there wasn't a lot of downside to this. >> Yeah. um the the operation itself when we see we were discussing last time I was on the show about the potential scenarios we as you mentioned earlier we anticipated that the first strikes for example would be on drug trafficking assets drug camps u like air strips or ports and then it's interesting because in late December there was one of these strikes uh a drone strike in Venezuelan territory but the operation The extraction itself showed a much higher risk appetite from the Trump administration because uh there it's a highly complex military operation with more than 150 um kind of aircraft the the different uh elements involved. They departed from 20 different bases. So this showed that the Trump administration was willing to take a high risk to have the political win of removing Maduro. Uh and maybe and and that's the kind of the perhaps one of the lingering questions that perhaps that is a victory that's enough for them at least for now and then when we think about the longer term we have to remember uh Secretary of State Marco Rubio is of Cuban descent uh how uh this situation in Venezuela and broad broader across Latin America of leftist autocracies this is something that uh is a sensitive topic for voters in Florida. So all of these elements will likely become drivers for the future decision making as the situation evolves. We have this year elections for governor and I think for the senate in Florida as well. So, who knows if uh a stronger approach to Venezuela and perhaps even to to Cuba will be something that the administration is willing to do now or if they will wait past the midterms and as the presidential election uh approaches again, they would be more willing again to take more risk to deliver what uh Latin voters in the US would perceive as a strong victory. So all of these elements need to be taken into consideration when we uh analyze the the kind of the incentives and constraints for the Trump administration. >> Okay. Um it seems that the reaction at least from the 8 million um refugees who left uh Venezuela at least from what we see on the mainstream media very positive. Um uh same within Venezuela. Yeah, definitely the diaspora, those that have fled the regime for the economic collapse of fear of repression. Uh there were celebrations across like US cities but across Latin American cities in Spain where most of these Venezuelans are concentrated in these different countries. uh what we had in Karakas in Venezuela was a much uh more muted reaction to some extent in a sense that overnight when they like woke up Saturday morning what's going on the future there could be more strikes the fact that since the regime is still in place uh the repression apparatus is still exists so you didn't uh see as many or as large demonstrations in Venezuela on the contrary because there is still the regime apparatus. What you had were small demonstrations of uh what could be described as progovernment uh protesters. So they were demanding the release of Maduru. They were denouncing US intervention. So that that kind of thing happened inside Venezuela. But part of that is because there's still a lot of fear. And then >> uh today is Wednesday. Over the past two, three days, there are reports that the government is stepping up the crackdown. There seems to be journalists detained. There seems to be that the collectivos are on the street harassing people. So, it's still an environment of fear inside the country. >> What does your gut tell you here about the the the general Venezuelan? Are they excited but just too afraid to show it or are they affronted that their country's so stubbornity was broken? >> Yeah, I I think a good proxy to understand uh Venezuelan's uh take on on the regime and the outlook for change is the results that we had in the July 2024 election. Right? So back then twothirds of Venezuelans voted for the opposition. So it's not an understatement to say that the majority of the population opposes the regime and would like to see regime change. Um but given what we had was just the removal of the regime leader Maduro but the regime is still there they are not in a position to to to go out on the streets and demonstrate or to celebrate or even to demand the the ousting of of the new president. Right. So uh but if you think that um that's what the election result was that there are yes uh kind of more Venezuelans than not that would be happy to see Maduro go. >> Okay. Um [clears throat] in just a second I'm going to ask about kind of the rest of the world's reaction to this especially the other countries in South America, one of which you live in right now. Um let me just ask you this. Uh so the country lost about a fifth of its population, right? Those 8 million that that that left. Um do you expect a m a material amount of those people to start making their way back to Venezuela either now or after democratic elections or are those people gone? >> Yeah. Uh for now I don't think that would be the case because uh as I said before the regime is still in place. So they wouldn't go back to the kind of the same situation that they they fled uh initially. I