Investment Pitches

Pitch Summary:
Our fourth-best-performing position is also our best-performing position of the year thus far, Enovix, which was up 39% during the second quarter and has increased by a further 57% in the first 17 days of the third quarter. Unlike Organo and Chemring, Enovix is sized correctly in our portfolio, having built a position over the last two years at an average price of $6.98. The stock is now trading at approximately $14/$15 and is our largest position, accounting for 14% of the portfolio. Enovix remains a volatile stock and a business that still has a few things to prove, so it could fall again, perhaps even more than once, before it reaches our probability-weighted value of $27. Still, we are confident that some of the initial operational growing pains are behind us. On July 7th, the firm released its AI-1 silicon anode smartphone battery platform. Enovix believes the 900WH/L capacity makes AI-1 the "highest energy density battery" commercially available on the market, complemented by fast charging (i.e., 50% in 15 minutes) and cycle rates of 900+ based on internal testing of initial units. Although we are aware of specialty batteries that have a higher energy density, specifically those from drone battery-focused producer Amprius, we believe Enovix's claim holds up for the most part. Most competitors are in a similar situation to Samsung, which has a road map for a 900 Wh/L cell phone battery but does not expect it to be available before 2027. Although we believe the stock has appreciated somewhat on a positive read-through from incremental disclosure regarding battery specs, coupled with the earnings beat (which it seems investors care about, but in these early days is meaningless), we suspect that the stock's rapid rise this time around has been facilitated in part by the unwinding of the firms persistently high short interest. The stock remains a favorite punching bag of the investing commentariat on twitter who are skeptical of everything from management's ability to manufacture the battery to skepticism of the potential of a silicon anode, or just doubt about the willingness of anyone to pay a premium price for a more energy dense battery, we expect the first purchase orders later this year to a be key de-risking event for the final unwinding of the prominent short position, which was still 30% of the stocks float at the end of the 2nd quarter.

BSD Analysis:
Massif Capital maintains a strong bullish stance on Enovix, positioning it as their largest holding at 14% of the portfolio with a $27 target price representing significant upside from current levels around $14-15. The manager's thesis centers on Enovix's breakthrough AI-1 silicon anode battery technology, which delivers industry-leading 900Wh/L energy density, 50% charging in 15 minutes, and 900+ cycle rates. This technological advantage provides a 2-3 year lead over competitors like Samsung, whose similar battery won't be available until 2027. The recent 96% gain (39% in Q2 plus 57% in early Q3) reflects both fundamental progress and short covering, with short interest still elevated at 30% of float. Massif expects upcoming purchase orders to serve as a key de-risking catalyst that could drive further short unwinding. While acknowledging the stock's volatility and execution risks, the manager expresses confidence that operational growing pains are subsiding and the company is positioned to capitalize on premium battery demand in smartphones and other applications.

Pitch Summary:
ENDI Corp (otc: ENDI) – we profiled ENDI in our 2024 first quarter letter when the share price was around $6.50 per share. The share price rose during the second quarter from $12.00 per share to $15.65 per share. ENDI owns CrossingBridge Advisors which manages fixed income mutual funds and a few managed accounts. Assets under management (AUM) for CrossingBridge grew over 30% in 2024, from $2.6 billion at the beginning of 2024, adjusted for the acquisition of the RiverPark Short Term High Yield Fund, to $3.4 billion at the end of 2024. According to their website, as of the end of June 2025, AUM was in excess of $4.0 billion, an increase of over 16% in the first half alone. We think the current interest rate environment is attractive for short term bonds. ENDI's operating margins in each of the last three quarters were 32% but that is misleading. ENDI incurs significant amortization charges related to its acquisition of CrossingBridge and other investment management contracts. Adjusted operating margin was 46 to 48%. First quarter cash earnings were $0.39 per share, or $1.56 per share annualized. Net cash and investments at the end of the first quarter of 2025 were approximately $3.00 per share, meaning the stock was trading at roughly eight times earnings, net of cash, at quarter end. Our fair value estimate just keeps rising as the company continues to execute. We wrote in our 2024 yearend letter that, based on their recent growth, a valuation of 12 to 15 times cash earnings plus net cash seems more reasonable. Using 12 to 15 times the current run rate of cash earnings plus net cash would result in a value between $21.85 and $26.50 per share versus the current $16 share price. Subsequent to quarter end, ENDI announced a cash investment in CrossingBridge in exchange for 25% membership interest. The price was $25.9 million. The fund, and other entities affiliated with the fund manager, including Solitron, participated in the transaction. We think it is a win-win deal. It shows the value of CrossingBridge and provides additional capital to good capital allocators to grow assets under management.

