Investment Pitches

Pitch Summary:
The author believes Sanuwave Health is deeply undervalued given its accelerating growth profile and the strengthening of its sales force. The company expanded from two sales representatives to nine in 2024 and plans to reach full national coverage with 12–13 in 2025, despite already delivering two consecutive years of 50% revenue growth with a small team. UltraMIST, its primary product, has barely penetrated the wound-care market, implying substantial runway ahead. Recent share volatility is attributed to former warrant and note holders selling after converting into common stock, creating temporary pressure in an otherwise tight float. Based on the author’s FY26 estimates, SNWV trades at just 10.5x EV/EBIT, which they view as far too low given ~50% incremental margins and high operating leverage. They argue the company deserves at least a 20x multiple due to its premium growth characteristics and expect continued execution to drive a major re-rating.

BSD Analysis:
Sanuwave sits in a favorable niche within wound-care technology, a category with large addressable markets driven by aging demographics, diabetes prevalence, and chronic-care reimbursement tailwinds. Its UltraMIST device is relatively early in adoption, giving the company multi-year growth visibility if clinical evidence and provider economics remain compelling. The sales-force expansion is a meaningful catalyst, since medical-device distribution often hinges on field coverage and physician engagement. However, the company’s historically small scale introduces risks: concentration of revenue in one flagship product, limited operating history at higher revenue levels, and dependence on successful commercialization rather than recurring consumables. The tight share structure can amplify both upside and downside volatility. Execution will need to remain consistent for valuation multiples to expand toward peers. While early growth metrics are strong and operating leverage is attractive, investors should remain mindful of reimbursement stability, clinical-trial visibility, and competition within advanced wound-care solutions.

Actual Post Content:
Here are a few updates on some recent names: Sanuwave Health (SNWV: NASDAQ) Since publishing the idea, SNWV traded as high as $35.58, yet most recently sold off to as low as $24.90, closing yesterday at $26.24. I believe a lot of the recent stock price volatility is down to the ‘weaker hands’ of former warrant and convertible note holders who only recently converted their investments to common stock in October ‘24. For a lot of them, this conversion was likely viewed as ‘found money,’ so to speak. As such, they are probably outsized contributors to the recent selling. However, with a tight register of only 8.5m shares and a free float that is considerably smaller, I believe the nature of the register is set up nicely to enable a decent long-term run as the company continues to execute into FY25 and ‘26 and all the weak hands move on in the much nearer term. To recap the crux of my thesis: Sanuwave started 2024 with 2 sales personnel and ended the year with 9. They expect to grow this to a team of 12-13 in 2025 which will enable the company to have full nationwide sales coverage for the first time. This team is also now incrementally more senior and experienced than in prior years. Despite the undercooked sales force throughout the bulk of 2024, the company still grew revenues 50% YoY (for the second year in a row), whilst also delivering 73% incremental EBITDA margins. On top of this, UltraMIST is about to achieve just 1% U.S. wound care market penetration. In other words, the bottom-line earnings growth runway is incredibly long and far-reaching, and I don’t believe we are trading anywhere near the right price given this extant runway and the operating leverage that will continue to drive earnings power rapidly from here. At today’s levels, Sanuwave trades at just 10.5x my conservative estimate of FY26 EV/EBIT (which only assumes the same absolute $ revenue growth achieved in 2024, despite the massively bolstered sales team today). Given ~50% incremental EBIT margins moving forward, I believe Sanuwave should and will command a premium market multiple of at least 20x FY26 EBIT, a multiple which adequately reflects its premium growth profile and embedded operating leverage. I suspect this is a “show me story” and believe continued execution into FY25 will wake the market up to the company’s profound organic growth prospects. As such, I added to my position yesterday.

URL: https://x.com/TenvaCapital/status/1929796102074912992

Pitch Summary:
The author argues that U-Haul appears undervalued given the strength of its core moving business and the embedded value of its self-storage segment. The moving division generates around $5 billion in revenue and has historically shown a long runway for growth, though recent results have normalized after the COVID surge. The storage business produces roughly $900 million in revenue at an estimated 60% EBITDA margin, implying about $540 million of EBITDA, which would be worth around $10 billion if valued in line with storage peers. Given U-Haul's total enterprise value, the author believes the market is effectively pricing the moving business at only 3–4x EBITDA and less than 1x revenue. They highlight that the last time U-Haul traded this cheaply on an EV/sales basis was in 2012, after which the stock tripled. Overall, the pitch presents U-Haul as a misunderstood and undervalued asset-backed operator with significant upside potential if valuation normalizes.

