Investment Pitches

Pitch Summary:
Within Canada, three companies produce all the potash... there is actually a potash royalty company, and it gets its royalties from those two largest North American potash producers. This is Altius Minerals. Altius doesn’t call itself a potash royalty company, because potash is a bit less than one-third of its royalty revenues... Another nearly 20% of royalties are from solar and wind power projects, almost exclusively in Texas.

BSD Analysis:
Altius offers leveraged exposure to essential resource scarcity themes—potash, copper, and renewables—without the capital intensity of mining. Its diversified royalty model supports steady free cash flow and dividend growth. Trading near 10x EV/EBITDA with low net debt, Altius is well-positioned to benefit from rising commodity demand and decarbonization trends.

Pitch Summary:
For all of this discussion about mining companies and gold, at Horizon Kinetics we bought neither. We bought gold royalty companies, like Franco Nevada Corp. and Wheaton Precious Metals. The gold royalty company only makes an investment once. Upon recovering its initial investment, its subsequent return on capital is nearly astronomical.

BSD Analysis:
By preferring royalty firms such as Wheaton, Horizon Kinetics highlights superior capital efficiency and perpetual cash flow scalability. Wheaton’s ~80% EBITDA margin and low-cost exposure to gold and silver prices provide durable compounding potential. With minimal operational risk and steady dividend growth, the company serves as an ideal asset-light inflation hedge.

Pitch Summary:
Silicon Motion, despite its rise this year, is simply back to where it was mid-2022, and it is now in a much stronger position. The company is firing on all cylinders, with growth in revenue and market share expected across every product line and strong entry into adjacent and new sub-markets for memory controllers. Never have I heard Silicon Motion management as optimistic on their future prospects as I hear from them today.

BSD Analysis:
Silicon Motion is the classic semiconductor orphan that gets ignored until a storage cycle turns — and this one is turning fast. As NAND pricing tightens and client SSD attach rates climb, SIMO’s controller business suddenly looks a lot more like a leveraged play on the entire storage ecosystem. The aborted MaxLinear acquisition hung over the stock like a toxic cloud, but now that the drama is gone, the company’s fundamentals can finally get credit for what they are: improving mix, tight cost control, and a return to meaningful revenue growth. SIMO has no illusions of competing with hyperscaler silicon; it dominates merchant controllers where OEMs care about stability and cost, not flashy branding. Margins are poised to expand as volumes recover and next-gen PCIe solutions ramp. At today’s multiple, the market is still treating SIMO like damaged goods even as the earnings setup gets meaningfully cleaner. This is a forgotten semi with real torque to a lasting storage rebound.

Pitch Summary:
Kingsgate has done very well as they continue to improve performance of their mining operation and continue to lower costs, helped in part by a rising gold price. But it is still valued at a market cap of only ~$630 million USD, while making ~$150+ million at present gold prices. This, for a mine whose grade is still improving and overall ounces sold per year can be expected to rise over time, which will make them sharply more profitable for the same expense base.

BSD Analysis:
Kingsgate’s turnaround has exceeded expectations, with improving grades and tight cost control transforming the mine into a high-margin cash generator at current gold prices. Despite a strong run, the valuation remains modest relative to its earnings power, especially as throughput and ore quality continue trending upward. The operation’s improving efficiency and expanding output position Kingsgate for significant operating leverage if gold prices stay elevated. Management’s disciplined execution and restored asset performance have rebuilt credibility after years of volatility. With capex largely behind it and cash flow accelerating, the setup favors continued rerating and potential capital returns. Kingsgate still screens as an under-owned, high-margin producer with a clearer path to compounding than the market is pricing in.

Pitch Summary:
Mesabi Trust holds a royalty interest on the Northshore (iron ore) Mine in the Mesabi Range in northern Minnesota... The Cliffs attempt to circumvent the royalty agreement obscures a highly valuable iron royalty stream with decades of remaining—and low cost—reserve life... It’s not difficult to calculate the current cash flow yield assuming historical mine production levels, current iron prices and the contracted premium.