BSD Analysis:
The manager presents a compelling growth story in ENDI Corp, which has delivered exceptional AUM growth of over 30% in 2024 and 16% in just the first half of 2025, reaching $4+ billion. The investment thesis centers on CrossingBridge Advisors' execution in the attractive short-term high-yield bond market, generating strong cash flows with 46-48% adjusted operating margins. At $1.56 annualized cash earnings per share and $3.00 net cash per share, the stock trades at just 8x earnings net of cash, representing significant undervaluation. The manager's fair value estimate of $21.85-$26.50 per share (12-15x cash earnings plus net cash) implies 37-66% upside from current levels. The recent $25.9 million investment for 25% of CrossingBridge validates the manager's thesis, implying a $105 million total valuation for the asset manager when ENDI's entire market cap was around $65 million earlier in the year. This transaction demonstrates both the market's undervaluation of ENDI and management's confidence in continued growth. The favorable interest rate environment for short-term bonds should continue driving AUM growth and fee generation.

Pitch Summary:
PharmChem (otc: PCHM) – the fund is the largest owner, at 33% of outstanding shares, and I serve as Chairman of the Board. The bid price for shares increased from $3.20 per share to $3.75 in the second quarter of 2025. PharmChem makes sweat patches used to detect drugs of abuse. It is an alternative to urine testing. On February 3, 2025 the Company announced the exploration of strategic alternatives. The release noted that PharmChem will consider various options, including acquisitions, potential sale of the Company, merger or a debt financed special dividend. In its May 9, 2025, earnings release the company noted it was in exclusive negotiations with a potential acquirer. The share price was $2.97 prior to that announcement. On July 21, 2025, PharmChem announced an agreement to sell the company for $3.75 per share with an expected close in early September. Most of the shares held by the fund were from a contribution-in-kind in August 2023 with a basis of $2.85 per share. The fund received a $0.25 per share dividend in October 2024. Based on a $3.75 per share buyout price, total gross return over two years will be approximately 40%.

BSD Analysis:
The manager executed a successful control position strategy in PharmChem, serving as Chairman while holding 33% ownership to drive value creation through strategic alternatives. The investment thesis centered on unlocking value in a niche drug testing company through either operational improvements or strategic sale. The manager's board leadership enabled the February 2025 announcement of strategic alternatives exploration, which immediately catalyzed interest from potential acquirers. The process moved efficiently from strategic review to exclusive negotiations by May, culminating in a definitive $3.75 per share sale agreement in July with September closing expected. The investment demonstrates strong execution with a 40% gross return over two years, including a $0.25 dividend received in October 2024. The $3.75 sale price represents a 26% premium to the pre-announcement price of $2.97, validating the strategic review process. This successful exit showcases the manager's ability to create value through active ownership and board influence in microcap situations where management engagement can drive meaningful outcomes.

Pitch Summary:
Solitron Devices (otc: SODI) - the bid price for shares increased from $14.28 per share to $15.75 per share during the second quarter. As a reminder, the fund manager is CEO and a board member of Solitron. The fund owns 11.6% of Solitron's outstanding shares and the fund manager owns 2.5% personally. While reported earnings have been soft the last few quarters due to lower revenues owing to timing of receipt of orders, Solitron started seeing a material uptick in orders at the end of fiscal 2025. In the fiscal third quarter ending November 30, 2024, bookings were $8.0 million in the quarter, versus sales of $3.4 million. Bookings included a large two-year order for HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) components from L3Harris – Solitron's second largest defense customer. In the fiscal fourth quarter ending February 28, 2025, Solitron did even better. Bookings in the quarter were $8.9 million versus sales of $3.1 million. Bookings in the fiscal fourth quarter included over $5 million from Solitron's largest defense customer, RTX (formerly Raytheon) for AMRAAM (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile) components. The order is believed to include parts for two or three years of SM-6 missile production as well, which is reportedly used, or intended to be used, to shoot down hypersonic missiles. In the first quarter ending May 31, 2025, bookings were $2.8 million versus sales of $2.7 million. We expect revenue to begin to reflect the higher backlog in the second quarter and fully reflect it in the third quarter. There continues to be strong domestic and foreign demand for both HIMARS and AMRAAM. The military has submitted an unfunded priorities list for a doubling in AMRAAM production by 2028 but any increase is up to Congress.

