In the Name of God. Amen.At the Rialto, under the protection of Saint Mark,these accounts are opened for the tradeof bills of exchange, merchandise, and money,with prudence, good faith, and just measure.May every transaction increase reputationmore than gold, and trust more than profit.When I invest and/or speculate with financial assets I follow one simple rule:DB_Silver_Fox’s Substack is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber."If you aren't willing to own a stock for 10 years, don't even think about owning it for 10 minutes."— Warren Buffett I started investing more heavily in EU and US equities during the COVID-19 crisis. My CAGR returns since then are 12.11% annually (the equity portfolio). Before that most of my capital was invested in real estate, physical gold and frontier market equities.I don’t compare to peers and indices. I just hope to compound above 10% annually for a very long time. *returns are calculated in USD**Table as at 11 August. Adyen and Adobe were subsequently sold; proceeds went to BEI.DE, FIE.DE, RBT.PA, BUCN.SW and a new position in Weyerhaeuser (~3.56%)Below you will see the cash-in and cash-out for each of the companies for a 5 year period (accumulation FY2021-FY2025). I will provide you with some short comments related to the cash flow canvas.RCO.PAsource: own calculationsIt is key to look at the net profit to operating cash flow bridge. More than 700 million were invested in new inventory build. As the cycle turned I expect much less investment in inventory and higher FCF (free cash flow).source: own calculationsThe inventory of Remy Cointreau has one unique feature - it increases in value with time (the cognac portion of inventory).Working the numbers is the science, understanding the story behind the numbers is the art. He who practices the craft of investing should be diligent with the science and patient with the art.This is my special situation investment. Overproduction led to more debt. China and US tariffs led to less sales. A combination of negatives which led to stock price weakness. Problems are real but cyclical and I look beyond them.RISKS:The capital allocation record is the risk, not just the cycle. Over FY2021–25 Rémy returned 120% of operating cash flow to shareholders — €408m of dividends plus €327m of net buybacks against €611m generated — funded with €174m of new borrowing and a €186m draw on cash, and the repurchases were made in the years to March 2022 and 2023 when the shares traded roughly €130–220 against €37–47 today. Meanwhile inventory absorbed €707m, more than the entire operating cash flow, and the build did not stop when revenue fell 36% from its FY2023 peak. I want to see the cash position rebuilt, the debt reduced, and no repurchases until the cycle has visibly turned.Stock chart:source: ft.comI think that Mr. Market punished the stock price way too much and this is a great opportunity to buy a piece of a business with such deep moat.WKL.ASsource: own calculationsThe company is generating mountains of cash flow from operations ~ 7.7 billion euro for 5 years. Capex and Acquisitions represent ~ 38% of CFO which is healthy. Dividends are another 30% of CFO which leaves 32% of CFO for discretionary capital allocation decisions. It is obvious what was the strategy of the management and at the current levels of debt I think that the strategy should shift into a more conservative one regarding the capital allocation. Management bought back shares for ~ 4.5 billion euro that is 58% of CFO. So management increased debt to buy more of its shares. The key question before deciding if this is right or wrong is to look at what prices the management was buying - at high prices (wrong) or at low prices (right) - above intrinsic value or below intrinsic value.source: own calculationsThe biggest buybacks were at the highest prices (above 100 euro per share). This is not prudent capital allocation. If management wants to add value to shareholders, buybacks should be made below intrinsic value.Actually I think at current prices it is a good decision to buy more of its shares ~ 70 euro per share. The problem is that the company already doubled its net debt and should also focus on reducing leverage.This is a common thread among wall street owned businesses. Management is focused more on pleasing the street by increasing EPS (by financial engineering using FCF to buyback shares no matter the price) than on adding economic value to the shareholders.RISKS: Not using the AI fears to accumulate its own shares below intrinsic value. The bad capital allocation decision of acquiring above intrinsic value led to value destruction and the psychology scars may prevent management capitalizing on the opportunity.Stock chart:source: ft.comAt current prices I think the this investment is quite de-risked from potential AI threats (I personally think that AI will help $WKL.AS on a net basis)value destruction from previous buybacks at above intrinsic value pricesCOLO-B.COsource: own calculationsThis is a business born of necessity. The quality of the business model and potential longevity are very high. But looking at the chart above some key questions arise about capital allocation.Again we see man made