BSD Analysis:
Mesabi Trust sits on one of the most attractive iron-ore royalty streams in North America, and the market continues to misprice it due to the ongoing dispute with Cleveland-Cliffs. Beneath the legal fog is a long-life, low-cost asset with decades of production potential and structurally healthy demand for high-grade pellets used in electric-arc steelmaking. Cash yields remain compelling on normalized production levels, and once the arbitration cloud clears, the income profile should reassert itself. The trust’s zero-overhead, asset-light model gives investors pure exposure to iron-ore pricing and volume without operational risk. Current sentiment reflects temporary uncertainty rather than impaired economics, setting up a sharp rerating when clarity returns. For investors willing to tolerate headline noise, Mesabi offers a rare, inflation-linked hard-asset stream with asymmetric upside.

Pitch Summary:
San Juan Basin Royalty Trust is a natural gas royalty trust with 119,000 net acres in northwest New Mexico. It is relatively unusual as being a pureplay on natural gas... The trust had amassed a capital deficit of over $20 million by the end of 2024. This resulted in the suspension of dividends, and an exodus of yield-oriented investors... It’s just a matter of waiting for the capital deficit to be erased by ongoing royalties.

BSD Analysis:
SJBRT is the kind of royalty trust that looks boring until you realize it prints cash like a slot machine whenever natural gas prices wake up. There’s no management team to screw things up, no capex to blow, and no balance sheet risk — just direct pass-through royalties from one of the most stable gas fields in the country. Production declines are real, but they’re slow, and the asset’s economics remain attractive with today’s drilling costs. When gas prices tighten or winter hits harder than expected, distributions can spike so sharply that income investors scramble to chase the yield. The trust is perpetually mispriced because it screens weird and doesn’t fit neatly into most portfolios. But if you want pure beta to natural gas with zero operational drama, San Juan is one of the cleanest high-yield vehicles out there.

Pitch Summary:
Within Canada, three companies produce all the potash... there is actually a potash royalty company, and it gets its royalties from those two largest North American potash producers. This is Altius Minerals. Altius doesn’t call itself a potash royalty company, because potash is a bit less than one-third of its royalty revenues... Another nearly 20% of royalties are from solar and wind power projects, almost exclusively in Texas.

BSD Analysis:
Altius is the smartest kid in the natural resources class — the one collecting royalties while everyone else plays capital-intensive whack-a-mole with commodities. Their royalty portfolio hits every major secular trend: copper, potash, base metals, and renewable power. That means they get paid through booms, busts, and whatever commodity regime the macro gods decide to unleash next. Altius doesn’t waste cash on marginal mines or speculative drilling; they back the winners and let operators burn their own capital instead. Free cash flow is reliable, the balance sheet is strong, and long-term optionality on copper and potash alone makes the current valuation look sleepy. This is a royalty house built for the next decade of electrification — and the market still treats it like a quirky Canadian resource stock. As supply deficits tighten, Altius’ portfolio should shine in a way equity-only miners can’t touch.

Pitch Summary:
For all of this discussion about mining companies and gold, at Horizon Kinetics we bought neither. We bought gold royalty companies, like Franco Nevada Corp. and Wheaton Precious Metals. The gold royalty company only makes an investment once. Upon recovering its initial investment, its subsequent return on capital is nearly astronomical.

BSD Analysis:
Wheaton is the royalty company everyone wishes they owned during volatility but somehow forgets about when gold prices are quiet. The business model is stupidly elegant: zero operating risk, fat margins, and pure torque to gold and silver prices without worrying about capex blowouts or labor strikes. Cash costs are basically nonexistent, so every uptick in precious metal pricing flows straight to the bottom line. The pipeline is stacked with long-life, low-cost mines, and Wheaton keeps scooping up new streams from operators who need capital but don’t want to dilute themselves to death. Balance sheet? Clean. Cash flow? Predictable. Optionality? Massive. If gold even flirts with new highs, Wheaton becomes one of the most leveraged — and least risky — ways to play the entire sector.