BSD Analysis:
The manager presents a compelling turnaround story in Solitron Devices, where he serves as CEO and board member, providing unique insight and control over execution. The investment thesis centers on a dramatic inflection in order bookings after several soft quarters, with bookings surging from $3.4 million in sales to $8.0 million in Q3 2024 and $8.9 million in Q4 2024. The company has secured major multi-year contracts with top-tier defense contractors L3Harris and RTX for critical missile system components including HIMARS and AMRAAM programs. Particularly noteworthy is the $5+ million RTX order for AMRAAM components that includes SM-6 missile production parts, positioning Solitron in the hypersonic defense market. The substantial order backlog should drive revenue acceleration in coming quarters, with the manager expecting full reflection by Q3. Strong domestic and foreign demand for these weapons systems, combined with potential AMRAAM production doubling by 2028, provides a multi-year growth runway. The manager's dual role as investor and operator creates aligned incentives and superior information flow, while the 14% combined fund and personal ownership provides meaningful influence over capital allocation decisions.

Pitch Summary:
Propel Media (expert: PROM) – has not publicly reported financials since 2019. We are completely left on our own to figure out revenue and profitability. We do know that there are 252 million shares outstanding. We also know that in 2022 they had agreed to be acquired by IQVIA Holdings (nyse: IQV) for between $700 and $800 million ($2.75 to $3.15 per share); however, in early 2024 the deal was blocked by the FTC and both Propel and IQVIA decided to walk away rather than fight. In June 2023, prior to the deal being blocked, we were able to purchase shares for $0.24 per share after becoming aware of the deal in published reports. The fund's valuation increased from $0.85 per share to $0.90 per share in the quarter. We purchased the stock in hopes of the deal going through. If it did, we expected a ridiculous 10-12x return. If it didn't, we believed we were still likely getting a bargain. We doubted that the next best liquidity event would value the company at 1/10 of the potential merger price with IQVIA. We still believe that and are willing to wait. Unexpectedly, Propel began paying a quarterly dividend in August 2023. In April of this year we received a dividend of just over $0.01 per share, much earlier than the normal 90 day interval. In total we have received over $0.086 per share in dividends, or 35% of our purchase price in two years. It has now been almost 100 days since the last dividend. Since Propel is a black box we do not know why the delay, but are not overly concerned about it. Last quarter we included another interesting data point we track - Propel's level of borrowing and its loan capacity. Propel's main business, DeepIntent, has an asset-based loan (ABL) facility with a publicly reporting company, SLR Investment Corp (Nasdaq: SLRC). SLR lists all their loans each quarter and also their unfunded commitments. This allows us to track the level of debt owed by DeepIntent but also gives us a good idea of their current revenue run rate. It is our understanding that most lenders limit borrowing capacity to 85 to 90% of a company's accounts receivable. It seems reasonable to assume DeepIntent grants 60 to 75 day payment terms on its accounts receivables. Based on this we can estimate DeepIntent's revenue run rate. It would be the current ABL loan amount (borrowed column below) divided by 85 to 90% to give us total receivables, and then multiplied by six (to annualize the sixty days of receivables to 365 days) to give us approximate annualized revenue run rate. What we learn is that annualized revenue was likely between $90 and $120 million at the end of 2022. That revenue appears to have risen to between $112 and $150 million as of the end of 2023, an increase of nearly 25%. By the end of 2024 the revenue run rate appears to have been between $200 and $266 million, or an increase of nearly 80% from a year earlier. In the first quarter, revenue run rate appears to be between $230 and $304 million, an increase of 14% in the first quarter alone. To say we are eagerly waiting to read SLR's second quarter filing is an understatement.