decisions as a key value destruction cause. It is the better problem. I prefer a man made problem against a structural business problem. It is better to have a good horse with a bad jockey, than a good jockey with a bad horse. I am not implying that the management of Coloplast is doing a bad job, I am saying that spending 91% of the 5 year cumulative cash flows from operations on dividends and financing CAPEX and acquisitions with new debt and equity issue seem questionable.CAPEX stands at ~ 30% of CFO. For the last 5 years two acquisitions were made for the total of 18.7 billion DKK or 78% of CFO.The two M&A deals:FY2022 — Atos Medical, DKK 10,633m. Announced November 2021, a laryngectomy and voice-prosthesis business, at a headline value of about $2.5 billion. Funded with debt: net new borrowing that year was DKK 10,730m — essentially the exact amount of the acquisition line.FY2023 — Kerecis, DKK 7,923m. An Icelandic fish-skin wound-care company. The total enterprise value was up to USD 1.3 billion (around DKK 8.9 billion), consisting of USD 1.2 billion (around DKK 8.2 billion) upfront cash and an earnout of maximum USD 100 million. The transaction was to be financed through an equity capital raise of around 9 billion Danish kroner via an accelerated book-building without pre-emption rights for existing shareholders.Reimbursement reform in US wound care. Coloplast paid DKK 7.9bn for Kerecis in FY2023. The acquisition case rested on a US biologics wound-care market where skin substitutes were reimbursed at average sales price — a structure that critics argued created incentives to select higher-priced products, and which drew a $1.2 billion Medicare fraud prosecution in Arizona. CMS has since rewritten it. Under the CY2026 Physician Fee Schedule, effective 1 January 2026, skin substitutes are treated as incident-to supplies rather than biologics and reimbursed at a flat $127.14 per square centimeter. Kerecis is better placed than most. Its average outpatient Medicare price of roughly $110/cm² already sat below the new flat rate. The risk is not that Kerecis loses coverage; it is that the pricing umbrella which justified an 8x revenue multiple no longer exists. Net Debt exploded but is still below 3x EBITDA (2.43x as of 31.12.2025).RISKS: I want the company to deleverage. Current levels of dividend payments are hard to sustain. Further M&A activity I see as a risk. What I want to see is CFO generation and debt reduction (by keeping the dividend or cutting slightly). Those post-factum misalignments create the opportunity to enter into a great business at the price of an average one.Stock chart:source: ft.comI was looking at the company for a long time but always thought it is too expensive. If not now then when?TFF.PAsource: own calculationsThis is an interesting one. During the COVID-19 period spirits and wine picked-up in terms of home consumption (off-trade channel) and after the lock-up periods the boost in on-trade channel uplifted the sector again. Prices rose, production rose, inventory rose. Brand owners wanted to make sure that they will have access to casks in order to secure continuity of the maturing process. Demand for casks increased (over-demand), prices of casks increased, profits increased. Management decided that this is the new normal and overinvested on the top of the cycle.The company spent on CAPEX and acquisitions 170 million euro for the 5 year period which is 189% of CFO. The gap it financed with new debt. At current levels of EBITDA the net debt position looks unsustainable. I am looking for one thing and one thing only in the management’s action - debt reduction!I believe there is a long way before profits start to recover. It is a second order type of recovery in the spirits and wine sector. First the brand owners like $DGE.L, $RI.PA, Campari, $RCO.PA will recover and after that the companies operating down the value chain will follow.RISKS: One risk - an overleveraged balance sheet. I believe the company will manage to survive and when the cycle turns to reap the benefits of the high operating leverage. The position is another special situation long-term play. I will think of increasing weight only after the fundamental recovery of brand owners companies is in place.No technology risks here.Stock chart:source: ft.comMy weighted average acquisition cost of my shares is 21.69 euro per share. This is my worst performing stock at the moment. The good news is that I don’t have urgent business to overperform the index at the end of the year and I have the luxury to wait. I am focused on one KPI here - reduce debt, survive and meet the uptick in the cycle as the undisputed market leader.BEI.DEsource: own calculationsPristine, conservative and prudent capital allocation in action.This is what I am looking for in a long-term compounder. Prudent capital allocation combined with a business moat - Brands in the particular case. For the 5 year period the company invested 2.8 billion euros in CAPEX + M&A - representing 60.5% of CFO. There is significant growth CAPEX + Chantecaille Beaute acquisition into these numbers which should support future growth:Key investments:source: own calculationsThe company reduced its investment portfolio