Pitch Summary:
Workiva Inc. This is another investment by an activist we had not followed before but have known and watched for a while. Irenic Capital was founded in October of 2021 by Adam Katz, a former Portfolio Manager at Elliott Investment Management, and Andy Dodge, a former Investment Partner at Indaba Capital Management. Irenic invests in public companies and works collaboratively with firm leadership. Their activism has thus far focused on strategic activism, recommending spinoffs and sales of businesses. Workiva is a leading provider of cloud-based reporting solutions, integrating financial reporting, sustainability management, and governance, risk, and compliance, into a sharable, data-integrated, and audit-ready environment. Over 40% of the Company’s revenue is derived from its SEC filing service, which simplifies SEC filings and other disclosures for public companies. This is a great business that serves some of the world’s largest enterprises, with 95% of the Fortune 100, 89% of the Fortune 500, and 85% of the Fortune 1000 using its platform, supported by an approximately 97% customer retention rate that has enabled consistent mid-teens revenue growth. But the problem for Workiva lies not in the quality of its business, but rather its lack of profitability. Despite scaling towards over $1 billion in revenue by 2026 and over 10 years operating in the public markets, Workiva is yet to generate a profit. As a result, Workiva shares currently trade at a roughly 25% discount to application software rivals like Workday and ServiceNow. This discount and operational challenges have drawn the attention of Irenic Capital, who has disclosed an approximately 2% position in the Company and issued a presentation to the Workiva Board calling for governance enhancements, operational changes and a review of strategic alternatives. Governance is a real issue at Workiva and an obvious reason for the discounted stock price. Workiva is still run like a private company with its three founders controlling the Company through the dual share class structure. This has led to a staggered board with little relevant experience and five of seven directors serving since the 2014 IPO. Irenic would like to see the dual class share structure collapsed and the board de-staggered and reconstituted with qualified directors including Irenic executive Krishna Korupolu. In the world of shareholder activism, this is generally tantamount to asking a country like North Korea to convert to a democracy, but Irenic’s prospects are not hopeless here (more on that below). Operationally, you get what you would expect from a founder-controlled company—an extremely bloated SG&A. Much of the margin pressure can be attributed to inefficiencies in the Company’s operating model, particularly within its sales force, as sales and marketing currently occupy 43% of revenue compared to 31% on average for peers. This has produced an estimated operating margin for Calendar Year 2025 of -7%, despite having 80% gross profit margins. Software as a Service companies of this caliber should be able to meet “Rule of 40” targets (operating margins plus revenue growth equal or exceeding 40), a level of efficiency that would be extremely accretive to shareholders, which Irenic believes is achievable by FY 2027. Workiva currently has an 18% revenue growth rate but spends an inordinate amount of money to get the last couple of percentage points. It should be able to sustain double-digit revenue growth with far less sales force spending, which could in itself meaningfully change the Company’s margin profile. Combining this with the Company’s extremely strong pricing power suggests room for significant profitability improvements. Irenic states that if Workiva is unable to execute as a refocused public company with improved corporate governance, the Board (preferably revamped) should run a strategic review, pursuing a sale of the Company to determine the best risk-adjusted path for shareholders. Workiva is one of the leading company in a secularly growing business with a vast blue-chip clientele and no real number two when it comes to its SEC filing service. The quality of Workiva’s business should mean no shortage of private and strategic interest. In fact, in 2022, reports surfaced that private equity firms Thoma Bravo and TPG had interest in a potential acquisition. Logical strategic acquirers include similar financial management platforms like Intuit, stock exchange operators (Nasdaq, LSEG, Deutsche Börse), as well as software behemoths such as Salesforce, Oracle, and IBM, all of whom could realize meaningful synergies. Comparable transactions —Smartsheet/Vista Equity (7x revenue), Coupa/Thoma Bravo (8x), AspenTech/Emerson Electric (14x), and AltairEngineering/Siemens (14x)— suggest a 7-8x forward revenue multiple for financial acquirers, which at $1 billion projected revenue for 2026, would imply 40-60% upside, with the potential for even higher premiums in a strategic transaction given the potential for significant synergies. While Irenic’s public presence at Workiva has likely piqued the interest of potential acquirers, the bottom line here is, as an effectively controlled company, nothing can happen without the consent of the controlling parties – the three founders, who through a dual class structure control roughly 44% of the voting power. While such factors can often stifle an activist campaign, there are a few reasons why this situation may be different. First, this is not a founding family but three different founders that are not necessarily aligned and may have grown apart. Matthew Rizai resigned as Chairman and CEO in June 2018 with a nice severance package. This and the fact that he was replaced by co-founder Mr. Vanderploeg as CEO and did not even stay on the Board indicates that this might have not been as mutual as the Company’s press release stated. Jeffrey Trom reduced his duties at the Company in 2022, resigned in 2023 and ended a consulting relationship in 2024. Additionally, all three founders are over 65 years of age and have been slowly selling shares. Of the three founders, only Martin Vanderploeg remains actively involved in the Company as the non-executive chairman and he has 10.6% of total voting power versus 24.6% for Rizai and 9.2% for Trom. At the price that Irenic thinks this Company could fetch in a sale, it is hard to believe that they would not be able to get the support of Rizai and/or Trom. Additionally, Irenic has stated that they have not ruled out nominating directors if the two sides can't reach an agreement and if it does come to that, we would not necessarily assume the three founders are aligned.