BSD Analysis:
The manager presents a compelling value play in Propel Media, purchased at $0.24 per share following a failed $2.75-$3.15 acquisition by IQVIA that was blocked by the FTC. The thesis centers on the belief that the company remains significantly undervalued despite the deal collapse, with the manager confident that future liquidity events won't value the business at just 10% of the blocked merger price. The investment has already generated substantial returns through unexpected quarterly dividends totaling $0.086 per share (35% of cost basis) over two years. Most compelling is the manager's detective work tracking DeepIntent's revenue growth through SLR Investment Corp's loan disclosures, revealing explosive growth from $90-120 million in 2022 to an estimated $230-304 million run rate by Q1 2025. This represents roughly 150% revenue growth over two years, suggesting a rapidly scaling digital advertising platform. The combination of deep value entry point, strong dividend yield, and accelerating revenue growth creates an asymmetric risk-reward profile. The expert market status provides additional upside optionality if the company eventually returns to public reporting or finds another strategic buyer.

Pitch Summary:
For the final section of our analysis, we are going to examine BCE, an investment we owned between 2020 and 2023, which for our purposes plays the role of the 'Mundane' Business. We sold our investment in BCE in 2023 because of deteriorating business performance. A business like BCE has a long history in Canada as part of the backbone of our telecommunications network. A strong telecommunications network is a critical part of having a thriving and vibrant 21st century economy. From this perspective, BCE and its competitors, Rogers and Telus, play an essential role in the economy. They are essential to the Government of Canada, their business customers, and the millions of households who rely on their services. Ironically enough – Constellation Software would not be able to exist if it were not for BCE's (and their competitors) telecommunications network. But are these characteristics sufficient to mean that BCE is a business that also has good economics for shareholders? This is an important distinction to make. It is possible to both: be an essential business while also offering poor economics for shareholders. BCE is a tangible asset heavy business, meaning they have substantial investments in tangible assets and physical infrastructure like network equipment, digital transformers, and 5G infrastructure. Asset heavy businesses like BCE are hurt by inflation because of the substantial increase in cost to both make new investments and maintain existing tangible assets. Additionally, because BCE is highly regulated, it means that it has a challenging time raising prices for customers without drawing the ire of the Government of Canada. Who wants to pay more for their cable or cell phone bill, anyway? This is a cocktail that the stock market does not like, however, sometimes it takes a long period of time for these lower quality economics to become fully evident. Despite substantial investments in their 5G network over the past several years, BCE's revenue has been essentially flat at $24 billion since the end of 2019, with operating profit being down slightly at $5.5 billion. This has occurred despite substantial investments in new tangible assets. Looking at BCE's Cash Flow Statement also provides further insight into how the business has fared over the past 5 years. The business has generated cumulative cash flows of $46.9 billion, meanwhile capital expenditures, dividends, and interest paid have totaled a cumulative $57.2 billion. This means that the business paid out $57.2 billion in cash flows yet only received $46.9 billion in cash flows into the business. How did this $10.3 billion deficit get funded? In effect – once the profitability of the business deteriorated, they were paying the high dividend by borrowing money from new investors – an unsustainable situation. In May 2025 BCE cut its dividend by 50%. One argument some investors have made in favour of BCE is that they own valuable media assets, including their investment in Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment (MLSE). But as is often the case, when a business enters financial distress, it sells what it can, not what it wants to. Along with the dividend cut in May 2025 BCE announced that it is selling its minority stake in MLSE to fund its expansion into the U.S. 5G network. Essentially, they have decided to double down on their existing business. Whether this works out for shareholders in the long run – only time will tell.

BSD Analysis:
Avenue Investment Management presents a cautionary bear case for BCE, using it as an example of inferior business economics during inflationary periods. The manager sold their BCE position in 2023 due to deteriorating fundamentals, highlighting the company's asset-heavy business model that requires substantial ongoing capital investments in network infrastructure. Despite significant 5G investments, BCE's revenue remained flat at $24 billion since 2019 while operating profit declined slightly to $5.5 billion. The company's regulated nature limits pricing power, creating a challenging environment during inflation. Most concerning is BCE's unsustainable cash flow profile - generating $46.9 billion in cumulative cash flows while paying out $57.2 billion in capex, dividends, and interest, resulting in a $10.3 billion deficit funded through debt. The 50% dividend cut in May 2025 and forced sale of MLSE assets to fund U.S. 5G expansion underscore the financial distress. Avenue emphasizes that while BCE provides essential telecommunications services, this doesn't translate to attractive shareholder economics, illustrating the critical distinction between business importance and investment quality.