and added 1.29 billion euro cash. After the CAPEX and M&A the company distributed 927 million euro in the form of dividends and ~ 1 billion euro in the form of buy-backs. The company also reduced debt by 566 million euro.This is a company I am planning to invest further. It can be a pillar for a conservative long-term portfolio. Increasing market share - top line growth is the priority here.The company has more cash than debt on the balance sheet and is solid as a rock.RISKS: Beiersdorf's principal risks are concentrated in the premium end of the portfolio (below 10% of consumer segment sales): La Prairie carries a disproportionate share of group profit against Chinese and travel-retail demand that has weakened materially, while Chantecaille sits on the balance sheet with €452m of goodwill from a €529m purchase made at over 5x sales at the peak of prestige beauty valuations.Structurally, the moat has already been breached once — L'Oréal built CeraVe from nothing into a global dermatological brand in a decade, and Eucerin now competes directly against it for the growth Beiersdorf is relying on. New capacity at Leipzig and Poznań has come online just as organic growth decelerated from 7.1% to 2.1%.Stock chart:source: ft.comThe stock is currently around 80 euro per share approximately 46% below all time high. A company with such strong brands combined with rock solid capital structure and prudent management is definitely something I am interested in.FPE.DEsource: own calculationsAnother beautiful capital allocation canvas. All of the company’s moves were funded by the cash flows generated from operations.source: own calculationsThe company is plowing back capital into the business in the form of CAPEX 24.9% of CFO and Acquisitions around 10.1% in total 35% of cash flows from operations. The rest is mostly distributed to shareholders 44.3% of CFO in the form of dividends and 16.1% of CFO in the form of buybacks. We can see that the biggest part of CFO is distributed to shareholders but no credit funds are used for that. Exactly what I call good and prudent and conservative capital allocation - common sense approach.The balance sheet of the company is rock solid. RISKS:Electrification is the structural risk, permanently reducing lubricant intensity per vehicle across the automotive value chain, while base-oil cost swings and weak German and Chinese industrial demand drive the near-term volatility. What is not at risk is solvency.Stock chart:source: ft.comThe biggest long-term threat is clear - electric vehicles require less lubricants. The market assumes that soon everything will be electrified and AI driven, but the road is always bumpy with many ups and downs and turns. The moment when the narrative shifts toward a more mild transformation scenario, putting more weight on the assumption that there is a lot of pending future demand for diesel cars from the emerging markets and we may see a full price recovery.FIE.DEsource: own calculationssource: own calculationsThe company generated ~ 1.8 billion euros for a 5 year period. It is evident that the company is in a growth mode. CAPEX represents around 25.7% of CFO but also one should see the 588 million euros for lease payments & other (pure lease payments is ~ 500 million euros). Those lease repayments are cash outflows and we may see them in the cash flow statement, but what they actually represent? Fielmann Group is a store operator, most of their stores are leased. So when you lease a real estate store you are actually making an investment which shows on the balance sheet as right-of-use asset on the debit side and as capitalized lease on the credit side. The investment does not show right away on the cash flow statement one can see only the lease payments. In the particular case we see 33% cash outflows for leases and others. The company also bought several companies - those investments accounted for ~ 39% of CFO. The company returned 26.5% from CFO to the shareholders mainly through dividends.source: own calculationsFrom the chart above we can see that the growth is real. The store network increased from 870 stores in 2020 to 1262 stores in 2025. We can observe that the group is focused on expanding its presence on the US market. For the five year period two acquisitions were made - In 2023 it bought SVS Vision a Michigan chain with more than 80 stores across 9 US states and in 2024 it bought Shopko Optical for around 333 million euros - this is a US chain operating 144 stores across 13 US states.From conservative net cash position the company expanded its number of stores which were financed by leases + several acquisitions of the last 5 years. Net Debt to EBITDA still stands at conservative 1.18x (as of 31.12.2025).The biggest chunk of the debt comes from store leases.RISKS:Fielmann's core is saturated — above 50% unit share in Germany with limited organic runway — so growth now depends almost entirely on a US market it entered from zero in 2023 and built by acquisition, adding 220 stores in eighteen months and part-funding the €333m Shopko purchase with new debt. Key risk is the execution of the US strategy.Stock chart:source: ft.comThis is a type of business which felt the damage of the COVID 19 