BSD Analysis:
Workiva is the dominant cloud platform for regulatory, financial, and ESG reporting — a niche that has become a must-have as compliance complexity surges. Its collaborative workflow engine is deeply embedded in enterprise reporting cycles, making churn almost nonexistent. AI integration is expanding automation capabilities, allowing Workiva to move further into high-value processes. Growth remains strong and margins are on the cusp of expanding meaningfully as scale kicks in. Investors fail to appreciate how mission-critical this platform has become; regulators don’t simplify, they add complexity. WK is a premium workflow software business still priced below its strategic importance. A long-duration compliance-tech winner hiding in plain sight.

Pitch Summary:
ViaSat Inc. This is an investment by an activist we had not followed before. Carronade Capital is a multi-strategy investment firm that focuses on process driven investments in catalyst-rich situations. Carronade founder Dan Gropper and his business partner Michael Costa both have a long history as top-notch credit investors and so our initial view was seeing Gropper as primarily a credit investor. But four of their seven person investment team, including Gropper, have spent considerable time working at Elliott Management, have experience with shareholder activism and are not afraid to use it. We had known Carronade from a previous activist campaign at Cannae Holdings which we did not invest in. But when we heard about the thesis here discussed below, we were floored at how clearly undervalued this Company was. We were able to quickly acquire a full position at $16.65 per share prior to the stock soaring to nearly $28 per share the following week. Read below and you will see why there is still tremendous value here. ViaSat is a global communications and defense technology company that operates at the intersection of secure communications, global connectivity, and aerospace and defense technology. The Company operates in two businesses segments – Communications (73% of revenue and 80% of EBITDA) and Defense and Advanced Technologies (“DAT”) (27% of revenue and 20% of EBITDA). Communications is ViaSat’s legacy satellite business, with offerings of fixed broadband, government, maritime and inflight communications (“IFC”). DAT offers defense-technology platforms for information security and cyber defense, space and mission systems, tactical networking, and other advanced technologies. This is a newer but rapidly growing business, with high to mid-teens revenue growth. Despite the Company’s strong strategic positioning, ViaSat’s share price has significantly underperformed, down 21.12%, 51.56%, and 57.98% over the past 1-,3-, and 5-year periods, respectively (prior to Carronade’s engagement). As Carronade Capital describes in their letter, this is a “materially misunderstood” business. Carronade believes that the reason why this Company is trading down is simple - ViaSat has been treated by the market as a small cap legacy satellite company that has been marked for death due to new high-profile entrants like Starlink. This narrative is two pronged: (i) that Starlink and similar entrants will make ViaSat’s Broadband business obsolete and (ii) that they are encroaching on ViaSat’s IFC market dominance. It is true that the broadband business is declining, as revenue is down over 27% year-over-year, but this is only a piece of the Communications business and the worst piece with the lowest margins. The Communications segment also has three other businesses: (i) Government, which is growing approximately 25% year over year; (ii) IFC, with 22% growth; and (iii) Maritime, which is growing at 11%. The second part of this narrative - the market threat in IFC, is greatly exaggerated. ViaSat’s IFC