BSD Analysis:
U-Haul occupies a structurally advantaged position in the North American moving market due to its vast network, high brand recognition, and dense physical footprint. Its scale creates both cost advantages and high barriers to entry, particularly in one-way truck rentals where network density is critical. The company’s parallel expansion into self-storage adds a recurring, margin-rich revenue stream that can increase capital efficiency, smooth cyclicality, and justify higher valuation multiples. However, the moving business is tied to housing turnover and migration trends, both of which have shown volatility post-COVID. Capital intensity remains a risk, as fleet refresh cycles and property investments strain free cash flow during downcycles. Storage operations help offset this, but execution and occupancy trends will determine how much of the peer multiple U-Haul can capture. Overall, the setup resembles a classic sum-of-the-parts discount in a dominant but cyclical operator, with clear catalysts through valuation rerating and continued storage expansion.

Actual Post Content:
Anybody look at $UHAL lately? - Monopoly moving biz -Connected self-storage operation -Stock gone nowhere for years $15b market cap Moving business does $5b of revenues, tremendous growth path over the years but down recently from post COVID peak $900m of storage revenue probably at 60% EBITDA margins = $540m storage EBITDA. Peers trade for 20x = $10b of storage So for $5b EV you get the monopoly moving biz for maybe 3-4x EBITDA and <1x sales Last time it traded for 1x EV to sales was like 2012 and it tripled over the next few years.

URL: https://x.com/evantindell/status/1929990448455790671

Pitch Summary:
The author analyzes $CRWV as a textbook setup for an extreme short squeeze driven by structural factors rather than fundamentals. Only ~8% of the company's full diluted share count floats freely, with most shares locked up by insiders and strategic holders. This creates a supply starvation effect compounded by green-shoe restrictions and insider share recalls. The stock also sits at the center of a controversial, high-momentum AI theme, increasing retail speculation and volatility. Options activity, especially zero-day contracts, forces dealers to buy into rising prices, adding mechanical upward pressure. Meanwhile, borrow availability across prime brokers is nearly zero, increasing borrow costs and forcing ongoing short covering. The author notes that these feedback loops can persist until major unlock dates in September. He does not express a valuation opinion but frames CRWV as a high-risk, high-volatility battleground with clear structural squeeze dynamics.

BSD Analysis:
CRWV exhibits the classic post-IPO microstructure fragility often seen when float is minuscule relative to fully diluted capitalization. The combination of insider lockups, ongoing issuance, and green-shoe restrictions effectively removes price-discovery mechanisms, creating a market dominated by derivatives hedging and liquidity vacuums. While this can generate explosive upside in the short term, it is generally disconnected from durable fundamentals and tends to unwind violently once supply constraints ease. The underlying business uncertainty—straddling AI-infrastructure and real-estate-like CAPEX cycles—further complicates fundamental valuation work, leaving participants reliant on sentiment and positioning. Rising borrow rates and share recalls can force repeated involuntary buying from shorts, but this buying is inherently transient. Long-term investors should be cautious: such setups rarely sustain elevated valuations once lockups expire and capital raises resume. The more material risk is that the stock eventually normalizes to a valuation driven by cash generation and project economics, not mechanical flows. Hedge funds shorting the name must recognize that the near-term distribution of outcomes is dominated by path dependency rather than intrinsic value.

Actual Post Content:
HOLY TRINITY OF SHORT SQUEEZES: $CRWV What is a short squeeze? No, it's not like the scene in BILLIONS where everyone is running around screaming “IT’S A SHORT SQUEEZE”. If you have ever shorted a stock, you have likely been squeezed … its not fun. Essentially a short squeeze is when you have dynamics at play beyond fundamental buying and selling that adds additional buying pressure to a stock which FORCES 'unnatural' things to happen. Normally you have long buying pressure... with a short you have multiple parties with different interests that can overwhelm the volume and move it higher. For example, it could be a risk model stopping a POD out, it could be a special sit unwind, it could be a highly shorted stock seeing massive inflows due to changing narratives, it could be due to microstructure… there is not a single reason, but they all result in the same out come… pain for shorts. What is the HOLY TRINITY of 'orchestrating' a Short Squeeze: 1. Low Float (architecture of deal) 2. Hot Theme (with controversy) 3. Microstructure PAIN (retail is fast here) For fun, lets look at a name captivating retail and confusing HF’s at the moment. $CRWV. I do not have a current position in it, so this is just me bouncing ideas off the interwebs for educational purposes. ARCHITECTURE OF A SHORT SQUEEZE: The narrative was too perfect for short sellers….a closed IPO window ‘24/25, nasty beta downside market February/March 25, downsizing of the IPO offering, high debt, controversy with short seller reports given relationship with NVDA, controversial roadshow, continual CAPEX needs, confusion around is it a tech company or real estate company… phew. I can just see and hear the analysts pitching their PMs as a 'hedge to AI company XYZ'. 3 key components of the IPO offering: 1. Deal size & dilution: ~50m shares sold to public …. I calculate ~600m shares on a fully diluted basis plus 2025 issuance… that gets me to

Pitch Summary:
Merger reshapes DSM into a higher-quality, synergy-rich nutrition & fragrance leader; divesting low-margin ANH business unlocks €4B cash and refocuses portfolio toward 20%+ EBITDA margins.