think that if we have a transition to democracy, the opposition wins, it takes office and then let's say for the first three to six months, perhaps a year, there is instability, then it's more likely that you will begin to see a return of these immigrants that left the country because of the the repression and the economic uh kind of meltdown and all those kind of negative impacts that we saw over the past 10 years. But I think that it will still take time and there would likely need to be clear evidence that the situation has changed that the outlook is positive that there there is room for improvement, economic growth, job generation because these are people that uh were starving actually like you had uh measures in kind of the crisis so severe that there were indicators showing the average weight loss of people in Venezuela because they don't access to food. So that's uh what people fled from, right? So I think they're only going to come back to when they have at least a perception that their lives can get better in Venezuela >> that they'll be able to actually eat. Yeah. At least. Um do do you I know we're sort of pontificating here but do you expect if we get to that stage where the diaspora starts reversing and these people come back in especially those who have been in wealthier nations US or some of the other wealthier Latam countries um do you expect that that to be a catalyst for sort of accelerating democratic change inside uh Venezuela because obviously they're coming back because they they left because they didn't like the regime. They're coming back having lived in much more open societies, probably enjoying a taste of what they got. Maybe they have more resources as a result, too. So, you know, I I I know it's going to take a while if if to get to that stage, but if it were to start to happen, is that something that would be an accelerating for for catalytical change? >> Yeah, it could be one of the the variables definitely. Because when we think even about from the economic side u part of this large uh kind of immigration amounts to brain drain as well, right? So many Venezuelans that were kind of highly trained that had degrees, technical degrees for the oil and gas sector including uh they have left the country. So uh when you bring people back, you have more uh all beyond the humanitarian aspect of it. Uh you start to have more uh kind of resources to rebuild the country and and as you said, you have more and more engaging civil society. You have people demanding transparency, fight corruption. So all of that could indeed uh help. But again, as you mentioned, I think this is um many steps further down the line um until we get to that point. >> Okay. All right. So, um [clears throat] we saw that a lot of the Venezuelan refugees celebrating this. Um how about the rest of South America? I know Maduro wasn't loved. Um, so maybe there's some countries that are happy to get him off the board, but no country likes the thought that, hey, the US could come in and remove me if they all of a sudden decide they don't like me. You live in a country, Brazil, which is kind of on that list. Um, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, um, those are kind of the countries that that even Trump himself and Rubio have said, "Yeah, those leaders should probably be not be sleeping as well [laughter] right now." So, so what has the reaction been from the rest of Latam and then we'll talk about the rest of the world. [snorts] >> Yeah, I think that there is a sense that Maduro uh was already pretty much isolated especially following the 2024 presidential elections because basically no country uh in in the western hemisphere acknowledged the results. They did not recognize him as uh presidentele. Uh but there was that limbo that at the same time that they did not recognize there was not much that they would do to to force him out. There were attempts by Brisbane Colombia to try to negotiate a new election. This did not uh succeed. So there is the sense that Maduro going is not necessarily a bad thing. But I think that the sentiment that prevails is a concern over what the US operation uh opens a precedent in terms of the violation of the sovereignty of countries in the region. Right? Because that was a US unilateral decision to go in extract and take to the US. uh and all of this the debate that we have um in international law, international organisms is that under international law, countries can only uh engage in a military uh action against another country in two situations. One is when they are attacked and then they are just responding and two if there is the approval of the United States security council. So for example, let's say oh there is a genocide in a country anywhere in the world. There is a group that is systematically killing a smaller part of the population. The United States Security Council can authorize the deployment of military troops to prevent that from happening. In this case, uh the argument is that none of these two situations occurred because there was no uh United Nations Security Council approval. And there is the argument that Venezuela did not attack the United States. But from