business is not going anywhere. Their customers have long-term contracts (5-10 years) and face high switching costs as they would need to replace their entire connectivity systems. They presently have customers with 4,120 planes and a backlog of another 1,600 planes from just those existing customers. And this is a very nascent market with only approximately one third of airplanes globally having Wi-Fi, so there is a huge untapped market, which ViaSat should get a large piece of despite competition from Starlink and other competitors. Additionally, ViaSat is well aware of the Broadband drag and are actively pivoting out of it to double down on the growth businesses with better margins. Exiting the broadband business over time while the other businesses continue to grow could actually be a plus for the Company as it will no longer be viewed as a sleepy broadband communications business. But that isn’t even the biggest part of the story. ViaSat is trading at such a large discount to intrinsic value because the market is missing a very important part of ViaSat’s business. The DAT business has been buried under the legacy business and its accompanying negative sentiment. DAT is a hidden gem, with EBITDA margins of 28%, double-digit revenue growth, and significant exposure to hot button next-generation defense and dual-use technologies such as the Golden Dome, next-generation encryption, drones, Device-to-Device (D2D) and Low Earth Orbit. While Carronade highlights how each of these translates into promising growth avenues, perhaps the best illustration of DAT’s mis-valuation lies in its D2D platform services, which is designed to enable global connectivity directly to unmodified smartphones and other internet of thing’s devices. DAT has $1.22 billion of revenue and $285 million of EBITDA. The peer comps to DAT - companies like AeroVironment, Kratos, Mercury Systems and Redwire all have lower margins and weaker growth profiles, yet trade at multiples ranging between the mid-20s to above 80x EBITDA. ViaSat currently trades at approximately 6x EBITDA. Carronade’s proposed solution is simple but compelling: spin-off or IPO the DAT Business to unlock this intrinsic value and eliminate the drag caused by the narratives orbiting the satellite business. Carronade models 20x to 51x (comp median) valuations for this business giving it a value of $6.3 billion to $16.2 billion, versus a present enterprise value for the entire company of approximately $8 billion (prior to Carronade’s engagement). This leaves the Communications segment with $3.3 billion of revenue and $1.2 billion of EBITDA. Applying a conservative 4x value to this business creates another $4.9 billion of value, and there is another $1 billion of value from the upfront and long-term annual payments pursuant to a recent legal settlement with Ligado Networks. According to the Carronade analysis, this gives ViaSat a total valuation of anywhere from $48.93 per share to $112.49 per share, versus its share price at the time of $16.53, or a 215% to 689% return.

BSD Analysis:
Viasat is battling through a brutal satellite failure that wrecked near-term confidence, but the long-term structural demand for global connectivity remains powerful. The company’s footprint in government, aviation, and mobility gives it revenue streams that don’t vanish with one technical setback. Still, the balance sheet is stretched and execution must be flawless from here. Viasat’s spectrum assets and geostationary capabilities have real value, but the market has written them off prematurely. If the company can stabilize the fleet and regain customer momentum, the equity has asymmetric upside. This is a classic high-risk communications-infrastructure story: volatile, levered, and potentially explosive. Not for the timid, but not dead either.