BSD Analysis:
The 2023 DSM–Firmenich merger created a €10B-revenue platform spanning nutrition, health, and perfumery. DSM’s commoditized vitamin-heavy mix is rapidly being upgraded as management exits animal nutrition (€4B cash proceeds) and divests €600M of other low-quality lines. Synergies of €350M EBITDA and €500M sales are tracking ahead of plan, with €120M realized and another €100M expected in 2025. By FY27, DSM-Firmenich should generate €10B sales at 20–22% margins, ~€2.0–2.2B EBITDA, implying 10–11x EV/EBITDA vs. peers Symrise (mid/high-teens) and Givaudan (low-20s). Balance sheet de-risked (~€4B cash inflow + €2.7B net debt). Upside as integration completes, synergies materialize, and re-rating narrows quality discount.

Pitch Summary:
Tight aircraft supply + higher re-lease rates + COVID-era roll-offs set up ~200 bps yield lift and EPS to ~double by 2029; shares still ~0.9x BV with likely buyback on excess capital.

BSD Analysis:
$5B of low-rate COVID leases (~20% of assets) roll off in next 2 yrs while new deliveries arrive on 8-yr leases signed into a tight market; management guides 15–20% higher yields than pre-COVID and ~20% asset growth; durable model (security deposits, repossession, long history of negligible credit losses) supports visibility to ~$10 EPS by ~2029 vs ~$5 in 2026.

Pitch Summary:
Cheap, vertically integrated nylon/caprolactam producer with structurally higher mid-cycle earnings from acetone and ammonium sulfate—late in trough, poised for 60–100% re-rate as spreads normalize.

BSD Analysis:
World’s lowest-cost nylon & caprolactam producer; vertical integration and byproduct diversification (acetone, ammonium sulfate) create durable moat and positive FCF even in troughs. Mid-cycle EBITDA has risen from ~$200M pre-COVID to $250–300M post-structural tailwinds: (1) acetone spreads up $0.05–0.10/lb post–anti-dumping tariffs = +$30–60M EBITDA; (2) shift to premium granular ammonium sulfate adds +$10–20M EBITDA; (3) nylon/caprolactam spreads (~$800/ton) are at multi-year trough, with supply tightening (China utilization down). Management is disciplined on capital allocation (debt reduction, share buybacks, prudent capex, dividend). Valuation: 2.8–3.4x mid-cycle EBITDA; 17–22% levered FCF yield. At 5x, fair value $39–48/share. Downside protected by cost curve position and profitability through cycles.