the most. You can see on the stock price chart that during this period the stock price hit bottom at around 30 euro per share. Now the company is firing on all cylinders + growing with a core US strategy + investing in the online sales channels. I can also state that the second generation succession is working and the current CEO and son of the founder Marc Fielmann is doing a great job so far.ADYEN.ASsource: own calculationsThis is the one position which I classify as for the too hard pile, but still I decided to acquire a position for the short-term. The business is growing and is positioned as infrastructure. My view on the business as critical infrastructure is what triggered the addition of Adyen to my portfolio.Adyen may be the single best business in this universe — better cash conversion than Robertet, faster growth than any name on the list, a balance sheet superior to Coloplast’s, and management that has refused every temptation toward dilutive M&A and financial engineering till most recently. Ownerless does not mean badly run. Culture can substitute for control while the founder is present, and twenty years of double-digit compounding is evidence of something durable. The problem with that structure is that it lasts exactly as long as the individuals do. Beiersdorf survived the twentieth century because the Herz family held the votes, not because its managers were unusually virtuous. Adyen has virtue and no votes.RISKS:They own toll booths on commerce — but the toll booths, not the toll collectors. A network (Visa, Mastercard) sets the price; an acquirer (Adyen) negotiates it merchant by merchant. Adyen diluted while its stock fell 37%. In 2026 YTD it made two acquisitions, paying $335m for Orb and 750 million euro ($879 million) for Talon a Berlin based loyalty platform — a departure from the organic discipline that was part of the case for it.CEO Van der Does comments in February 2026:“We've been very, very disciplined in not going through acquisitions. So we have one platform, one stack.”August 2026 actions: Adyen did 2 acquisitions. - that deviation between words and actions triggered thoughts about reducing the position. I am writing those words on 14th of August - $ADYEN is up ~ 15% for two the days, looks like a good moment and I sold the position (at ~ 25% profit). With the proceeds added to BEI.DE; FIE.DE; RBT.PA; BUCN.SW and added a new position WY (Weyerhaeuser Company).Stock chart:source: ft.comRBT.PAThis company is special. I cannot think of a better way to describe Robertet than a short poetry. Robertet is the perpetual craftsman.In Grasse the hills run down to sea,where one house kept its own degree —since eighteen-fifty, hand and field,one family, and one slow yield.Let others build the rose from coal,and sell the scent without the soul.Robertet held the harvest tight:the jasmine picked before first light.The world came round, as worlds will do,and named it natural, named it new —as though the idea were lately grown,and not the ground they’d always known.source: own calculationsHealthy CAPEX of around 31% from CFO, ~ 65% of CFO were returned in the form of dividends and buybacks to shareholders. The company did some M&A for 178 million euros (39% of CFO) for the 5 year period FY2021-FY2025. The company increased debt by 129 million euro and disposed of assets for 23 million euro.The balance sheet is rock solid. Net Debt/EBITDA stands at 0.42x (as of 31.12.2025). The big spike in debt in 2022 is to finance a buyback in the same year for ~ 204 million euro.RISKS:Robertet's raw material is agricultural — jasmine, rose, vanilla — so it carries crop, weather and origin-country risk that cannot be hedged, and it sells into an industry dominated by four buyers who are also competitors.The main customer base is four companies. Givaudan, Firmenich-DSM, IFF and Symrise dominate the fragrance and flavor industry, and Robertet is a specialist supplier to a concentrated set of large buyers who also compete with it. That is a difficult negotiating position, and it caps in a way pricing power however good the product.Stock chart:source: ft.comThe stock price is around 20% below all time high but in terms of pricing relative to operating profit is close to the cheapest in the last 10 years:So I guess the big question is if those profits are going to hold. Discretionary spending is hit and I won’t be surprised if the company prints a couple of quarters with disappointing results. This is a business and a management/family team focused on the long run not on the next quarter.ZTSsource: own calculationsThis is a tactical speculative position. Zoetis is a creature of wall street. Great business and a strong market position but for me it is obvious that management is managing for pleasing the street. Investments in the business for a 5 year period represent 25% of CFO, while buybacks represent 69%. My read is that EPS is growing mainly for the reduction in shares outstanding which is not the same as EPS growth based on sales growth and increased productivity and efficiency. The mathematics is the same but the DNA is not.The only case in which I will embrace huge buybacks is when those are made below intrinsic value - that move is a great