Pitch Summary:
Tripadvisor Inc. Tripadvisor, Inc. is the operator of three online platforms designed to enhance the travel planning experience. Its legacy business, Tripadvisor.com, is a large guidance platform in the world, with 300 million monthly unique visitors and more than a billion reviews and $900 million in revenue. Viator, a rapidly scaling booking platform for tours and other travel experiences, is expected to do well over $900 million in revenue this year. Lastly, TheFork is a restaurant reservation platform, which is now an forefront marketplace for online dining reservations in Europe and is expected to generate over $200 million of revenue this year. Despite owning a trio of these businesses, the Company still trades at a heavy discount - around 7x EBITDA versus low to mid-teens for peers and even higher multiples for Tripadvisor historically. There are a few explanations behind this valuation disconnect. Since its spinoff from Expedia in 2011 and up until just a few months ago, Tripadvisor had horrific governance - a controlled ownership by Liberty Media Corp, a dual class share structure, and weak shareholder protections such as a plurality voting standard. This was reflected in ISS recommending against the election of three directors at the Company’s 2024 Annual Meeting, including Chairman Gregory Maffei, who received over 60% withhold votes. Small, controlled companies don't tend to trade very well and this is what this was. However, this all changed in April 2025 when Tripadvisor bought back Liberty Media’s controlling position and consequently collapsed the dual class structure. While the Company’s share price has appreciated since, it’s likely there is still some hangover from Liberty Media’s years of control. Secondly, the decline of Tripadvisor’s core nameplate business, which saw revenue decrease 7.95% from 2023 to 2024, is certainly a factor. If the Tripadvisor business was the Company’s only segment, this valuation could be justified. But Viator does as much revenue as Tripadvisor and is growing at double digit rates and TheFork is also growing at high single digits, has $200 million in revenue, $65 million in EBITDA and can reach margins greater than 20% at scale. And while Tripadvisor did have a year of declining sales, it is still a market leader with $900 million of revenue and $250 million of EBITDA with the Company expecting a return to growth this year. Enter Starboard, who filed a 13D announcing that they have taken a 9.01% position in the Company and intend to meet with the Company’s Board and Management team regarding potential value creation opportunities. As is typical in a Starboard investment, there are multiple levers to unlock value here. The first and maybe most likely plan is status quo, which is extremely rare for an activist like Starboard. But if Tripadvisor returns to revenue growth and the other two segments continue to grow revenue and margins, there may be very little to be done here except watch the stock soar as the market starts understanding the Company better. If growth does not happen at Tripadvisor, there is an opportunity to run it differently, focusing more on the bottom line than investing for the top line. And this is where Starboard has been very valuable in helping companies. Third, while the three businesses have some strategic synergies, if not operational ones, they are run independently and can really show the sum of the parts value through a sale of even just one segment. This is not something that Starboard generally advocates for and is not advocating for it here. But TheFork is a very strategic asset in a space that is ripe with acquisition - Resy to Amex, OpenTable to Booking.com, and SevenRooms to Doordash are just a few examples. These deals typically occurred at mid to high single digit revenue multiples. A 5x revenue multiple for TheFork would be a $1 billion valuation, approximately 40% of Tripadvisor’s total enterprise value, despite only accounting for approximately 10% of the Company’s total revenue and 5% of its EBITDA. Finally, there is a potential hidden AI value here. With hundreds of millions of users and a 25-year history, Tripadvisor has very valuable and unique data that could be a highly valuable asset for AI providers. Moreover, they have recently announced partnerships with Perplexity and Open AI, but the terms of these deals are not public. Lastly, there is also the potential sale of the entire Company. While Starboard is not a “Sell-the-Company” activist, any time an activist engages with a company, it puts the Company in pseudo-play and any potential acquirer who has been kicking the tires will suddenly have their interest piqued. And there have been interested potential acquirers here. During the Liberty buyback process, Tripadvisor disclosed receiving multiple acquisition offers, and another bid from a strategic buyer surfaced in early 2025 at $18-19 per share. Since then, Q1 results were better than expected, future guidance has improved, and the stock has increased over 18% year-to-date, so if interest existed then, there is no reason it shouldn’t exist now. A sale of the Company is not Starboard’s agenda here but they are economic animals with a fiduciary duty to their investors and if an unsolicited offer comes in, they will encourage the Company to accept it if they believe that it is in the best long-term interest of stockholders.