Pitch Summary:
I welcomed one new holding to the portfolio this year: Azelis, the second-largest specialty chemicals distributor in the world. I historically owned the lower-quality peer Brenntag for quite some time, but now that they trade at roughly similar multiples (yes, really), I am happy to report I have come to my senses and moved into the more durable specialty chemicals corner. Aren't we all on our journey to increasingly recognize that paying up for quality is worth it? What's the background? Azelis is a Belgian specialty chemicals distributor with 4,300 employees and 70 labs, founded in 2001 via the merger of Novorchem in Italy and Arnaud in France. But the heritage can be traced back to 1898 … I can smell durability. About 60% of revenues are generated from life sciences (Food & Health, Personal Care, Agriculture, Pharma) and 40% from industrials (Coatings, Adhesives, Rubbers, Lubricants). They are leaders in various niches, but with just 2% market share closely behind big brother IMCD, the industry is still very fragmented. Azelis ties together 2,700 suppliers with 59,000 customers across 65 countries by cooking individualized formulations in its labs, based on valuable exclusive agreements. What do they do? Imagine a small-sized shampoo producer that seeks a new formulation that foams well, smells like matcha, and complies with EU cosmetic regulations. They don't have the in-house chemistry muscle to pull it off quickly. Azelis steps in with a curated blend of surfactants, fragrances, and preservatives from its network of suppliers. Their lab runs formulation tests and tweaks it until it's just right. They handle compliance, safety, and shipping. The shampoo brand gets a fully developed, regulation-ready formula and can launch in record time, without hiring chemists or chasing suppliers. Simultaneously, the chemical suppliers are grateful to avoid managing the long tail of thousands of SME customers, each requiring custom formulations. This is golden distributor work right there. What's the moat? Luckily, it's a combination of several ones driving their high returns on capital, including economies of scale from its global distributor network with a growing portfolio and purchasing power, allowing for better pricing terms. They can also centralize regulatory systems, digital tools, and compliance better, creating cost advantages and improved service that smaller players struggle with. Barriers to entry are decent as well, given success hinges on exclusive supplier mandates from relationships, paired with specialized application knowledge. Once a customer is onboarded with individualized formulations, they are also quite sticky, as switching triggers another migraine. Azelis emerged as one of the industry leaders with a reliable reputation, known for innovative products. Why is their distribution model special? Azelis is particularly asset-light: They don't own trucks and just a handful of labs, which is valuable when things turn south, as there's no heavy cost structure weighing them down. Sticky customer relationships ensure their income is recurring as long as the customer continues to purchase that shampoo. FCF generation is also counter-cyclical as inventories are released upon challenging times. Why does it grow above GDP? Great question. There is growing demand for chemical distributors serving SMEs. Today, around 20% of the potential TAM is outsourced, but that share is rising steadily, with chemical manufacturers raising the bar +0.5% each year. Distributors serve as outsourced marketing and development arms for producers, while also acting as trusted technical advisors to customers. How did primary research go? There are numerous expert transcripts available that all lack genuine customer feedback. Why? Because their customers are tiny, making them tough to fetch. This called for some old-fashioned legwork, so I hit the circuit. Among the valuable trade shows were Food & Ingredients in Frankfurt and In-Cosmetics in Amsterdam (why is everything in Amsterdam?). For the record, the cosmetics crowd was noticeably easier on the eyes than the ingredient folks. Conversations were even a nudge more awkward than usual, and it took me a while to figure out why. This industry is incredibly relationship-driven, built on years of mutual trust. Everyone had meetings, except me. Everyone knew everyone, except me. Good for the moat, bad for my mosaic. I met multiple delighted SME customers who reported that Azelis is the fast-paced innovation lab of their choice, as they closely collaborate with them via their efficiently decentralized model. Various customers also appreciate their digital investments, but some old-schoolers still prefer calling IMCD over the phone to request samples. Good morning, guys. Importantly, their customers admit that they have become more willing to accept price hikes, as reliability now matters much more than it did in 2019. Nice, that drops right through the P&L. Azelis also enjoys strong bargaining power over suppliers: Small chemical producers were lining up to pitch their products at trade shows, hoping Azelis would add them to their large platform. A word on culture As the saying goes, culture eats strategy for breakfast. Has the speed of growth affected their culture? Not a dime. Because if there is one thing I've learned, it's that you don't want to own a mixed bag of speedy bolt-ons that lack the necessary integration. As an ex-PE asset brought to the market with relatively high leverage, this was one of my key concerns. Yet, my impression was that they are building trust and loyalty amongst customers, rather than solely expanding through M&A. Management & company visit in Belgium I met CEO Anna Bertona at several trade shows, and seeing her in action was highly reassuring. No surprise she has been overachieving in her role heading their EMEA division. She works very hard, juggles with suppliers, customers, and also manages to keep my capital allocation questions from ruining her afternoon. What stood out was how effortlessly she connected with everyone. For a business like Azelis, where relationships are key, such leadership is of utmost importance. Anna raises the CEO quality bar of my portfolio. By the time I made it to their HQ in Antwerp, she decided I earned an upgrade and delegated my pessimistic questions to her excellent CFO. A minimalistic office outside the city showed how little fat there is left to cut post PE ownership. No doubt, the weak share price has been keeping them busy. "If you take a bigger ticket, we will show you all 70 labs". Spending time with CFO Thijs Bakker turned into an AI capabilities deep dive, which, given my AI concerns mentioned above, had me on alert. But credit where it's due: their in-house AI chat tool for customers searching for formulations truly impressed me. This is getting really techy, in the best way. Customers can easily access a well-structured online library of formulations, sorted by application, performance criteria, and regulatory needs. It felt like browsing Airbnb for chemical recipes. Azelis sits on a treasure trove of proprietary data, most of which my third screen can only dream of accessing. Quick durability check: AI disruption risk looks small here. It may generate new formulations, but validation requires labs and testing to ensure the outcome is safe for human skin, lungs or lunch. Incremental capital has been and will be carefully deployed into smaller bolt-on deals at attractive multiples. With thousands of targets left, the runway is long. We're in good hands here. Whats the difference to IMCD? To all Visa vs. Mastercard experts, relax. Yes, they're similar, but this isn't a rivalry worth overthinking. It's not that deep. Regionally, each swims in its own lane (with different products, exclusive agreements, and customers), so don't expect a Formula 1 rivalry. That said, zoom in and Azelis slowly pulls ahead in two areas: First, IT. Customers often consider Azelis as more forward-thinking, digitally integrated, data-driven, and less reliant on fax machines. Second, culture. Azelis feels vibrant, optimistic, and hungry, more of a challenger than an incumbent. Spend five minutes at their booth and you'll get it. There's just more energy in the room. Risks that matter While the sector is generally quite localized (it's mostly water), a full-blown trade war would be suboptimal. Despite their exposure to the life sciences and counter-cyclical cash generation, disrupted trade flows would still affect them. If Brenntag or Univar were to carve out their specialty divisions, competitive intensity could also tick up. And yes, leverage is on the higher side, but the model can handle it. Management regrets not taking more debt off the table at IPO. Fair enough. Lastly, less than a third of the company is still owned by its former PE investor. But let's be honest: this is a textbook example of a non-fundamental mispricing. Give it another 400 meters into the marathon, and that overhang should fade into the rearview. After having fired various bullets at the idea, I'm happy to report that I've joined the cap table of what I believe is a highly durable business that will compound at mid-teens for many years to come, and that was available to purchase at a significant discount to its twin, IMCD.