Pitch Summary:
Constellation Software, founded by Canadian entrepreneur Mark Leonard in 1995, is a leading provider of mission-critical software solutions and services to a select group of public and private sector markets. They acquire, manage, and build industry specific software businesses which provide specialized solutions to their over 125,000 customers. Essentially, they own and operate business software that allows their customers to function. Some examples would be the software to schedule a doctor's appointments, the software to run a local library, or software used by a local gym to book fitness classes. Wherever a business interacts with software, Constellation is there. Constellation has generated a remarkable track record of success for long term investors and Mark Leonard has built an enduring business model and culture to support it. We made our initial investment in April 2020 at a share price of $1,280 which at the time felt like an expensive price. Five years later the shares are trading on the TSX at a price of close to $5,000. Rather than focus on the share price it is the business economics and performance that is worth highlighting over this past 5 years. A business like Constellation has been in a strong position to weather this period of inflation because it requires minimal tangible assets to operate. Over the past 5 years Constellation has more than doubled its revenue and operating profit while only requiring a minor increase of $239 million in new tangible assets. This is calculated below by taking the $551 million in tangible assets at the end of 2024 and subtracting $312 million at the end of 2019. Over the same period the company has grown Operating Profit by $908 million to a total of $1.395 billion by the end of 2024. For every $1 increase in tangible assets the company has generated $3.80 in additional Operating Profit. Constellation has also demonstrated a strong ability to generate consistent and growing cash flows as shown in the below financial summary. Another critical aspect of Constellation's economics is the requirement of minimal annual capital expenditures. Such minor requirements for capital spending mean that the company has additional cash flow that can be reinvested back into the business, principally to acquire additional software businesses. This is what superior economics looks like. A highly profitable company, with growing profits and cash flows, with only minor needs for additional new tangible assets, in addition to having ample opportunities to reinvest its profits back into the business. The challenge with a business like Constellation is that many investors understand and recognize these high quality characteristics and are hence willing to pay a higher valuation for the business. In this sense, the stock market can function as a pari-mutuel system (betting pool) where investors place excessive bets on Constellation's ability to generate strong returns long into the future which drives up the valuation. Future returns for Constellation Software are likely in the same category. At today's share price we believe that the business can still generate modest returns for long term investors. Owning a business like Constellation is sticking with our theme of investing in high quality companies with superior long-term economics.

BSD Analysis:
Avenue Investment Management presents a compelling bull case for Constellation Software, emphasizing its exceptional business model and inflation-resistant characteristics. The manager highlights CSU's asset-light structure, requiring minimal tangible assets while generating substantial returns - achieving $3.80 in additional operating profit for every $1 increase in tangible assets over the past five years. The company has more than doubled revenue and operating profit since 2019 while requiring only $239 million in new tangible assets, demonstrating remarkable capital efficiency. CSU's mission-critical software solutions across diverse vertical markets provide defensive characteristics and pricing power. The manager acknowledges valuation concerns, noting that high-quality characteristics have driven premium pricing, but maintains confidence in the company's ability to generate modest long-term returns. The investment thesis centers on CSU's superior economics, consistent cash flow generation, minimal capital expenditure requirements, and ample reinvestment opportunities through acquisitions. Avenue views this as a quintessential high-quality investment that exemplifies their strategy of owning businesses with enduring competitive advantages.

Pitch Summary:
@InvestSpecial highlights a special-situations opportunity at Scholastic driven by monetization of its valuable SoHo real estate. The company has begun formally marketing excess space at its 555 Broadway headquarters, suggesting that a sale is highly probable. Based on estimates of retail NOI and achievable office sale prices, the author calculates potential proceeds of roughly $200–250 million—enough to eliminate all debt and possibly return additional cash to shareholders. The pitch notes that Scholastic’s core operations trade at just ~4x EV/EBITDA with no net leverage, implying that the equity does not reflect the embedded property value. Additional upside could come from sale-leaseback opportunities for another 200,000 square feet of office space. While the author acknowledges weaknesses in Scholastic’s publishing catalog and limited industry expertise, the real estate angle alone makes the situation compelling. Overall, the thesis is that a clear catalyst exists to unlock hidden asset value and improve capital structure.