the Trump administration, the argument is well, Venezuela was providing uh was a corridor to provide drugs to the United States. this was a risk to the national security and therefore we are in a position to step in. So there are two sides of the argument when we look from the Latin American countries. The concern is well they did this in Venezuela they could they might as well just do this in other countries as well. And I think that the two countries that would be on the top of the list for a similar action, not an extraction like Maduro, but uh air strikes against drug trafficking uh sites would be Colombia, which is the main producer of cocaine in the world. Uh and the fact that as you mentioned, Colombia has a leftist president who has been a stark critic of President Trump. He has opposed the strikes on boats. He has denounced uh what he described as the kidnapping of Maduru. Trump and him have exchanged uh kind of heated public statements. So there is the outlook that there could be drone strikes against drug drug trafficking sites in Colombia and to some extent Mexico as well because Mexico is the main source of fentinil. So when think about Colombia, Venezuela, we are talking about cocaine. When we think about Mexico, there is also fentinil. And in Mexico, President Claudia Shenbound has repeatedly said she would oppose any sort of unilateral uh military intervention. So, it's a tricky situation. Uh and then we have to see how it evolves, but it's more likely than not that we'll see some sort of uh military operation in remote areas of these countries in 2026. >> Okay. Um I I I'm resisting continue to get in that thread, but just given the time, I'm I'm going to jump to the rest of the world. So, um you know, obviously China, Russia not thrilled about this um for a whole bunch of reasons. Um and so they've voiced their strong displeasure. Um beyond them, how is the rest of the world reacting to this? >> Yeah, it's interesting because for both Russia and China, this is a two-edged sword because Venezuela wasn't ally. uh Russia provided uh arms for decades to Venezuela. Now Venezuela provided oil to China. China lent a lot of money to Venezuela. But if we take a step back and we analyze what this military operation and the extraction of Maduro represents more broadly, it shows that the US is willing to exert strong influence if not dominion on the Western Hemisphere. This was outlined in the national security strategy, a document that was published uh late in 2025 that the Trump administration thinks that for national security reasons, Washington needs to have we can even talk about like to some extent control over other hemisphere of the western hemisphere. That means or at least suggests that the US is less uh is willing to be less president less present sorry in other parts of the globe >> and it's more comfortable that other superpowers also exert power in their areas of influence in their backyards so to speak. So from that perspective, that's a good thing for uh Putin in Moscow and in Russia and for she in Beijing in China because they have military aspirations as we know in Ukraine and also in Taiwan. China has long said it aims to unify China uh so bring Taiwan under the authority of Beijing. So the precedent that this operation sets is also a positive for them in that regard. And then talking about the world more broadly, I think it goes in line with what we said before that no one is sad uh to see Maduro go. So no one is really um kind of opposing that aspect. But a lot of countries especially from Europe for example they have underscored um the risks of violating international law because if you start violating that persistently you end up >> in the jungle world so to speak right there are no rules and everyone can do as they please and then this is not necessarily helpful to the maintenance of of kind of a more stable relation between countries. Mhm. Now, well, okay. Um, [clears throat] I'm curious. Does Rain have an opinion? And let's put good or bad aside for a moment. Um, but if America were to continue to pursue this Monroe Doctrine, you know, maybe Monroe doctrine on steroids. Um, we really want to, you know, have primary primacy in the Western Hemisphere. I'm sure they, you know, US still wants to keep its toe hold in a lot of other places still, but but hold to them less lightly than we did before, but really lock in the Western Hemisphere, really, you know, exploit all of its resources, protect it with a golden dome missile shield. We've got two massive oceans on either side. You know, kind of to your point, we care a little bit less about what happens in the rest of the world as long as we're controlling our hemisphere and running it the way that we want it to. Would that work for America? Like is that is is is that a strategy that would actually make America stronger, safer, etc. than it is today? >> Yeah. From our analytical perspective, like setting aside if it's like good or bad, uh when we think about what this can uh translate in terms of business impacts, uh it's the kind of thing that you have pros and cons. I think like basically like everything, right? Because if you think