BSD Analysis:
Baumann presents a compelling bull case for Azelis as a specialty chemicals distributor with superior durability characteristics compared to peers like Brenntag. The manager's thesis centers on Azelis' asset-light model, sticky customer relationships through customized formulations, and strong competitive moats including exclusive supplier agreements and specialized technical expertise. His extensive primary research at trade shows validated customer satisfaction and pricing power, with clients increasingly willing to accept price increases due to reliability concerns post-2019. The company's 2% market share in a fragmented industry provides significant consolidation runway, while their digital capabilities and AI-powered formulation tools create differentiation versus traditional competitors like IMCD. Management quality appears strong based on direct interactions with CEO Anna Bertona and CFO Thijs Bakker. Key risks include trade war exposure and higher leverage from PE ownership, though Baumann views the PE overhang as a temporary mispricing opportunity. The investment thesis projects mid-teens compounding returns driven by structural market share gains and margin expansion.

Pitch Summary:
Canadian E&P with low leverage, deep tax shields, and major upside from asset sales; trades at ~$22K/flowing boe or $30K precedent deals.

BSD Analysis:
Obsidian has transformed since 2019 under CEO (and FrontFour PM) Stephen Loukas—reducing debt, selling non-core assets, and focusing on Peace River heavy oil and Willesden Green light oil. The April 2025 Pembina sale netted C$220M cash + C$85M in InPlay shares + $15M WI, transferring $400M ARO. Remaining 29.2K boe/d implies EV/flowing <$23K, or <$16K adjusting for $2.2B NOL (PV ~$200–300M). Sum-of-parts suggests equity value ~$985M (C$13.9/shr). Shares trade at 3–4x 2026E EBIT or ~5x FCF ($60–70 WTI), with $1.55/shr FCF at $70 oil and active buybacks (share count -25% since 2022). Peace River’s Clearwater wells show 100%+ IRRs, and NOLs make OBE a tax-efficient acquisition target. Loukas signals willingness to “harvest value”—likely via asset or corporate sale. Downside cushioned by low-cost structure and FCF breakeven near $47 WTI.

Pitch Summary:
PIPE deal caused dilution and price drop; remains pre-revenue with quarterly loss; overvaluation in microreactor market.

BSD Analysis:
Short thesis centers on dilution and a long, capital-intensive path to commercialization. Recent financing/registration activity increases float and creates a supply overhang; operations remain pre-revenue with multi-year regulatory and HALEU fuel hurdles before any cash generation. Valuation is driven by optionality and policy headlines more than fundamentals; watch for registration effectiveness, lock-up expiries, and cash burn cadence.

Pitch Summary:
Revenue possibly overstated by ~$283M; claimed downloads nearly double actual numbers; major gaps in gaming and social/chat revenue reports; declining paying user base; concerns about auditor reliability.

BSD Analysis:
Pelican Way Research critiques Yalla’s user growth authenticity and revenue sustainability, suggesting heavy reliance on incentivized traffic and opaque related-party dealings. The Middle East gaming/voice-chat niche faces saturation risk. Limited disclosure, questionable governance, and competitive encroachment from global platforms raise downside catalysts.

Pitch Summary:
Biorem is positioned as a promising investment due to its substantial backlog and growth initiatives. Despite a challenging Q1, the company's backlog of CAD 68 million and a strong focus on organic growth initiatives suggest potential for significant earnings per share. The stock is trading at a low price relative to its cash reserves, presenting an attractive risk-reward opportunity.

BSD Analysis:
Biorem's Q1 performance was impacted by seasonal and logistical challenges, which are expected to resolve in subsequent quarters. The company's backlog, which supports a potential CAD 0.20 EPS, indicates robust future revenue streams. With a share price under CAD 2 and CAD 0.30+ per share in net cash, Biorem offers a compelling valuation. The management's focus on expanding international client support and securing logistics for its biological media solutions is crucial for sustaining growth. Given the CEO's track record in capital stewardship, Biorem is well-positioned to capitalize on its market opportunities, particularly as environmental regulations drive demand for air quality solutions.