BSD Analysis:
TripAdvisor is a bruised travel-tech veteran trying to reinvent itself after years of brand stagnation and monetization underperformance. Viator is the bright spot — the experiences segment is a secular growth story and TripAdvisor’s best asset by a mile. The core site still has enormous global traffic, but engagement has been uneven and platform upgrades remain slow. Management has a chance to rebuild the narrative by leaning into experiences and higher-margin channels. The valuation is cheap because investors assume the legacy challenges are fatal; they aren’t. If TripAdvisor can translate its traffic dominance into real conversion gains, upside is significant. A messy turnaround, but a salvageable one with latent optionality.

Pitch Summary:
Performance Food Group Co. Performance Food Group (“PFG”) is the third largest food service distribution company in North America, behind Sysco and US Foods, which all together command approximately 38% market share. The Company operates through three segments. The core FoodService Segment (61.8% of EBITDA) distributes national, customer, and proprietary-branded food and food-related products. Convenience (20.6%) distributes candy, snacks, beverages, cigarettes, and other tobacco products to convenience stores. Specialty (17.61%) distributes candy, snacks, beverages, and other items to specialty vendors. On August 21, 2025, Sachem Head delivered a nomination notice for the following four candidates to stand for election to PFG’s Board at the 2025 Annual Meeting: Scott D. Ferguson (Founder and Managing Partner of Sachem Head), David A. Toy, R. Chris Kreidler and Karen M. King. Additionally, Sachem Head has urged the Company to explore a potential business combination with US Foods and, absent a transaction, further improve margins. Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Toy previously served together on the US Foods Board as part of a Sachem Head Cooperation Agreement. At US Foods, Sachem Head helped install a new CEO and management team which catalyzed a successful turnaround for the Company - since Sachem Head filed their 13D at US Foods, the Company’s stock has more than doubled. The other two candidates have just as much experience: Mr. Kreidler was the CFO for Sysco for 6 years and Ms. King is an EVP at McDonalds and serves on the Aramark Board. This is an all-star team of nominees that are well positioned to navigate PFG through operational improvements and a strategic evaluation. While there is an opportunity to improve operating margins at the Company, the main catalyst here is the merger with US Foods. The potential synergies that could be attained in such a merger make it very hard to ignore. These synergies are evident from another proposed industry consolidation, Sysco’s 2013 attempt to merge with US Foods. Publicly, this deal was projected to deliver annual synergies of at least $600 million within three to four years relative to US Foods’ $826 million of EBITDA at the time. In other words, the projected synergies represented more than 70% of US Foods’ EBITDA, and the numbers that were thrown around privately were even larger. This is an extraordinary figure, and largely unique to the food distribution landscape and the amount of purchasing, logistics and warehouse rationalization synergies that these companies have. Extrapolating these numbers to a US Foods/PFG merger and applying similar levels of synergies using the EBITDA of PFG’s Foodservice segment ($1.2 billion), which holds most of the synergistic potential, a merger could be expected to yield $800 million to upwards of $1 billion in synergies. Moreover, if there is anyone who could validate this analysis, it would be Sachem director nominee Chris Kreidler, who was the CFO of Sysco at the time. However, the Sysco/US Foods deal was ultimately blocked by the FTC due to antitrust concerns centered around a merger of #1 and #2 that would eliminate Sysco’s only national competitor. There are a few reasons why a merger between US Food and Performance Food Group may have a different outcome. First, this would be a merger of the second and third largest players, rather than first and second; and unlike Sysco, PFG is not a national competitor, with little to no footprint on the West Coast. Additionally, today’s regulatory environment under the Trump administration is significantly more favorable than it was when the Sysco deal was reviewed under the Obama administration. While any approved deal would likely require divestitures in certain markets and there is no guarantee of an approval, with potential synergies like this, the Board owes it to its shareholders to at least explore the possibility of a US Food merger. And that is all Sachem Head is asking. They are not forcing the Company to sell but rather pleading with them to evaluate this potentially lucrative opportunity that has been brought to them. In July 2025, US Foods confirmed in an 8-K filing that they had approached PFG about a potential combination. But it takes two to tango and PFG had not meaningfully engaged with them. Since Sachem Head’s engagement, the Company has changed its stance. Just two weeks after Sachem Head went public with its campaign, PFGC and US Foods entered into an Information Sharing Agreement pursuant to which the two parties agreed to share information on a potential combination that would create a distribution firm with roughly $100 billion in sales. Moreover, a week after that Sachem Head and PFG entered into a Cooperation Agreement pursuant to which the Company agreed to appoint Scott Ferguson, Founder and Managing Partner of Sachem Head, to the Company’s Board. With all of this quick action it is obvious to us that if Sachem Head is right and this deal makes sense and can pass regulatory muster, it will happen.