that there will be this stronger focus on uh the Western Hemisphere that the Trump administration will seek to uh work more closely with even if just right-wing governments, more allied governments, that would likely create opportunities for US companies. Uh we are seeing the at least the plan to revamp the Venezuelan oil and gas sector. There will likely be a lot of obstacles to that and the plan may not work, but that could become an opportunity for US oil majors there. Venezuela has a lot of uh mineral riches as well from gold to diamonds to >> Yeah, it's it's ridiculously wealthy natural resources. Yeah, >> exactly. But we can also think about like uh other countries with uh like Argentina with natural gas in Vakamerta. There is Paraguay that has cheap energy and can become a hub for data centers. Um right. So there are >> sorry to interrupt but I mean are are there is there an interest in Latin and South America in this Monroe doctrine like hey like if America were to say yeah we're going to we're going to take you know as much of our manufacturing away from China and Asia as we can and invested in in in Latin and South America. Are there countries they're saying yeah let's do that like I'll raise my hand. >> Yeah. Basically in Latin America historically what we have is uh governments that do not have enough resources to develop their own industries and that they rely on foreign investment to do so. So uh of course there is like issues like corruption reg like regulatory obstacles a lot of protectionism in some countries like Brazil and Argentina are very protectionist because they don't want to open their uh manufacturing sectors to foreign competition because that could lead to the bankruptcy and the collapse of their own domestic sectors. But aside all of these obstacles the countries are open to foreign investment. What we have seen over the past decades is that China has become the main source of foreign direct investment in basically uh all of South America and many countries America as well. >> The US given the much closer link to the region for centuries is still the when you look about what we call the stock. So what has been invested over time the US is still is the leader. So a lot of US companies are present here. They still have an influence on policym because they they are able to to lobby. Um so they they do not oppose that. The issue with the Monroe doctrine is not that it can bring cooperation is the way that the relationship is established that it's much more around coercion and pressure rather than cooperation. Mhm. >> Prior to uh what we are seeing as this resurgence and a lot of people are calling the dawn row because of Donald Trump the kind of one of the main principles of the US foreign policy was what they called shared prosperity was the idea exactly you're saying that through cooperation and investment if US companies or US resources would improve the quality of life improve improve the economic conditions in the countries in the region, people would be more inclined to stay in their countries because they have a better life, they have a better prospect then immigrate for instance to the US illegally, right? >> So that was a way to frame u the relationship that focused more on cooperation rather than coercion. Now, what we will likely see is more like the the threats of tariffs, the threats of sanctions, and even perhaps military threat as a way to get the countries in the region to stick to Washington's interests. >> Um, and I guess TBD, you know, it was more carrot, now the stick's getting introduced. you know, will it be more stick going forward or is this just an interim time to get everybody to line up and then it goes back to more carrots, you know, TBD? Um there's a lot of discussion here in the live chat about um Taiwan and its semiconductor uh importance to the US and and what I'm wondering and this is just me thinking in real time aloud here um [clears throat] is you know if indeed that this is the vision of the US unite the western hemisphere in the way that that the Monroe Doctrine sort of envisions you know could Trump be talking to Russia and talking to China um and saying hey guys. Like, yeah, say whatever you need to say publicly about what I just did here. And by the way, I'm not going to let you get, you know, a real permanent foothold in in in Latin America. You're just going to have to suck it up. But Russia, you know, I'm I'm working with you to end the Ukraine war. You're going to end up with a big chunk of Ukraine, right? China, I know you want Taiwan. I'll let you have it eventually. just give me five or 10 years so that we can build our own, you know, domestic uh chip manufacturing to the point where we're not so dependent on Taiwan. Do you think there's some of that backdoorism going on saying, "Hey, yeah, everybody can kind of own their part of the world here now." >> Yeah, I think it's uh less uh of an open and blunt um kind of statement, but that's what the indications and the acts transpire, right? So even though uh the US or US officials or Trump are not necessarily saying as you framed this as you kind of phrased out loud that's the kind of the messaging