BSD Analysis:
Scholastic’s SoHo real estate provides a unique margin of safety in an otherwise challenged legacy publishing business facing secular erosion from digital media and shifting educational budgets. The valuation disconnect implied by a sub-5x EBITDA multiple with no net debt suggests that investors are primarily pricing the operating business while assigning little or no value to the property. A credible monetization plan—supported by hiring evaluators and beginning the marketing process—could catalyze a rerating, especially if proceeds exceed debt and allow for share repurchases or dividends. However, the durability of the core publishing business remains a key risk: absent strong IP or recurring franchises, revenue may remain stagnant, limiting long-term strategic appeal. The SoHo asset’s liquidity and pricing depend on commercial real estate market conditions, which remain uncertain. Sale-leaseback structures could optimize capital efficiency but introduce fixed lease obligations that reduce future flexibility. Ultimately, the special-sits attractiveness hinges on timely execution of asset monetization and disciplined capital allocation rather than operational improvement.

Actual Post Content:
Hidden RE play over at $SCHL Prominent publisher and distributor of children's books is looking to monetize its prime NYC real estate assets. The sale of excess capacity at its HQs + retail space could fetch $200–250m. Operations at 4x EV/EBITDA with zero net debt.👇 A sale appears highly likely. The company has already hired independent evaluators and begun marketing the excess property. The assets are located at 555 Broadway in SoHo, so they should be marketable even in the current environment. Proceeds will be used to pay off debt and potentially return the rest to shareholders. So, what's it worth? 26k sqft of retail space exepcted to generate $11.1m rental rev, with 70% NOI margin on that and cap rate of 5% = $155m just for this. Co also has... ...108k sqft of excess office space could conservatively be sold for around $700/sqft in SoHo, though I’m not an expert and open to other views. That would amount to roughly $76m, bringing the total to $230m, more than enough to cover $SCHL debt and leave some cash on top. After this, they would have 200k sqft of office space potentially for sale-leaseback so some further hidden value here. The biz is not without hair, it's clearly a challenged publisher with few prominent titles historically, so while a 4x multiple does seem cheap... ...my industry knowledge is limited — so I won’t make a strong call on cheapness. Still, it’s clearly an interesting situation to keep an eye on and follow closely.

URL: https://x.com/investspecial/status/1947976239832010964

Pitch Summary:
Scholastic ($SCHL) is presented as a compelling special situation driven by significant underappreciated real estate value. The company trades at ~5.4× EBITDA on a ~$770m enterprise value and generates a ~10% free cash flow yield, but the core of the thesis is asset monetization rather than operating growth. SCHL owns prime properties in Soho (555 and 557 Broadway) and a warehouse in Jefferson City, MO, which together could be worth roughly $500m. Management has indicated proceeds would be used to delever and fund share buybacks; after estimated tax leakage, ~$300m of cash could be returned to shareholders, representing over half the current market cap. Pro forma for a sale-leaseback, the core business would trade closer to ~2.5× EV/EBITDA. Despite being unexciting, the underlying education publishing and book fair businesses are viewed as stable due to sustained public funding.

BSD Analysis:
The K–12 education publishing industry is low-growth but structurally resilient, anchored by recurring school budgets and entrenched distribution channels. Scholastic’s competitive position is strongest in trade publishing and book fairs, where brand, relationships, and logistics create durable cash flow despite secular pressure on print. The real estate portfolio meaningfully distorts reported valuation, masking the cash-generative nature of the operating business. Asset monetization would sharpen capital allocation, reduce leverage, and unlock shareholder returns without impairing core operations if executed via sale-leaseback. The principal risks are execution timing, real estate market conditions, and the temptation to reinvest proceeds into low-return growth initiatives rather than buybacks. However, stated intent to return capital and the magnitude of potential proceeds materially cap downside. Valuation implies skepticism that management will fully crystallize asset value. If assets are monetized and the core business is re-rated even to modest peer multiples, equity upside appears substantial relative to current pricing.

