Institutional ticker directory tracking stock mentions, long/short ideas, and high-conviction pitches extracted from quarterly hedge fund letters.
| Ticker | Company | Sector | Industry | Pitches | Stance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fund / Manager | Thesis Excerpt | Stance | Period / Date | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hayden Capital, LLC Fred Liu | “Smart Rent. “ Disappointing ” is the only way to describe our investment over the last three years. While shareholders could easily blame it on the macro environment, I think our investment mistake runs much deeper . It was misjudging the people. We first invested in mid -2022, and were excited by a rapidly growing software business, that was disrupting the multifamily apartment industry . Revenues grew ~ +52% y/y the first year of our ownership, and traction continued in 2023 at ~+41% y/y . Meanwhile operating margins trended in the right direction, improving from - 62% to - 18% during that time frame – well on their way to profitability the following year. (See our original investment thesis for more information ; LINK ). Starting with s mart a ccess (keyless entry), SmartRent had an opportunity to eventually become the “operating system” for multifamily rental operations. But the problems started as interest rates jumped over the past few years . For their multifamily customers, it became harder to finance & acquire new buildings for their portfolios. SmartRent 's new deployments fell alongside these declining industry transaction volumes. SmartRent installation costs ~$1,300 per apartment unit, and ~$ 3 - 8 per month afterwards. Elevated interest rates mattered for a couple reasons . First, new buildings typically install SmartRent after being bought by a customer that uses SmartRent for the rest of their portfolio. For example, the bulk of SmartRent's customers are large public REITs or multifamily owners that own >10,000 units. When these customers buy a new 2 00-unit property, they're going to install SmartRent to integrate with the rest of their properties , since the technology allows them to efficiently manage the operations and maintenance of their entire portfolio. Second, the upfront cost of several hundred thousand dollars is considered capex , and financed as part of the property transaction or funded separately with debt. As interest rates rise, it makes it harder to borrow money and the interest burden harder to justify. But with over $200M on the balance sheet (~1/3rd of total market cap) , we were betting that SmartRent had more than enough capital to weather this headwind....log , and getting to profitability through pricing increases. For example, they had ~5 50K units actively “deployed” in 2022, but also a backlog of over ~850K “committed” units with signed contracts and just waiting to be installed . However, by early 2024, cracks started appearing in the thesis. We started seeing SmartRent's institutional customers delay their backlog installations – choosing to conserve cash instead of deploying it in a n uncertain real estate environment. Not only did this affect growth, but also part of our original thesis is that the medium & small sized owners would be spurred to adopt this technology, forced by competition by the large players. These smaller operators tended to pay software rates closer to $8 per unit per month, versus the $3 -4 the larger customers were paying. I always saw signing the large customers as benefitting SmartRent's brand (i.e. “if Equity Residential is using it, we [a smaller owner] should try it too”), while the real profits would come from higher margin “ long-tail” customers . As such, these changes affected SmartRent's cash situation . Lucas wanted to launch new products to sell to their Top 15 customers and grow wallet share / revenues with them. However, this came at the cost of higher R&D and manufacturing costs – a major reason why SmartRent wasn't profitable yet. Alternatively, the board wanted to focus on the high-margin software piece, and focus on raising ARPU and renewing their sales effort to grow their customers into the “long-tail” customer base (the ones who pay $8 per month). I agreed with the board's strategy , but ultimately disliked their way of handling the situation. I'll save the gritty details, but effectively the disagreement / lack of goodwill was so large, that Lucas resigned the same day that the board voted in going in a new direction (in July 2024) . Obviously, the sudden departure of the founder & long-time CEO isn't good for anyone. The company spent six months looking for a replacement and announced a new CEO starting in February 2025. But Shane Paladin lasted a mere 6 weeks, before the board asked him to leave in April 2025. He was then replaced by Frank Martell , who has been on the board for a year . Frank was previously the CEO of LoanDepot, and the CEO of CoreLogic before that. While I believe the board ultimately made the right decision in bringing Frank into the seat, the manner in which it was handled left a bad taste in our mouth. I...everal times . While I think he and the rest of the board have good intentions and are moving the company in the right directio... urgency . There are also a few members of the board where I question if there would be more appropriate replacements . I do think the fundamental business problems are fixable – but it needs the right people & culture in place . The company needs to move faster , and they just aren't at this time . As such, we chose to exit our position earlier this year. I don't think this is the end of the story for SmartRent , and still believe they'll reach profitability soon. But given the concentrated nature of our portfolio, we don't have room for companies who don't operate at their full potential . So we'll watch the situation unfold from the sidelines for now, and have reallocated the proceeds into more attractive opportunities. This mistake cost us -50.3% on the position. We purchased our shares at an average cost of $3 .34 and sold them at an average of $1.66. We've learned a costly lesson in the misjudgment of people. BSD Analysis: SmartRent provides smart-home automation for multifamily real estate, giving landlords better security, energy management, and operational efficiency. The company benefits from the digitization of property operations, a trend still early in adoption. Hardware-heavy cycles create lumpiness, but recurring software revenue is growing steadily. SmartRent's partnerships with major property managers give it distribution leverage and embedded growth. The main challenge is scaling profitably in a market that still treats proptech with skepticism. If SmartRent sustains margin improvement, the model becomes very attractive. It's a real asset-digitization play with solid optionality.” | BEAR | Q2 2025 Aug 27, 2025 | View Pitch |
Vulcan Value Partners - Large Cap C.T. Fitzpatrick | “SmartRent provides digital transformation software and hardware to the apartment industry, experiencing robust demand and an increasing number of deployed units. Supply chain issues have normalized, and the company has a massive installation backlog that will drive high-margin recurring subscription revenues. As more units are installed, margin expansion is expected over the coming years.” | BULL | Q2 2023 Jun 30, 2023 | View Pitch |
Each excerpt above is the manager's commentary on this ticker specifically. The full letter has the rest of their portfolio thinking, risk discussion, and broader institutional context.