Pitch Summary:
We also invested 2% in AJ Bell in May, investing some of the cash, following our reduction of NEXT plc. AJ Bell operates a capital-light, high-return model. It has delivered strong incremental cash returns on gross equity over the last five years of 71% and continues to grow organically, benefiting from demographic and regulatory tailwinds (e.g. pension freedoms, ageing population). Assets under administration (AUA) and customer numbers have both grown meaningfully since the 2019 IPO. AJ Bell's business is underpinned by high customer satisfaction and a retention rate of ~94%. It combines low prices with good service, supported by scalable technology (e.g. 'Touch' platform for advisers). Culturally, the company echoes Admiral in its employee ownership and purpose-led values, which we like! Culture & Leadership: Culture is a key driver of long-term value. Employees received share grants at IPO and the internal values (Straightforward, Intelligent, Personal, Principled, Energetic) are well embedded in its business. Leadership is strong—CEO Michael Summersgill has risen internally and maintains the cultural continuity post the departure of the founder, Andy Bell, in 2022. Financial Resilience & Valuation: Revenue is split between fixed, ad valorem and transactional fees, giving balance and inflation protection. The company has no debt (outside lease liabilities) and is conservatively financed. The valuation, stands at ~21.5x trailing Price/Earnings (vs 33x average), with 22% annual EPS growth since IPO and a 31% net margin feeding into strong returns on capital and equity. Risks & Competition: Risks include the competitive response from Hargreaves Lansdown under new ownership (CVC) and the normalisation of net interest income as rates stabilise. However, the long-term structural growth drivers remain intact for AJ Bell's investment case.

BSD Analysis:
Castlebay established a 2% position in AJ Bell, attracted by the company's capital-light, high-return business model in the UK investment platform sector. The manager emphasizes AJ Bell's impressive 71% incremental cash returns on equity over five years, supported by strong demographic tailwinds including pension freedoms and an aging population. The business demonstrates exceptional customer loyalty with 94% retention rates, combining competitive pricing with quality service through scalable technology platforms. The company's strong culture, evidenced by employee share ownership and well-defined values, provides sustainable competitive advantages. Financial metrics are compelling with 22% annual EPS growth since IPO, 31% net margins, and conservative financing with minimal debt. At 21.5x P/E versus the historical 33x average, the valuation appears attractive despite potential competitive pressures from Hargreaves Lansdown under new ownership.

Pitch Summary:
In April we invested 2% in Greggs PLC. The investment case for Greggs is centred on Branding and Process Power - built on its strong brand recognition, consistent financial performance and strategic growth initiatives. The company has demonstrated resilience in its operations, with a focus on expanding its market presence and enhancing customer experience, which positions it well for future growth. Greggs' moat includes its strong brand loyalty reflected in its extensive network of stores and established supply chain. The company's commitment to quality and customer service further strengthens its competitive advantage. Following the impact of Covid, its developing relationships with Uber Eats and Just Eat, provides greater distribution resilience – were another type of 'lock-down' to occur. Greggs' Revenue pathway is driven by expanding its store footprint, enhancing product offerings and increasing sales through delivery and online channels. The company aims to grow its customer base and improve sales per store through innovation and marketing strategies. There has been lots of evidence of its innovation over the years. Its vegan sausage roll, being one such example; and the technological development of a Greggs 'App', through which 20% of orders now come. The valuation analysis was impacted by the Covid loss making year of 2020, which blew out the valuation rating due to the impact on earnings. However, we can adjust for this in order to understand the valuation opportunity. Our Reverse Discounted Cash Flow model adjusts for the period of Covid. Greggs have traded on a long run average P/E of 18 years in relation to its earnings. Today the valuation stands at only 12x, which should provide a good potential re-rating, to enhance the investment return as it compounds its return on invested capital. It appears that the market believes the business has matured, yet it continues to grow and has made investment in further distribution infrastructure. As the store numbers increase towards 3,000 shops in the UK and store opening hours expand across the portfolio of shops - this should enhance incremental returns. There are still many areas in the UK that are underpenetrated by Greggs, providing further room for growth.

BSD Analysis:
Castlebay initiated a 2% position in Greggs based on the company's strong brand recognition and process advantages in the UK bakery market. The manager highlights Greggs' resilient business model, supported by an extensive store network, established supply chain, and growing digital capabilities including partnerships with delivery platforms and a mobile app generating 20% of orders. The investment thesis centers on continued store expansion toward 3,000 locations, with significant underpenetrated markets remaining across the UK. The valuation appears attractive at 12x P/E versus the historical average of 18x, creating potential for multiple expansion alongside organic growth. Innovation capabilities demonstrated through products like the vegan sausage roll and technological investments support the growth trajectory. The manager views the market's perception of business maturity as misplaced given ongoing expansion opportunities and infrastructure investments.