Actual Post Content:
$SCHL is an interesting special situation here. $770mm EV trading at 5.4x EBITDA and a free cash flow yield of ~10%. What makes it interesting though are its real estate holdings that it expects to monetize. These include 555 and 557 Broadway in Soho and a warehouse in Jefferson City, MO. Combined these assets could be worth ~$500mm. $SCHL has said they will use the cash to delever and fund buybacks. Assuming tax leakage of around $40mm, I think you could see $300mm of cash for shareholder returns representing over 50% of the market cap. While the core business is not sexy, it should be relatively steady given strong state and local funding for education. The vast majority of their profitability is driven by their trade publishing and school book fair businesses. Pro forma for a sale-leaseback of the real estate $SCHL is trading at 2.5x EV/EBITDA. Assuming a more normalized multiple in the 6-7x range, you could see 70-85% upside on the stock.

URL: https://x.com/cparyse86296/status/1948023026697552098

Pitch Summary:
Vistry is a UK homebuilder... Vistry recently completed a transition to a capital-light "partnerships" business model... Vistry partners with housing associations and local authorities to build affordable housing... This model requires significantly less capital than traditional homebuilding... Vistry is targeting a 40% return on capital employed (ROCE)... Vistry has committed to returning £1 billion to shareholders over the next three years... The stock trades at a mid-single-digit P/E ratio despite its high returns on capital and growth profile.

BSD Analysis:
Vistry Group is a high-leverage, deep-value UK homebuilder poised for a dramatic re-rating, driven by a successful strategic pivot to a Capital-Light Partnership Model. The entire thesis is a structural change: Vistry is shifting away from traditional private speculative housing to partnering with local authorities. This partnership model delivers superior, lower-risk gross margins (20%−25% target) and significantly reduces its capital intensity. Management has aggressively executed this shift, cutting 1,000 jobs and realizing £52 million of annual cost savings. The stock, trading at a steep discount, is a leveraged bet on a massive margin and multiple inflection as the capital-light model's superior returns are fully realized.

Pitch Summary:
Our fourth-best-performing position is also our best-performing position of the year thus far, Enovix, which was up 39% during the second quarter and has increased by a further 57% in the first 17 days of the third quarter. Unlike Organo and Chemring, Enovix is sized correctly in our portfolio, having built a position over the last two years at an average price of $6.98. The stock is now trading at approximately $14/$15 and is our largest position, accounting for 14% of the portfolio. Enovix remains a volatile stock and a business that still has a few things to prove, so it could fall again, perhaps even more than once, before it reaches our probability-weighted value of $27. Still, we are confident that some of the initial operational growing pains are behind us. On July 7th, the firm released its AI-1 silicon anode smartphone battery platform. Enovix believes the 900WH/L capacity makes AI-1 the “highest energy density battery” commercially available on the market, complemented by fast charging and cycle rates of 900+ based on internal testing. Although we are aware of specialty batteries with higher densities, we believe Enovix’s claim holds for the most part. Although we believe the stock has appreciated somewhat on a positive read-through from incremental disclosure regarding battery specs, coupled with the earnings beat, we suspect the stock's rapid rise this time around has been facilitated in part by the unwinding of the firm’s persistently high short interest. We expect the first purchase orders later this year to be a key de-risking event for the final unwinding of the prominent short position, which was still 30% of the float at quarter end.

BSD Analysis:
Enovix is a disruptive battery technology pure-play whose stock is a high-stakes, asymmetric bet on the successful commercialization of its 3D Silicon Lithium-ion rechargeable battery. The core moat is its proprietary 3D cell architecture and 100% silicon anode design, which achieves an industry-leading 950 Watt-hours per liter (Whr/L) energy density—a game-changer for Electric Vehicles (EVs) and mobile electronics. Crucially, the company has demonstrated the ability of its EV test cells to charge from 0-80% in as little as 5.2 minutes. The stock is a conviction bet on execution: the massive value inflection will occur as its high-speed direct assembly process achieves production scale, positioning it to capture a significant share of the rapidly growing silicon anode market.