move. source: own calculationsWe can see that the biggest part of the buybacks were done at much higher prices. There is no correlation between the stock price and the buybacks. In 2022 the avg. price of the buybacks was $167.79 per share, in 2025 it was $134.06 per share and YTD it is $105.36 per share. I couldn’t find information about the avg. price of buybacks for the other years. For me it is obvious that a lot of capital was destroyed in that buyback fiasco.Net Debt has increased through the years but the balance sheet is stable. As of 31.12.2025 Net Debt/EBITDA stands at 1.68x.RISKS:Zoetis's 37% margins depend on patents that are already expiring — US companion animal revenue fell 11% last quarter on generics and dermatology competition — so the moat is rented rather than owned. Against that, management retired 77 million shares at an average of $138 against a $77 price and borrowed $2bn on convertibles in December 2025 to keep buying, which makes the capital-allocation record itself a forward risk rather than a settled one.Stock chart:source: ft.comThe reason I bought Zoetis is because I think that Mr. Market is giving an opportunistic quotes at the moment for the world’s leading business in the industry combined with a long-term tailwind for animal pharma. Business results are weakening from patent expirations but still dominating the industry (biggest animal healthcare company in the world) and management is scoring low on capital allocation practices - those problems are not enough to explain the stock falling ~ 70% from all time high. I think there is quite an emotional (overreaction) element and a capital outflow element in that price decline. I expect quite a violent short-term price recovery so I decided to open a speculative position here.CPRTsource: own calculationsThis is how the cash flow statement of a deep moated business should look like. For a 5 year period the business generated $6.8 billion of cash flow from operations. It paid 0 dividends and reinvested 37% back into the business - $2.4 billion in CAPEX and $116 million in acquisitions. The company allocated $1.9 billion in investment securities (this represents 28% of CFO). This is a cash generative machine reinvesting in the business and growing a cash pile. For the 5 year period it increased cash by $2.3 billion.The business is gaining from two main externalities - catastrophic events and cheap insurance premiums. At the moment insurance premiums are rising and are quite expensive which is hurting the business - but this is a cyclical phenomenon which opens an opportunity. Electric cars are more likely to be claimed for a total loss because of much higher repair costs.This is the most conservative balance sheet I have ever seen. The net cash position is $4.7 billion as of 31.12.2025.RISKS:Copart's earnings depend on two variables it does not control: total-loss frequency, which is an insurer decision driven by repair-cost inflation, and used-vehicle prices, which set the fee per unit — so falling used-car values compress volume and revenue simultaneously, which is what the current de-rating is pricing. Longer term, the moat protects the position but not the price: Copart and IAA form a duopoly selling to large, consolidated insurers with real negotiating power, and autonomous driving reduces accident frequency at some indeterminate future date.Stock chart:source: ft.comThe stock price halved from ~ $60 per share to ~ $30 per share. Given the oligopolistic position, the network effect and the strong balance sheet I am really glad that I have the opportunity to build a position around $30 per share mark. I believe that the company is experiencing problems which are cyclical in nature.AFX.DEIn 1889 Ernst Abbe did something almost nobody in industrial history has done.He owned the Carl Zeiss optical works outright. He was wealthy, successful, and entirely free to pass it to his children.Instead he transferred the entire company to a foundation, and wrote a statute that bound it: profits to be reinvested or used for the welfare of employees and science, no individual to draw wealth from ownership, no family — including his own — to control it.He then subjected himself to the statute. He capped his own salary at a multiple of the lowest-paid worker’s.The foundation still owns the company today.Most owners talk about stewardship while retaining every option to sell. Abbe removed his own options, permanently, in writing.That is the difference between a good owner and a constitution. One depends on the character of a man. The other survives him.source: own calculationsThe institutional and constitutional structure of ownership is great and let’s look at the 5Y cumulative cash flow.source: own calculationsWe can immediately grasp what is the elephant in the room here and it is called acquisitions. The company spent 90% of all cumulative 5 year CFO for acquisitions - 1.1 billion euros.The company financed this endeavor with new debt and 587 million euros from the parent cash pool (the foundation). source: own calculationsThe chart above shows how the cash-in and cash-out dynamics evolved through the years. And 2024 is the outlier year when big decisions were made and executed.The