that the other sides start to understand perhaps act upon. So uh of course it's early to say that that's what the outcome will actually be and that uh either Russia or China will uh take decisive action and do similar military operations uh targeting the leaders of Ukraine or Taiwan. It's not necessarily that outcome, but the perception that the world order is changing and it's giving them more room to exert influence in in their uh kind of own uh backyard, so to speak. >> Okay. Um Mario, I'm looking at the time. We got about seven minutes until the hour. Um I've still got a few questions and I'd love to grab some from the audience. Can you go a little bit long or do we need do we have a hard stop at the hour? >> I could go like 10 more minutes maybe. >> Okay, thank you. Um, all right. So, um, let's talk about, um, uh, Venezuela's oil industry here. So, um, it's a little debated because of the quality of the oil, but but it's sort of globally accepted that Venezuela has the greatest oil reserves in the world. Um, a lot of it's really heavy crude, um, super heavy crude even. Um, good news for the US though is we have refineries that specialize in that. Um, so [clears throat] if we are now essentially taking over the running of Venezuela's oil industry and saying, "Hey, you know, maybe at some point in time Venezuela we we give it back to you, but but for the foreseeable future, we're going to run it. We're going to revitalize it. We're going to dramatically increase the output. You're going to benefit. Our companies that are doing this are going to benefit. Um, we're [clears throat] also going to make sure that Venezuela oil, Venezuela o Venezuelan oil doesn't get to our enemies the way that it was. Right. You said it was 4% of of China's oil imports. Um, what's the import of this? Um, and how fast can this be brought up to uh notably greater production than it is today? I I've heard a lot in the past couple days of manage your expectations because this infrastructure is pretty pretty creaky and rusty. Exactly. I think that's one of the main challenges. uh we saw reports uh yesterday and today that the Trump administration will have meetings with oil companies executives on Friday and that's what uh Trump outlined in the press conference that the idea is that you bring in uh private sector money to rebuild the infrastructure of the Venezuelan oil sector and from there of course since Venezuela has 17% of the world's reserves you can just get oil pumping and that that would pay for their investments, that would pay for compensations u for prior expropriations that happened in Venezuela. And that would be a way that everyone is able to make money uh and kind of be happy with it, so to speak. But as you said, there are operational challenges because the oil is actually super heavy. So it's uh not cost efficient. the the cost of extraction is is higher than in other areas in other types of oil. Uh you have a scenario in which companies given the current low oil prices they are not at a moment in which they are willing to carry out large investments. So even putting Venezuela aside uh regular projects this is a moment of much more constraint from a budgetary perspective than of investing large sums of money. >> Right? If you think that there are there are like third party uh data showing that it would take 110 billion dollars to rebuild uh the Venezuelan oil infrastructure and it will likely take between 10 to 15 years to get production as to get to a significant increase to say double uh production or at maybe get like three times higher than what it is today which is what it had uh in the early 2000s. So we're talking about a lot of money and a kind of a long time frame and the long time frame is important because that's would that that would require a stable political environment. So a company is comfortable with injecting that large sum and kind of believe that we just reap the benefits a decade down the road, a decade and a half. And that's not the scenario we have in Venezuela right now. We have of course Madur has been removed. You have a new president but as we were discussing earlier she can be ousted by the military. She can face protests for uh being too friendly to the US. Uh there could be a transition to democracy and the opposition gets to power but is not able to govern. There can be an armed conflict. So these kind of wide range of scenarios of high uncertainty, they are also constraints for companies to invest. And then just to wrap from even from a legal perspective, you could get US companies access to uh Venezuelan oil and gas assets. The let's say the Venezuelan government allows that. But a lot of those assets that are currently sanctioned uh the companies don't have the authorization from the US Treasury Department to operate. But the assets there belong to other companies. There are companies from Russia, from China, from other countries, from Europe even that they hold stakes in oil fields. Let's say the government can just say okay, I'm handing over to US companies. This could easily become a matter of litigation in international courts or uh even the fear that well now Trump is in power