I didn’t go over 389 companies which have their compensation based on ROIC. Even when I switched to a highly aligned metric, "FCF per share" – this proved to be unnecessary.Why?Because companies which became compounders (such as Monster Energy) didn’t have the simplicity of ROIC or FCF per share compensation, they had different ways of compensation, but usually one thing in common: insider ownership.Today, I’ll take a look at some of the fastest 100-baggers and what made them achieve their results (except biotech, where the results are based on a coin flip from the FDA).Nexstar Broadcasting (5.0 Years)Qualcomm (7.3 Years)Cisco Systems (7.3 Years)Jack Henry & Associates (8.3 Years)Southwest Airlines (9.5 Years)Monster Beverage (9.5 Years)Home Depot (9.7 Years)Oracle Corp (10.3 Years)Keurig Green Mountain (10.7 Years)Microsoft (10.8 Years)All companies mentioned here will have data from almost the beginning of their journey to make it easier to draw conclusions about what their common traits were. The summary of the findings is provided here:These companies are very varied by industry, but a high gross margin (or a capital-light approach, for Monster Energy) made me that the companies had enough cash to withstand recessions. Companies with high insider ownership tend to havebetter margins, but it’s not a rule. What’s surprising is that companies such asSouthwest, which had low insider ownership, and dependency on oil prices, became 100-baggers. The same goes for HD - I thinkthe reason could be either: a differentiated solution (Southwest - cheap flights)a generic, but reliable store (HD)(copy-paste approach, like Dino Polska maybe?)But Dino has high insider ownership - 51%. Some of the companies were hype (Dell? Cisco?), but some were boring and overlooked - I mean, who could have thought that a house materials retailer could grow so much? KGM is also interesting - in their filing, there was nothing about its machines (or I[nieczytelne słowo] me this), which provideda crucial barrier to entry - it was the K-cups.The low cost of production OR low cost of selling (Southwest) became their driversSo either capital-light or volume based. The majority were capital-light.The next compounder should have at least 15 - 20%+ insider ownership - if the CEOowns a large piece (Monster) - it’s more likely to grow - incentives!Avoid companies which are with low insider ownership.Under $4B, but some were above $50B?!Verdict: more likely to happen with smaller companies. Large companies were likely under the influence of the the dot-com bubble (Except HD & Southwest).Nexstar BroadcastingA TV station which acquired other TV stations. In 2003, they had a market cap of $129M. Their highest ownership was from Royce Yudkoff, who owned 25.7% of the company and had 90.5% of its voting power. The only issue with this company was that a gross margin calculation would be impossible to do, due to their business model, which didn’t have a cost of revenue like other businesses. But they did have an operating margin of -1.85%. They operated in a boring niche – TV broadcasting focused exclusively on the acquisition, development & operation of TV stations (serial acquirer) – like Constellation Software!QualcommThe owner of intellectual property of 3G networks – CDMA tech. In 2001, they had a market cap of $38B. Irwin Jacobs owned 3.43% of the company. All directors & executives owned 7.08%. Gross margins of 69.49%. Their niche seemed overlooked – CDMA tech – but it allowed them to operate as a capital-light business, essentially making it easier to scale their operations.CiscoIn 2002, they had a market cap of $103B. Total executive officer ownership totalled 1.8%. They had a gross margin of 63.51%. This was the time of the dot-com bubble. A company which said it provided internet protocol networking solutions was priced up based on hype.Jack Henry & AssociatesIn 2001, they had a market cap of $2.2B. Michael E. Henry & Vicki Jo Henry together had a 12.3% ownership in the company. Total executive ownership in the company was at 24.9%. Gross margins were at 56.1%. They operated as a niche provider of vertical market software primarily for banks and other financial institutions – very boring, but they did focus on acquisitions at that time, again, similar to Constellation Software.Southwest AirlinesIn 2001, they had a $15B market cap. Insiders as a whole owned 2.3%. Gross margins couldn’t be calculated – operating margins were at 18.07%. They operated a short-haul, point-to-point, low-fare airline. They managed to get a loyal customer base through their low fare yet high standard of flight quality. They were already doing share buybacks during that time, as it was already a large company back then.Monster BeverageA hallmark of compounders – a capital-light creator of recipes and brands of energy drinks. Concentrates are blended at independent production facilities, allowing Monster to experiment with their packaging (like EA did) and focus 100% on customer acquisition, which in turn gave them the great results we know them from today. In 2001, they had a gross margin of 44.23%. The CEO owned 39.7% of the company – Rodney Sacks. Their market cap was $22M. They succeeded because they delegated the most capital-heavy aspect of their business – production.Home DepotIn ‘01, they had a market cap of $93B. Total insider ownership was at 5.4% of the company. They had 29.9% gross margins and were the world’s largest home improvement retailer – they were selling building materials and other things. They build a loyal customer base.OracleIn 2006 they had a $50B market cap. Lawrence Elison (CEO) owned 24.2% of the company. I didn’t directly see a gross margin, so I used their cost of services, and I got 82.5% gross margins. They were the world’s 2nd largest enterprise software company – they were automating crucial aspects of businesses and pushing their Oracle Database 10g (grid computing – for every kind of business possible) – but at the time, they were doing acquisitions of smaller companies, which did work better than them. They wanted to own everything from a database system to customer relationship management and warehouse management. This was a large lack of customers, different from Jack Henry & Associates. They had a confusing mess of overlapping products.Keuring Green MountainIn 2001, they had a market cap of $65M, with a gross margin of 42.75%. Robert P. Stiller owned 48.4% of the company. They were a B2B company which sold coffee machines to offices, so that people wouldn’t even go to the local Starbucks – they had a cheaper coffee in the office, which was made from beans which were in bags (but you couldn’t put your own beans because they would clog the machine and spray hot water everywhere). It was a genius way of making a subscription-based business – you HAD to buy K-cups; otherwise, the coffee couldn’t be drunk. Coffee shops hated them, but so what?Want the Software too?If you become a Founding Member of the NabzdykRatings Software today (€9/mo), I will manually grant you Premium Access to this Substack for free.Become a founding memberThis isn’t financial advice.Antoni NabzdykTotal time spent on article: 1 hour and 39 minutes