deal:D.O.R.C. — Dutch Ophthalmic Research Center (International) B.V., bought 100% from Eurazeo SE.On price: roughly €985m for €200m of revenue is about 5x sales, and against a "mid double-digit" operating profit — call it €50m — roughly 20x EBIT. That is a full price for a private-equity exit.The acquisition was financed mainly through parent cash pool draw. That draw was possible because the pool balance had been built up: the "other receivables" position — money Carl Zeiss Meditec had lent to the parent — fell from €953.5m in FY2021 to €170.9m in FY2025. In effect the subsidiary called back cash it had previously placed with its parent.The timing has not been kind. DORC closed in April 2024. Since then the group's operating margin has fallen to roughly 8.9%, operating cash flow has declined to €209.9m from €247.3m, and the dividend was cut 47% to €52.5m. The shares are down roughly 80% from their peak.But what is the strategic fit of D.O.R.C. and why $AFX.DE pulled the trigger?Zeiss sold everything in the operating room except the retinal surgery equipment itself, and DORC filled that gap with consumables that sell every time an operation happens rather than when a hospital approves a budget — exactly the kind of revenue Zeiss lacked as its equipment sales collapsed. The logic was right; paying 5x sales to a private equity seller while its own shares fell 80%, funded entirely with parent cash and new debt, was the expensive part.RISKS:Carl Zeiss Meditec is the most entrenched business in the portfolio and currently the least profitable — operating margin has fallen to roughly 8.9% as Chinese volume-based procurement extracts the surplus from a position surgeons cannot easily switch away from, proving that switching costs protect the position but not the price. Stock chart:source: ft.comWhen a company of that caliber - regarding governance and moat is crushed I am eager to take the risk and hold the shares.VETO.PAsource: own calculationsThe company capital allocation is conservative and solid. For a 5 year period it generated 400 million euro in cash flow from operations. It invested 28% of it in CAPEX and repaid existing debt with another 28% of the generated cash flows. The company returned around 15% of the generated cash flows to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks.The balance sheet is rock solid. The company is growing organically and is increasing its net cash position.RISKS:Vetoquinol's core problem is that its "Essentials" strategy is branded off-patent — it sells what others invented once the protection lapsed, which caps pricing at roughly 2% a year, enough to cover input inflation and nothing more. That is why operating margins have sat between 10% and 15% for two decades.Stock chart:source: ft.comThe company is family owned and is managed very conservatively for the very long term. I like the setup especially when the stock price is down ~ 50%.RAT.Lsource: own calculationsFor the 5 year period there was one key event. The acquisition of Investec Wealth & Investment UK — the UK and Channel Islands wealth business of Investec plc, with £43.7bn of client assets. The perimeter excluded Investec Bank (Switzerland) and Investec Wealth & Investment International, which stayed with Investec. The deal was financed through issuance of additional shares.Why financing the deal with shares instead of cash was a good decision:Retrospectively the shares now are ~15% (before dividend) cheaper compared with the price of issuance. Rathbones is now running a £50m buyback, extended by a further £20m, buying stock at ~1,650p that it issued at ~£19.60. Retiring your own currency below the price you printed it at is value-accretive to the holders who stayed. Whether by design or accident, that partially unwinds the dilution at a favorable price.Regulatory capital preserved - better if the deal was financed through additional debt.It locked the seller in as a 41% shareholder. This is the important one. In wealth management the asset is client relationships, and advisers can walk out with their books. By taking shares rather than cash, Investec now bears the attrition risk alongside Rathbones. A cash seller would have had every incentive to hand over the assets and leave.Voting was capped at 29.9% while economics ran at 41.25% — so Investec got the exposure without control. That is a well-structured piece of dealmaking.Net debt/EBITDA running at 0.39x - which is ok.RISKS:Rathbones' revenue is a fee on client assets, so earnings fall directly with markets while its cost base — people and offices — does not, and it faces persistent structural fee compression from passive products and cheaper platforms. The near-term risk is execution: the Investec Wealth integration was paid for with 45 million new shares, a 77% increase in the count, and it must deliver both the promised synergies and net client inflows against an industry where advisers and their clients leave together.Stock chart:source: ft.comOn 16 June 2026 Rathbones disclosed the findings of a Skilled Person Review. This is a section 166 review, scoped by the FCA and run after engagement with the regulator. The findings concern the UK Wealth Management business. Two areas: the implementation