Pitch Summary:
Back in 2019, we pitched US big-box specialist hard-surface flooring retailer, Floor & Decor, as our stock pick at the Sohn Conference. Since Sohn, Floor & Decor has grown its business through the pandemic, subsequent years of record low housing turnover and the recent tariff announcements. We believe these external challenges have been extrapolated by the market; meanwhile, Floor & Decor exhibits an even stronger business case than it did in 2019 and is poised to accelerate its growth over the coming years. The US hard surface flooring industry is valued at about US$40 billion annually. The market has a mix of a few large, well-known retailers and thousands of smaller, independent stores. As the only player that's consistently gaining market share, Floor & Decor is the standout winner. They're the second largest player in the market. Home Depot, while still the biggest, has seen its share remain flat over the past five years. And Lowes has experienced a slight decline in its share. It is the thousands of smaller independent retailers that have felt the real pain. Unlike Floor & Decor, who have the scale to source direct from manufacturers, the independents typically buy inventory from distributors, which drives up their costs. They therefore can't match Floor & Decor's everyday low pricing strategy, and their product range is much smaller. Floor & Decor even offers the same design and installation services that helped independents compete with Home Depot and Lowes. As a result, the independents are steadily losing market share. We expect this trend to continue, and frankly, the longer the current market downturn lasts, the tougher it will be for these independents, which will only accelerate Floor & Decor's market share gains. We wouldn't be surprised to see Floor & Decor overtake Home Depot in market share by 2030. Floor & Decor's competitive advantages are deeply rooted in its 'flywheel' business model, which continually reinforces the strength of the business over time: First, specialisation and economies of scale are key. Unlike general big-box retailers, such as Home Depot and Lowe's, which dedicate a small fraction of their space to flooring, Floor & Decor specialises entirely in hard surface flooring. This gives them unmatched purchasing power with their over 240 global suppliers. As they grow and their market share increases, this scale advantage only gets stronger, and gives them even more bargaining power with manufacturers who rely on Floor and Decor as an increasingly important customer. Second, the customer value proposition and experience are central. Floor and Decor pass on those reduced costs to customers through consistently lower prices. When combined with an enormous selection (around 4,400 unique inventory pieces per store) and excellent in-store customer service, this drives adoption, trust and greater market share. Their ability to maintain and expand competitive price gaps is crucial. Finally, their store rollout strategy and the maturation of their store base are evolving advantages. With 254 stores and a long-term target of 500+ in the US, Floor and Decor have a substantial runway for growth. In its first year, a new store typically operates at a negative profit margin because sales are low while fixed costs and initial setup expenditures are high. By year three, however, the store has typically ramped up and generates mid- to high-single-digit operating profit margins. By then, the store is generating 50% cash-on-cash returns from the initial outlay. Beyond that, as they fully mature, individual stores can achieve impressive operating profit margins in the mid- to high teens. Currently, almost half of their 254 stores are three years old or younger. This means a significant portion of their business is still marginally profitable at best, clouding the aggregate profitability. Floor & Decor's 500+ store rollout program is a continuous growth engine. Despite this challenging market, they're still opening another 20 new stores this year. And these stores are truly enormous – the newly opened warehouse serving NYC spans 1.2 hectares. Although the ongoing rollout masks the underlying profitability of the mature store base, it will shine through over the coming years as stores mature and the market rebounds. The US import tariffs are affecting the entire industry; however, Floor & Decor's structural advantages allow them to manage the changing situation more effectively than smaller competitors. Their scale and direct purchasing relationships with over 240 suppliers across 26 countries gives them leverage and flexibility to mitigate increased costs. Since the 2018 tariffs, Floor & Decor has shifted sourcing from China, dropping from 50% to under 5% of sales by the end of this year. The US is now their largest supplier and, remarkably, gross margins increased throughout this transition. Smaller independents rely on distributors to source product, who hold the bargaining power to pass on tariff costs to retailers, adding to their already higher cost base. Interestingly, as tariffs are forcing competitors to raise prices, Floor & Decor has flexibility to expand the price difference between their products and competitors', a key feature of their flywheel model. This builds trust with customers and could accelerate their market share gains. So, while tariffs present a challenge for the industry, they actually reinforce Floor & Decor's competitive position. Recent conditions have masked the strength of Floor and Decor's flywheel business model and underlying earnings power, creating a highly attractive investment opportunity. Putting everything together, here's what it means for the company's financial future: Revenue: Currently US$4.5 billion, revenue is poised for significant growth from new store openings, the maturation of its large cohort of young locations, and an eventual market rebound. Profit Margins: The 6-7% operating margin is temporarily depressed by market weakness and the costs of the maturing store base. However, gross margins have risen throughout this period, proving strong cost management. As conditions improve, we expect operating margins could double. Overall Earnings Power: Current profitability is not indicative of the business' true potential. The underlying tailwinds discussed could drive Floor & Decor to US$1 billion in annual operating profit by 2030. Given Floor & Decor's market cap is just US$8 billion today, we have a significant margin of safety in a high quality, growing business and expect to realise a home run investment over the long term.