the Venezuelan government agreed they start investing and then let's say Trump leaves office there is a military coup in Venezuela and then the new government just nationalizes all over again. >> All over again. Yeah. >> Yeah. So like for a private company it's a kind of high stakes scenario to to follow through with this plan. So that's why we see that these constraints uh will significantly uh limit the the outlook that this will actually uh be a successful effort. >> Okay. So, uh, Cliff here asks, uh, it's being reported on US news that US oil companies were not consulted on taking control of Venezuela oil. Oil executives saying the cost is over 200 billion investment required. So, we can be debated 100 billion, 200 billion. First off, do you know whether or not they were uh consulted or not about this beforehand? >> Yeah, it doesn't seem to be the case that there was a formal consultation. There were reports in December that the Trump administration was uh having informal conversations but this is not the case that for example they had a plan that they outlined a plan and that the companies had agreed to it. It doesn't seem to be the case indeed even so that the reports the more recent reports is that on Friday there will be uh there will be a meeting between Trump officials Trump himself with oil executives. So certainly this is not something that there has been an agreement uh upon as of now. >> Okay. Um so Cliff then follows up with a question that says what if the oil companies say thanks but no thanks. Um what I have heard and and I I can't imagine this wouldn't have to be part of a solution is that you know a lot of the buildout's going to be subsidized initially by the US government and um you know Trump has actually mentioned this directly and said you know there could be various ways in which the US could be reimbured from that you know either out of future profits or whatever but that to your point um the companies which of course if they can make money they they'll do it happily um you the a good chunk of the lifting might be done by the government financially um to to to make this happen. Let let me ask you this, Mario. So um uh let let's assume for a moment that things don't go well with Venezuela and US relations from here, but possession is 9/10en of the law. US is now running Venezuela's uh oil infrastructure, at least its offshore oil infrastructure. Um, you know, the the threat the US always has is, hey, you do anything to sabotage what we're doing here and we're just going to rain, you know, military hellfire down on you. So, could there be a if things went sour, do you envision one of the more likely options would be that you've got a you've got a country, but its oil reserves offshore are run by another country that is basically saying, "Don't mess with us. Um, or else you're you're going to regret it." >> Yeah, I think there could be a kind of >> Let's hope it doesn't get to that stage. But but is that how it might play out? There could be different arrangements. Um but more likely if that if if it comes to a scenario in which the current government is not willing to cooperate or or things don't play out, it's more likely that the US will put pressure to then get to regime change than to to operate because the issue is that in Venezuela a lot of the the oil are uh in the Orinoco River oil belt. So the Orino oil belt in Orino is a river. So they're not necessarily offshore, they are in land. >> Okay. >> So it's not just that you can have uh vessels, the naval ships uh kind of protecting offshore assets. There there is offshore production. Um but it's not just offshore. So uh it's not as simple as having a a government in place and having the oil infrastructure aside from it. >> Okay. All right. Um, well, look folks, if you've got any other questions, uh, please feel free to ask them in the chat here and I'll I'll ask them in the last couple minutes we have here with Mario. Mario, is there anything that's on your radar that I haven't thought to ask you about in terms of this very fluid situation? >> Well, I think we we covered a lot of ground uh here. just uh in terms of the scenarios that we have. We have outlined five scenarios for how we see the situation likely evolving. Uh and then if you want I can just very briefly uh outline them just to have in mind how things can play out. Uh and one is in which the new president cooperates with the US and remains in power. Again we are talking about three to six months. There is a scenario in which she defies Washington. uh then the US resumes the military campaign and then this is a very uncertain scenario because you don't know if the regime uh stands. >> Yep. >> There is one that the hardliners house to the president uh consolidate power and then there is kind of this tension with the US. >> The fourth scenario is basically the regime collapsing rather than a regime change the regime collapsing. You have infighting. You have different groups controlling parts of the military and paramilitary apparatus and then this just evolves to an internal armed conflict and basically chaos. >> Okay. So that's the failed state scenario. Right. >> Exactly. That's