BSD Analysis:
PFGC is one of the quiet winners in U.S. foodservice distribution, outperforming peers through scale, routing efficiency, and a relentless focus on independent restaurants. Margins keep expanding as mix shifts toward higher-value specialty and convenience-store channels. The industry remains fragmented, which gives Performance Food Group ample space for consolidation and operational leverage. While foodservice can be cyclical, PFGC’s execution has been consistently better than broadline rivals. Inflation headwinds have turned into pricing power opportunities. The stock trades at a discount to its operational quality. A steady compounder in a sector investors chronically underestimate.

Pitch Summary:
MaxLinear, Inc. has shown signs of recovery with sequential revenue growth and narrowing operating losses. Despite trading at a modest sales multiple and benefiting from the AI boom, the company continues to face challenges such as historical losses, execution issues, and the unresolved Silicon Motion litigation.

BSD Analysis:
MaxLinear's recent performance indicates a potential turnaround, with third-quarter sales rising by 56% to $126 million. However, the company still reports significant operating losses, partly due to restructuring costs and stock-based compensation. The ongoing arbitration related to the failed Silicon Motion acquisition poses additional risks, though the potential $160 million termination fee is relatively small compared to the company's market value. While the company is approaching break-even levels, its past track record and current profitability issues warrant caution. Investors should monitor the company's ability to sustain revenue growth and improve operational efficiency.

Pitch Summary:
Twilio Inc. is fundamentally strong with a significant cash position and improving financial metrics, but its current valuation does not justify a bullish stance.

BSD Analysis:
Twilio has shown robust financial performance with a 13.5% increase in revenue year-over-year, driven by an increase in active accounts. The company has improved its cost structure, leading to better profitability metrics. However, despite these positive developments, the stock is not considered undervalued at current levels. Management's guidance suggests continued growth, but the valuation remains a concern for value investors. Recent strategic wins, including deals with ConversationRelay and Manus AI, indicate positive momentum, yet the stock's price needs to align with value investor expectations before a bullish stance is warranted.

Pitch Summary:
Northwest Bancshares, Inc. remains a solid income-generating stock, yielding near 6.5%. Despite a mixed Q3 performance due to the Penns Woods merger, the bank shows potential with growing loans and deposits.

BSD Analysis:
Northwest Bancshares reported a 25% increase in revenues for Q3, driven by the Penns Woods merger, though earnings per share missed estimates by $0.02. The merger led to increased net interest income but also higher noninterest expenses and loan loss provisions. Asset quality saw some softening, with nonperforming loans and assets slightly increasing. Despite these challenges, the bank's margins improved, and both loans and deposits showed growth. The bank is expected to stabilize as merger-related issues are resolved, making it a suitable hold for income-focused investors.