and embedding of Consumer Duty and compliance, oversight and assurance arrangements. The shares fell 17-18% in a single session. I have written an article where you can read more about the implications and risks from this matter. I started a position in the company because I think that the market is understating the long-term earning power of the business. source: own calculationsThis is a tactical speculative position. During the process of writing the article I sold the position at ~ +9% return. The reason - It is not in my circle of competence and it is too exposed on technology change. With the proceeds added more $WY. The position of is now ~ 3.56% of portfolio. Weyerhaeuser is the largest private timberland owner in the US. Roughly 10.4 million acres owned in the US, plus long-term licenses on additional acreage in Canada. STO3.DEsource: own calculationsThis is a cyclical business - highly correlated to German construction. The capital allocation is prudent. We can see that for the 5 year period the company generated 563 million euro in cash flow from operations. The company reinvested 38% (216 million euros CAPEX) back into the business. The 86 million euros in acquisitions and securities is mainly investment in securities (~ 66 million euros). The company distributed 26% of the generated cash flow from operations to shareholders in the form of dividends. Debt was reduced by 132 million euros (23% of the CFO).The balance sheet is rock solid. We should keep in mind that the company is doing business in a cyclical industry and the quality of the balance sheet may deteriorate fast. The key point here is that the company has the balance sheet strength to survive a cyclical crisis.RISKS:Sto is a bet on German construction, which is in a deep downturn — revenue has fallen from €1.72bn to €1.59bn and operating margin from roughly 8% to 4.02%, taking ROIC to 6.37% - meaning the business should be running at below cost of capital and probably destroying value. Facade insulation and render is also a commodity-adjacent product sold into a cyclical, subsidy-sensitive market, where German energy-efficiency retrofit policy can turn demand on or off by regulation rather than by anything Sto controls.Stock chart:source: ft.comAt ~ €600m the market values Sto at 0.79x book and 3.5x EV/EBITDA against €159m of net cash — 27% of the market capitalization — so you are paying roughly €441m for a business that generated €563m of operating cash flow over the past five years and still produced €94.5m in a bad year. The €1.59bn of revenue and 4.02% operating margin are a cyclical trough in German construction, not a broken business: operating margins ran near 7% before the downturn.At net sales of 1.59 billion euros 7% (operating margin) = 111 million EBIT@30% tax rate = 78 million euros net profitP/E_norm. = 7.7x The demand driver is regulatory and structural. Europe's building stock must be insulated to meet energy-efficiency targets. That demand is deferred by weak construction, not destroyed by it.BUCN.SWsource: own calculationsAnother excellent capital allocator. The company generated 1.5 billion CHF (Swiss Francs) for a 5 year period. It distributed 548 million CHF through dividends (36% of CFO), it reinvested into the business another 547 million CHF (again 36% of CFO).The company invested 228 million CHF in acquisitions and investments. Around 33 million CHF is investment in securities and ~ 32 million CHF intangibles purchase so that leave us with ~ 163 million CHF (11% of CFO) in acquisitions. The company acquired 5 companies in the five year period (one per year). No single deal above 50 million CHF threshold. Meaning that the company is doing regular small targeted acquisitions to boost position and growth. I like that approach. Going for big acquisitions is one of the riskiest strategies available in the playbook.The balance sheet is rock solid.RISKS:Bucher is a machinery cyclical at the bottom of its cycle: revenue has fallen 19% from CHF 3,597m in 2022 to CHF 2,914m in 2025 and operating margin from 12.0% to 7.9%, driven by an agricultural equipment downturn where farm incomes, crop prices and dealer destocking set demand rather than anything Bucher controls. The FY2025 operating cash flow of CHF 407m — a five-year high against a five-year low in operating profit — is working capital released as inventories unwound, not earnings recovering. What is not a risk is the balance sheet.Stock chart:source: ft.comThis is another cyclical business which is managed by an owning family, has proven great capital allocation abilities and is very conservatively financed. If you found this valuable, consider becoming a subscriber. Your support helps sustain this work. Thank you - and Godspeed.Disclosure:The views expressed in this analysis are my own and are provided for informational purposes only. This content does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any securities. I may have a financial interest in the companies discussed. Always conduct your own due diligence or consult a registered financial advisor before making investment decisions.DB_Silver_Fox’s Substack is a reader-supported publication. 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