a failed state scenario. And then the least likely uh is a scenario in which there is a transition, a democratic transition and the opposition takes power. And this is very unlikely especially when we think about a shorter time frame. This could happen further down the line, but for now it's still highly unlikely. >> Okay. All right. Um, there was a uh funny question here for you. Um, what's the US going to do about all those drugs flooding our country from Greenland? Um, and I know that's that's being said sarcastically. Um, but you and I talked super briefly before we turn the camera on, Mario. Um, I would actually to the extent there is interest and so folks indicate in the live chat or in the comments if you're watching the replay how interested you are. Um, I will I'd be happy to reach out to Rain and get someone on from your North America um team to talk about the situation with Greenland, you know, and and certainly post Venezuela, the administration's been dialing up its its uh you know uh past uh uh chest beating saying that it wants to annex Greenland one way or the other. Um, so, uh, I guess you know, I'll work with you and your colleagues to to set that up if if indeed folks are interested. But, but just real quick, Mario, a lot of people kind of roll their eyes when Greenland comes up, but I I don't think Rain thinks that it's a it's a laughable issue, meaning that that there probably is something that's going on there and there probably is something that's going to happen there at some point. >> Yeah, definitely. I think that uh when this first came up, everyone was like, how serious is the Trump administration being about this and what we have seen since and especially after uh the developments with Venezuela is that the Trump administration is willing to take risk and is willing to adopt measures that can that in the past were considered in improbable, disruptive, but to exert and to put in practice what it has outlined. as its national security strategy to uh defend the national interest. And then of course when you think of Greenland, it's strategic position in the Arctic, how it connects to to Russia, to China, uh to kind of mineral resources. and then when you think about Europeans and NATO. So, it's a highly contentious uh issue and yeah, I'm sure uh one of my colleagues would be happy to to dwell into that because it's certainly uh enough to to discuss for over an hour again. >> Okay. Yeah. Okay. Great. Well, thank you. And um look, uh I I I don't know much about this, so I'm I'm looking forward to getting educated by your uh your analysts there. And I don't mean to sound callous, but you know, I kind of think back to the Cuban missile crisis where there there's just certain lines that the country is just not going to accept, right? Okay, we're not going to accept Russian nukes right off our shores, right? Um where if if the US, forget Trump specifically for a second, got to the point where it said, "Look, we're just too strategically vulnerable to our adversaries on, you know, some part of the North America, you know, some part of our hemisphere. We can't let that stand. And yeah, we want to be nice guys, but if we're talking about 50,000 people, you know, surely we can either come to some arrangement where we make them all billionaire, you know, millionaires and uh, you know, everybody's happy, or if not, we we find some way to be I guess my point is we're not going to let 50,000 people get in the way of protecting our our our what we consider to be a vulnerability in a key flank. >> Yeah, indeed. that that seems to be the the position of at least some people inside the administration and that they're willing to act uh under that premise. >> Okay. All right. Um well, look, Mario, um I can't thank you enough. These updates are so useful and valuable, especially in such a fluid situation. Um I would love to have you back on again in the future. Uh I'm going to I'm going to hope don't take this personally. I'm going to hope it's not soon in the sense that um I don't want to I hope we don't we're not we're not reacting to uh you know some unfortunate new development like uh a coup inside uh the country or something like that. But obviously anything material that happens I would love to have you back on this channel to do this again for the audience. >> Yeah, it would be a pleasure to join you again and it's always great to have these conversations. So thanks for having me. >> All right. Well, folks, please express your thanks to Mario for coming on and doing this for us. Um, please also hit that like button and click on the subscribe button below if you haven't already, as well as that little bell icon. Mario, for folks that would like to follow you in your work in between now and your next appearance on this channel, where should they go? >> Yeah, we can always uh reach out to to rain@ rainnetwork.com or reach out to the email info@rainnetwork.com. >> All right, fantastic, Mario. Thanks so much for doing this. Thanks for going a bit late. Um, always super useful and valuable. Really appreciate it, my friend. >> My pleasure. >> All right, and everybody else, thanks so much for watching.