BSD Analysis:
Montaka presents a compelling bull case for Floor & Decor, positioning it as a market share winner in the $40 billion US hard surface flooring industry. The manager's thesis centers on the company's flywheel business model, which combines specialization, economies of scale, and superior customer value proposition to drive sustainable competitive advantages. With 254 stores currently and a target of 500+, Floor & Decor has significant expansion runway while benefiting from store maturation economics that improve from negative margins in year one to mid-to-high teens operating margins at maturity. The company's ability to source directly from 240+ suppliers across 26 countries provides pricing power and supply chain flexibility, particularly advantageous during the current tariff environment where competitors face higher costs. Montaka expects the cyclical housing downturn to create pent-up demand that will benefit Floor & Decor disproportionately, with potential for operating margins to double from current 6-7% levels and reach $1 billion in annual operating profit by 2030. At an $8 billion market cap, the manager sees significant upside potential as the market currently undervalues the company's true earnings power.

Pitch Summary:
IDEXX Labs is a global leader in pet diagnostics, offering in-clinic diagnostics (razor and razor blade consumables) and out-of-clinic reference labs. We have researched the business for two decades and admired its durable competitive advantages, highly recurring and profitable business model, attractive runway, supported by tailwinds from pet ownership and the "humanization of pets," and strong execution by its management team. IDEXX employs a successful "surround the customer" strategy by offering diagnostic tests across many modalities, along with imaging and veterinary practice management software. With a dominant market share in pet diagnostic tests, IDEXX continues to expand its addressable market by innovating new types of testing and creating additional revenue streams for its veterinary customers. We envision years of continued innovation and market expansion, with minimal competitive threats. Historically, we questioned IDEXX's persistently high valuation. However, the recent, transitory business slowdown—driven by fewer vet clinic visits as COVID-era pets remain relatively young—has made the valuation more attractive. We believe the company's long-term outlook remains largely unchanged. As these pets approach 6-7 years of age, their vet care needs will increase, supporting our expectation for sustained double-digit organic revenue growth and mid-to-high teens EPS growth. Even with EPS growth at least in line with the portfolio average, we expect IDEXX to also exhibit safety-like characteristics due to its unique competitive position, recurring revenues, and loyal shareholder base.

BSD Analysis:
Polen Capital's new position in IDEXX represents a classic quality compounder investment after two decades of research. The managers highlight IDEXX's dominant market position in pet diagnostics with a "razor and razor blade" recurring revenue model and comprehensive "surround the customer" strategy. The investment thesis centers on secular tailwinds from pet humanization trends and an aging COVID-era pet population that will drive increased veterinary visits. The fund capitalized on a temporary valuation compression caused by younger pets requiring fewer vet visits, viewing this as a transitory headwind. With minimal competitive threats and continuous innovation expanding the addressable market, IDEXX offers both growth (mid-to-high teens EPS growth expected) and defensive characteristics through its recurring revenue base. The 34% appreciation since purchase validates the timing of their entry at more attractive valuations.

Pitch Summary:
Oracle was our top-owned relative contributor, up 56% in the quarter (and 76% since the market bottom on April 9) as the market embraced a meaningful acceleration in growth driven by the Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) segment. The company appears to be in the early stages of a significant increase in revenue growth, fueled in part by its position as a go-to cloud infrastructure provider for training generative AI models. This is only one facet of the investment thesis. Oracle has been successfully migrating enterprise software customers to the cloud and is, for the first time, able to bring its database clients to the cloud as well—creating a multi-pronged growth investment thesis. As the air came out of many perceived "AI beneficiaries" amidst elevated tariff-related uncertainty in 1Q, we noted in our previous Quarterly Letter that this had pressured Oracle shares. We took advantage of this weakness by adding to our position in 1Q. Oracle is now one of our largest portfolio weightings.

BSD Analysis:
Polen Capital presents a compelling bull case for Oracle, highlighting the company's transformation into a cloud infrastructure leader. The managers emphasize Oracle's dual growth drivers: the accelerating Oracle Cloud Infrastructure segment, particularly for AI model training, and the successful migration of enterprise software and database clients to the cloud. This multi-pronged approach creates a diversified revenue acceleration story. The fund's tactical approach of adding during Q1 weakness demonstrates conviction in the long-term thesis. With Oracle now representing one of their largest positions and delivering 76% returns from market lows, the investment validates their thesis of Oracle being in the early stages of significant revenue growth acceleration. The positioning as a preferred cloud infrastructure provider for generative AI training adds a compelling secular growth component to the traditional enterprise software migration story.